League of Women Voters of Fla., Inc. v. Detzner

Citation: 314 F. Supp. 3d 1205Docket: Case No. 4:18-CV-2§51-MW/CAS

Court: District Court, N.D. Florida; July 24, 2018; Federal District Court

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The order grants a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs regarding early voting access in Florida's public universities and colleges. Florida has 12 public universities and 28 state and community colleges, with significant student populations, particularly at the University of Florida (UF), which enrolls over 52,000 students. Approximately 68% of Gainesville's voting-age population is affiliated with UF and Santa Fe College. In 2016, over 1.1 million individuals were enrolled in higher education institutions in Florida, with nearly 830,000 in public colleges and universities, and about 107,000 staff members employed at these institutions. 

Voting trends indicate that 2.4 million individuals under 30 were registered to vote in Florida in November 2016, representing more than a quarter of the electorate. Early voting is popular, with 40.3% of voters participating in 2016, and this trend is notably higher among college students—43% voted early in 2016 compared to 18% nationwide. Despite this, Secretary of State Kenneth Detzner's opinion prohibits the establishment of early voting sites on college campuses, preventing nearly 830,000 students from voting early at their institutions. This restriction also affects local residents affiliated with these educational institutions, limiting their ability to vote where they work, study, or live.

The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction regarding the Secretary of State's Opinion that prohibits early voting on university and college campuses, finding it in violation of the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. The motion was prompted by significant wait times experienced by Florida voters during the 2012 elections, attributed to inadequate voting locations. Under Florida law, election supervisors had limited discretion in designating early voting sites, restricted to offices, city halls, or public libraries. In response to these issues, the legislature amended the early voting statute in 2013 to allow a broader range of locations, including civic centers and government-owned facilities. However, it did not include provisions for college or university facilities as eligible early voting sites. In January 2014, the Secretary of State, responding to inquiries about designating the J. Wayne Reitz Union on the University of Florida campus as an early voting site, determined it did not qualify under the amended statute's definitions. The Secretary argued that since the legislature did not explicitly include colleges and universities, facilities related to them could not be classified as "convention centers" or "government-owned community centers." This interpretation was solely based on the lack of explicit legislative inclusion, without additional justification.

Plaintiffs include six university students and two organizations: the League of Women Voters and the Andrew Goodman Foundation. Key plaintiffs are Megan Newsome (22), a recent University of Florida graduate and Puffin Democracy Fellow; Amol Jethwani (21), a student with experience in facilitating rides to polling sites; Mary "Jamie" Roy (20), a Student Ambassador for the Andrew Goodman Foundation; Dillon Boatner (21), a student member of the League; Alexander Adams (19), a first-time voter from Florida State University; and Anja Rmus (19), a student who has voted in previous elections. Newsome, Jethwani, Roy, and Rmus are registered in Alachua County, while Boatner is registered in Volusia County but plans to change to Alachua. Adams is registered in Leon County. The defendant is Florida's Secretary of State, who oversees the uniform interpretation and implementation of election laws and provides authoritative opinions to election supervisors.

Each plaintiff claims that the Secretary's opinions impose burdens on their voting rights. For example, Roy relies on public transport and experienced long travel times to voting locations. Newsome organized a shuttle program for early voting, which involved significant waiting times and was not accessible to all students due to scheduling conflicts. These logistical challenges highlight the difficulties faced by students in exercising their voting rights in the context of the Secretary's policies.

Ms. Newsome has previously sought rides or hired Uber services for transportation to early voting locations. Amol Jethwani coordinated rides, investing considerable effort in matching drivers and riders. The individual Plaintiffs assert that having an early voting site on campus would significantly ease their voting access. Before addressing the merits of Plaintiffs' motion, the Court dismisses the Defendant's claim that the Pennhurst doctrine bars consideration of the case. The Defendant attempts to recast federal claims as state claims, which the Court rejects, affirming that the Plaintiffs have raised federal constitutional issues. The Court notes that federal courts can review and intervene in state laws alleged to be unconstitutional, citing precedent that supports the jurisdiction to enjoin state officials from violating federal rights. The Court confirms its authority to assess a state officer's interpretation of state law in light of federal constitutional standards, ensuring that vague state statutes do not allow for interpretations that contravene the U.S. Constitution.

