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Scalia v. Cnty. of Kern
Citation: 308 F. Supp. 3d 1064Docket: 1:17–cv–01097–LJO–SKO
Court: District Court, E.D. California; April 10, 2018; Federal District Court
Lawrence J. O'Neill, Chief District Judge, addresses a case concerning the death of Kimberly Morrissey-Scalia, a pretrial detainee at Kern County Jail, who died following two falls from her bunk. Her husband, John Scalia, is the plaintiff, filing claims against multiple defendants including Kern County, Kern County Hospital Authority, Sheriff Donny Youngblood, Sergeant Joel Swanson, Detention Deputies Randi Allen and Misty Miller, and Nurse Rowena P. Blakely. The allegations include deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of the Bane Act, failure to summon medical care under California Government Code § 845.6, negligence, and medical negligence. The defendants, KCHA and Blakely, filed a motion to dismiss, which the plaintiff opposed. The factual background reveals that Morrissey-Scalia, with a history of mental illness and alcohol dependency, was initially placed on suicide watch upon her arrest on June 22, 2016. After being transferred to Lerdo Pre-Trial Facility on June 27, she fell from a top bunk and reported injuries. Nurse Blakely assessed her but failed to conduct further testing or refer her to a physician before allowing her to return to her cell. Subsequently, she fell again and was found unconscious and vomiting. After being transported to the infirmary and then to a medical facility, she underwent emergency surgery but ultimately died on July 1, 2016. The court has determined that the motion to dismiss is granted in part, indicating that some claims may proceed while others may not. Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when a plaintiff does not adequately state a claim for which relief can be granted. This can occur due to a lack of a legally cognizable theory or insufficient factual allegations supporting a cognizable theory. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts typically accept the complaint's allegations as true, interpret them favorably to the non-moving party, and resolve any uncertainties in their favor. For claims involving fraud, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) imposes a heightened pleading requirement, necessitating detailed disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the fraud, including specifics about the "who, what, when, where, and how." This requirement aims to protect defendants from frivolous fraud claims by ensuring they are informed of the allegations against them. Failure to meet this standard can lead to dismissal of the fraud claim, which is akin to a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for insufficient pleading. The analysis addresses a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows individuals to seek redress for constitutional rights violations committed under state law. It clarifies that § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but a mechanism to enforce federal rights. To establish a claim, there must be a direct connection between the defendants' actions and the alleged constitutional deprivations. The Ninth Circuit interprets "subjecting" someone to a deprivation as involving affirmative actions, participation in others' actions, or failing to act when required, which results in the deprivation. Plaintiffs are required to satisfy a "linkage requirement," explicitly identifying which defendants are responsible for each violation and the factual basis for the claims, ensuring that defendants are adequately informed of the allegations against them. For cases involving inadequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Inmates can assert these claims under the Eighth Amendment if convicted or under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause if they are pretrial detainees; the latter provides broader protections. In either case, demonstrating "deliberate indifference" by prison officials is essential for the plaintiff's success. To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must fulfill a two-part test. Initially, they must demonstrate a serious medical need, indicating that a lack of treatment could lead to significant injury or unnecessary pain. Secondly, they must show that the defendant responded with deliberate indifference, which involves proving a purposeful act or failure to address the medical need, alongside harm resulting from this indifference. Deliberate indifference may manifest through denial, delay, or intentional interference with medical care. The standards for claims made by inmates under the Eighth Amendment and pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment are traditionally aligned. However, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the standard for pretrial detainees' claims has become less defined. Kingsley established that excessive force claims require an objective standard, assessing whether the force used was objectively unreasonable from a reasonable officer's perspective at the time. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Castro extended this objective standard to failure-to-protect claims, arguing that both types of claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and share similarities in their underlying rights and nature of harm. