Court: District Court, W.D. New York; August 17, 2018; Federal District Court
Charles Reed, Sr. and Richard Reed, pro se plaintiffs and family members of Charles Quincy Reed, Jr., initiated a legal action under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983, and 1988. They allege that Quincy's parole officer, Curt Cashman, along with various law enforcement officers from the City of Rochester Police Department and the New York State Police, violated their Fourth Amendment rights through a warrantless search of a location they believed to be Quincy's residence. Cashman and the Rochester Police Department (RPD) defendants have both filed renewed motions for summary judgment, to which the plaintiffs responded. The Court sought additional clarifications regarding the apartment layout where Quincy and the plaintiffs lived.
The Court granted both Cashman’s and the RPD Defendants' motions for summary judgment, resulting in the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. The factual background indicates that Quincy, who had a prior conviction, was released on parole with specific conditions, including permitting his parole officer to conduct visits and searches of his residence, notifying the officer of any changes in residence or employment, and residing only at an approved location. These conditions were outlined in his "Certificate of Release to Parole Supervision."
Quincy was released to parole and initially arranged to live with his mother, Lisa Reed, and her husband, Charles, at their home. However, due to Charles's criminal record, this arrangement was denied by the NYS Parole Division. Lisa then proposed that Quincy reside in a vacant building she owned at 532 Upper Falls Boulevard, where she planned to create two apartments. Quincy moved into "Apt. 2," the south-side apartment, upon his release in August 2011 and lived there alone until the end of 2011.
In early 2012, Quincy moved to 14 Lavender Circle with his parents to facilitate commuting to a new job. However, due to parole restrictions regarding cohabitation with Charles, who had felony convictions, Charles moved to 532 Upper Falls Boulevard and took over Apt. 2, while Quincy stayed at Lavender Circle.
After a conflict with his sister at Lavender Circle in March 2012, the Parole Division instructed Quincy to leave, prompting him to return to 532 Upper Falls Boulevard. By this time, Apt. 1 had been renovated, so Quincy moved there while Charles and another individual, Richard, occupied Apt. 2. Quincy acknowledged that he did not have explicit permission to reside in Apt. 1 while Charles and Richard were in Apt. 2, although they were aware of his parole conditions. Prior to May 1, 2012, Quincy requested Lisa to draft a lease for Apt. 1, which he executed on that date, despite Lisa not having assigned apartment numbers.
In May 2012, Cashman was assigned as Quincy's parole officer. At Quincy's release in August 2011, the Parole Division's case management system (CMS) noted only one remodeled apartment, Apt. 2, located at 532 Upper Falls Boulevard, where Quincy was reported to be living. The CMS entry, made by former officer Maria Rhodes, described the apartment's layout and indicated ongoing remodeling by Quincy's mother. On May 31, 2012, Cashman conducted a home visit but only met Quincy outside the building without entering, thus not observing the apartment's actual conditions.
In late July 2012, Cashman received information from a Monroe Crime Analysis Center (MCAC) bulletin about a shooting involving Taiquan Gatson, a former parolee, and a suspect named "Charles Reed." Cashman suspected this referred to Quincy, who had a history of gang involvement and was potentially connected to a feud between gangs. Concluding that Quincy might possess a weapon related to the incident, Cashman decided to conduct a parole search of Quincy's apartment. On July 27, 2012, during a roll-call for Operation IMPACT, Cashman informed fellow officers of his plan to search Quincy's apartment that evening and requested assistance from the Rochester Police Department (RPD).
On July 27, 2012, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Richard Lee Reed encountered Cashman and other officers from the Rochester Police Department (RPD) at 532 Upper Falls Boulevard. Cashman identified himself as Quincy's parole officer and stated they were conducting a routine in-home visit, which Richard initially accepted as part of Quincy's parole stipulations. As Richard ascended the stairs to retrieve items from his apartment, Cashman followed him, asserting that they did not need a search warrant for the visit. Despite Richard’s inquiry about a warrant, Cashman reiterated their authority due to the nature of the visit.
Richard did not specify which apartment was his and which belonged to Quincy, assuming Cashman already knew. Richard opened the door to his apartment, after which Cashman and the officers entered ahead of him. Upon entering, they encountered Quincy, who was subsequently handcuffed, followed by Richard being handcuffed shortly thereafter. The specific location of Richard's handcuffing is unclear, but he ended up in the living room with Quincy and Quincy's girlfriend, both of whom were also handcuffed. In contrast, Cashman’s testimony indicated that Richard had pointed out the locations of his and Quincy's bedrooms before the officers entered. Cashman described Quincy as appearing disheveled, wearing casual clothing, and noted the presence of Quincy's girlfriend in the room.
