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Turpin v. Ray
Citation: 319 F. Supp. 3d 191Docket: Civil Action No.: 17-2453 (RC)
Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; July 12, 2018; Federal Appellate Court
Charles Turpin has filed a lawsuit against Metropolitan Police Department Officers Anthony Rowley and Sharon Strange, the District of Columbia, and landlord Darnell Ray, alleging individual and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures. Additionally, he claims common law violations, including trespass, false arrest, wrongful eviction, and malicious prosecution against Officers Rowley and Strange, and malicious prosecution against the District of Columbia. He also brings common law claims against Darnell Ray for wrongful eviction, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. The court has granted motions to dismiss the 1983 claims of illegal entry, false arrest, and malicious prosecution against Officers Rowley and Strange, as well as the municipal liability claim against the District of Columbia. The court has declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, which will be remanded to the D.C. Superior Court. Factual background includes Mr. Turpin's long-term tenancy under Darnell Ray, initially with his partner, Ms. Miles, whose death prompted Mr. Ray to seek Mr. Turpin's eviction. Following a landlord-tenant case, a judgment of possession was issued, resulting in a Writ of Restitution for eviction, which expired without action from the U.S. Marshals, who are responsible for executing evictions in D.C. During this period, Mr. Ray changed the apartment locks, leading Mr. Turpin to forcibly re-enter the unit. Subsequently, police were called by Mr. Ray on December 29, 2016, but the responding officers did not intervene, considering the situation a civil matter. Mr. Ray contacted the police regarding Mr. Turpin, who had been evicted but remained in the apartment. Officers Rowley and Strange informed Mr. Turpin of his eviction, during which he acknowledged forcing entry and claimed the Writ of Restitution against him had expired. Despite his claims, the officers arrested Mr. Turpin and removed him from the premises. Subsequently, he faced charges of destruction of property and resisting arrest, for which he was acquitted on July 10, 2017. On October 6, 2017, Mr. Turpin filed a lawsuit in D.C. Superior Court, later moved to federal court by the District of Columbia. He alleges Fourth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers Rowley, Strange, the District of Columbia, and common law tort claims against them and Mr. Ray. Currently, motions to dismiss from the officers, the District, and Mr. Ray are pending. The legal standard for a motion to dismiss requires a complaint to present a "short and plain statement" of the claim, assuming the truth of factual allegations and construing them favorably to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must provide sufficient factual content to render the claim plausible, avoiding mere conclusions or speculative assertions. Officers Rowley and Strange assert that Mr. Turpin has not adequately stated claims for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights and argue for dismissal based on qualified immunity. They contend that no constitutional violations occurred as Mr. Turpin had unresolved tenancy status and admitted to property destruction, which negated any expectation of privacy and established probable cause for his arrest. Additionally, they claim entitlement to common law privilege regarding false arrest and trespass claims, while also stating that Mr. Turpin failed to plead claims for wrongful eviction and malicious prosecution. The District of Columbia similarly argues that Mr. Turpin has not sufficiently alleged a "deliberate indifference" claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or common law malicious prosecution. In addressing the 1983 claims against Officers Rowley and Strange, Mr. Turpin alleges illegal entry into his apartment without a warrant or exigent circumstances, and an arrest without probable cause. The officers argue that Mr. Turpin failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy and that, even if a violation occurred, their actions were protected by qualified immunity due to the lack of clearly established law at the time. The Court recognizes the Supreme Court's mandate to resolve qualified immunity issues early in litigation and finds that, under the circumstances presented, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, the Court grants their motion to dismiss the illegal entry claim on these grounds. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individuals may file claims against defendants who, while acting under state or local authority, violate constitutional rights. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability unless their actions breach clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize. Courts evaluate qualified immunity through a two-pronged test: (1) whether the official's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time. A "clearly established" right is based on existing legal precedents. The determination of qualified immunity is context-specific, focusing on the official's conduct in the particular situation and allowing for reasonable mistakes regarding law and fact. In assessing whether Mr. Turpin's Fourth Amendment rights were infringed, the court must explore whether, under the District of Columbia's laws on self-help evictions, a tenant retains a possessory right and corresponding expectation of privacy after a Writ of Restitution expires but before a formal eviction occurs. