Court: District Court, W.D. Oklahoma; August 22, 2018; Federal District Court
Defendants filed a Second Motion to Dismiss, responding to Plaintiff’s allegations following his convictions for sex offenses in 2002 and 2015, which required him to register as a sex offender under the Oklahoma Sex Offenders Registration Act (OSORA). After his 2016 release from prison, Plaintiff was informed by Oklahoma City that his residence was unsuitable due to its proximity to a park, which he contests, claiming it is a small greenbelt owned by a homeowners' association, not used for recreational purposes. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause, and seeks declaratory relief. The Court previously granted part of Defendants' earlier motion to dismiss, allowing Plaintiff to amend his complaint. In his Second Amended Complaint, he reiterates his claims but specifies the nature of the greenbelt. Defendants argue that the residency restriction complies with constitutional standards and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for declaratory relief. The standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) requires that the complaint contain sufficient factual matter to establish a plausible claim for relief.
A claim is deemed to have facial plausibility when the plaintiff includes factual content that permits the court to reasonably infer the defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct, as established in *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim requires a context-specific analysis, relying on judicial experience and common sense (*Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679; *Robbins v. Oklahoma*, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248). The specificity needed to establish plausibility varies by context, with the Supreme Court indicating no return to stricter pre-Rule 8 pleading standards. The Tenth Circuit describes the *Iqbal* and *Twombly* standards as a balanced approach, rejecting both heightened fact pleading and overly vague complaints. Allegations must provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim and its basis (*Khalik v. United Air Lines*, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191; *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, judges must accept all allegations as true, regardless of their likelihood of proof (*Robbins*, 519 F.3d at 1247).
Regarding the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a statute violates this clause if it is retroactively applied and, if based on civil intent, has a punitive effect that undermines that intent (*Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84). The plaintiff claims that OSORA is enforced retroactively, which the defendants do not dispute, so no further examination of retroactivity is required. To assess whether the OSORA residency restriction constitutes a retroactive punishment, the court will apply the "intents-effects" inquiry from *Smith v. Doe*. This involves determining if the Oklahoma Legislature intended to impose punishment or create a civil regulatory scheme. If the intent was not punitive, the court must evaluate whether the plaintiff's allegations, if true, suggest that the statute's effects are punitive enough to negate the legislative intent.
Plaintiff recognizes that OSORA (the statute in question) is intended to be non-punitive. The court's analysis focuses on the alleged punitive effects of OSORA based on legal precedents, particularly the Smith and Shaw cases. The Shaw court indicated that residency restrictions aim to minimize opportunities for sex offenders to access children. However, Plaintiff claims that the specific application of OSORA’s residency restrictions lacks this intended purpose.
Plaintiff describes the contested park as a small, improperly designated area of grass that does not serve recreational purposes and asserts that it is unlikely to attract children, thus questioning the need for residency restrictions tied to OSORA’s goals. The Plaintiff argues that the restrictions resemble historical punishment, impose unnecessary housing constraints, limit offenders based solely on past behavior, lack a rational connection to reducing recidivism, and are excessive regarding OSORA's stated non-punitive objectives.
These allegations, if accepted as true, could indicate that the restrictions imposed by OSORA negate its civil intent, potentially violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Plaintiff's claims are deemed plausible enough to survive a motion to dismiss, suggesting that the application of residency restrictions to a non-recreational area exceeds what is necessary and lacks rational justification.
Additionally, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from arbitrary government actions. The court implies that the Plaintiff's allegations of excessive restriction warrant further examination in discovery and potentially at trial. Consequently, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Ex Post Facto claim is denied.
Procedural due process prevents the state from depriving a party of property without fair procedures, while substantive due process protects against property deprivation for arbitrary reasons, regardless of procedures. In Onyx Properties LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Commissioners of Elbert Cty., the court noted that the plaintiff did not assert a procedural due process claim in the Second Amended Complaint, so the court only considered the substantive due process claim. Substantive due process safeguards fundamental rights and liberties deeply rooted in U.S. history, and any statute affecting such rights must be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. If a fundamental right is not at stake, the statute must still have a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. To successfully claim a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate either that a fundamental right is burdened by inadequately tailored legislation or that a non-fundamental right is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
The plaintiff claims a fundamental property right to use his property, specifically to live in his home. He argues that the application of the OSORA residency restriction, based on the proximity of a "small area of grass" not designated for recreation, unjustly prevents him from residing there. The defendants do not dispute this assertion of a fundamental property right but instead focus on whether OSORA infringes upon family-related rights, citing Eighth Circuit cases where sex offenders claimed a fundamental liberty interest in living with family. Unlike those cases, which focused on liberty interests, the plaintiff emphasizes his property right. He contends that the enforcement of OSORA against his home infringes on this right, as the grass area in question is not a park or used for recreational purposes.
Defendants have not contested the assertion that Plaintiff's alleged property right qualifies as a fundamental right subject to heightened scrutiny. Consequently, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately presented facts to support a substantive due process claim for the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, Plaintiff has established a plausible argument that the application of OSORA to a small area of grass, which is neither designated nor utilized for recreational purposes, lacks a rational connection to its stated objective of protecting children in parks. The Court notes that applying the statute to such small green spaces, if true, could constitute arbitrary governmental action prohibited by substantive due process protections. At this stage, the Court does not assess the merits of the claims; a well-pleaded complaint can advance even if actual proof seems improbable.
Regarding the request for declaratory relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court recognizes its discretion to declare the rights of litigants in cases of actual controversy. The Tenth Circuit outlines several factors for district courts to consider when deciding whether to exercise this discretion. Defendants challenge only the first two factors, arguing that there is no controversy to resolve and that Plaintiff's claims under the Ex Post Facto Clause and Due Process are more effective remedies than declaratory judgment. However, since the Court has denied Defendants' motion to dismiss concerning these constitutional claims, it finds no reason to alter its previous assessment of the controversy's existence. The Court determines that Defendants have sufficiently adverse legal interests to Plaintiff to justify the issuance of a declaratory judgment, and they fail to provide authority supporting their claim that Plaintiff's constitutional claims would be a more effective resolution. Therefore, Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts to support a plausible claim for declaratory judgment.
Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim is denied. The Court, in its order dated August 22, 2018, refers to the Plaintiff's 'Second Amended Petition' as a 'Second Amended Complaint,' in line with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff mistakenly cites Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections to argue that the Oklahoma Sex Offender Registration Act (OSORA) is punitive and violates the U.S. Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court clarifies that while it respects state supreme court interpretations of statutes, it is not bound by them when assessing constitutional violations. The Court previously analyzed OSORA under Tenth Circuit standards and will not repeat that examination here. Municipal ordinances mandate a percentage of green space in residential and commercial properties, which raises concerns about how OSORA restrictions on sex offenders could extend to minor green areas, potentially infringing on residency rights. The Defendants only briefly contest the Court's jurisdiction without substantial argument, and the Court affirms its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
