Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania; April 11, 2018; Federal District Court
Matthew W. Brann, United States District Judge, addressed cross-motions for partial summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs Rodney Tyger and Shawn Wadsworth against Defendants Precision Drilling Corp., Precision Drilling Oilfield Services, Inc., and Precision Drilling Company, LP. The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion while denying the Plaintiffs' motion. The case, initiated as a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action on October 17, 2011, has evolved with an amended complaint filed in January 2012, and the Defendants responding in February 2012. Following a denial of the Defendants' summary judgment motion in December 2012, Chief Judge Conner conditionally certified a class of approximately 1,000 hourly rig employees in January 2013.
The Defendants sought partial summary judgment in April 2017, asserting that the time spent by Plaintiffs on donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE) and their walking time was not compensable. Conversely, the Plaintiffs' cross-motion requested a ruling that their donning, doffing, and inspecting PPE constituted compensable work, along with claims for walking, waiting times, and time spent in required meetings.
The factual background details that the Defendants operate oil and gas drilling rigs, employing rig hands who work extensive shifts that exceed 40 hours weekly, receiving overtime pay and additional compensation for specific conditions related to their work.
The dispute centers on four main issues: (1) whether shifts are completed within the designated time; (2) whether pre-shift meetings were compensated prior to mid-2010; (3) if employees perform work before and after scheduled shift times; and (4) whether employees' shifts correctly account for all hours worked.
Rig hands follow a daily routine that varies by rig type, starting with either a joint meeting in the "dog house" or a pre-tour safety meeting in the company man's or rig manager's trailer. Attendance at these mandatory meetings is required. Basic personal protective equipment (PPE) includes steel-toed boots, hard hats, safety glasses, fire retardant coveralls, gloves, and ear plugs, which are necessary to mitigate various workplace hazards such as chemical exposure, electrical shock, and working at heights.
A specific risk is associated with "tripping pipe" operations conducted by derrickhands, involving the lifting and positioning of heavy drilling pipes while secured with fall protection equipment.
Defendants utilize various types of drilling mud, including water-based, oil-based, and gel-based mud, with caustic and synthetic substances posing health risks. Precision acknowledges the potential dangers of caustic (sodium hydroxide) and synthetic muds, emphasizing that proper PPE, such as rubber aprons, gloves, and safety glasses, is essential to prevent health hazards from exposure to these materials. Precision also notes that while hundreds of mud additives may be harmful, the likelihood of harm is reduced with appropriate PPE usage.
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Ronald E. Bishop, asserts that the drilling fluids on Defendants' rigs contain glycol ethers like 2-butoxyethanol, which can harm red blood cells and may disrupt endocrine function. Defendants counter this claim, referencing Dr. John M. DeSesso's opinion that 2-butoxyethanol does not harm reproductive organs or cause teratogenic effects at expected human exposure levels.
Rig workers, referred to as rig hands, often get drilling mud and other substances on their personal protective equipment (PPE), and while the extent of contamination varies, Defendants acknowledge that the PPE reduces chemical exposure risk. Testimony from rig managers supports that coveralls frequently become contaminated with drilling fluids and chemicals. Although rig hands are required to clean and change soiled PPE promptly during their shifts, evidence suggests they often cannot do so due to work demands. Defendants do provide disposable Tyvek suits, waterproof rain suits, face shields, respirators, aprons, and gloves for tasks involving high exposure to drilling fluid.
Defendants also offer changing facilities at their rigs for workers to don and doff PPE. However, Plaintiffs dispute Defendants' claims that these facilities are merely for convenience and argue that company policies limit the option to change off-premises. They reference testimony from Michael Adkins, Precision's Global Vice President of Health and Safety, highlighting concerns about bringing home soiled PPE, especially those contaminated with caustic chemicals. Adkins acknowledged the common sense of not carrying hazardous materials home but stated that employees are permitted to do so. He could not definitively state whether it is safe to bring home PPE contaminated with health hazards. Defendants' employee handbook emphasizes that while PPE reduces exposure risk, it does not eliminate it, and proper selection and use of protective gear are essential.
Dr. Ronald Bishop testified that personal protective equipment (PPE) primarily safeguards workers' eyes and skin from hazardous materials. However, exposure to these materials can render PPE hazardous, mainly through skin contact with harmful substances like glycol ethers and inhalation of radioactive dust particles from contaminated surfaces. He opined that it is unsafe for Precision Drilling employees to transport unclean PPE in enclosed areas or outside the worksite due to potential contamination and health risks.
In the legal context, summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine dispute over material facts, allowing the movant to claim entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. A "genuine" dispute exists if a reasonable jury could side with the non-movant, and a "material" dispute could influence the case's outcome. To counter a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must present evidence that supports their position. Courts must draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and evaluate cross-motions for summary judgment separately.