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted that the principles articulated in Kingsley apply broadly to various claims, not just those involving force. Importantly, under the precedent set by Bell v. Wolfish, a pretrial detainee can succeed in a due process claim by demonstrating that the government's actions are not rationally related to a legitimate objective or are excessive, without needing to prove intent to punish. Castro overruled a previous ruling that applied a uniform deliberate indifference standard across all 1983 claims and required plaintiffs to demonstrate a defendant's subjective intent to punish in pretrial detainee failure-to-protect claims. The court established that a pretrial detainee must show more than negligence but less than subjective intent, akin to "reckless disregard," which can be assessed through an objective standard recognizing the aggravated risk a reasonable person would perceive. There remains ambiguity regarding whether a pretrial detainee must prove subjective or objective unreasonableness for claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, leading to a split among California district courts. Most courts in the circuit continue to apply the Eighth Amendment standard for claims related to untreated serious medical needs. In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, deliberate indifference is interpreted objectively, with no subjective component required. The Ninth Circuit has recently refrained from addressing this issue, maintaining that the subjective standard from the Eighth Amendment is still relevant for pretrial detainees' medical needs claims. Castro specifically overruled Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, clarifying that pretrial detainees do not need to prove a defendant's subjective intent in failure-to-protect claims. Clouthier established a unified standard for assessing pretrial detainees' claims of deliberate indifference, applicable to both failure to protect and serious medical needs. The Ninth Circuit has consistently used this "deliberate indifference" standard in various cases, such as Lolli, Gibson, and Cabrales, which addressed issues like medical care for diabetic and mentally ill detainees and suicide prevention. The Clouthier court noted that the "deliberate indifference" standard requires a subjective test, meaning the defendant must be aware of a significant risk. However, the Castro court questioned the applicability of this subjective standard following Kingsley, suggesting that the objective standard used in excessive-force claims could also apply to medical needs claims. The dissent by Judge Ikuta argued that the majority's new test was overly narrow, as it required action from the defendant, potentially excluding cases like Lolli. The majority maintained that the outcome would remain the same under the new test. The Court concluded that the Castro decision does not limit the new test exclusively to failure-to-protect claims, and the reasoning applies to deliberate indifference cases related to medical needs as well. An objective test for deliberate indifference applies to the Plaintiff's claim, as established by Castro. To succeed in a deliberate indifference claim regarding failure to protect, the Plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) the defendant intentionally decided on the conditions of the plaintiff's confinement; 2) those conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff; 3) the defendant failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate that risk, with a reasonable officer recognizing the high degree of risk; and 4) the defendant's inaction caused the plaintiff's injuries. Additionally, when considering untreated medical conditions, the Plaintiff must show: 1) a serious medical need; 2) a purposeful act or failure to respond to the plaintiff's medical needs, with the defendant appreciating the high degree of risk; and 3) harm resulting from the indifference. The intent level required is between negligence and subjective intent, characterized as "reckless disregard." The defendant's conduct must be objectively unreasonable, evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A mere inadvertent failure to provide medical care does not constitute a deliberate indifference claim under §1983. The Plaintiff sufficiently meets the first prong by alleging that the Decedent fell from a height of approximately five feet onto concrete, sustaining injuries to her face, elbow, knee, and suffering from a bump on her eyebrow. The Decedent was unable to walk and was transported to the jail infirmary in a wheelchair. The allegations indicate a serious medical need due to the fall, particularly the risk of traumatic brain injury. The Defendant, Blakely, allegedly spent less than ten minutes with the Decedent, failed to implement a follow-up plan, did not consult a physician, and did not conduct any tests. When viewing the allegations favorably for the Plaintiff, the claim that it was objectively reckless not to assess the Decedent for potential head trauma after her fall meets the second prong of the deliberate indifference test. Decedent suffered a serious medical need for evaluation and treatment of a possible traumatic brain injury following a fall. Immediate medical attention is critical to prevent severe complications, including brain bleeding and swelling, which can be fatal. The allegations state that Decedent was not evaluated for such injuries and was returned to jail, resulting in untreated trauma and subsequent delays in necessary care, contributing to her death. BLAKELY's actions are claimed to have exposed Ms. Morrissey-Scalia to a significant risk of death, and her failure to take reasonable measures, despite recognizing this risk, is asserted to be the cause of Decedent's death. Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's claims are contradictory, asserting that Blakely cannot be both deliberately indifferent and inadequately trained. However, the standard for deliberate indifference is largely objective, allowing for the possibility that Blakely was aware or should have been aware of the risks involved, while also suggesting KCHA failed to provide proper training regarding head trauma. Thus, the motion to dismiss the first cause of action is denied. Regarding the second cause of action against Kern County Hospital Authority (KCHA), liability is examined under Monell v. Department of Social Services, which holds that municipalities can be liable for unconstitutional acts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if such acts stem from official policies or customs. A municipality cannot be liable solely based on the actions of its employees (respondeat superior). Liability can arise from a deliberate choice of action or a "policy of inaction" that results in a failure to protect constitutional rights. To establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) deprivation of a constitutional right, 2) existence of a policy or custom, 3) deliberate indifference of that policy or custom to the constitutional right, and 4) that the policy or custom was the direct cause of the violation. Municipal liability under Monell can arise from four primary sources: (1) actions taken in accordance with an official policy, (2) established practices or customs that serve as the local government's standard operating procedure, (3) decisions made by a final policymaking authority whose actions represent official policy, or (4) delegation or ratification of decisions by a final policymaker to subordinates. Policies can manifest as either actions or inactions and can be formal or informal. A municipality may be liable for failure to adequately train employees on a valid policy if it demonstrates deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens. While inadequate training may indicate a potential policy issue, it must reflect a conscious disregard for rights, typically shown through a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees. In some cases, an "obviousness" standard can replace the need for a pattern to establish liability. The defendants assert that the plaintiff's allegations lack specificity and do not identify a distinct pattern, practice, or custom by KHCA that demonstrates deliberate indifference to the decedent’s rights. The Plaintiff asserts that the First Amended Complaint (FAC) identifies unconstitutional actions and omissions by Blakely and claims that KCHA's customs, policies, or practices were closely linked to these actions. The FAC alleges KCHA inadequately trained nurses at the Lerdo jail infirmary, specifically placing an untrained nurse in a critical triage role for traumatic brain injury cases. It also claims that KCO and KCSO provided insufficient training for recognizing and treating severe head trauma among pretrial detainees and lacked adequate medical resources, including properly trained medical professionals. Furthermore, KCO and KCSO allegedly failed to appropriately manage inmates with mental health issues and did not adequately train staff to identify when inmates needed urgent care for head trauma. If any policies or training existed, they were purportedly poorly implemented. The FAC details specific failures by KCHA and KCO, asserting that KCHA ignored the foreseeable consequences of its training deficiencies, which led to violations of constitutional rights. As a result, the motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Monell claims was denied. In addition, the third cause of action is based on California Civil Code section 52.1, known as the Bane Act, which allows individuals to seek damages and injunctive relief for interference with their rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion. The Bane Act defines "interferes" as "violates," and the essence of such a claim is that the defendant used improper means to prevent the plaintiff from exercising legal rights or to compel the plaintiff to act against their legal obligations. To establish a claim under Civil Code section 52.1, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant interfered with their legal rights through threats or violent acts. Specifically, a claim under the Bane Act requires proof of (1) intentional interference with a constitutional or legal right, and (2) that such interference was executed via threats, intimidation, or coercion. Defendants argue that the plaintiff's claim against Blakely lacks allegations of threats, intimidation, or coercion, thus failing to meet the Bane Act’s requirements. The plaintiff contends that the claim should be sustained, asserting that Blakely's deliberate indifference constitutes coercion. The interpretation of the Bane Act's requirement for threats, intimidation, or coercion has generated substantial debate. Courts have varied in their decisions regarding whether these elements must be separate from the underlying constitutional violation. In the case of Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, the court ruled that inherent coercion from a constitutional violation, such as wrongful detention, does not satisfy the statutory requirement for additional coercive conduct. The court emphasized that the Bane Act aims to address more egregious conduct rather than mere negligence or human error. Subsequent cases have explored this distinction between intentional and unintentional conduct, with some courts asserting that the Shoyoye ruling applies primarily to unintentional acts. In Bender v. County of Los Angeles, the court clarified that unlawful arrests involving excessive force do present coercion separate from inherent coercion in wrongful detention. Overall, the legal landscape remains complex, with courts continuing to navigate the nuances surrounding the Bane Act’s requirements. In Allen v. City of Sacramento, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that a claim under California's Bane Act requires allegations of coercion beyond what is inherent in a wrongful detention or arrest. Citing Shoyoye, the court concluded that simply alleging a wrongful arrest does not meet the necessary elements of section 52.1. The Ninth Circuit upheld this principle, emphasizing that plaintiffs must demonstrate threats, intimidation, or coercion independent of the actions that constitute the detention or search to succeed on a Bane Act claim. The Court of Appeal in Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco addressed inconsistencies among federal district courts regarding whether separate allegations of coercion are necessary for Bane Act claims. The court noted differing views on whether coercion must be independent of the underlying constitutional