Cashman entered a room labeled "office" and discovered a fake plant containing a small black pistol with a partially removed magazine. He reported this potential violation to the Rochester Police Department (RPD) and assisted in searching the room, where they found pants and a wallet belonging to Quincy, but he did not help search the rest of the apartment and left about thirty minutes later. Quincy, who was in the room with his girlfriend, Brittany Breedlove, at the time, claimed he awoke from sleep when he heard Richard arguing with officers outside. Richard, who was handcuffed in the living room, testified that he remained there until the handgun was found and subsequently refused consent for a full search of the premises, after which he was taken to a patrol car.
Charles, Quincy's grandfather, arrived during the search and stated that he heard Cashman inform the RPD officers about the need for proper paperwork to continue the search, noting that Cashman had relinquished control after finding what he was looking for. Charles explained that Quincy frequently spent time at his apartment due to amenities like air conditioning and cable. While Richard remained in the patrol car, he observed RPD officers removing a safe from the apartment, which had been alerted on by a narcotics dog but was found empty. Investigator Powell of the RPD was responsible for seizing the safe.
A court will grant summary judgment if the movant demonstrates there is no genuine dispute over any material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, per FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). When assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the opposing party (Scott v. Harris). If the movant meets the initial burden of proving no genuine issue of material fact exists (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby), the burden shifts to the nonmovant to provide evidence supporting a jury verdict (Salahuddin v. Goord). The non-moving party must present sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to find in their favor, even in the presence of disputed facts (Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell). Summary judgment is warranted if the non-moving party fails to show an essential element of their case for which they bear the burden of proof at trial (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett). In cases where the nonmovant is pro se, the court should interpret their submissions liberally and favorably (Burgos v. Hopkins).
All claims against former RPD Chief Sheppard are dismissed due to the plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate his personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations, which is necessary for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Supervisory officials cannot be held liable solely based on their authority. Personal involvement can be established if the defendant directly participated in the violation, failed to remedy it after being informed, created or tolerated unconstitutional policies, was grossly negligent in supervision, or showed deliberate indifference to the rights of the plaintiff. Sheppard, who served as police chief from November 2010 to December 2013, declared he was not consulted about or involved in the events of July 27, 2012, and only learned of them post-retirement. His mention in the complaint was limited to his title and duties, lacking any allegations of negligence or culpability. No deposed individuals implicated him, reinforcing the absence of personal involvement. The court also noted that mere supervisory status or a position in the command hierarchy does not suffice to establish liability. Thus, the dismissal of Sheppard as a defendant is warranted due to the plaintiffs' failure to allege any actionable misconduct on his part.
Claims against unidentified "known and unknown" law enforcement and state police agents have been dismissed as untimely. On December 26, 2012, the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed in forma pauperis and instructed them to identify unnamed defendants and amend their complaint within the statute of limitations. The RPD Defendants contended that the plaintiffs' failure to identify these defendants warranted dismissal. Section 1983 claims, lacking a specific statute of limitations, are treated as personal injury actions, borrowing the relevant state law statute, which in New York is three years under CPLR § 214(5). The limitations period for the plaintiffs' claims began on July 27, 2012, when the warrantless search occurred, and expired on July 27, 2015. As the plaintiffs did not identify or serve any defendants within this timeframe, their claims are now untimely. Courts typically allow some discovery for identifying "John Doe" defendants; however, the plaintiffs had sufficient opportunity to do so and failed. Consequently, all claims against the "known and unknown" defendants are dismissed with prejudice, as the plaintiffs' delay in naming specific officers was fatal to their civil rights claim.
The Fourth Amendment claims against Cashman, Minurka, Jimenez, and Powell are dismissed based on established legal principles regarding warrantless searches. The Supreme Court has determined that a search without a warrant based on probable cause is generally "per se unreasonable," with limited exceptions. Police entry into a home, constituting a search under the Fourth Amendment, is only permissible with a warrant, exigent circumstances, or valid consent. The consent exception allows for warrantless searches if voluntary consent is obtained from the property owner or from a third party with sufficient authority or relationship to the property. The concept of "common authority" is rooted in mutual use and joint access, not merely in property interest. This principle holds even when police mistakenly believe a co-occupant has shared authority to consent to a search.