Challenges to interpretations of state law in state courts may be hindered due to the courts' deference to state interpretations, particularly when federal courts bar these challenges. Examples include two federal cases where courts invalidated state election law interpretations. In **Obama for America v. Husted**, the court found that Ohio's differing deadlines for military and non-military early voters violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, leading to an injunction against the state. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision, noting that the Secretary of State’s interpretation imposed undue burdens on non-military voters. Similarly, in **Charles H. Wesley Educational Foundation v. Cox**, the court ruled against the Georgia Secretary of State's interpretation of voter registration laws, which rejected bundled applications, deeming it a violation of federal law. 

Currently, the court is reviewing the Defendant's Opinion, which is treated as effective state law by election supervisors in Florida, despite the Defendant's claims of its advisory nature. Declarations from Ion Sancho, a long-serving Supervisor of Elections, indicate that Florida's election supervisors generally consider the Division's written opinions authoritative and adhere to them unless contradicted by a court or statute. The supervisors' compliance is driven by the practical need to avoid controversy in election administration, as they receive the Secretary of State's opinions without any disclaimers suggesting limitations on their applicability. Consequently, the supervisors interpret these opinions as the Secretary’s intended enforcement of Florida’s election laws.

A group of University of Florida (UF) students requested the Gainesville City Commission to establish an early voting site on campus. In response, the Gainesville City Attorney sought clarification on whether the Reitz Union could qualify as a government-owned community center or convention center for early voting under the amended Section 101.657 of Florida Statutes. The Defendant's opinion concluded that the terms "convention center" and "government-owned community center" do not broadly include the Reitz Union or similar college facilities, which were explicitly excluded by the Legislature as early voting sites. The Defendant's rationale for this conclusion was based on the Reitz Union's affiliation with UF as a specific educational institution. Consequently, this ruling implies that no on-campus facilities, including stadiums or public libraries, could serve as early voting sites, despite those being permitted under the Early Voting Statute.

Plaintiffs are seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the Defendant from prohibiting county supervisors of elections from establishing early voting sites on college campuses and to compel the Defendant to inform election supervisors about the Court's directive. For a preliminary injunction to be granted, the moving party must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, show that irreparable injury will occur without the injunction, establish that the potential harm to them outweighs any damage to the opposing party, and confirm that the injunction would not negatively affect the public interest. Although a preliminary injunction is a significant remedy, it should be granted if the movant convincingly meets these four criteria.

Courts evaluate alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments regarding the right to vote using the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. Voting is recognized as a fundamental political right that underpins all other rights, with historical support from cases like Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Burdick v. Takushi. Effective voting necessitates extensive planning and regulation to ensure fairness and order in elections, as emphasized in Storer v. Brown. 

In applying the balancing analysis, courts assess the nature and extent of the claimed injury to voting rights against the justifications provided by the state for its regulations. The scrutiny applied varies depending on the severity of the restrictions: if a regulation imposes "severe" restrictions, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Conversely, reasonable and nondiscriminatory restrictions typically meet scrutiny if they align with significant state regulatory interests. Even minor burdens must be justified by substantial and legitimate state interests.

The Court assumes, for the analysis of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, that Defendant's Opinion is a "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction." However, the Opinion is found to be facially discriminatory based on age and imposes significant burdens on Plaintiffs' rights, contrary to the Defendant's claims. While some courts have deemed certain administrative burdens as minor, the restrictions here are substantial, particularly as Florida's public college and university students are entirely prohibited from on-campus early voting due to the Opinion. This creates a disproportionate impact on younger voters, contradicting the principle that the effects of laws must not unevenly affect identifiable groups. The Opinion effectively establishes a secondary class of voters who are denied access to early voting in convenient locations. This treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause, as once the right to vote is granted, it must be equal for all citizens. The statute allows for early voting as a convenience, but constitutional issues arise when such conveniences are selectively available, thereby undermining rational and equitable administration of voting rights. The Defendant's actions are deemed inconsistent with constitutional protections.