violation, particularly in cases of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The Cornell court, while dealing with a Bane Act claim stemming from a wrongful arrest, aimed to clarify that a plaintiff does not need to allege coercion separate from the violation inherent in the arrest itself. The court's thorough analysis critiques the Shoyoye ruling, which suggested that coercion must be distinct, ultimately disagreeing with that interpretation. Shoyoye's examination of coercion distinguishes between coercion inherent in wrongful detention and that which is independent, particularly regarding tort versus statutory liability in jail overdetention cases. The court clarified that Section 52.1 of the Bane Act necessitates an analysis of whether the requisite scienter for liability is satisfied, even when negligence is demonstrated. It rejected interpretations suggesting that independence from inherent coercion is necessary for all Section 52.1 claims related to search-and-seizure violations, asserting that such readings misinterpret the statute. The Bane Act explicitly prohibits "interference with" protected rights through "threat, intimidation, or coercion," without requiring the coercion to be separate from the constitutional violation. The court emphasized that the statute's unambiguous language must be applied as written, noting that law enforcement actions are often coercive and suggesting that exempting them would create unwarranted judicial immunity. It concluded that the phrase "threat, intimidation, or coercion" serves to elevate the seriousness of the statutory violations beyond mere tort claims. The standard for determining the egregiousness of an unlawful arrest hinges on whether the arresting officer possessed specific intent to infringe on the arrestee's rights, rather than requiring proof of coercion independent of the wrongful detention itself. This approach aligns with federal civil rights law, ensuring that ordinary negligence does not meet the threshold for Section 52.1 claims. The test for specific intent involves determining if the right in question is clearly defined and applicable to the situation at hand. The trial judge must determine if the defendant acted with the intent to deprive a victim of protected rights. If so, even if the defendant did not recognize the unlawfulness of their actions, they will be legally deemed to have acted with the requisite specific intent—demonstrating reckless disregard for constitutional or statutory protections. Defendants argue against applying the reasoning of the Cornell case until the California Supreme Court's review deadline has passed, noting the court denied review on February 28, 2018. They suggest instead adopting a Northern District of California decision from January 2018, which does not reference Cornell. However, a more recent opinion acknowledges that Cornell offers a more persuasive interpretation regarding the coercion element of the Bane Act than previous cases. The court's analysis in Cornell extends beyond wrongful arrest to all Bane Act claims, emphasizing that intentionality is crucial. The court further cites M.H. v. County of Alameda, which established that deliberate indifference to medical needs constitutes a coercive act under the Bane Act. The court concludes that the reasoning in Cornell is persuasive and finds that the plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for relief under the Bane Act, as the right to be free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is clearly applicable in this context. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Blakely acted with the intent to deprive him of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, meeting the standard of reckless disregard necessary for a claim of deliberate indifference under the Bane Act. The First and Fourteenth Amendment claims assert a right to be free from wrongful government interference in familial relationships. Although Plaintiff recognizes that Bane Act claims cannot be brought as wrongful death actions, he seeks to have his individual claim dismissed without prejudice in case of a future legal change, which the Court denies. Consequently, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss the Bane Act claim related to survival but grants it without leave to amend for the individual claim. Regarding the Fourth Cause of Action under California Government Code § 845.6, it states that public entities and employees are not liable for injuries caused by failure to provide medical care to prisoners unless the employee knows the prisoner requires immediate medical care and fails to act. Liability is limited to serious, obvious medical conditions requiring urgent attention. California courts emphasize that this provision allows action against public entities solely for failing to summon immediate medical care, not for malpractice in delivering care. The case Watson v. State of California illustrates this standard, wherein a plaintiff (an inmate) claimed prison officials failed to provide proper medical care following an injury. In the month following the plaintiff's transfer to a different state prison, he underwent a physical intake exam where medical personnel, informed of his injury, did not examine his tendon due to his ability to walk. Four days later, another physician took x-rays and diagnosed a sprained ankle. The subsequent month, during another transfer, a physician noted a probable mending Achilles injury. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants, asserting that the State provided prompt medical care and had no actual or constructive notice of the Achilles injury, as none of the examining doctors recognized its severity. The court stipulated that dissatisfaction with treatment necessitates filing a negligence action against medical providers under section 845.6. In the case of Nelson v. State of California, the court dismissed a prisoner's claim regarding a missed diabetes diagnosis, clarifying that failure to prescribe correct medication constitutes medical malpractice, not a failure to summon medical care. The opinion in Castaneda further illustrated that the state was immune from liability under section 845.6 for a prisoner’s failure to receive a biopsy. Although the prisoner was referred for a biopsy by medical personnel, the court concluded that these actions constituted a summoning of medical care. The failure to provide further treatment or follow-up was seen as a question of the reasonableness of care rather than a failure to summon it, with the court emphasizing that decisions made by medical professionals regarding patient care are protected as professional judgment. Dr. Leong's choice not to mark a situation as 'Urgent' or 'Emergent' is deemed a medical judgment rather than a failure to summon care. The estate's cited omissions relate to the provision of medical care, for which the State has immunity. The plaintiff references *Jett v. Penner*, where the Ninth Circuit interpreted California Government Code § 845.6 as encompassing both diagnosis and treatment, holding that the need for medical care can arise multiple times for ongoing serious conditions. However, *Castaneda v. California* later rejected this interpretation, asserting that issues such as failure to prescribe medication or ensure proper diagnosis fall under how care is provided, not under the obligation to summon care. The *Castaneda* court emphasized that the quality of care relates to the medical practice standard and does not render the State liable under § 845.6. The Ninth Circuit acknowledges that its interpretations are only binding unless contradicted by California courts, and thus they will adhere to the *Castaneda* decision over *Jett*. The complaint states that Defendant Allen, with Defendant Miller's knowledge, transported the decedent to the jail infirmary after the initial fall. Blakely is alleged to have improperly cleared the decedent for return to B-Pod without transferring her to an emergency trauma center, consulting a physician, or conducting adequate tests. The contention revolves around whether Blakely, as a medical professional, should have recognized the need for further evaluation or established a follow-up plan for the decedent in her cell. Additionally, there is inquiry into whether Blakely should have called for an ambulance sooner after the decedent's second fall. These considerations pertain to the quality of medical care provided and do not constitute a violation of California Government Code § 845.6, which requires a negligence claim to be filed against medical providers if treatment was summoned but deemed inadequate. Consequently, the motion to dismiss the claim under § 845.6 is granted with the opportunity for amendment. The fifth cause of action addresses negligence and premises liability against all defendants. The court interprets this as two related claims: general negligence and premises liability. The defendants argue that there are no allegations showing that they own or maintain the jail, which the plaintiff concedes, thus the premises liability claim is dismissed without leave to amend. The plaintiff intends to pursue a general negligence claim against Blakely for actions not covered by the medical negligence claim. However, based on Flowers v. Torrance Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., California law allows only one negligence action per set of facts, regardless of claims being categorized as professional or ordinary negligence. As such, only one standard of care applies, leading to a dismissal of the premises liability claim. The Court of Appeal determined that a nurse's failure to raise a gurney rail constituted a basis for ordinary negligence but not for medical negligence, based on expert testimony. The California Supreme Court reversed this decision, asserting that a single factual scenario cannot give rise to two distinct duties of care. It emphasized that a defendant has only one duty under a given set of circumstances. In this case, the plaintiff is allowed to plead alternative claims, indicating that if medical negligence is not applicable, ordinary negligence could be asserted. However, the complaint does not demonstrate any conduct by the defendant, Blakely, outside the medical context, implying that all alleged actions fall under medical negligence. Consequently, the motion to dismiss the ordinary negligence claim was granted with leave to amend. Regarding punitive damages, defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiff's claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court noted that punitive damages under Section 1983 can be awarded for actions driven by malice or reckless indifference to constitutional rights, paralleling common law tort standards. The method of challenging a punitive damages claim—whether through a motion to dismiss or a motion to strike—is not entirely settled. The Ninth Circuit previously ruled that a motion to strike cannot eliminate a claim for damages on legal preclusion grounds, as demonstrated in Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., where the court found that striking specific damage requests was inappropriate and that such motions should be classified under Rule 12(b)(6) instead. A motion to strike is subject to an abuse of discretion standard on appeal, whereas a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is reviewed de novo. It would create inconsistencies in standards of review if parts of a pleading were dismissed under Rule 12(f) instead of Rule 12(b)(6). Courts in this Circuit have applied the Whittlestone ruling, establishing that requests for injunctive relief can be stricken under Rule 12(f), but Rule 12(f) cannot be used to strike requests for punitive damages. Instead, challenges to punitive damages claims should be made via a 12(b)(6) motion, which is limited to the sufficiency of claims rather than remedies. Recent decisions affirm that a prayer for relief, being a remedy, cannot be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Defendants' motion, regardless