Defendants seek partial summary judgment in a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action on three grounds: (1) Plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation for time spent donning and doffing PPE; (2) the lack of compensation for donning and doffing negates claims for compensation for walking time between these activities and safety meetings; and (3) the failure to pay was not a willful violation of the FLSA. The FLSA, established in 1938, sets minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees for workers, and violations can lead to liability for backpay, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees. The definitions of "work" and "workweek" are not provided by the FLSA; however, the Supreme Court's ruling in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. indicated that the "statutory workweek" includes all time employees are required to be on the employer's premises or on duty. This interpretation was later limited by the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1946, which aimed to protect employers from liability for certain claims.
The Portal-to-Portal Act establishes two exceptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regarding compensation for travel and preliminary or postliminary activities. Specifically, it excludes walking, riding, or traveling to and from the workplace, as well as activities that occur before or after the principal work activities. The Act does not alter previous definitions of "work," "workweek," or "workday." The Supreme Court has defined "principal activities" to include all activities that are integral and indispensable to the main activities performed by an employee. In the case of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, the Court clarified that "integral" refers to necessary components of a whole, while "indispensable" signifies duties that cannot be overlooked in the performance of principal activities.
In a motion for partial summary judgment, Defendants argue that the donning and doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE) is not a principal activity of the employees and question whether this process is integral and indispensable to drilling oil and gas wells. They assert that drilling can occur without this PPE and that the current work environment does not resemble those previously deemed hazardous enough to warrant such equipment as integral. Defendants also claim that the PPE in question is generic and does not meet legal standards.
Conversely, Plaintiffs argue that wearing and removing PPE is mandated by both industry regulations and Defendants' safety policies. They counter Defendants' claims by highlighting the daily dangers faced by rig workers, supported by expert testimony from Dr. Ronald E. Bishop regarding chemical exposure and its health risks. Plaintiffs contend that their working conditions are similar to those deemed hazardous in Steiner v. Mitchell, asserting that classifying the PPE as generic contradicts both the Busk decision and relevant circuit precedents. The differing interpretations of these cases necessitate further examination.
In Steiner v. Mitchell, battery plant workers were exposed to hazardous chemicals, including lead compounds and sulphuric acid, leading to significant health risks from contamination. The Supreme Court determined that the time spent by these employees showering and changing clothes after their shifts was compensable, as it was integral to their employment activities. This ruling was supported in later cases such as IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez and Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, where Justice Sotomayor clarified that an activity is considered "indispensable" if an employee cannot perform their primary duties safely without it.
In the context of oil drilling, the court analyzed whether personal protective equipment (PPE) was essential. The plaintiffs contended that federal law mandated the use of specific PPE, including steel-toed boots and safety glasses, making it legally "integral and indispensable" for performing their tasks safely. They argued against the defendants' claim that PPE was not essential because drilling could theoretically occur without it, asserting that the absence of the required gear would impair the safety and effectiveness of their work. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations emphasized the necessity of providing and maintaining protective equipment in hazardous work environments.
The regulation and policy requiring personal protective equipment (PPE) do not change the analysis of whether such PPE is "integral and indispensable" to the plaintiffs' principal activities. The Supreme Court's decision in Busk rejected the notion that an employer's requirement alone qualifies an activity as integral. While the presence of an OSHA regulation is pertinent, it does not solely dictate the inquiry; instead, the focus is on whether the work environment necessitates donning and doffing this PPE for safe completion of tasks.
Plaintiffs argue that their drilling activities create a hazardous environment, citing potential exposure to dangerous chemicals, supported by expert testimony from Dr. Bishop regarding the risks associated with drilling mud. Although the defendants challenge Dr. Bishop's conclusions, the mere acknowledgment of chemical exposure does not encapsulate the entire issue.
Defendants contend that the availability of additional PPE makes the generic PPE used less integral. Past rulings, such as Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., found that donning and doffing certain protective gear was not integral to employment. However, subsequent rulings, including Perez v. City of New York, clarified that the generic nature of PPE does not preclude it from being considered integral if it protects against significant workplace risks associated with the employees' principal activities.
The case requires a detailed examination of the specific PPE, the nature of the employees' work, and their interrelation. Evidence indicates that employees are required to don additional PPE during their shifts when dealing with hazardous materials, including face shields, respirators, and specialized suits, which are utilized on-the-clock.
Provision of specialized personal protective equipment (PPE) for employees working with hazardous chemicals is confirmed by Jim Christensen and Shayne Klepper, both experienced rig managers at Precision. Plaintiffs acknowledge the use of such PPE in their depositions, with James McIvor affirming its protective function and John Beaver specifying the need for respirators, rubber gloves, and rubber aprons. The repeated mention of specialized PPE by the Plaintiffs underscores its significance.
