Adams Outdoor Adver. Ltd. P'ship v. Pa. Dep't of Transp.
Docket: No. 5:17–cv–01253
Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania; February 8, 2018; Federal District Court
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr., United States District Judge, addressed a legal challenge by Plaintiff Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership against the constitutionality of the Interchange Prohibition in Pennsylvania's Outdoor Advertising Control Act of 1971. Defendant Leslie S. Richards, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The court denied the motion regarding Adams's claims that the Act violates First Amendment rights, including both a facial challenge related to the lack of time restrictions and an as-applied challenge due to delays in application decisions. Conversely, the court granted the motion to dismiss Adams's claims for monetary damages, the vagueness challenge concerning the 500-feet spacing requirement, and the facial substantive due process claim. Additionally, the court partially granted the motion regarding the as-applied substantive due process and equal protection claims, dismissing them without prejudice as premature. The request for a venue transfer was also denied.
In the background, it is noted that Adams engages in outdoor advertising by leasing space from property owners to erect billboards. The Amended Complaint alleges the Interchange Prohibition’s vagueness, specifically regarding the regulation that prohibits structures within 500 feet of an interchange or safety rest area. The Act includes exemptions for "official" and "on-premise" signs, as defined by federal law, which are not counted in the spacing calculations.
Adams argues that the Interchange Prohibition provision is vague due to multiple changes in PennDOT's interpretation over the past thirty-seven years regarding the applicability of the 500-feet spacing requirement for structures near interchanges or safety rest areas. The latest change occurred in 1997 when PennDOT stated that the spacing requirement applies to both sides of the highway, communicated through a strike-off letter, despite no amendments to the Act necessitating this reinterpretation. Adams contends this interpretation conflicts with 67 Pa. Code. 445.4, which specifies that distances between sign structures are to be measured along the nearest pavement edge on the same side of the traveled way.
At the time of filing complaints, Adams sought to erect a billboard on the south side of U.S. Route 22 in Hanover Township, which would not be within 500 feet of an exit ramp on that side, but would be within that distance from a ramp on the north side. Adams raises claims of violations of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights related to free speech, due process, and equal protection. He challenges the constitutionality of the Act both on its face and as applied, asserting that the Interchange Prohibition is unconstitutionally vague and not narrowly tailored to serve a governmental interest, citing the absence of time restrictions and the potential for PennDOT to exercise unlimited discretion in its interpretations.
In addressing a motion to dismiss, the court is required to accept all factual allegations as true and view the complaint favorably to the plaintiff. A plausible claim is established if the factual allegations exceed a speculative level. Legal conclusions within the complaint, however, are not afforded this presumption. The burden falls on the defendant to show that the plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief.
When venue is deemed improper, a court must either dismiss the case or transfer it to a suitable district or division as per 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). In situations where venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 allows for transfer based on the convenience of parties and witnesses or in the interest of justice. Venue may be appropriate in multiple districts, and the decision to transfer lies within the court's discretion, with substantial deference given to reasonable balancing of public and private interest factors. The burden to demonstrate the need for transfer falls on the moving party, as established in Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co. The factors considered for transfer include the choices of the plaintiff and defendant, the location of the claim, convenience for parties and witnesses, access to evidence, enforceability of judgments, trial logistics, court congestion, local interest in the matter, public policies, and familiarity with state law in diversity cases.
In the case concerning Adams, allegations of combined First and Fourteenth Amendment violations assert that the Act imposes a total prohibition on speech at a specific location. Adams argues that the vagueness of the Interchange Prohibition leads to inconsistent interpretations, which undermines valid time, place, and manner regulations and may suppress speech based on content. Additionally, Adams contends that the lack of time constraints on the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) and a one-year delay in processing its application infringe on free speech rights. These allegations also raise substantive due process challenges. The court first considers whether Adams can seek monetary relief from Richards, who claims qualified immunity from such liability due to the absence of clear precedent establishing the Act's unconstitutionality. Adams limits its claims to injunctive relief, which is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, resulting in the dismissal of all claims for monetary relief while allowing the pursuit of injunctive relief.
Adams's claim that the Interchange Prohibition infringes on its First Amendment right is sufficient to proceed in early legal stages. To assess a potential First Amendment violation, it is essential to determine if the statute is content-based or content-neutral. A content-based statute requires the state to demonstrate a compelling interest and that the regulation is narrowly tailored to that interest. Conversely, content-neutral regulations allow for reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech, as long as they are justified without reference to the content and leave open ample alternative communication channels.
Adams argues that the Interchange Prohibition functions as a total ban on speech rather than a valid time, place, and manner regulation due to its arbitrary application. However, the First Amendment does not guarantee unrestricted communication in any location or manner desired. Adams's reference to the Central Hudson test, applicable only to commercial speech, is misplaced since the Amended Complaint includes both commercial and non-commercial speech. Therefore, Adams's claims should be evaluated under the framework established in Rappa v. New Castle County, rather than Central Hudson, as clarified by the Melrose case, which emphasizes that the rejection of sign applications must be assessed under Rappa's guidelines for First Amendment claims.
