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United States v. Eychaner
Citation: 326 F. Supp. 3d 76Docket: Criminal Case No. 4:17cr76
Court: District Court, E.D. Virginia; August 15, 2018; Federal District Court
Mark S. Davis, United States District Judge, ruled on a Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal filed by Defendant Elmer Emmanuel Eychaner, III, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (c)(1). The motion was denied for Counts Two, Three, and Four, but granted for Count Five, resulting in the vacating of Eychaner's conviction on that count. In August 2017, Eychaner faced five charges: (1) Accessing visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct (Count One), (2) Attempted receipt of obscene visual depictions of minors (Count Two), (3) Destruction of a tangible object to impede a federal investigation (Count Three), (4) Obstruction of justice through attempted evidence tampering (Count Four), and (5) Violating penalties for registered sex offenders (Count Five). Eychaner pleaded not guilty, and after a jury trial in May 2018, he was found guilty on the remaining counts. The trial evidence revealed Eychaner's prior conviction in December 2007 for possession of child pornography, resulting in a 120-month prison sentence and lifetime supervision. As part of his supervised release starting in June 2016, he was prohibited from using a computer without prior approval and from accessing pornographic material. Eychaner later expressed a desire to obtain a monitored computer for job searches. Monitoring software was installed in August 2016, and shortly thereafter, suspicious activities were reported to his probation officer, including a search for images of clothed minors and attempts to circumvent monitoring through voice recognition software. Despite this, he was permitted to retain his computer with restrictions on its use. On November 17, 2016, the Defendant accessed the Internet using his roommate's Wi-Fi and performed explicit searches on Bing.com through the Cortana voice recognition program, generating numerous anime images of children in sexual scenarios. He also visited websites "premiumhentai.site" and "premiumhentai.biz" for similar content. His online activity was monitored by RemoteCOM, which captured screenshots every ten seconds from 6:34 p.m. to 7:38 p.m. The following morning, Defendant contacted his Probation Officer, Candace Yost, expressing a desire to return his computer due to the expense of the monitoring software. He soon called back, admitting to viewing "anime child pornography" and claiming he had found a loophole in the monitoring system. After this confession, Officer Yost consulted with Officer Mako, who confirmed that while there was no keystroke anomaly, RemoteCOM had documented extensive explicit imagery. When Officer Yost requested to collect his computer, Defendant stated he had discarded his hard drive in a storm drain out of anger, referring to his computer as "the danger zone." Later that day, Officers Yost and Powers retrieved the remaining components of his laptop, including the mouse and battery, but the hard drive was permanently lost. The officers submitted the collected items to the FBI for forensic analysis, but the absence of the hard drive prevented any examination. At trial, the Government presented thirteen images derived from the screenshots captured during Defendant's searches, with additional images redacted. The trial included testimony from forensic analysts explaining the investigative steps that would have been taken had the hard drive been available. The Government presented thirteen images from Bing.com searches and five screenshots from premiumhentai.site and premiumhentai.biz as evidence. One screenshot described a "newest lolicon 3D image set" that included explicit content and a bonus animation video. Additional screenshots contained details about the type of images, their quantity, and the username of the creator. Some images featured a "DOWNLOAD" button, indicating accessibility. Evidence also included screenshots showing that Eychaner had deleted his Bing.com search history shortly after 8:00 p.m. on November 17. The defense relied solely on the testimony of Dr. Kirsten Cather Fischer, an expert in Japanese literature and culture, who provided definitions of relevant terms and discussed manga's history and artistic value. While she acknowledged uncertainty regarding the specific images' value based on the Government's evidence, she suggested they might possess serious value when viewed within their original context. The Government accepted her definitions but contested her views on the literary or artistic merit of manga involving lolicon, shotacon, and toddlercon. At the trial's conclusion, the Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the Court granted for the "actual receipt" aspect of Count Two but denied for other counts. After presenting evidence, the Defendant renewed the motion, which was again denied. The jury ultimately found the Defendant guilty on all remaining counts of the indictment. Count Two involved the jury being instructed to use a special verdict form for each of the eighteen explicit images presented. The jury found Eychaner guilty for all eighteen images. On June 1, 2018, Eychaner filed a Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, which was met with a government opposition two weeks later, followed by Eychaner's reply in late June. The matter is now ready for a decision. Under Rule 29(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant can move for a judgment of acquittal within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the jury is discharged. The court can set aside the verdict if it determines that substantial evidence does not support the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In analyzing the sufficiency of evidence for Eychaner’s conviction on Count Two, the government needed to prove that he intended to commit the underlying offense of receiving obscene visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and that he took a substantial step towards committing that crime. The elements of the underlying offense include: (1) knowingly receiving a visual depiction; (2) the depiction showing a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; (3) the depiction being obscene; (4) the defendant knowing the sexually oriented nature of the depiction at the time of receipt; (5) the defendant knowing the depicted individual was a minor; and (6) the depiction being transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Eychaner contests the sufficiency of evidence regarding his intent to commit the offense, the substantial step taken towards it, whether the images depicted minors rather than youthful-looking characters, whether the minors were engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and whether the depictions were obscene. The Court will address each of these challenges in detail. Sufficient evidence exists to establish that Eychaner specifically intended to commit the underlying offense. Eychaner contested the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, claiming it only demonstrated an intent to view images, not to receive them. The Government provided evidence that allowed the jury to conclude Eychaner possessed the necessary specific intent, despite occasionally conflating the concepts of specific intent and substantial steps towards the offense. The Court highlighted this distinction during the trial, addressing it in the denial of Eychaner's Rule 29 motion on Count Two. The Court noted parallels with the case of United States v. Groenendal, where the Sixth Circuit upheld a conviction for attempted receipt of child pornography. In Groenendal's case, while on supervision for a previous conviction, he was allowed a monitored computer, during which he searched for child pornography. The evidence included logged searches, mouse movements over images, and prior convictions, which collectively demonstrated his specific intent to receive the images. The appellate court affirmed that similar evidence could support a finding of specific intent in Eychaner's case. Eychaner removed his hard drive, hindering forensic analysis of whether his Internet cache held specific images or if he had downloaded them. Despite this, both his case and that of Groenendal relate to attempted receipt rather than actual receipt of images, making the cache evidence unnecessary to establish intent. Eychaner's admission indicated a specific intent to view the images, and the jury needed to determine if he sought to receive them. Several pieces of evidence supported the jury's inference of his specific intent: 1. Eychaner’s search terms on Bing.com, such as "Lolicon 3D images" and "Toddlercon Sex," indicated intent to receive explicit content. 2. He employed suggested search terms from Bing.com, which further implied an active pursuit of such images. 3. Eychaner admitted to searching for and viewing "anime child pornography," reinforcing the inference of intent. 4. Screenshots showed he clicked on and enlarged images, suggesting an intent to interact with them beyond mere viewing. 5. His prior conviction for possession of child pornography allowed the jury to infer he was not merely a passive viewer of explicit images. These factors collectively established a strong basis for the jury to conclude that Eychaner had specific intent to receive the images in question. Eychaner had a documented history of collecting sexually explicit images of children, indicating a pattern of behavior that suggested intent to receive or collect such images rather than merely view them. The jury could infer that his past actions, including repeated confessions to viewing explicit images and the destruction of his hard drive, indicated an intention beyond simple viewing. His claims of anger at failing to abstain were countered by the inference that he sought to conceal evidence of further criminal activity. The circumstances of his online behavior, including the use of explicit search terms on a monitored system, suggested a motive to download images rather than just view them. Eychaner's prolonged engagement with explicit websites—searching and enlarging numerous images—further supported the inference of intent to collect rather than merely view. Additionally, the Government needed to establish that Eychaner took a substantial step toward committing the offense, defined as a direct act that strongly corroborates criminal intent. Evidence presented at trial indicated that Eychaner secured permission