The summary judgment standard requires consideration of facts favorably towards the Plaintiffs, indicating a narrow interpretation of compensability for generic PPE, as noted by Gorman. The Second Circuit's stance on this issue has been critiqued by other circuits, including the Sixth and Fourth, which have adopted broader interpretations.
A genuine dispute exists regarding the harmful nature of drilling mud and chemicals involved in the Plaintiffs' work. Expert Dr. Bishop elaborated on the hazardous components of drilling muds, highlighting their necessity for operational effectiveness and the inherent risks associated with them. He emphasized that all options for creating drilling muds are hazardous, confirming that employees are exposed to such chemicals, raising concerns about the extent and duration of that exposure.
Dr. Bishop's Report highlights the risks associated with exposure to glycol ether, specifically 2-butoxyethanol, found in Precision drilling fluid additives. Plaintiff Glenn Hoganson's testimony supports the harmful nature of oil-based mud. Despite Defendants challenging Dr. Bishop's conclusions and presenting opposing expert testimony, his report and testimony are sufficient to create a factual dispute regarding the toxicity of the exposure and the working conditions for Plaintiffs. Defendants claim that the presence of specialized personal protective equipment (PPE) mitigates this toxicity. However, evidence indicates that rig workers' coveralls, although flame retardant, often become contaminated with drilling mud and chemicals, undermining Defendants' argument. Testimony from rig managers confirms that coveralls frequently get covered with oil-based mud, and Glenn Hoganson acknowledges that while PPE offers some protection, it is insufficient to completely prevent exposure. Viewing the facts favorably for Plaintiffs, there remains a genuine dispute regarding the toxicity of the oil-based mud, preventing summary judgment for Defendants.
Additionally, regarding Plaintiffs' compensation claim for time spent walking between donning and doffing locations and safety meetings, the Portal to Portal Act typically excludes walking time as non-compensable when it occurs before or after principal work activities. However, walking time may be compensable if it occurs between principal activities. The continuous workday rule established by the Department of Labor indicates that exemptions from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) do not apply to the time between the first and last principal activities. Due to the existing factual dispute concerning compensation for donning and doffing, the same applies to the walking time, precluding summary judgment on this issue as well.
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim that their failure to pay compensation constituted a willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA outlines a three-year statute of limitations for willful violations and a two-year limit for non-willful violations. A willful violation occurs when an employer either knows or shows reckless disregard for whether their conduct violates the statute. According to Supreme Court precedent, if an employer acts reasonably in determining its legal obligations, their actions cannot be considered willful. The court finds that Plaintiffs failed to oppose the summary judgment on the willfulness claim, indicating abandonment of the argument for a three-year statute of limitations. Furthermore, the court notes a lack of evidence that Defendants knew or suspected their practices violated the FLSA. Consequently, summary judgment is granted for Defendants, establishing a two-year statute of limitations for the claims.
Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, they argue that pre-shift and post-shift donning and doffing, as well as time spent walking to and waiting for safety meetings, are compensable under the continuous workday rule. However, the court denies this motion, stating that regardless of how the facts are viewed, the same conclusion is reached: the claims for compensability of those activities are not supported.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment argues that donning and doffing personal protective gear should be compensated as work, citing precedents from the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court. However, the court finds that both cited cases, DeAsencio v. Tyson Foods and Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., do not support Plaintiffs' broad interpretation. In DeAsencio, the Third Circuit noted that preliminary or postliminary work is non-compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act unless it is "integral and indispensable" to the principal activities of the job. The court emphasized that it did not rule that donning and doffing are automatically compensable without this analysis. In Sandifer, the Supreme Court's comments were deemed irrelevant to the issue of compensability, as the employer's defense relied on a collective bargaining agreement. Ultimately, the court determined that the compensability of donning and doffing depends on whether such activities are integral and indispensable. Given the existence of genuine disputes regarding material facts concerning Plaintiffs' claims, summary judgment in Defendants' favor was deemed inappropriate, leading to a denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment based on an alternative ground.
Plaintiffs seek a ruling that time spent in mandatory pre and post-shift safety meetings is compensable work, arguing that all Precision employees attended these meetings prior to mid-2010, yet only Pennsylvania employees received retroactive pay. Defendants counter that summary judgment is inappropriate because the claim was neither included in the original complaint nor conditionally certified, and they assert that pre-shift meeting time is non-compensable. The Court agrees with Defendants, finding that the claim for pre-shift meeting compensation is not within the scope of alleged violations outlined in the Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs had previously alleged violations under the Portal-to-Portal Act related to time spent walking to safety meetings and donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE), but not for the pre-shift meetings themselves. The Court emphasizes that a complaint must provide clear notice to defendants of the claims being made, and in this case, the Amended Complaint lacks a claim for pre-shift meeting compensation. Additionally, since the Plaintiffs were Pennsylvania employees who had already received retroactive pay for these meetings, they cannot introduce this claim at the summary judgment stage. The Court also denies Plaintiffs' request for summary judgment regarding post-shift safety meetings, as Defendants have provided evidence that these meetings rarely exceeded the scheduled end time.