The determination of whether a statute is content-based or content-neutral begins with a context-sensitive analysis, particularly in the case of sign ordinances. While Richards claims the regulation in question is content-neutral, the court finds the situation more complex. According to the guidance from Rappa, if there is a significant connection between speech content and a location, the state may exempt certain speech from broader restrictions, provided this does not aim to censor viewpoints and meets specific criteria established in Metromedia: the exception must advance an important state interest, be narrowly tailored, and minimally impact the overall regulatory goal.
The statute in Rappa prohibited signs within 25 feet of public highways and included several exceptions, such as directional or warning signs and on-premises signs. The court applied intermediate scrutiny and determined that the state’s interest in directional signs outweighed its aesthetic and safety interests in their prohibition, finding the exemption narrowly tailored. Regarding on-premises signs, the court ruled that the exemption was not content-based, as it related solely to the relationship between sign location and message rather than the content of the message itself.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Reed v. Town of Gilbert established that a regulation targeting specific subject matter is considered content-based, even without viewpoint discrimination. The Court found the Sign Code unconstitutional under strict scrutiny because it singled out certain signs, including temporary directional signs. It determined that the regulation failed to demonstrate a necessity for limiting these signs to address aesthetic concerns or traffic safety, thereby not being narrowly tailored to the government’s interests.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet determined the status of Rappa following Reed, but the current Court does not need to address this at this stage because at least one exemption to the Interchange Prohibition requires a context-sensitive analysis that must be narrowly tailored to serve the state interest. Viewing the facts favorably for Adams and based solely on pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court finds that Adams has adequately raised a First Amendment challenge to proceed to discovery. The Interchange Prohibition is deemed not unconstitutionally vague, nor does it grant PennDOT unrestrained discretion, as it provides clear guidelines for where signs can be placed along highways. Adams argues that the Prohibition is vague due to its lack of clarity for ordinary individuals regarding permissible outdoor advertising locations and the potential for arbitrary enforcement by PennDOT, supported by inconsistent interpretations of the Prohibition. A statute may be considered vague if it either fails to give reasonable notice of prohibited conduct or encourages arbitrary enforcement. In assessing vagueness, courts must consider both the statute and its regulatory interpretations. The First Amendment requires that regulations provide agencies with adequate standards for permit issuance. If Congress has intentionally left gaps, agencies are empowered to create regulations to fill those gaps, which are generally upheld unless arbitrary or capricious. The Act provides PennDOT with authority to create rules governing outdoor advertising, which includes criteria outlined in the Act. The 1997 strike-off letter issued by PennDOT, reflecting a change based on subsequent court opinions, is relevant to the vagueness analysis and is not arbitrary or capricious, thus it will be given controlling weight. Adams's claim that the Court cannot consider this letter is incorrect.
The court finds that the statute in question is not unconstitutionally vague, as it provides clear guidance to individuals of ordinary intelligence regarding prohibited conduct. The Interchange Prohibition explicitly states that no structure may be erected within 500 feet of an interchange or safety rest area, and the 1997 strike-off letter from PennDOT clarified that this 500-foot rule applies to signs on both sides of the highway. Consequently, applicants have had clear notice for the past twenty years that the prohibition applies to such signage. Adams's claim of vagueness is also rejected under the second prong of the Hill test, which examines whether the law encourages arbitrary enforcement; the Act provides a consistent method for measuring compliance, as outlined in the 1997 letter, and there is no evidence of inconsistent application by PennDOT. Adams's challenge, based on a historical change in PennDOT's interpretation of the spacing requirement, is deemed unpersuasive and could lead to unreasonable outcomes if accepted. Additionally, a previous court ruling in George Wash. Motor Lodge Co. v. Commonwealth reinforced that the statute's intent is clear and consistent with regulations, aiming to alleviate distractions for drivers on high-speed highways. The court concludes that the application of the 500-foot rule to both sides of the highway aligns with the statute's purpose of reducing potential distractions for drivers.
The Commonwealth court clarified ambiguities in the Act, dismissing Adams's vagueness challenge related to the 500-feet spacing requirement in the Interchange Prohibition. Adams raised First Amendment claims, arguing that the absence of deadlines in the Act for PennDOT's response to permit applications constitutes an unlawful restriction on free speech. He cited FW/PBS, asserting that the lack of reasonable time limits risks indefinite suppression of permissible speech. However, Richards contended that FW/PBS is inapplicable as it relates to content-based restraints, while the Act is content-neutral. The court disagreed with Richards, stating that the Act is not entirely content-neutral and that the absence of strict time limits violates First Amendment protections. Consequently, the court allowed Adams to proceed with his claim regarding the lack of deadlines and the one-year delay in PennDOT’s action on his application.
In regard to Adams's substantive due process claims stemming from the same issues, the court dismissed these, reasoning that the alleged delays do not meet the "shocks the conscience" test required for substantive due process claims related to executive actions. Furthermore, the court found Adams's as-applied substantive due process claim premature because he had not utilized available appeal processes after his permit application was denied. According to PennDOT's procedures, an applicant can appeal a denial, and only after exceptions are addressed does the decision become final. At the time of filing, PennDOT had not ruled on Adams's application.
