Court: District Court, D. Arizona; August 24, 2018; Federal District Court
The Government's Motion to Dismiss, filed by federal officials referred to as the Government or Customs, is under consideration by the Court. Following the motion, the Court requested the Government to justify why judgment on the pleadings should not favor the Plaintiff, Alberto Rodriguez. Rodriguez, a U.S. citizen from Phoenix, Arizona, seeks judicial review after Customs denied his security clearance application in 2016, which was necessary for his employment as a baggage handler at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport. The denial stemmed from an incident on September 9, 2011, when Rodriguez, along with two friends, was detained by Customs officers in California without explanation. He was held for several hours and his vehicle was impounded, but he was not charged with any crime. One friend, Joel Sanchez, was later deported due to being in the country illegally. Rodriguez believed Sanchez was in the process of obtaining lawful status and had no intention of assisting him in violating immigration laws.
In 2016, Rodriguez applied for a security clearance, the first such application he made through Customs, despite having worked in his position since 2008 with previous clearances from the City of Phoenix. His application was denied on the grounds of a past incident involving an illegal alien, which was cited as a violation of 19 C.F.R. 122.183(a). The regulation stipulates that security clearances may be denied if an applicant poses a risk to public safety or has committed a disqualifying offense, which includes any violation of U.S. immigration law. The Government indicated that Rodriguez's past detention constituted a disqualifying offense under this regulation.
A key disqualifying offense includes any violation of U.S. immigration law. Rodriguez engaged legal counsel for an administrative appeal regarding his access to Customs Security areas. His attorney contended that no statute applied to his actions, asserting there was no evidence or probable cause linking Rodriguez's travel with any immigration offense. The Acting Port Director denied the appeal, citing concerns about public safety and security without specifying any law Rodriguez violated. Rodriguez submitted a detailed follow-up letter arguing that the denial was an abuse of discretion, which was met with a brief rejection from the Director of Field Operations, again lacking explanation.
Rodriguez then sought judicial review, requesting a mandamus to compel an evidentiary hearing, a declaratory judgment on the vagueness of a regulation, procedural guidance for the administrative process, and a remand for failure to adhere to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Government moved to dismiss these claims, and the court dismissed all but the remand claim. The APA permits judicial review when an agency action is taken without observing required procedures. Citing *Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, the court noted that agencies must follow their own regulations, which mandate written notice of denial reasons for Customs clearance, although they cannot disclose these reasons to the employer.
In Cheney v. Department of Justice, the Federal Circuit ruled that an agency must provide specific written notice detailing the reasons for suspending a security clearance, allowing the employee to make a meaningful response. The court found that Mr. Cheney was not given adequate information regarding the allegations against him, preventing him from effectively addressing the suspension. The government argued that the principles from Cheney apply to Rodriguez's case, where the letter denying his security clearance failed to specify any laws he supposedly violated, thereby not allowing him a meaningful opportunity to respond. The court identified significant deficiencies in the denial letter, noting that no statute imposes strict liability for transporting undocumented aliens without evidence of knowledge or intent. It emphasized that casual social interactions with undocumented individuals are not criminal and that the letter also lacked any indication of a disqualifying act or probable cause for such conduct. As a result, the motion to dismiss Rodriguez's Accardi claim was denied.
The contention regarding the denial of Rodriguez's clearance is invalidated due to the absence of detailed reasons in the denial letter. The letter indicated Rodriguez was arrested for violating immigration law but did not assert probable cause for that violation. Customs is obligated to provide specific reasons for denial, as mandated by 19 C.F.R. 122.183(b), and applicants are not responsible for addressing uninvoked grounds for denial. The Administrative Procedure Act requires compliance with agency regulations, ensuring transparency in discretionary actions and preventing arbitrary decisions.
Customs issued a second denial letter after legal action was initiated, despite no application being pending at that time. Misdated June 19, 2016, it was actually sent on June 20, 2018, by Acting Port Director West, who previously denied Rodriguez's first appeal. This letter referenced Rodriguez's 2016 application and incorporated subsequent court submissions, claiming a prior arrest for transporting an illegal alien under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and stating a conclusion of violation without further explanation. It also cited a belief that granting clearance would pose risks to public safety and security.
Following this, Customs filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the second letter satisfied regulatory requirements. The court allowed Rodriguez additional time to respond until he could exhaust appeals related to the new letter. Subsequently, on June 28, 2018, Customs sent a third denial letter that reinforced the second letter without acknowledging it. This letter introduced new assertions about Rodriguez's employment status and a deportation incident concerning another individual, while reiterating that security clearance applications must be supported by employer justification. The court indicated potential procedural impropriety regarding these letters, prompting further inquiry into the matter.
Denials of security clearance by Customs are considered final unless appealed, as per 19 C.F.R. 122.183(c), which binds Customs to this finality. The regulation is designed to prevent lower tribunals from altering decisions during the appellate process, avoiding disruptions due to changing agency positions. The Court criticized the rationale for denying Rodriguez's security clearance based on his unemployment, which stemmed from Customs's own denial. Furthermore, the second and third denial letters failed to specify how Rodriguez violated 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and merely restated regulatory language without addressing his specific circumstances.