Warrantless searches of homes are generally deemed unreasonable, but exceptions exist for individuals on probation or parole. The Supreme Court established in *Griffin v. Wisconsin* that the state's interest in supervising probationers allows for a degree of privacy invasion due to "special needs," which renders the warrant requirement impractical. In *Knights*, the Court upheld a warrantless search conducted by a sheriff's deputy for a specific crime investigation, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment's touchstone is reasonableness, which balances individual privacy against legitimate governmental interests. Probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy compared to parolees, as parole resembles imprisonment more closely than probation does. A warrantless search is deemed reasonable for probationers if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In *Samson v. California*, the Court ruled that no individualized suspicion is necessary for searches of parolees who have agreed to terms allowing searches without a warrant or cause. Both cases highlight that acceptance of probationary conditions indicates awareness of the authority to search, contributing to the reduced expectation of privacy for probationers and parolees.
Plaintiffs Richard and Charles argue that the search conducted by Cashman and the RPD Defendants was unreasonable because it targeted a non-parolee co-tenant (the apartment did not belong to the parolee, Quincy). They assert that non-parolees should not face consequences for a parole search directed at a parolee and claim that they did not give consent for the search. In response, Cashman and the RPD Defendants argue that Richard did provide consent through his actions and statements, and that Charles, being absent, could not withhold consent. Furthermore, they contend that Georgia v. Randolph is not applicable in the context of parole searches, asserting that Richard and Charles had a diminished expectation of privacy due to their cohabitation with a parolee, which they argue justified the search based on significant state interests. They also claim entitlement to qualified immunity, arguing that existing law regarding the issues raised is uncertain.
Qualified immunity protects state officials from liability in lawsuits regarding discretionary actions under two conditions: (1) Their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize, as established in Moore v. Vega; (2) They can demonstrate that their belief in the lawfulness of their actions was objectively reasonable at the time. The Supreme Court clarifies that a right is "clearly established" when existing precedent places the legal question beyond debate, not requiring a directly applicable case. Furthermore, “clearly established law” must be specific to the case's facts, meaning plaintiffs must identify prior case law that distinctly indicates the unlawfulness of the officials' conduct. The threshold for assessing whether a search was legal hinges on a reasonable officer's belief in its lawfulness, considering established law and available information. Officials may claim qualified immunity even if their decision was wrong, as long as it was reasonable, shielding them from liability for mistakes, whether factual or legal.
Cashman and the RPD Defendants believed they were entering the residence of Quincy, a parolee in Cashman's custody, when they entered Apt. 2 at 532 Upper Falls Boulevard. Warrantless searches are permitted under parole conditions if officers are reasonably sure they are at the correct residence. The court found Cashman's belief to be reasonable based on the parole records indicating that Apt. 2 was Quincy's approved residence, and Quincy had not updated his living arrangements despite moving to Apt. 1 in 2012. During a May 2012 home visit, the only information available to Cashman was that Apt. 2 was habitable. Discrepancies arose regarding the actual location of Quincy at that time; Cashman testified that Richard directed him to Quincy's bedroom, while Quincy stated he was in the "office" room when Cashman entered. Cashman had previously stated he had a meeting with Quincy in Apt. 2, despite admitting he had never been inside prior to July 27, 2012. Quincy's testimony indicated he was in a different room than Cashman believed he was, adding to the confusion about his actual residence.
Cashman and the RPD Defendants entered Apt. 2 based on Quincy's last reported residence to the Parole Division, which was undisputedly Apt. 2. Quincy was required to notify the Parole Division of any changes in his residence as a condition of his parole, which he failed to do when he moved to Apt. 1. On July 27, 2012, neither Quincy nor Richard informed Cashman or the RPD Defendants of this change. The Court determined that Cashman had probable cause to believe he was in Quincy's apartment, and the RPD Defendants were entitled to rely on this information due to the cooperative nature of law enforcement.
Cashman and the RPD Defendants argued they had reasonable suspicion to search the "office" in Apt. 2 based on a bulletin linking Quincy to a gang-related shooting. They also contended that the search was justified by Quincy's acceptance of search conditions in his parole agreement. Parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy compared to the general public, and New York State regulations mandate that parolees permit searches by their officers. Quincy was aware of these conditions, which further justified the search under Fourth Amendment standards. Case law indicates that this diminished expectation of privacy extends to locations other than the parolee's residence.
