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Senese v. Longwood Cent. Sch. Dist.
Citation: 330 F. Supp. 3d 745Docket: 2:15-cv-07234 (ADS)(AYS)
Court: District Court, E.D. New York; August 3, 2018; Federal District Court
On December 18, 2015, Adam Senese filed a federal discrimination lawsuit against Longwood Central School District (LCSD) and employees Laura Hopkins, Cara Chudyk, and Janine Rozycki, alleging gender-based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New York State Human Rights Law. The claims arose from Senese's suspension and termination as a probationary special education teacher. The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint. Senese, a male weighing approximately 250 pounds, previously worked as a teaching assistant at Eastern Suffolk BOCES, where he began in 2009, progressed to a full-time role, and received tenure in 2013 alongside obtaining New York State certification for teaching elementary and disabled students. He applied for a teaching position at LCSD in June 2013, noting his Nonviolent Crisis Prevention training. Although Chudyk also applied, she was not selected. Senese participated in interviews conducted by a panel of female staff and was eventually offered a probationary position, which he accepted, starting at Ridge Elementary School for the 2013-2014 school year. His probation period was two years due to his prior tenure at BOCES. At Ridge, he taught developmentally disabled students in the Alternative Learning Program (ALP), which served students with severe disabilities and was designed based on recommendations from the District's Committee of Special Education. Rozycki was the Principal, and Hopkins served as the Assistant Principal at Ridge during this period. During the 2013-2014 school year, the Plaintiff's class began with eight students but reduced to seven. He had one teaching assistant, Melissa Lopez, and four one-to-one aides, including Vanessa Holzhauser. Supervisors Schuster and Rozycki conducted multiple observations and evaluations without noting any performance issues. The Plaintiff could not recall any physical restraint incidents during his first year. However, Hopkins observed him assisting a male student, Student R, in a bathroom stall, which raised concerns about misinterpretation of his actions; the Plaintiff did not remember this event. At the end of that school year, he was invited to return for a second probationary year. In the 2014-2015 school year, the Plaintiff's class included seven students, with three returning and four new. Lopez was replaced by Chudyk, who had been with the District for eight years. Several aides returned, and new aides included Gina Grasso and David Glover. The Plaintiff received CPI training in February 2015 and later participated in the District's Aspiring Administrator Academy. Before February 2015, he had not physically restrained any students and was unaware of any restraints being used by aides. Between February and April 2015, the Plaintiff was involved in two incidents requiring the physical restraint of Student B, a disabled student from another teacher's class. The first incident occurred when he was called to assist with Student B’s aggressive behavior, but he could not recall the details. The second incident also involved assistance from another teacher to restrain Student B. The Plaintiff's deposition indicated a lack of recollection regarding the specifics of an incident involving Student B, including details about other individuals present, Student B's behavior, and the method of physical restraint employed with Jackson. During one incident, Mintel alerted the Plaintiff to Student B's physical aggression. Mintel's aide quickly brought the Plaintiff to the scene, where Senese applied a defensive CPI technique involving wrist control. Rozycki witnessed the Plaintiff and Jackson using a "team hold" to restrain Student B. The Plaintiff remembered bringing Student B to a conference room to calm her, but could not confirm if this was related to the earlier incidents. Mintel decided to move Student B to the conference room following her disruptive behavior, which was observed by Hopkins, who noted the Plaintiff's forceful instructions to Student B. Student B then crawled under a table, from which she was later coaxed by social worker Columbia. Hopkins expressed doubts about the necessity of physical restraint in the situation. On April 27, 2015, Hopkins discussed her observations with Columbia and Rozycki, who advised her to speak with the Plaintiff regarding the restraint technique. Following this, Hopkins confronted the Plaintiff about the incident, but he could not recall her presence and sought clarification on the incident date. Hopkins did not provide this information, while Senese affirmed his adherence to proper CPI techniques despite his inability to recall specific details. Hopkins also noted a lack of recollection regarding the technique used in her own CPI training. Hopkins testified that she advised the Plaintiff about the need for caution in his conduct with young elementary-aged children, specifically noting concerns during a maneuver where a child expressed discomfort. While the Plaintiff did not