Adams's application to PennDOT has been denied, and although he appealed the denial and requested a stay, there is no final decision regarding his application. Consequently, his substantive due process claim based on the application is dismissed without prejudice due to the finality rule. Conversely, his facial challenge to the Act’s lack of deadlines is not barred by this rule but is dismissed because legislative acts can withstand substantive due process challenges if they serve a legitimate state interest. The Interchange Prohibition aims to minimize distractions caused by signs near high-speed highway exits, which Adams failed to adequately challenge.
Adams's equal protection claim is also dismissed as premature, being similarly barred by the finality rule, as he did not utilize administrative remedies. The court denies a request to transfer venue to the Middle District of Pennsylvania for ongoing litigation. Richards argued for this transfer based on procedural connections to PennDOT and the nature of the challenge related to state-wide policy. Adams contended that venue in the Eastern District is appropriate due to the location of the proposed billboard. Federal venue jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which allows actions to be brought in districts where defendants reside, where significant events occurred, or where defendants are subject to jurisdiction. The court emphasizes that the nature of the litigation is crucial in determining where substantial events took place.
Adams raises several claims regarding the Act's constitutionality, including a First Amendment challenge based on the absence of time restrictions and an as-applied challenge due to delays in its application. A significant portion of the events occurred in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where the law was enacted, supporting the venue's appropriateness under Section 1391(b)(2) for statewide policy challenges, as established in Chester v. Beard. However, Adams's as-applied challenge is also rooted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where the billboard would be erected and where he alleges suppression of his speech rights. Citing Kalman, the Court emphasizes that harm from First Amendment violations occurs in the district where the expression was intended to take place. Therefore, both districts have substantial relevance to the claims. Venue can be appropriate in multiple districts, as reaffirmed in Neopart Transit, which suggests that significant contacts in a selected district are sufficient, regardless of stronger ties elsewhere. The Court notes that while the plaintiff's choice of forum favors retaining the venue, the defendant's preference leans towards transferring the case to the Middle District. The factors considered for venue appropriateness are almost equally balanced, with the claim's origin in the Eastern District being a key consideration.
The fourth and fifth factors regarding venue balance similarly, as Adams is situated in the current District while Richards is in the Middle District, suggesting that witnesses may be found in both locations. The sixth factor is minimally impactful since relevant books and records, although likely located in the Middle District, can be produced in the Eastern District. The case cited states that the location of records matters only if they cannot be produced in the alternative forum, which is not contested here. The declaratory judgment related to Adams's proposed billboard would be enforced in the current District, but its implications are state-wide, rendering the seventh factor neutral. No practical considerations exist to expedite the trial, and the parties did not address court congestion, making the eighth and ninth factors also neutral. Both districts have vested local interests; the Eastern District pertains to the proposed billboard and Adams's free speech claims, while the Middle District involves the constitutionality of a state law enforced by Penn-DOT. The eleventh factor is neutral, as both courts are familiar with the relevant law. Ultimately, the factors are evenly balanced, and since the burden of proof lies with the movant, Richards has not demonstrated a need for transfer, leading to the denial of the motion.
Adams’s First Amendment claim against the Act is sufficiently stated, highlighting the absence of time restrictions for PennDOT on sign applications. His as-applied challenge based on a one-year delay in application processing is also viable at this stage. However, his vagueness challenge regarding the 500-feet spacing requirement is dismissed, as are his substantive due process claims, while the as-applied and equal protection claims are dismissed without prejudice due to being premature. Given that significant events related to Adams's claims occurred in this District, particularly regarding the alleged suppression of free speech, Richards's venue transfer request is denied. A separate order will follow.
The 1997 strike-off letter indicates that PennDOT's previous interpretation of the spacing requirement for structures along highways has been overridden by two Commonwealth Court decisions. These rulings clarify that the 500-feet spacing rule applies universally to any structure, aligning with the intent of the governing Act. Adams claims to have submitted a permit application on March 8, 2016, but PennDOT did not respond for a full year, leading to a denial on April 27, 2017. The court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Due to overlapping constitutional claims, there is confusion about how to evaluate Adams’s claims, prompting the court to assess them under various constitutional theories. The court references the four-part analysis from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission to evaluate potential First Amendment violations related to commercial speech. The excerpt also distinguishes relevant case law, including Johnson and Metromedia, which pertain to the regulation of signage. Adams's challenges regarding the vagueness of the Act and the absence of deadlines for permit decisions will be examined in subsequent sections. Additionally, substantive due process claims will be addressed later. The court notes that the claim may be premature due to ripeness concerns, advising Adams to consider the law before potentially refiling after completing PennDOT’s administrative processes. The court further highlights the necessity for plaintiffs to demonstrate similar treatment when asserting equal protection claims, referencing previous cases that support this requirement. Finally, it states that Richards has not met the burden of proof regarding a venue transfer.
