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Stockman v. Trump
Citation: 331 F. Supp. 3d 990Docket: Case No. EDCV 17-01799 JGB (KKx)
Court: District Court, C.D. California; September 18, 2018; Federal District Court
On March 23, 2018, Defendants, including President Trump and various military secretaries, filed a Motion to Dissolve a Preliminary Injunction related to a policy affecting transgender individuals in the military. Plaintiffs, consisting of individuals and Equality California, opposed this motion on April 25, 2018, and Defendants replied on May 7, 2018. A hearing was held on July 30, 2018, after which the Court denied Defendants' Motion. The case began when Plaintiffs filed a complaint on September 5, 2017, alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment (equal protection, due process, right to privacy) and First Amendment retaliation, seeking declaratory relief. They had previously filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on October 2, 2017, which the Court granted on December 22, 2017. The factual background indicates a shift in military policy regarding transgender service members. Initially, in June 2016, the Department of Defense announced a policy allowing open service by transgender individuals. However, on July 26, 2017, President Trump announced via Twitter a reversal of this policy, stating that transgender individuals would no longer be allowed to serve, citing concerns over medical costs and military focus. This was formalized in a Presidential Memorandum on August 25, 2017, which included directives to prohibit new transgender recruits, discharge current transgender service members, and limit funding for sex reassignment surgeries. Subsequently, an Interim Guidance was issued on September 14, 2017, which temporarily protected current transgender service members from discharge or denial of reenlistment based solely on their transgender status. In August 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) eliminated mandatory exclusions based on gender and identity disorders from its physical disability policy and instructed military branches to evaluate the need for prohibiting openly transgender individuals from serving. In July 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter established a Working Group, involving various military and health experts, to analyze justifications for the ban on transgender service members. The group reviewed evidence from multiple sources, including scholarly research and consultations with medical professionals. The Working Group commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct a comprehensive study on the implications of allowing open service by transgender individuals. The RAND Report found no negative impact on operational effectiveness, readiness, or unit cohesion from such a policy. It also determined that healthcare costs for transgender service members would be minimal, estimating an annual increase of between $2.4 million and $8.4 million compared to the DOD's total healthcare expenditures of approximately $49.3 billion. Furthermore, the report indicated that discharging qualified transgender personnel could incur significant administrative costs and result in losing valuable skills. Ultimately, the Working Group concluded there was no justification for a blanket prohibition on transgender military service. On June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter announced that transgender Americans could serve openly without fear of discharge based solely on their gender identity, emphasizing that this policy aligns with military readiness and the value of diversity. High-ranking military officials, including former leaders such as Eric K. Fanning, Michael Mullen, Raymond E. Mabus, and Deborah L. James, supported the policy allowing transgender individuals to openly serve in the military, initially set to begin on July 1, 2017, but postponed to January 1, 2018. The Department of Defense (DOD) issued guidelines and handbooks to facilitate this policy, emphasizing non-discrimination based on gender identity and offering medical treatment guidance. These officials drew parallels between the acceptance of transgender service and the earlier integration of gay and lesbian service members following the repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." However, on July 26, 2017, President Trump announced via Twitter a ban on transgender individuals serving in the military, followed by a Presidential Memorandum that established new directives on military accession and retention. Trump criticized the Obama Administration’s policy changes, arguing they undermined military effectiveness and cohesion. The response from military leadership was largely critical of the ban, with current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford advocating for the rights of individuals meeting military standards to serve. It remains unclear whether top military officials were consulted prior to the ban's announcement. Additionally, 56 retired generals and admirals expressed concerns that the ban would harm military readiness. The new directives were to take effect on March 23, 2018, but judicial orders have since blocked their implementation, with injunctions remaining in place. On February 22, 2018, Defendant Mattis issued a memorandum recommending the revocation of President Trump's 2017 Presidential Memorandum to allow the military to adopt a new policy regarding transgender service members. Mattis established a Panel of Experts to evaluate transgender military service, which included senior Defense Department and Coast Guard officials. The Panel engaged with transgender service members and analyzed the implications of gender dysphoria on military effectiveness and unit cohesion. The Department of Defense (DOD) determined that allowing individuals with a history of gender dysphoria to serve posed substantial risks, potentially undermining military readiness and unit cohesion. The memorandum criticized the RAND Report for its shortcomings, including reliance on limited data and inadequate consideration of healthcare costs and military readiness. Mattis proposed policies disqualifying transgender individuals with a history of