recall his response, Senese reiterated Hopkins' warning, emphasizing the importance of being careful as a male in a school setting. Hopkins indicated that it was inappropriate for a man to take a student to the bathroom, although it was unclear if she referenced a specific incident from the 2013-2014 school year. After discussing her observations and concerns with Rozycki, she mentioned that she had not seen the type of restraint used during the incident in question. Following their conversation, the Plaintiff spoke with Rozycki, who confirmed that Hopkins had previously raised her concerns with her and advised the Plaintiff not to worry about potential disciplinary action. Two days later, Chudyk called Hopkins to discuss her concerns regarding the Plaintiff's interactions with students, detailing three specific incidents: inappropriate anger towards a student, grabbing a student by the collar and neck, and forcibly holding a student's wrists. Chudyk reported observing various forms of physical interaction that made her uncomfortable, but she did not allege any physical injuries to the students. She delayed reporting her concerns due to intimidation, the Plaintiff's popularity, and fears of not being believed. Hopkins informed Chudyk of her need to discuss certain concerns with Rozycki. Later, Grasso contacted Hopkins to express concerns about the Plaintiff's behavior in the classroom, providing specific examples of inappropriate physical interactions with students, including holding hands and wrists and an incident involving kicking. Following these discussions, Hopkins texted Rozycki to request a conversation. On April 30, 2015, Hopkins communicated with Rozycki about the information from Chudyk and Grasso, prompting Rozycki to initiate an investigation. Chudyk reported a tense atmosphere in the Plaintiff's classroom, describing him as intimidating and often rude, while also detailing instances of him squeezing students' hands and yelling. Grasso corroborated this by recounting multiple troubling incidents, including the Plaintiff's anger towards children and specific physical confrontations. Rozycki subsequently informed Schuster of the allegations and convened additional staff members, with varying responses regarding the Plaintiff's conduct. When the Plaintiff noticed aides being pulled from his classroom, he inquired with Rozycki, who revealed allegations against him. He was then removed to a conference room where he denied the accusations during a meeting with Rozycki and Schuster. Later that afternoon, Rozycki updated Superintendent Dr. Michael Lonergan on the investigation and planned to interview a former teacher's aide the next day. She also completed and submitted a Child Abuse in the Educational Setting Form, detailing the allegations against the Plaintiff, which included squeezing and restraining students inappropriately. Rozycki indicated "Reasonable Suspicion" on the Child Abuse Form, prompting Lonergan to place the Plaintiff on administrative leave during an investigation. The Plaintiff was prohibited from contacting students, parents, or staff, and from entering district property without approval. Lonergan believed the allegations did not meet the threshold for mandated reporting under NYSED guidelines. Rozycki later reported to Lonergan that she interviewed aides from the prior school year, with one aide, Holzhauser, expressing discomfort with the Plaintiff's behavior, including claims of being rough with children. Holzhauser had previously withheld her report due to fear of disbelief and repercussions. On May 4, 2015, the Plaintiff consulted attorney Saul Zabell and signed an affidavit. That evening, Zabell faxed a Charge of Discrimination to the District, which was officially received the next morning. The District did not investigate the EEOC Charge but submitted a position statement that included the Child Abuse Form. On May 6, 2015, Lonergan and interim Assistant Superintendent Gerstenlauer conducted interviews with several employees, during which multiple individuals reported concerning behaviors by the Plaintiff, including inappropriate physical contact and aggressive behavior towards students. Following these interviews, on May 8, 2015, Lonergan met with general counsel Powers, who stressed the seriousness of the situation, leading to a directive for the Director of School Safety to contact the Suffolk County Police Department. Hopkins also reported her observations to the police, unaware of any complaints against her or the District. The Plaintiff was not contacted or arrested by the police regarding the District's complaint. On May 11, 2015, Lonergan communicated with NYSED Investigator Bart Zabin, providing him with a Child Abuse Form received from Rozycki. Zabin later informed Assistant Superintendent Michael Gargiulo on June 25, 2015, that NYSED would not pursue a Part 83 case, determining the allegations did not constitute child abuse in an educational context. On June 18, 2015, Lonergan met with the Plaintiff and the teacher's union president, during which the Plaintiff recorded the conversation. He inquired whether the District was retaliating against him, to which the union president replied "no." While