from his probation officer to use a computer and tested the monitoring software, actions that could be interpreted as preparatory steps leading to his criminal conduct. On November 17, 2016, Eychaner engaged in multiple online activities indicative of intent to access illicit materials involving minors. He logged onto his roommate's Wi-Fi, used voice commands to navigate to Bing.com, and entered explicit search terms related to child pornography. Eychaner reviewed search results, enlarged several explicit images, and accessed a website allowing downloads of such content. Additionally, he had removed his hard drive and admitted to viewing illicit images, which allowed the jury to infer that he intended to receive visual depictions of minors in sexually explicit conduct. Regarding the images presented to the jury, the defendant disputed whether certain exhibits depicted minors or involved sexually explicit conduct. The government established that many images clearly featured minors based on physical characteristics and context, such as size relative to adults. For example, exhibit 14a-2 featured a youthful character in a suggestive pose, with evidence supporting that she was prepubescent. Exhibit 14a-4 depicted a female character performing oral sex, with ambiguity surrounding her age primarily stemming from her hairstyle, as her more childlike features were not fully visible. The jury was positioned to determine that the images, despite the defendant's claims of ambiguity, likely depicted minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. A reasonable juror could conclude that the character in question is a minor, based on her youthful appearance, hairstyle, and the size of her mouth relative to an adult male's penis. In Government's exhibit 14a-10, titled "Dennis the Menace fucks his mom," the character's size relative to his mother does not explicitly indicate his age; however, the context suggests he is a minor, supported by the jury's familiarity with Dennis the Menace's characterization as under eighteen. Defendant questions whether Government's exhibit 14a-14, featuring a young nude male in a sexually suggestive pose, qualifies as a depiction of sexually explicit conduct. The Government argues that it meets the criteria for "sexually explicit conduct" under 18 U.S.C. 2256(2)(A) due to its lascivious exhibition of genitals. To assess this, courts apply the six non-exclusive factors from United States v. Dost, which include the focus on the child’s genitalia, suggestive setting, unnatural pose, level of clothing, implication of sexual willingness, and intent to elicit a sexual response. The depiction in exhibit 14a-14 meets nearly all Dost factors: the minor's genitals are prominently displayed, the child is fully nude with underwear dangling from his ankle, he is positioned unnaturally on his back with legs spread, and his pose appears to suggest sexual availability. The character's portrayal indicates the minor's willingness to engage in sexual activity, supported by the image's use in an advertisement for another site, suggesting its intent to attract viewers. The jury had sufficient evidence to determine that Government's exhibit 14a-14 depicted a minor in a lascivious display of genitals. Regarding the obscenity of the images, the jury's assessment followed the three-part Miller v. California test: (1) whether the material appeals to prurient interest, (2) whether it depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and (3) whether it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The defendant challenged the jury's conclusion on the images' obscenity but did not present new arguments post-trial. A dispute arose about the scope of "work as a whole," with the Government arguing that individual images or full screenshots should be considered, while the defendant contended that the original manga work should be presented if the images were part of it. The defendant maintained that if the original work could not be found, prosecution for the extracted images should not proceed. Defendant contended that the Government was obligated to provide context from the original websites of the images from Bing.com, asserting that without this evidence, the jury could not adequately determine the obscenity of the images. The Court, however, found both parties' interpretations of the "work as a whole" standard incorrect. The Court clarified that isolated portions of non-obscene works, when presented separately, become a new "work as a whole" for analysis. It concluded that the images from premiumhentai.site and similar websites should be evaluated collectively for obscenity under the Miller test. The Court noted that images depicting children in sexually explicit scenarios are inherently obscene when viewed in isolation. The key issue was whether the Government provided sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that each "work as a whole" was obscene. For conviction on Count Two, the jury needed to unanimously identify at least one obscene depiction. The Government only needed to demonstrate the obscenity of one image for a conviction. The jury found all listed images obscene, and thus, Eychaner must demonstrate that the Government did not meet its burden for each image to secure an acquittal. The jury had enough evidence to conclude that at least three images from premiumhentai.site were obscene. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding of obscenity for fifteen images, which the Court will summarize rather than analyze individually, as it previously ruled that a reasonable juror could deem them obscene. The Defendant did not present new arguments regarding these images or those from premiumhentai.site that would necessitate further examination. The jury's assessment of three specific images from premiumhentai.site was informed by five pieces of evidence demonstrating the overall obscenity of the images. First, the jury recognized that the images originated from a pornographic website catering to audiences interested in sexual manga involving minors, particularly "lolicon" and "shotacon," which depict sexualized portrayals of young girls and boys, respectively. Second, two of the images were part of a set described in explicit detail, highlighting the obscene nature of the content. The third point involved the jury’s review of tags associated with the images, such as "hardcore," "rape," and "nude," which further indicated the site's focus on obscene content. Overall, the jury concluded that the nature of the website and the explicit descriptions provided were sufficient to infer the obscene nature of the images in question. A reasonable juror could conclude that the tags on premiumhentai.site indicate that its content is aimed at pedophiles interested in manga images of minors in sexual situations, lacking serious artistic, literary, or political value. The jury was aware of obscene titles associated with images and sets, such as "cum-in-mouth" and "Vinput Lolicon 3D Pack," which suggested that the complete sets likely contained further obscene depictions of children. An advertisement on the site for "Only Best Shotacon" featured a young male in a sexual context, leading the jury to infer that "shotacon" referred to graphic sexual images rather than serious manga works. The jury could also deduce that the site's content was pornographic based on the nature of the advertisement. The evidence presented by the Government was deemed sufficient to support the jury's verdict regarding three images from the site. For two images part of specific sets, the jury could reasonably determine they were obscene based on their graphic nature and descriptive tags. The third image, which was an advertisement of a young boy, was also concluded to be obscene, as it stood alone and was not part of a larger work. The Government met its burden of proof, and the Defendant failed to present evidence demonstrating that these works had serious literary, artistic, or political value. Instead, the Defendant relied on Dr. Cather's testimony, which the jury ultimately rejected, finding that works depicting sexual relations with children could not possess such value under the Miller test. Defendant has not specifically argued against the Government's evidence regarding the obscenity of images from premiumhentai.site, leading the Court to conclude that a reasonable juror could find these images obscene beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury's determination of obscenity for fifteen additional images was supported by various indicia, including: 1. The graphic sexual depictions involving children within the images. 2. The pornographic nature of the websites hosting the images, such as xHamster.com. 3. The explicit titles of the videos, like "3d cute loli fucked hard." 4. The brief duration of some videos, indicating a lack of serious narrative content. 5. The search terms used to find these images, for example, “show images of Lolita sperm.” These factors led the jury to reasonably infer the overall obscenity of the works. Consequently, Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal regarding Count Two is denied. Regarding Count Three, which charges Eychaner with the destruction of a tangible object to impede a federal investigation, the Government needed to prove that Eychaner knowingly destroyed a computer hard drive with the intent to obstruct an investigation. Evidence showed that he removed his hard drive and discarded it, satisfying the first two elements of the charge. Although Eychaner claimed he discarded the hard drive for reasons unrelated to obstructing the investigation, the circumstances indicated he should have anticipated an investigation due to his prior activities on a monitored computer. Eychaner had a reasonable basis to anticipate an official investigation into his activities, particularly given his previous forensic laptop analysis in a 2008 child pornography case. This awareness likely influenced his actions when he disposed of his laptop hard drive, as a reasonable juror could conclude he intended to obstruct a subsequent investigation by the United States Probation Office. Consequently, his Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal for Count Three was denied. Regarding Count Four, which charged him with Obstruction of Justice and Attempted Evidence Tampering, the Government needed to establish that Eychaner altered or destroyed evidence—specifically, his laptop and hard drive—with corrupt intent to impair its availability in an official proceeding. The evidence showed significant damage to his laptop and the disposal of the hard drive, preventing a forensic examination. The jury was aware of Eychaner’s prior child pornography conviction, allowing them to infer his knowledge of the potential forensic implications. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he acted with corrupt intent, leading to the denial of his Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal for Count Four. On Count Five, which charged Eychaner with penalties for being a Registered Sex Offender, he renewed his motion for acquittal. Under 18 U.S.C. 2260A, the statute specifies a significant penalty for offenders committing felonies involving minors. Eychaner's argument centered on the predicate offense not involving a minor, warranting his acquittal on this charge. Defendant filed a motion for acquittal on Count Five, arguing that the term "involving a minor" necessitates the presence of an actual person under eighteen, claiming no evidence supported that element. This motion, introduced during the trial, raised a statutory interpretation issue to be considered after the Government's case-in-chief and prior to jury deliberation, without ample time for reflection. The Court denied the motion based on the information available at that time but indicated a willingness to reconsider it post-trial. During the trial, the jury was instructed on two elements of the offense: 1) Eychaner committed a specified felony involving a minor, specifically under 18 U.S.C. 1466A(a)(1), and 2) he was required to register as a sex offender when committing the offense. The jury found Eychaner guilty of attempting to receive obscene anime cartoons depicting minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, leading to his conviction on Count Two and subsequently on Count Five. No evidence indicated that the cartoons were produced using actual minors. The Court now needs to determine if the "involving a minor" element of 18 U.S.C. 2260A was met given Eychaner's attempts to receive cartoon depictions of imaginary minors. The Court noted a lack of jurisdictional precedent on this issue. In addressing it, the Court must first explore the plain meaning of "minor" as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2256(1) as "any person under the age of eighteen years," which raises the question of whether "person" refers solely to actual individuals or could also encompass imaginary creations. Determining whether "person" should be interpreted narrowly or broadly is crucial, as it impacts the interpretation of "minor." Since the statute 2256 does not define "person," the Court will refer to dictionary definitions, per precedent from *Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer* and *Blakely v. Wards*, which advocate for using ordinary meanings in the absence of statutory definitions. Dictionary definitions consistently suggest a narrow interpretation of "person," primarily signifying an individual human being. The definitions from the Oxford English Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary, and Webster's Third New International Dictionary emphasize that "person" refers to actual individuals rather than abstract or fictional entities. Given that the term "minor" in section 2256(1) requires the context of a "person" and is not modified by terms like "virtual" or "imaginary," the Court concludes that "minor" clearly means an actual individual under the age of eighteen. The Government's argument that the definition of "minor" simply imposes an age cutoff overlooks the necessity for "minor" to refer to a "person." The Government claims that because section 1466A criminalizes obscene depictions of minors regardless of their existence, the term "minor" in section 2260A must be interpreted similarly. However, the Court highlights that "depiction of a minor" is distinct from the term "minor" itself, reinforcing that the latter must refer to real individuals. A depiction may suggest the subject does not exist in reality, and the term "minor" typically refers to a real person. The language in 18 U.S.C. § 2260A specifies "involving a minor," necessitating the participation of a real person, which is not satisfied by a cartoon character. The court interprets "involving a minor" as including a minor as a necessary element in a felony offense. Definitions of "involve" indicate it means to include or contain something as part of itself. The court concludes that a minor is involved in a crime only if they are the subject of a visual depiction, such as a photograph of an actual child in explicit conduct. A minor may also be considered involved if they inspired a depiction based on a past encounter. However, a fictional character does not meet this criterion. Examining the broader context of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A reveals that the statute includes multiple predicate offenses that necessitate the involvement of an actual person, with some requiring a minor as a victim. The inference is that Congress intended the phrase "involving a minor" to apply similarly in cases where § 1466A is the predicate offense, emphasizing the necessity of a minor being victimized for the statute to apply. An inference is drawn that an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A, which involves a fictional cartoon