A parolee lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in residences he does not own or control, including those of third parties, especially when a search's purpose is not arbitrary or harassing. The court highlighted that granting a parolee privacy rights in a third party's home would exceed rights afforded in his own home. While standard release certificates do not imply unrestricted consent for searches, any warrantless search must be rationally related to the parole officer's duties. The officer's conduct must substantially relate to their responsibilities, as established in Huntley. The Second Circuit affirmed that this standard aligns with Fourth Amendment requirements. In this case, the court determined that the parole officer's search of Quincy’s apartment was justified due to credible information suggesting Quincy was involved in a crime and possibly possessed a firearm, thus violating parole conditions. The information indicated reasonable suspicion, which does not require additional consent beyond establishing a reasonable relationship to the officer's duties for warrantless searches.
The New York State Division of Parole's Policy and Procedures Manual mandates that consent from the parolee or an adult household member is required for a warrantless search of a parolee's residence. Quincy's signed certificate of release provided the necessary consent, as established in *People ex rel. McNeil v. New York State Bd. of Parole*, which states that such a certificate constitutes express consent for searches as a condition of parole.
Furthermore, the court finds that Cashman and the RPD Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Following the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in *Samson*, it is not definitively established that specific suspicion is necessary before conducting searches of a parolee or their residence. While the California statute in *Samson* required a clear written agreement for suspicionless searches, New York's regulations do not explicitly mandate such a waiver. The Supreme Court's ruling hinged on the California parolee's clear acceptance of suspicionless searches, which is not paralleled in New York's regulations.
Since *Samson*, there has been inconsistency among courts regarding whether New York's parole regulations equate to the California statute, leading to a lack of consensus on the applicability of *Samson* to New York parolees. The Second Circuit has not definitively endorsed the legality of searches without reasonable suspicion in parole contexts. Consequently, even if the information available to Cashman did not meet the threshold for reasonable suspicion, the ambiguous legal landscape means that a reasonable parole officer would not have perceived their actions as unlawful, thereby making the right not clearly established for qualified-immunity purposes.
The RPD Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as established by the Second Circuit, which permits police assistance during reasonable parole searches. The case of Reyes confirms that coordinated efforts between federal probation officers and police do not make a search unreasonable, provided the officers pursue legitimate probation objectives. The police presence in this instance did not render the warrantless search constitutionally unreasonable, as a reasonable officer would not perceive the parole officer's actions as unlawful.
The issue of whether the plaintiffs' consent was necessary for the parole search is examined. Quincy’s consent was established through his signed certificate of release, and there is no evidence he objected during his deposition. The plaintiffs argue that the ruling in Georgia v. Randolph, which invalidated a spouse's consent when the other spouse objected, should apply here. However, the interpretation of Randolph in relation to co-residents of parolees has produced varying judicial conclusions across different cases.
The Smith panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's Section 1983 claims based on qualified immunity, determining that it was not clearly established that the decision in Georgia v. Randolph applied to probation searches. The plaintiff, mother of a probationer, objected to a warrantless search conducted by police at her home, which the probationer had listed as her residence. Although the Supreme Court's Randolph ruling indicated that an objection from one resident supersedes consent from another when both are present, the court noted that it was unclear if this principle applied to probation searches, which are treated differently due to their unique circumstances. Courts have consistently recognized that probation and parole situations present distinct considerations, leading officers to reasonably conclude that general search rules may not apply similarly to probation searches. The panel highlighted that the legal landscape surrounding a non-probationer’s expectation of privacy when living with a probationer remains unsettled. As a result, the plaintiff could not demonstrate that her rights regarding the search were clearly established as of September 2013, thus granting the officers qualified immunity. The court declined to address the broader constitutional question regarding the Fourth Amendment's applicability to such searches, stating that this case was not suitable for advancing the law.
Cashman and the RPD Defendants are granted qualified immunity regarding the plaintiffs' claim that Richard, as a dissenting co-tenant, could override Quincy's consent given due to his parole conditions. The Court grants summary judgment for Cashman (ECF 64) and the RPD Defendants (ECF 66), dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint (ECF 1) entirely. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the case. There are noted discrepancies in the spelling of some defendants' names between the caption and the actual names, with corrections made where applicable. The document references several exhibits and provides details about the physical location related to the case, mentioning Richard's prior living situation and Cashman's testimony regarding the search that led to Quincy's arrest for weapon possession. It clarifies that a parole officer has a duty to monitor parolee compliance with parole terms. The Court distinguishes between probation/parole searches and consent searches, referencing relevant case law and upholding the jury's verdict favoring defendants on state-law civil rights claims where qualified immunity does not apply.