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, mandating that warrantless entries into homes are generally unreasonable unless exigent circumstances exist. Additionally, Fourth Amendment protections apply only if the plaintiff has a subjective expectation of privacy that society finds reasonable. A significant body of case law has examined the expectation of privacy in landlord-tenant relationships, but the specific circumstances of this case remain unaddressed. Relevant cases demonstrate that tenants may lose their expectation of privacy if evicted, occupy a residence illegally, or are present through coercion. In this instance, the court determines that it does not need to assess the constitutionality of the officers' actions regarding qualified immunity, as it is sufficient to analyze whether their conduct was clearly prohibited under the circumstances. For qualified immunity to apply, the officers must have had reason to believe that the consenting party (Mr. Ray) had legitimate authority over the premises, and that Mr. Turpin no longer had a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy due to prior eviction proceedings and a Writ of Restitution issued against him. The court finds that, given Mr. Turpin's prior long-term tenancy and subsequent illegal re-entry into the home, his expectation of privacy was not clearly established, thus supporting the officers' actions. If the eviction had not occurred or if Mr. Turpin had not broken into the residence, the outcome might have differed. The Court determined that the officers' entry into Mr. Ray's home, with his permission, did not constitute a clearly established constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment, referencing Circuit case law such as Ratcliffe. Consequently, the motion to dismiss the illegal entry claim was granted based on qualified immunity. Regarding the 1983 false arrest claim by Mr. Turpin, the officers contended that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred and asserted their entitlement to qualified immunity, citing a reasonable, albeit possibly mistaken, belief in the existence of probable cause for the warrantless arrest. The Court acknowledged that while probable cause is typically a jury question, the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Wesby supports qualified immunity for officers who reasonably conclude probable cause is present. A warrantless arrest is deemed constitutional if supported by probable cause, which is defined as a prudent person's belief, based on total circumstances, that a crime occurred. In this case, both Mr. Ray and Mr. Turpin informed the officers that Mr. Turpin had broken a door to enter the residence and that an eviction judgment against him existed. Officers Rowley and Strange argued they acted on the belief that a crime had occurred, specifically citing D.C. Code 22-303 against property destruction. The Court noted that even favoring Mr. Turpin's claims, the facts suggest a reasonable officer would likely conclude probable cause existed for the arrest. Thus, the Court found it unnecessary to determine the constitutionality of the officers' specific actions, as qualified immunity could still apply if the alleged violation was not clearly established at the time, following the modified test from Pearson v. Callahan. To withstand a motion to dismiss, Mr. Turpin must present sufficient facts demonstrating that Officers Rowley and Strange violated a clearly established constitutional right or were aware of the illegality of their actions. Relevant case law, including White v. Pauly and Boatwright v. Jacks, emphasizes the necessity for plaintiffs to allege facts indicating that defendants should have known their actions were wrongful. For warrantless arrests, establishing probable cause requires a substantial body of case law, as noted in Wesby, where officers received qualified immunity despite an eventual lack of probable cause due to the absence of any controlling case law indicating a Fourth Amendment violation in similar circumstances. In Mr. Turpin's case, both officers were informed of his alleged criminal behavior and the existence of an eviction judgment against him, leading them to believe a crime had occurred. Mr. Turpin has not identified any pertinent case law demonstrating a Fourth Amendment violation under these facts. Consequently, the officers' qualified immunity claim is upheld since they acted on a reasonable belief, aligning with the Supreme Court's findings in Wesby that lack of clear precedent favors immunity. As a result, the court dismisses the false arrest claim based on qualified immunity. Mr. Turpin claims that Officers Rowley and Strange violated his Fourth Amendment rights by initiating criminal proceedings against him, constituting an unreasonable "seizure." The officers argue that no constitutional violation occurred and assert their entitlement to qualified immunity. The Court notes that even if Mr. Turpin's claims implied a Fourth Amendment "seizure," the unclear legal standards in D.C. regarding such seizures in malicious prosecution claims, along with the Court's previous ruling granting qualified immunity for the false arrest claim, lead to the conclusion that qualified immunity also applies to the malicious prosecution claim. To assess qualified immunity, the Court must determine (1) if a constitutional violation occurred and (2) if that violation was "clearly established" at the time. The analysis for malicious prosecution differs from false arrest, with the key event being the filing of a criminal charge. A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 necessitates the plaintiff to prove (1) the defendant initiated or continued criminal proceedings, (2) the proceedings ended in the plaintiff's favor, and (3) a predicate constitutional violation occurred due to those proceedings. Mr. Turpin has not adequately demonstrated the existence of a predicate constitutional violation. Previous cases cited, such as Pitt and Thorp, illustrate instances of Fourth Amendment violations involving detention or humiliating conditions, which Mr. Turpin's claims do not parallel. In *Spiller v. District of Columbia*, the court determined that the plaintiff's claims of being "deprived of liberty" due to his arrest and subsequent court appearance did not meet the necessary threshold for a malicious prosecution claim to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court emphasized that Mr. Turpin's assertion of "unnecessary and illegal detention" lacked sufficient factual support to demonstrate a restriction on his liberty, especially compared to precedents set in cases like *Pitt* and *Thorp*. The ruling highlighted that while the right to be free from malicious prosecution is recognized under the Fourth Amendment, the claim must be supported by clearly established legal standards at the time of the alleged violations. The concept of an unreasonable "seizure" related to malicious prosecution remains ambiguously defined across various jurisdictions. The court reiterated that to avoid qualified immunity, a plaintiff must present specific facts indicating a violation of a constitutional right, which must be clearly delineated in the context of