character, does not meet the "involving a minor" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. Section 1466A criminalizes the attempted receipt of any visual depiction, including drawings or cartoons, that shows a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct and is deemed obscene. The Fourth Circuit has established that the "depicts a minor" component can be satisfied by either an actual minor or a cartoon representation, as clarified in United States v. Whorley. Notably, § 1466A(c) states that it is not necessary for the depicted minor to exist, implying that the term "minor" would typically refer to an actual minor unless specified otherwise. Consequently, since § 2260A is not an offense under § 1466A, the term "minor" in § 2260A should not be interpreted to include non-existent minors. This reading is supported by the broader context of § 2260A, which does not suggest ambiguity in the phrase "involving a minor." Additionally, the Government's argument for interpreting § 2260A's "involving a minor" in light of other statutes that include the term "actual minor" is rejected, as the principle of in pari materia, which advocates for harmonizing statutes addressing the same subject matter, does not apply here. The Court emphasizes that interpreting § 2260A based on separate statutes diverges from its plain meaning. United States v. Morison established that sections 793(d) and 794 of the Espionage Act address distinct offenses with separate punishments, emphasizing the need to identify essential elements that differentiate them. The principle of in pari materia, which allows for the interpretation of statutes in relation to others, is applicable only when a statute’s language is ambiguous. The Fourth Circuit, along with other circuits, cautions against this principle's use in the absence of clear ambiguity. In the case at hand, the court found that 18 U.S.C. 2260A is unambiguous, thus rejecting the Government's argument for an in pari materia analysis. The court concluded that since a fictional cartoon character does not meet the definition of a "person," the "involving a minor" element of 2260A was not satisfied in Eychaner's attempt to receive obscene cartoon images. Consequently, Eychaner's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was granted for Count Five, resulting in the vacating of his conviction on that charge. However, the motions for Counts Two, Three, and Four were denied. The court ordered that a copy of the opinion and order be sent to both the defendant’s counsel and the U.S. Attorney's Office in Newport News, Virginia. Additionally, the case involved testimony about Cortona, a voice recognition program akin to Alexa and Siri, and noted the search terms used by Eychaner in relation to the charges. Animated Toddlercon Sex was a focal point in the trial, highlighted by specific examples from Eychaner's searches. Notably, one search for "Vip Zona 3d Hentai" yielded a thumbnail image from XXXBunker.com depicting a childlike female character being penetrated by an adult male. Another search for "Shotacon 3D Little Girl" returned a thumbnail from xhamster.com showing a prepubescent female character in a similar context. To mitigate prejudice against the Defendant, the Court had previously limited the number of images shown to the jury, which the Defendant agreed to. Disputes arose regarding the scope of the "works" analyzed for obscenity under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A, with the Court clarifying that the "work as a whole" for isolated thumbnail images was the material linked on the websites. This standard aligned with precedents indicating that individual digital clips can constitute the "work as a whole" when presented without context. During the trial, expert witness Dr. Cather's testimony raised concerns about the artistic, literary, or political value of the images, prompting the Government to request the admission of full screenshots to clarify misconceptions. The Court permitted the publication of three full screenshots specifically to counter Dr. Cather’s implications. However, the Government did not present the full contents of the webpages linked to the thumbnails, though both parties acknowledged the images originated from mainstream pornography sites. The Court categorized some images as coming from premiumhentai.biz and premiumhentai.site, while Dr. Cather described manga as a Japanese cartoon style. Manga cartoons are characterized as two-dimensional, hand-drawn images organized into panels to create a narrative. They are divided primarily into two subgenres: seijin manga for adults and seinen manga for children. Anime is described as the film adaptation of manga. Collectively, the court refers to images from both anime and manga as "manga" images. "Hentai" denotes paraphilia or abnormal sexual desires and can include depictions of both children and adults in sexual contexts. The term "lolicon" describes the sexual attraction of older males to young girls, originating from the novel "Lolita," while "shotacon" refers to similar themes involving young boys. "Toddlercon" is a subgenre of both lolicon and shotacon, focusing on toddler-age characters, typically between two to six years old, as objects of older men's sexual desire. The court clarified that "to