the Plaintiff was on administrative leave, physical education teacher Matt Simonton spoke with Board members Paul Infranco and Michael Loguercio on May 1, 2015. Infranco assured Simonton that "facts will work themselves out," while Loguercio allegedly advised against the Plaintiff filing a lawsuit, suggesting it could jeopardize his employment. Loguercio did not recall this discussion and failed to inform Lonergan about it. On June 19, 2015, Lonergan recommended to the Board of Education that the Plaintiff’s probationary employment be terminated. Following a letter from the Plaintiff’s counsel requesting reasons for this recommendation, Lonergan detailed deficiencies in the Plaintiff's performance in a letter dated July 2, 2015, citing failures in student safety, poor professional judgment, inability to maintain professional boundaries, and classroom management issues. The Plaintiff was allowed to respond but did not do so. The District's Board of Education voted to terminate the Plaintiff’s employment effective August 31, 2015. During his administrative leave, Chudyk applied for a special education position and was hired, along with 12 other new special education teachers, three of whom were male and not placed at Ridge Elementary. Chudyk was assigned to the Plaintiff's former position. The Plaintiff alleges that the accusers are dishonest, driven by personal interests and bias against the Plaintiff's gender, describing this belief as a "gut feeling." Procedurally, the Plaintiff initiated the case on December 18, 2015, with a complaint against the Defendants, who responded on February 22, 2016. The Plaintiff subsequently filed a first amended complaint on March 8, 2016, and a second amended complaint, which is the current operative document, on July 23, 2016. This second amended complaint includes seven causes of action for gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), with the Plaintiff seeking various forms of relief including compensatory and punitive damages, a declaratory order, an injunction, attorneys' fees, interest, and costs. A request to file a third amended complaint to add claims against the District's lawyers was denied by Magistrate Judge Anne Y. Shields on the grounds that it was futile. On December 1, 2017, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims. The summary judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that a court grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must interpret evidence in favor of the non-moving party, allowing for reasonable inferences and resolving ambiguities accordingly. A genuine dispute exists if a reasonable jury could potentially rule in favor of the non-moving party. The burden lies with the movant to demonstrate the absence of material facts that would preclude summary judgment, which can be satisfied by showing a lack of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. The moving party must initially demonstrate a lack of genuine material disputes. Upon meeting this burden, the nonmoving party is required to present specific evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial, exceeding mere speculation or conclusory statements. The court's role is to identify factual issues for trial without resolving them, drawing inferences against the moving party. Evidence must be more than "merely colorable" to oppose summary judgment effectively. In cases of alleged discriminatory retaliation, courts must exercise heightened caution due to the rarity of direct evidence of discriminatory intent, often relying on circumstantial evidence. This evidence must be scrutinized to allow a rational finder of fact to infer discrimination. Nonetheless, the principles of summary judgment apply to discrimination cases, necessitating that plaintiffs provide substantial, admissible evidence rather than mere allegations to resist such motions. The evidence must collectively support a rational inference that the employment decision was influenced by discrimination. To bring a discrimination claim before a jury, a plaintiff must not only discredit the employer's rationale but also provide credible evidence supporting the claim of intentional discrimination. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, which necessitates sufficient evidence to suggest that the employer's legitimate reasons for an adverse action are false and that discrimination is the more likely cause. Summary judgment remains a viable outcome in discrimination cases, even those that are fact-intensive. In this instance, the Plaintiff contends that his termination by the District in 2015 was discriminatory, but the Defendants argue that he has not provided enough evidence to establish a prima facie case or to challenge their non-discriminatory reasons for the termination. The Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed to meet the prima facie requirements outlined in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which necessitates proof that the Plaintiff belongs to a protected class, is qualified for the position, experienced adverse employment action, and that the circumstances suggest discrimination. While the burden to show circumstances indicating discrimination