of being classified as a motion to dismiss or strike, is deemed unsuccessful. The court finds that the plaintiff has adequately alleged a claim for deliberate indifference, which supports the request for punitive damages. Defendants contend that punitive damages related to the medical negligence claim should be dismissed, citing California law (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.13), which necessitates court approval before including punitive damages in healthcare provider negligence claims. The plaintiff's opposition only addressed the punitive damages in relation to the original claim. Section 425.13 is deemed inapplicable in federal court concerning the negligence claim, as California district courts are divided on its applicability, with the Ninth Circuit yet to provide clarity. Most courts have analyzed whether Section 425.13 is procedural, which would render it inapplicable in federal court, or substantive, which would make it applicable. The case of Jackson v. E. Bay Hosp. determined that Section 425.13 serves primarily as a procedural tool for managing pleadings rather than defining substantive rights, thus it should not be enforced in diversity cases. This aligns with the California Supreme Court's view that the rule's intent is to manage pretrial processes regarding punitive damages, which federal courts can achieve through their own case management. Further, Section 425.13 does not impose substantive limits on damages that a plaintiff can seek. In Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter, it was concluded that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3) allows plaintiffs to include all forms of relief in their initial complaint without needing prior approval or evidence for punitive damages. The court concurs with this reasoning, affirming that Section 425.13 does not alter the substance of negligence claims or the burden of proof for punitive damages, which can still be asserted. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss the punitive damages request is denied. Regarding attorneys' fees, the defendants seek dismissal based on the argument against the underlying causes of action for violations of 1983 and the Bane Act. Since the court has denied their motion to dismiss these claims, the potential for attorneys' fees remains intact under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(h). Defendants contend that the request for attorneys' fees under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 is improper, arguing that the plaintiff's complaint lacks supporting facts and that the claim is premature. Section 1021.5 allows a court to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in cases that enforce significant public rights, provided certain conditions are met, including the necessity of private enforcement and the absence of unjust recovery diversion. The court finds that while litigating this issue is premature, it does not warrant dismissing the fee request. The plaintiff has not yet filed a motion for fees, and it is too early in the litigation to determine if the statutory prerequisites will be satisfied. In the order, the court grants in part and denies in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, specifically: 1. Denying dismissal of the first cause of action for deliberate indifference under § 1983. 2. Denying dismissal of the second cause of action for Monell liability. 3. Denying dismissal of the third cause concerning the Bane Act for the survival claim, but granting it without leave to amend for the individual claim. 4. Granting dismissal of the fourth cause under Government Code § 845.6 with leave to amend. 5. Granting dismissal of the fifth cause for negligence and premises liability with leave to amend. 6. Denying dismissal of the request for punitive damages. 7. Denying dismissal of the request for attorneys' fees. 8. Requiring the plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 20 days of service of the order. The court references that similar claims regarding inadequate medical care have previously been affirmed as failing on various standards in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit has not applied the Kingsley standard to claims of deliberate indifference to a detainee’s serious medical needs, as noted in Richmond v. Huq. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged a potential shift in the Fourteenth Amendment's deliberate indifference jurisprudence post-Kingsley, which might eliminate the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate the defendant's subjective intent. The court also discusses other cases including Bender, Allen, and Lyall, with Allen being highlighted as the only California appellate opinion to deeply engage with Shoyoye, concluding that vague allegations of interference with constitutional rights are insufficient. The document outlines that under the law, conspiracies to oppress individuals in the exercise of their constitutional rights can lead to legal penalties. It emphasizes that in the absence of state court guidance, federal courts must predict state court decisions. It cites Cornell’s analysis as a reliable predictor of the California Supreme Court’s stance on these issues. Furthermore, it refers to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which allows courts to strike insufficient defenses or irrelevant matters from pleadings. The court has dismissed the premises liability claim against certain defendants. Regarding punitive damages in professional negligence cases involving health care providers, plaintiffs must obtain court permission to include such claims in their pleadings. This permission is contingent upon demonstrating a substantial probability of prevailing on the punitive damages claim, with strict timelines for filing motions related to these claims. The definition of "health care provider" is also specified, encompassing various licensed individuals and entities within the health care sector.