Defendant's Opinion imposes a prohibition on nearly 830,000 individuals living and working in public college communities in Florida, significantly impacting young voters by denying them reasonable access to alternative early voting locations. This voter class uniquely faces such restrictions. Dr. Rodden's report highlights the disproportionate effects on college students, revealing that travel times to early voting sites are markedly longer for student-dominated census block groups compared to those without. His analysis indicates that college students typically reside in areas with high population density and limited car access, further exacerbating travel challenges. Additionally, he notes that biking as a commuting option is rare in Florida due to safety concerns. The Court finds the Defendant's attempts to measure access from the campus edge inadequate, as students would need to traverse significant distances from various campus locations to reach voting sites. The Opinion's impact is particularly notable given that a substantial portion of Florida's college students utilized early voting in previous elections, with 43 percent participating in 2016, surpassing the national average. Overall, the analysis underscores the challenges posed by the Opinion on a demographic that is highly engaged in the early voting process.

Younger voters are increasingly opting for early voting primarily due to convenience, which plays a crucial role in their decision-making process regarding how to vote. Experts note that the cost-benefit analysis of voting significantly influences voter behavior. Restrictions at polling locations can increase costs, making early voting more appealing. On Election Day, younger voters face additional challenges, such as higher rates of provisional ballot rejection due to incorrect precincts, especially as they frequently move residences. In Florida, voters aged 18 to 21 have provisional ballots rejected at over four times the rate of those aged 45 to 64. Long wait times at on-campus polling locations exacerbate these issues, with reports of students waiting over an hour, and complications from frequent address changes leading to further delays. Vote-by-mail also presents challenges, with voters aged 18 to 21 being eight times more likely to have their ballots rejected compared to those over 65. The plaintiffs, who live far from early voting sites, are uniquely burdened by a prohibition against accessing a centralized voting location near their school or work, increasing the obstacles they face in exercising their voting rights.

Defendant fails to articulate sufficiently weighty interests to justify the burdens imposed on Plaintiffs' voting rights. While state laws may impose restrictions on voting access, these must be supported by precise and legitimate regulatory interests. The Defendant identifies three interests: adherence to state law, alleviating parking concerns, and preventing campus disruptions from early voting sites. However, the claim of following state law is flawed, as the Early Voting Statute does not prohibit early voting on college campuses and gives election supervisors discretion in site designation. The Defendant's interpretation relies on unadopted amendments and misconstrues the statute's flexibility. Additionally, the concern about parking difficulties is deemed neither precise nor substantial, with local supervisors better positioned to assess such issues. Testimony indicates that an early voting site at Florida State University could alleviate transportation burdens rather than exacerbate them. Overall, the Defendant's arguments lack the precision and weight necessary to justify limiting Plaintiffs' voting rights.

Adding an early voting site is suggested as a solution to reduce long lines and parking issues at existing locations, particularly at the University of Florida, where increased student shuttle usage has led to congestion. The rationale for this addition is supported by the need to minimize disruption on campus during elections, with the argument that a supervisor of elections is better suited to assess potential disruptions than the defendant. The plaintiffs face significant burdens on their voting rights, which the defendant has not sufficiently justified with precise governmental interests. 

The defendant's opinion is also deemed a violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment due to its discriminatory impact based on age. The Amendment guarantees voting rights for citizens aged eighteen and older, and courts have noted a lack of clear guidance on evaluating such claims. Recent judicial consensus favors applying the Arlington Heights standard for assessing potential violations of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. This court agrees with this approach, emphasizing that the Amendment's language is similar to the Fifteenth Amendment, which suggests that the Arlington Heights framework is appropriate. The court notes that the impact of official actions on different age groups is crucial for analysis, particularly if a pattern of discrimination emerges despite neutral legislation. However, mere impact is not sufficient without a significant pattern being evident.

Defendant's Opinion demonstrates a clear pattern of age discrimination, disproportionately affecting younger voters. The justifications provided—adhering to state law, alleviating parking issues, and minimizing campus disruption—appear to be mere pretexts for discriminatory intentions. Although the Opinion does not explicitly name college students, its impact is unmistakably biased. The Court draws parallels to historical instances of discrimination, such as the 1910 Oklahoma grandfather clause that effectively disenfranchised African-Americans despite lacking explicit language targeting them. Similarly, the Opinion's effects represent an intentional and facially discriminatory act against a specific demographic, violating the Voting Rights Act and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.

The Court finds no valid non-discriminatory interpretation of the Opinion, which constitutes a clear infringement on voting rights, supported by weak rationales. This contrasts sharply with historical efforts in Florida to expand voting access in 2013. While the procedural integrity of the decision-making process is acknowledged, adherence to procedure does not render the Opinion constitutional if it is rooted in intentional discrimination against younger voters.