the case, rather than stated as a broad principle. The ruling referenced several cases illustrating the complexity of defining what constitutes a sufficient restriction on liberty, noting that previous circuit rulings require a demonstration of some form of post-arraignment "seizure" for a claim to be viable under § 1983 malicious prosecution. Ultimately, the court concluded that mere allegations of deprivation of liberty were inadequate to establish a Fourth Amendment seizure when the plaintiff was released immediately after arraignment. The Court determined that Officers Rowley and Strange were not on notice of any clear law prohibiting their actions during the arrest of Mr. Turpin, as case law regarding the minimum requirements for a "seizure" in a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is unsettled. Consequently, the lack of a clear precedent meant that the officers could not be held liable for any pretrial conditions imposed on Mr. Turpin following formal charges. The Court dismissed the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim on qualified immunity grounds since Mr. Turpin's complaint did not indicate any impermissible "seizure." In relation to Mr. Turpin's claim against the District of Columbia for municipal liability based on inadequate training and oversight of MPD officers regarding warrantless entries, he alleged that policymakers were aware of ongoing constitutional violations and acted with deliberate indifference. However, Mr. Turpin withdrew this municipal claim in response to the District's motion to dismiss, reserving the right to reinstate it after discovery. The defendants argued that he failed to adequately plead a pattern of abuses necessary for a deliberate indifference claim and that his withdrawal warranted dismissal with prejudice. The Court agreed with the defendants but opted to dismiss the claim without prejudice, noting that dismissal with prejudice is generally an exception in federal practice, as it precludes any future litigation on the merits of the claim. Mr. Turpin's withdrawal of his municipal liability claim fails to address the District's challenges, resulting in the concession of the Defendants' motion to dismiss. However, the Court opts not to dismiss the claim with prejudice, allowing Mr. Turpin the chance to substantiate his claim on its merits. Consequently, the District's motion to dismiss the § 1983 municipal claim is granted, but the dismissal is without prejudice. Mr. Turpin also asserts D.C. common law claims against various defendants for wrongful eviction, trespass, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Initially, the Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over these claims as they related to the federal claims. However, with the dismissal of the constitutional claims, the Court lacks independent subject-matter jurisdiction over the state law claims. Therefore, these common law claims are remanded to the D.C. Superior Court. The Court references 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which allows for the dismissal of state claims once all federal claims are eliminated. It underscores that factors such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor remanding the state claims to local courts, particularly when the case is at an early stage and the plaintiff originally filed in state court. The D.C. Circuit has indicated a preference for remanding state claims once federal questions are resolved. Jurisdiction over Mr. Turpin's remaining state law claims is not exercised due to the dismissal of federal claims, which were based on federal question jurisdiction. The case has not advanced beyond the motions to dismiss, and discovery has not commenced. Mr. Turpin, having initially filed in D.C. Superior Court, will not face prejudice in returning to that forum. Citing precedent, the court notes that significant federal judicial resources have not been invested in this case, and as a D.C. resident, Mr. Turpin will not be disadvantaged by pursuing his claims in Superior Court. Consequently, the common law claims against Officers Rowley and Strange, the District of Columbia, and Mr. Ray are remanded to D.C. Superior Court for consideration of local law claims, including trespass and malicious prosecution. The court grants the motions to dismiss the § 1983 claims of illegal entry, false arrest, and malicious prosecution against Officers Rowley and Strange, as well as the municipal liability claim against the District of Columbia. It reaffirms its acceptance of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true at this stage and clarifies that the District of Columbia is treated as a state for § 1983 purposes. The defendants provide minimal support for their motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim, primarily arguing that the existence of probable cause negates such a claim. The Court undertakes a qualified immunity analysis for Mr. Turpin's constitutional claim despite limited information regarding Officers Rowley and Strange's involvement beyond the initial arrest. The defendants did not contest the claim's facial deficiencies, which suggest Mr. Turpin did not adequately plead a constitutional violation to survive a motion to dismiss. However, the Superior Court docket indicates that Mr. Turpin underwent drug testing and attended multiple court hearings, potentially constituting a Fourth Amendment seizure. The Court acknowledges it can take judicial notice of public documents without converting the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment. Even if Mr. Turpin were granted leave to amend his complaint to incorporate these restrictions, the unclear legal standards regarding probable cause for his arrest and the nuances of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim imply that even a properly drafted violation would not withstand the qualified immunity defense. Notably, the case law indicates that qualified immunity often hinges on factual disputes that necessitate further discovery, but in this instance, neither party raised such disputes concerning Turpin's arrest or prosecution, allowing the Court to make a qualified immunity determination. Officers Rowley and Strange claim common law privilege concerning Turpin's claims, while Mr. Ray contends that Turpin fails to state a viable claim against him. The Court ultimately declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, thus not addressing these issues.