receive a visual depiction" involves taking possession of it through actions like downloading or saving from the Internet, while merely viewing such depictions does not constitute the crime of receipt. The case at hand differs from previous matters, as one defendant destroyed evidence regarding potential downloads. Dr. Cather, the defense's expert, noted that determining the ages of manga characters is challenging due to stylized artistic features. However, her testimony implies that the artist's subjective intentions regarding character age should dictate judgments about whether the characters are minors, a claim unsupported by case law, and the court emphasizes that a reasonable juror’s interpretation of the images takes precedence over the artist's intentions. Adopting the Government's position on Bing.com images could broaden obscenity laws beyond Congressional intent, risking prosecution for individuals based on a single, randomly captured thumbnail from a generally non-obscene work. For instance, a modern film adaptation of Romeo and Juliet, which has significant literary and artistic value, could include a sex scene that, while potentially offensive in isolation, does not render the entire film obscene under the Miller test. If a thumbnail from this scene were displayed on Bing.com, the Government's theory could lead to prosecution of someone merely searching for that image, despite its context within the larger, non-obscene film. This perspective contradicts Supreme Court precedents, which assert that scenes should not be judged separately from their narrative context. Evidence showed that Bing.com image results link to their source websites, indicating that the obscenity of an image should be assessed in relation to the entire work. The Defendant's argument, suggesting that the Government must present the full original work for prosecution of related images, lacks legal support and would enable defendants to evade accountability for obscene images. For example, if an artist uploads isolated images from an obscene manga while locking away the original work, the Defendant's theory would prevent any prosecution, allowing individuals to possess these images without fear of legal consequences. Similarly, if an artist creates a standalone obscene image that appears part of a larger work, the theory would impose an unfeasible burden on the Government to locate a non-existent original work for prosecution, undermining Congressional efforts to combat the distribution and possession of obscene materials. Isolating a three-minute sex scene on a website alters its legal treatment, making it the "work as a whole" for analysis. If a search engine captures a thumbnail from this scene, the original three-minute video remains the relevant "work as a whole" because the thumbnail links back to the source. The jury's determination of obscene images does not affect the Guidelines calculation, as both parties agreed that the number of convicted images is irrelevant. Under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b. 7. App. n. 6, only images that meet the definition of "child pornography" under 18 U.S.C. 2256(8) factor into this calculation; obscene cartoon images do not qualify. The Government's exhibit 14a-14 lacks evidence that it is part of a larger work, addressing the defendant's argument regarding the necessity of showing the entire underlying work. The Court clarified the definition of "acting corruptly," emphasizing intent to undermine justice without needing to show success in that objective. Additionally, cases like United States v. Slaughter and United States v. Dahl examined the interpretation of "involving a minor," with Slaughter adopting a broad view and Dahl a narrow one. However, these precedents do not directly resolve whether depictions of fictitious characters, perceived as minors, qualify under the statute. The discussion centers on the interpretation of the term "minor" in 18 U.S.C. § 2260A, particularly in contrast to the term "actual minor" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. The Court distinguishes between "actual minors" (real persons under eighteen) and fictional depictions of minors. It references the Eleventh Circuit's ambiguity regarding the definition of "person," which raises questions about whether it includes both living and deceased individuals. The Court will apply dictionary definitions from 1996, the year § 2256(1) was adopted, and more recent definitions for § 2260A, enacted in 2006. The Court concludes that because Congress explicitly used "actual minor" in § 2252A when it intended to reference real individuals, the absence of similar language in § 2260A indicates that offenses involving non-actual minors are also subject to its penalties. The Court reflects on prior rulings, suggesting that it might reconsider the in pari materia construction due to the differing statutory context. It emphasizes that the use of "minor" should be interpreted broadly as potentially including non-actual minors, but notes that Congress did not structure § 2260A in a way that would support this interpretation. The Government's argument that "minor" in § 2260A can refer to fictional minors is deemed unpersuasive, as there is no precedent for Congress using "minor" to denote non-existent individuals.