is minimal and does not require rigorous proof, it cannot rely solely on vague or conclusory claims without supporting details. Successfully establishing a prima facie case creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination by the employer, which must then be addressed by the employer's rebuttal. The employer bears the burden of production to present a legitimate, clear, specific, and non-discriminatory reason for any adverse action taken against an employee. If the employer successfully meets this burden, the employee must then demonstrate that the employer's stated reason is a mere pretext for discrimination. The employee does not need to prove that the discriminatory motive was the sole or primary factor in the decision; rather, they need to show that their protected status was a contributing factor among other potential reasons. Relevant case law establishes that for claims under Title VII, the employee must prove that discriminatory intent was one of the employer's motives, even if other lawful motives were involved. Evidence that the employer's justification is unworthy of credence can serve as circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination, allowing for the inference that the employer may be hiding discriminatory motives. Furthermore, once the employer's justification is deemed inadequate, it raises the possibility that discrimination is the most likely explanation, especially as the employer is positioned to provide the true rationale for their decision. While a plaintiff's prima facie case combined with evidence of a false justification may support a finding of unlawful discrimination, it does not guarantee a jury will find in favor of the plaintiff. A defendant may still be entitled to judgment if clear, non-discriminatory reasons for the decision are established, or if the plaintiff only presents weak evidence against the employer’s claims alongside strong uncontroverted evidence of no discrimination. The principles outlined emphasize that employment discrimination cases should not be treated differently from other factual questions in court. Judgment as a matter of law or summary judgment is contingent on several factors, including the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the credibility of the employer's explanations, and any supporting evidence for both parties. The Supreme Court case Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. establishes that courts must undertake a case-by-case analysis for summary judgment, refraining from imposing a blanket requirement for Title VII claimants to provide more than a prima facie case and evidence of pretext. However, it does not prevent Title VII defendants from succeeding in a summary judgment motion even when a plaintiff has established a prima facie case. In evaluating a gender discrimination claim, it is acknowledged that the plaintiff meets three of the prima facie criteria: belonging to a protected class, being qualified for the position, and experiencing an adverse employment action (suspension and termination). The focus is on whether the circumstances indicate that discrimination motivated these actions. The key issue is establishing that the adverse decision was influenced by discriminatory reasons. This can be shown through direct evidence of intent or indirect evidence suggesting discrimination, such as derogatory performance critiques, biased comments, more favorable treatment of non-protected employees, or the sequence of events leading to termination. Methods to demonstrate discrimination include disparate treatment, requiring proof of discriminatory intent, and the concept of creating a "mosaic" of evidence that collectively suggests discrimination. In *Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust*, the court addressed a claim of gender discrimination based on disparate treatment. The plaintiff contended that his suspension and termination were motivated by gender discrimination, alleging that he was treated less favorably than female counterparts. However, the court found that the plaintiff's claims did not demonstrate that the district's actions were influenced by discriminatory animus, as they stemmed from serious misconduct complaints against him that warranted investigation and disciplinary action. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that they were treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside their protected group. The court emphasized that proof of discriminatory motive is essential but can be inferred from differences in treatment. The plaintiff failed to identify any similarly situated female employees who received more favorable treatment despite accusations of misconduct. Although the district employed a significant number of both male and female special education teachers during the relevant period, the absence of evidence showing that any female employee accused of mistreating students was treated differently undermined the plaintiff's claim. Thus, without comparable examples, the plaintiff could not fulfill the burden of demonstrating circumstances indicative of gender discrimination. Senese's accusations of inappropriate behavior by multiple co-workers