Meetings occasionally extended beyond their scheduled end times, but the additional time was minimal and often balanced by earlier concluded meetings. The issue of whether this time is compensable under the de minimis doctrine is supported by statements from rig managers. Summary judgment was denied on December 18, 2012, as the parties continued to dispute the duration and frequency of extra time spent in end-of-shift meetings, indicating that this issue remained unresolved after discovery. The court granted Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in part, specifically regarding the statute of limitations, while denying Plaintiffs' Motion in full. Defendants attempted to strike Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts for not complying with local rules, but the court denied this motion, acknowledging that despite some immaterial information, Plaintiffs' detailed submission was beneficial in addressing their arguments. The factual record was reviewed comprehensively, noting any disputed facts. Additionally, Plaintiffs contended that compensable work begins at the changeover meeting, asserting the necessity of donning personal protective equipment (PPE) as the start of compensable time, citing OSHA regulations and company safety rules.
Exposure to gel and barite over time can lead to silicosis and other respiratory issues. Defendants assert that working conditions may present a lethal environment, necessitating additional protective gear for employees, including respirators and gloves. The legal framework cited includes various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relevant case law, and statutory references regarding principal activities and integral tasks in the context of workplace protections. The discussion highlights the necessity of protective measures and the implications of working conditions on employee health. The parties have engaged in comprehensive exchanges of statements and responses related to these points, with references to expert reports and deposition transcripts supporting their positions.
The document references multiple depositions and legal precedents regarding the classification of pre-shift activities in relation to employees’ principal work activities. It emphasizes that merely requiring certain activities, such as donning protective gear or attending safety meetings, does not automatically qualify them as "integral and indispensable" to an employee's main duties. Key cases cited include Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, which clarifies that pre-shift activities required by an employer do not meet the criteria established in Steiner v. Mitchell. Moreover, the findings from several other cases, such as Bonds v. GMS Mine Repair Maintenance and Olive v. Tennessee Valley Authority, further support the argument that mandated activities do not necessarily qualify as integral to principal work functions. The document also notes the admissibility of expert reports and evidence, as no motions to strike have been filed. Various depositions and declarations are referenced to substantiate these points regarding the nature of safety gear and pre-shift activities in relation to employee duties.
The document references several legal cases, including *Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp.*, *Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr. Inc.*, and *Gorman*, highlighting differing judicial interpretations regarding integral activities in employment law. It notes that the Department of Labor (DOL) regulations define principal activities to include all activities integral to those principal activities. An example provided indicates that changing clothes at the workplace can be integral if required by law or employer policy, whereas activities deemed merely convenient or not directly related to principal tasks may be classified as preliminary or postliminary. The document also mentions challenges from the plaintiffs regarding the applicability of the "change at home rule" post-*Busk*, arguing that the nature of their work prevents them from taking personal protective equipment (PPE) home. The judge concludes that summary judgment is not warranted since the plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts that a reasonable jury could consider the option of taking PPE home as illusory.
In the legal context of donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE), various case law precedents are referenced, including *Perez v. Mountaire Farms* and *Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.*, which provide insights into the compensability of such activities under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The absence of binding Third Circuit precedent on whether donning and doffing PPE is considered integral to poultry processing is noted as relevant in determining the willfulness of an FLSA violation.
Additionally, it is established that when a party fails to address a claim in response to a motion for summary judgment, that claim may be considered abandoned. Courts require both parties in cross motions for summary judgment to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists; if neither does, the motions must be denied. Further complications arise from the genuine dispute of material fact regarding the time spent on donning and doffing PPE, which prevents summary judgment for plaintiffs. The *Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours* case is cited to illustrate that while donning and doffing might be compensable, the Third Circuit did not definitively rule on this matter. Finally, it is clarified that safety meetings do not qualify for compensation.
The Court must determine whether certain activities are "integral and indispensable" to a principal activity, referencing the case Bonds (2015). Claims for uncompensated time related to pre-shift meetings may become compensable under the continuous workday rule if donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE) is deemed essential. Plaintiffs argue that mandatory pre-tour meetings were attended by all employees prior to mid-2010, yet those working outside Pennsylvania did not receive retroactive pay for these meetings. Defendants counter that post-shift safety meetings are not universally applicable to the collective and plan to seek decertification on this basis. This argument regarding commonality is reserved for the summary judgment process. The document mentions various legal precedents and declarations supporting the claims and defenses presented. Additionally, it notes the applicability of a de minimis doctrine, which excludes trivial amounts of time spent on preliminary activities from the statutory workweek calculation.