A unanimous Senate, nearly unanimous House of Representatives, and 38 ratifying states aimed for the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to protect against significant barriers to young voters' rights, as illustrated in Worden v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Elections. The court views the prohibition of on-campus early voting by the Defendant as a clear infringement on these rights. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claim under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must show irreparable injury, which is defined as harm that cannot be remedied through monetary compensation. Irreparable harm is presumed when voting rights are restricted, as established in Obama for Am. and League of Women Voters of N.C. The court recognizes that once an election occurs, there is no opportunity for redress. Plaintiffs argue they will face significant challenges to vote early, including increased travel distances and time, particularly impacting individual and organizational Plaintiffs.

The court weighs the threatened injury against potential harm to the Defendant from the injunction. The injury to Plaintiffs involves violations of their constitutional rights, affecting approximately 830,000 college students in Florida. In contrast, the Defendant's discriminatory opinion would be rendered ineffective, with minimal damage to the Defendant, as it would simply restore discretion to election supervisors regarding early voting sites. The court acknowledges that while the Defendant may argue logistical challenges, the potential harm to young voters' rights takes precedence.

Adding early voting sites could create confusion, but the voting rights of approximately 830,000 young voters outweigh the concerns. An injunction is deemed to serve the public interest as it protects constitutional rights and promotes accessible voting for all. Current voter turnout, particularly among younger voters aged 18 to 29, is significantly lower than the overall registered voter turnout. Creating barriers for younger voters contradicts public interest.

The Court clarifies it is not responsible for determining early voting sites, but rather it removes restrictions on Florida's supervisors of elections, allowing them to choose early voting locations freely. The preliminary injunction grants the following orders:

1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is granted.
2. The Secretary of State is prohibited from enforcing the Early Voting Statute in a way that restricts the use of various public facilities affiliated with colleges or universities for early voting.
3. The Secretary must inform election supervisors that excluding these facilities from consideration as voting sites is unconstitutional, thereby reinstating their discretion.
4. The Secretary must file a Notice of Compliance with the Court by July 27, 2018.
5. The injunction will take effect once a bond of $500 is posted to cover potential costs and damages for any party wrongfully enjoined.

The case concerns in-person early voting, distinct from absentee or mail-in voting and separate from Election Day polling places.

The Court refers to the signed Opinion by Maria I. Matthews, Director of the Division of Elections, as Defendant's Opinion, noting that this Division operates under the Florida Department of State, which issues formal interpretations of election laws. Plaintiffs are confirmed to have standing, which the Court addressed in its Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff Roy identifies as gender-queer and uses the pronoun "they." The Court asserts its independence in interpreting federal law, indicating it is not bound by state agency interpretations. The Court finds Defendant's arguments about the Opinion's limited scope unconvincing, as they overlook the comprehensive reasoning presented within the Opinion. The Opinion is illustrated through a hypothetical scenario regarding federal regulations on animals in offices, emphasizing that interpretations extend broadly beyond specific inquiries. The Court cites precedent from Bonner v. City of Prichard regarding the accessibility issues faced by plaintiffs in reaching early voting sites. Additionally, the Court finds Dr. Rodden's credibility and methodology sound, based on data from various authoritative sources, while recognizing that densely populated areas may exist outside the typical census block tracks.

Alexander Adams lives one mile from the nearest early voting site, with other individual Plaintiffs living even farther away: Dillon Boatner (five miles), Amol Jethwani (1.5 miles), Megan Newsome (five miles), and Anja Rmus (two miles). They all argue that having an on-campus early voting site would alleviate significant burdens on their voting rights. The court clarifies that it is not mandating compliance with a federal court's interpretation of state law, but rather examining the Early Voting Statute to assess the Defendant's interests in adhering to state law. The Plaintiffs' Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim is acknowledged as valid, and the court notes that its analysis involves balancing the burdens on the Plaintiffs against the Defendant's interests, which it finds to be weak, thereby favoring the Plaintiffs' position. The court is prepared to challenge any pretextual justifications provided by the Defendant. Historical context is given, noting that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was passed overwhelmingly by Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the states, though Florida has not ratified it. The court also addresses the Defendant's arguments regarding the timing of the lawsuit and the practicality of adding on-campus early voting sites for the 2018 elections, pointing out that none of the individual Plaintiffs were eligible to vote in 2014 and emphasizing that it is the responsibility of election supervisors to decide if it is "too late" for such an addition.