gender dysphoria from military service, except under specific conditions: they must have been stable in their biological sex for 36 months prior to service, service members diagnosed after enlistment could remain if they did not require gender transition, and those diagnosed under the previous policy could continue serving in their preferred gender while receiving necessary treatment. Additionally, transgender individuals without a history of gender dysphoria could serve in accordance with their biological sex. Following this, President Trump issued a new memorandum on March 23, 2018, officially revoking the 2017 policy and allowing the DOD to implement the new guidelines. In response to these changes, Defendants requested the dissolution of a preliminary injunction from the Court. In a related case, Karnoski v. Trump, the court partially granted a motion for summary judgment on April 13, 2018. The court addressed similar arguments regarding mootness and standing and ruled that discrimination against transgender persons requires strict scrutiny, but did not decide the level of deference to the DOD Report. The court has upheld the existing preliminary injunction and denied the defendants' motion to dissolve it, with the defendants currently appealing this decision to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the preliminary injunction will remain in effect during the appeal to maintain the status quo. The court's decision is part of the ongoing review of the Karnoski case, specifically concerning the order that upheld the injunction and denied the defendants' motion. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the parties' positions until a trial occurs. To obtain such an injunction, a party must demonstrate either a likelihood of success and potential irreparable harm or that the balance of hardships favors them while presenting serious questions. The U.S. Supreme Court requires four elements for a preliminary injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, a favorable balance of equities, and that the injunction serves the public interest. A district court has the discretion to modify or dissolve a preliminary injunction if there are significant changes in facts or law, with the burden on the party seeking such changes to show justification. Regarding the defendants' argument about mootness, they claim the plaintiffs' challenge is no longer relevant due to the introduction of a new policy that significantly alters the controversy compared to the 2017 Presidential Memorandum. They argue that this new policy includes exceptions allowing some transgender individuals to serve, based on military judgment rather than a categorical ban. However, the court finds these arguments unconvincing, noting that the new policy does not substantially differ from the previous one, thus not rendering the challenge moot. The City of Jacksonville enacted an ordinance mandating the allocation of a percentage of its budget to Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs). This policy was challenged, leading to a district court issuing a preliminary injunction against the city. Subsequently, Jacksonville repealed the original MBE ordinance and introduced a new one with key modifications: it now focused solely on women and black individuals instead of all minority groups; the funding percentage was changed to a range; and it presented five alternative methods to meet participation goals. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of mootness, emphasizing that the city's new ordinance, despite its differences, still fundamentally disadvantaged certain groups in securing city contracts by offering preferential treatment to black- and female-owned businesses. In a related context, President Trump’s policies regarding transgender individuals in the military were outlined, starting with a proclamation that barred their service. The 2017 and 2018 Presidential Memoranda established similar policies, which prohibited transgender individuals from serving consistent with their gender identity and required proof of stability in their birth sex for thirty-six months. Although the defendants claimed there were exceptions to these policies, the essence remained unchanged, as all individuals who had undergone or required gender transition were disqualified, while those without a history of gender dysphoria could serve only in their biological sex. Thus, these policies also disadvantaged transgender service members in a fundamentally similar manner to previous regulations. Individuals with gender dysphoria who do not require or have not undergone gender transition are exempt from the military policy if they can adhere to standards associated with their biological sex. A diagnosis of gender dysphoria does not determine exclusion from military service; rather, serving consistently with one’s transgender identity is what leads to exclusion. The policy effectively aims to eliminate the recognition of transgender identity. Forcing transgender individuals to serve in accordance with their biological sex fails to represent open service and suppresses their transgender characteristics. The controversy surrounding the new policy mirrors that of the previous one, disadvantaging transgender individuals in similar fundamental ways. In addressing constitutional review, the defendants claim the new policy warrants rational basis review, arguing it draws distinctions based on a medical condition rather than transgender status. However, this characterization is inaccurate, as a gender dysphoria diagnosis does not determine exclusion. The defendants seek deference due to the military context of the policy, but constitutional protections should not be disregarded. The military’s review of regulations is more deferential than that of civilian laws, provided the military acts thoughtfully rather than reflexively. Prior evaluations indicated no justification for the ban on transgender service members. The Department of Defense (DOD) has since conducted its own study, concluding that accommodating gender transition poses risks to military readiness and undermines unit cohesion, while also incurring disproportionate costs. The DOD Report and the new policy regarding the