Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; August 22, 2018; Federal Appellate Court
Richard Jones has filed multiple claims against the District of Columbia concerning his alleged overdetention and strip search following a court-ordered release on December 7, 2015. After his release order was issued, he was transferred to the D.C. Jail, where staff failed to locate the release order despite Jones' notifications, leading to a strip search and several hours of detention. Jones contends that he was unlawfully held for over five hours by the Department of Corrections, which he alleges routinely detains individuals past their release times due to its policy of waiting for paper release dispositions. He claims this practice results in unconstitutional overdetention and that the Department does not consistently adhere to its own policy regarding the transportation of released defendants without strip searches unless there is individualized suspicion. Jones raises constitutional claims related to his overdetention and strip search, as well as common law claims for false arrest and invasion of privacy.
In evaluating the District's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The complaint must contain sufficient factual content to establish a plausible claim for relief. The Court will assess whether a constitutional violation occurred and if a municipal policy or custom caused that violation in determining the viability of Jones' claims for municipal liability.
Jones claims that his overdetention and strip search violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, alongside common law claims for false arrest and invasion of privacy.
Regarding his constitutional claims, Jones contends that the overdetention was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, since Jones was already in custody when ordered to be released, his freedom of movement had already been curtailed, negating the Fourth Amendment’s applicability. Additionally, he failed to allege facts indicating a new seizure occurred due to the overdetention. Most courts have ruled that overdetention claims should be addressed under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Consequently, the Court will dismiss Jones's Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim.
Jones also argues that his overdetention violated his substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Substantive due process protects against egregious government misconduct and grave unfairness. To establish a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate either a significant infringement of state law due to animus or a deliberate disregard of the law affecting substantial personal rights. While overdetention can infringe on the liberty interest of being free from incarceration without a conviction, retaining custody for administrative purposes does not automatically constitute a constitutional violation. There is no clear benchmark for permissible delays in overdetention cases, but courts generally agree that acceptable administrative delays are significantly shorter than the 48-hour limit for detentions pending probable cause after warrantless arrests.
The District seeks a judicial determination that brief delays, specifically those lasting a few hours, are inherently reasonable in the context of post-release detentions. However, legal precedent indicates that release should occur within hours after the right to it arises, and delays beyond a certain threshold may be deemed unreasonable and unconstitutional. The Court cannot categorically assert that overdetention exceeding five hours is constitutional at this stage, allowing Jones to establish a claim for a constitutional violation.
To assert municipal liability, Jones must show that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. His complaint meets this requirement by identifying the District's release system as the source of overdetentions, citing inefficiencies such as a paper tracking system, misplaced documents, and manual processes. This reflects a longstanding custom that exemplifies the District's operational procedures, thus supporting his claim.
Consequently, the Court denies the District's motion to dismiss regarding Jones's Fifth Amendment claim related to overdetention. Regarding the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims stemming from a strip search before Jones's return to his cell, he argues that such a search is unconstitutional unless there is individualized, reasonable suspicion. However, existing D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court precedents, notably Bell v. Wolfish, establish a balancing test for evaluating the reasonableness of inmate searches, emphasizing the need for correctional officials to maintain reasonable search policies without requiring individualized suspicion prior to strip searches.
The Supreme Court emphasizes the necessity of routine searches in prisons to deter contraband, asserting that prison officials have a substantial interest in safeguarding the safety of inmates and staff when new inmates join the general population. In this case, the District argued that searches are warranted upon an inmate's admission to prevent contraband, without needing individualized reasonable suspicion. The Court referenced the decision in Florence, which established that such searches are permissible.
Jones contends that the District's blanket strip search policy, as previously challenged in Barnes v. District of Columbia, lacks justification and violates the Fourth Amendment. However, the District has presented a rationale for conducting searches to prevent contraband entry. Importantly, the standards governing inmate searches have evolved since Barnes, with subsequent rulings clarifying that individualized suspicion is not necessary for searches prior to integrating inmates into the prison population.
Furthermore, Jones has not shown that a specific District policy led to his strip search, as he acknowledges that the District’s policy diverts released defendants to a facility where they are not strip-searched absent individualized suspicion. Consequently, the Court dismisses Jones's Fourth Amendment claim against the District. Additionally, Jones's Fifth Amendment claim is also dismissed, as the Fourth Amendment provides the explicit constitutional protection against unreasonable searches, making it the appropriate basis for such claims.
Jones claims his overdetention and strip search violated common law torts of false arrest and invasion of privacy. He asserts that his overdetention qualifies as false arrest or false imprisonment, defined as unlawful detention. The court indicates that a viable false arrest claim requires allegations of unlawful detention, and since Jones's complaint lacks such allegations regarding a new arrest post-release order, the court grants the District's motion to dismiss this claim.
Regarding the invasion of privacy claim stemming from the strip search, the court outlines that this tort requires an invasion of physical solitude that is highly offensive to a reasonable person. The court finds the District's strip searches of individuals prior to entry into the general prison population reasonable, concluding that Jones did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in this context. Thus, the court grants the District's motion to dismiss this invasion of privacy claim as well.
In conclusion, the court partially grants and partially denies the District's motion to dismiss. Counts 3, 4, and 5 are dismissed for failure to state a claim, while Counts 1 and 2 survive based on alleged violations of Jones's Fifth Amendment rights due to continued detention after a court order for release. Jones's Fourth Amendment claim related to overdetention is dismissed. Additionally, a motion for leave to file supplemental authorities is denied as moot. Jones clarifies that he did not plead an Eighth Amendment violation and instead asserts a procedural due process claim without identifying specific procedures violated. The court notes that substantively, false arrest and false imprisonment are effectively the same.