The Court vacated its scheduling order due to significant delays and directed the Government to justify why judgment should not be entered in Rodriguez's favor, as the case presented a straightforward legal question. Rodriguez is entitled to judgment against the September 10, 2016 denial because he did not receive a written notice that adequately stated the reasons for denial, violating 19 C.F.R. 122.183(b). The September letter lacked detail and clarity, implying a strict liability for simply being the driver of a vehicle carrying an undocumented alien, which contradicts established law.
The June 20 and June 28, 2018, denial letters were deemed procedurally improper, as they attempted to reconsider a matter that was no longer within Customs's jurisdiction following the Court's ruling. The Government's position that these letters moot the case is incorrect, as the finality of the initial denial remains binding on Customs.
Rodriguez's 2016 security clearance application was denied, and after exhausting administrative appeals, he sought judicial review. Customs's denial became final once administrative appeals were exhausted, as regulations prohibit issuing new determinations on closed matters. The Supreme Court has established that filing an appeal divests lower courts of jurisdiction over the case aspects involved. This principle prevents lower tribunals from altering decisions during appeals, ensuring they do not disrupt appellate review. In this case, Customs improperly issued additional denial letters, attempting to introduce new reasons and facts into an already closed administrative record.
The Government argued that agencies could address administrative complaints during ongoing litigation; however, Customs did not resolve the complaint but instead issued repeated denials. The Government's claims suggest an unlimited ability to reaffirm agency actions with new justifications, which is contrary to Customs's regulations and established appellate standards. The cited cases involved agencies ultimately granting relief, unlike Customs's position, which remained unchanged. The subsequent denial letters, attempting to restate the final decision rather than initiate a dialogue, are invalid as they do not provide grounds for further response from Rodriguez. Consequently, the second and third denial letters are deemed improper and do not represent legitimate grounds for affirming the initial denial.
The second and third denial letters from Customs violate established regulations by not providing comprehensive reasons for denying Rodriguez's security clearance. Even if the second letter, dated June 20, 2018, were procedurally valid, it fails to meet the requirements set forth in *Accardi*. The Government claims this letter offers a more detailed explanation, but it merely presents three vague bases for denial: 1) the judgment that granting clearance could endanger revenue or security; 2) evidence of a pending investigation suggesting Rodriguez may have engaged in disqualifying conduct; and 3) a conclusion that Rodriguez violated 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). These reasons lack specificity and detail, merely echoing regulatory language without providing substantive evidence or clarity on the basis for the alleged threat to national security or the mens rea necessary for the claimed violation.
Additionally, previous court orders have indicated that a mere conclusion is insufficient for providing detailed reasons. Customs's assertion of a thorough review process does not clarify the reasoning behind the denial, which must allow Rodriguez to respond meaningfully. The Government acknowledges that while Customs is not required to detail every inference it drew, it must provide sufficient reasoning to meet the essential elements of the alleged crime, which it has failed to do. Therefore, Customs's actions constitute a violation of its own regulations as outlined in 19 C.F.R. 122.183(b).
Customs' second letter regarding Rodriguez's security clearance denial lacked the full and detailed reasoning required by 19 C.F.R. 122.183(b) and was issued in bad faith. The June 28, 2018 letter failed to provide adequate justification for the denial and was insincere, as Customs claimed it learned Rodriguez was no longer employed by American Airlines, which the Government argues justified a third denial letter. However, the agency's lack of clarity about the reasons for Rodriguez's termination is viewed as bad faith, especially since the denied clearance was crucial for his job, which had been supported by the airline for eight years. The Government's assertion that Customs only recently discovered Rodriguez's employment status is deemed implausible and a misuse of power, as Customs' initial denial was the direct cause of his job loss. The Court emphasizes that the review should focus on the circumstances that existed at the time of the denial, where Rodriguez was still employed. The Government's position would prevent judicial review of unlawful denials, undermining the principle that federal officials must adhere to the law and act in good faith. Rodriguez is entitled to have the unlawful denial invalidated and to receive a fresh, lawful review of his application. The document concludes with the observation that it remains unclear whether the decision regarding security clearances is subject to judicial review.
The Court refrains from ruling on whether the security decision in this case falls under the 'committed to agency discretion by law' exception of the Administrative Procedure Act, noting the Government's failure to cite relevant statutes or cases. This issue may be relevant in future proceedings but is not addressed at this time. Additionally, the Court denies attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act despite substantial evidence of Government bad faith in their attempts to deny the clearance application. The motion for fees is viewed narrowly, and while the bad faith is acknowledged, the incurred fees are deemed modest. The Court denies the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and orders a judgment in favor of Plaintiff Alberto Rodriguez, reversing the September 10, 2016 denial of his security clearance and remanding for further action. The motion for contempt treated as a request for attorney fees is also denied. The Court retains jurisdiction for any further proceedings that may arise from the remand. The Court cites precedent indicating that an agency cannot introduce new refusals or reasons during ongoing judicial review, underscoring the importance of thorough and accurate compliance with review processes.