military ban on transgender service members do not warrant military deference for several reasons. Firstly, these measures are seen as retroactive justifications for the ban initially announced by President Trump on July 26, 2017, which explicitly stated that transgender individuals would not be accepted in the military after consultation with military experts. This proclamation formalized in the Interim Guidance and the 2017 Presidential Memorandum established a policy that was later challenged in court for lacking adequate justification. The DOD's 2018 study attempts to rationalize the original ban, which was already claimed to be based on expert consultations. Comparatively, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court upheld a revised immigration policy that was substantially different from its initial formulation and underwent multiple revisions in response to legal challenges, addressing allegations of religious animus. In contrast, the transgender ban remains fundamentally unchanged and directly reflects Trump's initial announcement without the evolution seen in the Hawaii immigration policy. Defendants reference Schlesinger v. Ballard, suggesting the Court accepted after-the-fact justifications in that case concerning gender-based discharge policies. However, the context and nature of the transgender ban differ significantly, as it lacks the iterative revisions that characterized the Hawaii case. Thus, the DOD Report's retrospective justification is viewed as inadequate in supporting the original ban on transgender service members. The Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress might have believed women line officers had fewer promotion opportunities than their male counterparts. However, dissenting opinions criticized this reasoning as an unsubstantiated legislative purpose. Plaintiffs argue that the Court evaluated the law's justification at the time of enactment, while the Defendants' quoted language raises questions about reliance on post hoc justifications. Previous Supreme Court rulings require that any justification for gender classifications must be genuinely persuasive and not contrived in response to litigation. The Court determined that Defendants are not entitled to rational-basis review due to military deference, and while Karnoski indicated strict scrutiny for transgender discrimination, the Court has opted for intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, Defendants must demonstrate that their policy justification is substantially related to a compelling interest. They assert three interests: military readiness linked to deployability, unit cohesion based on sex-based standards, and cost reduction. The Court previously dismissed the cost argument as insufficient under intermediate scrutiny. The focus of the analysis will be on military readiness and unit cohesion. Defendants argue that gender dysphoria is the key issue, but the Court finds this perspective flawed, clarifying that a diagnosis of gender dysphoria does not automatically warrant exclusion from military service. The Court is not swayed by Defendants' concerns regarding mental instability associated with gender dysphoria. Individuals with gender dysphoria are exempt from the new military policy as long as they do not present as transgender. The defendants express concerns that those who undergo gender transition surgery may negatively impact military deployability; however, this concern does not substantiate the overall policy, which bans all individuals who present as transgender, regardless of surgery status. The rationale for banning accession of individuals who have undergone gender transition surgery cannot justify the entire policy, even if accepted as valid. Regarding unit cohesion, defendants assert that accommodating transgender service members without requiring full sex-reassignment surgery could undermine privacy expectations, essential for maintaining unit cohesion. They argue that the only viable option for transgender service members is to mandate sex reassignment surgery. Defendants contend that allowing service members to use facilities corresponding to their identified gender could infringe on the privacy of non-transgender service members. They highlight a specific incident involving a transgender woman and conflicting privacy complaints from female service members. In contrast, plaintiffs reference various non-binding cases asserting that allowing transgender individuals to live according to their identity does not compromise the privacy or safety of others. Defendants argue that these cases do not apply to the military context. The military has historically cited unit cohesion concerns to challenge the integration of minority groups. A cited case, Log Cabin Republicans v. U.S., determined that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy violated the First Amendment, despite the government's claims that it was necessary for unit cohesion and privacy. The court found no connection between the policy and unit cohesion, based on military testimony. Open service by gay individuals does not negatively impact unit cohesion, as established in Witt v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force. The military has historically integrated diverse groups, including racial minorities and women, without detrimental effects on professionalism or effectiveness. Concerns about discipline and morale associated with admitting openly gay individuals have mirrored past arguments against desegregation and the inclusion of women, which have proven unfounded. These assertions are viewed as attempts to resist change, as the military has demonstrated resilience and adaptability in integrating new members. Consequently, the argument of "loss of unit cohesion" is deemed insufficient to justify a ban on transgender individuals from military service. The Court ruled against the Defendants' motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction against the transgender ban, indicating the justification for the ban is not compelling enough to survive intermediate scrutiny. However, this ruling was later vacated as moot following the enactment of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 by Congress.