differentiate him from other District employees, who have not faced similar allegations. The Plaintiff has not identified any female employees who were terminated or accused of misconduct, nor has she shown that any such employees were subject to the same performance evaluation and discipline standards. Any comparable employees would need to be probationary, as Senese was the only probationary special education teacher at Ridge during the relevant period, and the record does not confirm the presence of other probationary teachers in the District. The claim that Chudyk is similarly situated is flawed, as she has not been accused of misconduct like Senese. To prove disparate treatment, the Plaintiff must show that similarly situated males engaged in comparable conduct and were treated differently. The Plaintiff's own misconduct, including a long-term relationship, harassing behavior, and dishonesty, has not been matched by any identified similarly situated employees allowed to remain employed, which undermines claims of discrimination. Additionally, for the gender discrimination claim to proceed, the Plaintiff must provide direct evidence of discriminatory intent. The absence of such evidence, coupled with the Plaintiff’s assertion that Senese was the only male ALP teacher at Ridge, does not sufficiently establish a prima facie case of discrimination without further context or analysis. The Court may grant summary judgment if no reasonable jury could find the Plaintiff has identified a similarly situated employee or demonstrated an inference of discrimination based on the provided facts. The court found that the Plaintiff's claim of being the only African-American at a location for one year did not constitute sufficient evidence for a prima facie case of discrimination. There was no evidence suggesting discriminatory intent by the decision-maker involved in the Plaintiff's termination. The Plaintiff provided no comments from decision-makers indicating such intent. He referenced remarks made by his supervisor, Hopkins, which included advice on being cautious while interacting with students due to his size and strength, and a recommendation to avoid being in a stall with a male student. However, these comments were deemed insufficient to infer discrimination, as they were made in a context of professional guidance rather than as discriminatory statements. The court's analysis considered the identity of the speaker, the timing and content of the remarks, and their context. The comments were not disciplinary in nature and were intended to address safety and propriety in a teaching environment. Furthermore, evidence indicated that the Plaintiff's physical characteristics necessitated reminders about appropriate conduct when restraining students, especially younger ones. Hopkins reminded Senese that it was inappropriate for a man to take a student to the bathroom, which is deemed only tangentially related to gender and lacks context linking it to the District's decision-making regarding adverse employment actions. The remarks are considered vague, failing to demonstrate a discriminatory state of mind, as supported by case law (Witkowich v. Gonzales). The court noted that comments must have clarity to indicate discrimination and that they do not reach the level of discriminatory intent established in prior rulings (Rodriquez-Cross v. Sessions). The inference of discrimination is further weakened by the fact that the Superintendent who suspended Senese is also male; courts typically infer against discrimination when decision-makers belong to the same protected class as the employee (Bauger v. Spanish Broadcasting Systems). Senese's disagreement with the District over his conduct is irrelevant if the District acted with a good faith belief in its appropriateness (Hargett v. N.Y. City Transit Authority). The District retains the right to suspend or terminate employees based on subjective judgments, provided they are not discriminatory. Senese's claims regarding motives of colleagues lack evidence of gender-based motivation. Consequently, he has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. Even if he had, the District asserts legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for his suspension and termination, linked to serious allegations of student mistreatment reported by multiple employees. Courts refrain from questioning an employer's non-discriminatory business decisions without evidence of discrimination (Peters v. Mount Sinai Hospital). The Court evaluates whether the District's reasons for the Plaintiff's suspension and termination were pretextual after the District provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale. The Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that discrimination influenced the adverse actions. In the Second Circuit, it suffices for the Plaintiff to demonstrate that discrimination was one of several motivating factors, rather than proving the employer's reasons false. Conclusory and speculative claims do not establish discriminatory intent, and the burden of proving pretext is greater than that for a prima facie discrimination case. The Plaintiff argues the District's investigation was biased, termed a "witch hunt," but the Court finds the investigation included multiple interviews and was not solely focused on a few individuals. Witnesses provided varying accounts, with some supporting the claim of inappropriate behavior. The Plaintiff's accusations against specific individuals for personal biases do not constitute a Title VII violation unless discrimination is proven. The Court deems the Plaintiff's claims against these individuals unfounded and affirms that the reasons for termination were legitimate and not pretextual. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's assertion that the lack of knowledge of current CPI techniques by certain individuals invalidates their assessments is deemed incorrect. The District's administration is responsible for evaluating and disciplining teachers across various subjects and techniques, utilizing their training and experience for decision-making. If only currently certified individuals were allowed to assess situations, administrative roles would be unfilled. Although Hopkins had prior CPI training, her certification lapsed by the time she discussed CPI techniques with the Plaintiff. Nonetheless, she is deemed qualified to assess situations based on her experience. Even if the Court were to dismiss non-current CPI instructor testimony as conjectural, there remains insufficient evidence to substantiate the Plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination against the District. Testimonies from the Defendants and witnesses, who may have lacked current CPI training, do not indicate prejudice but rather a lack of information. The Court finds no evidence linking the Plaintiff's suspension or termination to discrimination, leading to the dismissal of the Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim with prejudice. Under Title VII, retaliation against employees for opposing unlawful employment practices is prohibited. An employer cannot take materially adverse action against an employee engaged in protected activities. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must demonstrate: participation in a protected activity, employer awareness of this participation, subsequent adverse employment action by the employer, and a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. The allegations need to provide plausible support for these elements, following the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. In a Title VII retaliation claim, the court's role when evaluating a summary judgment request is to assess whether the admissible evidence presented is adequate for a rational finder of fact to infer a retaliatory motive. A prima facie case of retaliation is established if a retaliatory motive is involved in adverse employment actions, regardless of whether it is the sole cause. If the employee meets this initial burden, a presumption of retaliation arises, shifting the burden to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. If the employer successfully presents such evidence, the employee must then demonstrate that retaliation was the 'but-for' cause of the adverse action, rather than merely a contributing factor. Senese's claims of retaliation stem from his suspension on April 30, 2015, his termination on August 5, 2015, and his reports to the Suffolk County Police and NYSED on May 8 and May 11, 2015, respectively. He argues these actions were retaliatory following a conversation with Rozycki on April 27, 2015, and an EEOC charge filed on May 4, 2015. However, the defendants contend that the April 27 conversation did not qualify as protected activity, a view the court supports. Under Title VII, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to show a reasonable belief that they were opposing a practice prohibited by Title VII, rather than demonstrating the unlawfulness of the conduct itself. For the protected activity element, the plaintiff must demonstrate a good faith belief that they opposed an unlawful employment practice, which the employer must have reasonably understood as such. A plaintiff can succeed in a retaliation claim even if the underlying conduct was not unlawful, provided they demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer's actions violated the law. Discrimination complaints need not be formal; informal complaints are also protected, encompassing various actions such as communicating with management or supporting co-workers. However, these informal complaints must be specific enough to clearly indicate that the employee is opposing conduct prohibited by Title VII. Generalized complaints about a supervisor's treatment are insufficient. In this case, the plaintiff, Senese, spoke with Rozycki about his prior conversation with Hopkins but did not assert that Hopkins' comments were inappropriate or discriminatory. Consequently, Rozycki could not reasonably interpret the discussion as a complaint of gender discrimination. Senese did not exhibit a good faith belief that he was opposing unlawful employment practices, as his vague statements failed to inform the employer of any alleged discrimination. Thus, the court concluded that the conversation did not qualify as a protected activity necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The May 4, 2015 EEOC Charge is identified as the sole protected activity in this case, establishing a prima facie case regarding Senese's EEOC Charge. The District has presented a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse actions taken against the Plaintiff, specifically citing an investigation initiated on April 30, 2015, which revealed serious allegations from multiple employees against Senese. This investigation justified the District's decision to involve the Suffolk County Police Department, notify the NYSED, and ultimately suspend and terminate Senese. The burden then shifts back to the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the adverse actions would not have occurred but for his protected activities. Under Title VII, the Plaintiff must prove that retaliation was the "but-for" cause of the adverse employment action, meaning that it must be shown that the action would not have happened without the alleged wrongful actions of the employer. The Plaintiff attempts to establish causation through four arguments: 1) the timing of events (temporal proximity), 2) the speculative nature of the investigation and allegations, 3) changes in Lonergan's decision to report following the receipt of the EEOC Charge, and 4) a board member's conversation with a teacher. The Plaintiff must demonstrate weaknesses or inconsistencies in the District's proffered reasons to satisfy the burden of proof. The Plaintiff fails to establish causation based on temporal proximity at the pretext stage. Senese was suspended on April 30, 2015, and terminated on August 5, 2015, while his EEOC Charge was filed on May 4, 2015, after the disciplinary process had commenced due to his alleged misconduct. Since the suspension occurred before the protected activity, causation cannot be established. The District initiated its investigation prior to any knowledge of the EEOC Charge, indicating that timing alone does not support a claim of retaliation as adverse actions began before any protected activity occurred. Although Senese's termination was finalized post-EEOC Charge, the process to discharge him had already begun. The Plaintiff's argument relying on temporal proximity is therefore insufficient. Additionally, the Plaintiff's assertion that the District's investigation was uncorroborated and speculative does not meet the burden to demonstrate pretext. The claim that the investigation was a "witch hunt" lacks substantiation. An employer is not required to prove the accuracy of the information used in its investigation, only that it reasonably relied on it. No evidence indicates that the investigation was influenced by Senese's gender or his protected activities. Senese also contends that Lonergan changed his mind about reporting the allegations to authorities after receiving the EEOC Charge. The District provided a legitimate non-retaliatory explanation for Lonergan's actions, citing a meeting with the District's general counsel that emphasized the seriousness of the matter, leading to the reporting of the allegations to law enforcement. The Plaintiff argues that the District had prior knowledge of the EEOC Charge before Lonergan's meeting, but this does not undermine the District's rationale for its actions. Mere temporal proximity is deemed insufficient for establishing pretext in a retaliation claim under Title VII. The Court reviewed Lonergan's deposition and determined that no reasonable conclusion could be drawn that Lonergan's decision to report the Plaintiff was causally linked to the Plaintiff's filing of an EEOC Charge. The Plaintiff also referenced a conversation between Loguercio and Simonton, where Loguercio suggested that pursuing a lawsuit against Longwood would likely lead to the Plaintiff's termination. However, it was undisputed that Lonergan was unaware of this discussion, and there was no claim that it was shared with other board members. Loguercio's comments, while imprudent, did not serve as the direct cause of Senese's termination. The Plaintiff failed to provide evidence to support the assertion that the District's reasons for adverse employment actions were pretextual. Consequently, the Court found no basis to conclude that the Plaintiff's conversation with Rozycki or the EEOC Charge influenced the District's decisions regarding suspension or termination, leading to the dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claim with prejudice. Additionally, the Plaintiff's claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) for gender discrimination and retaliation are treated similarly to those under Title VII. Following the dismissal of the Title VII claims, the Court considered whether to maintain jurisdiction over the NYSHRL claims. The Court, referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), decided to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, emphasizing that state law issues should be avoided when federal claims are dismissed. Thus, the remaining claims (II, IV, V, VI, and VII) were dismissed without prejudice. The Court ultimately granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claims and directed the Clerk of the Court to close the case.