United States v. Shine

Citation: 306 F. Supp. 3d 1322Docket: CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:17cr102–MHT

Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama; January 4, 2018; Federal District Court

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The court considers whether statements made by Kendall Dewight Shine during two separate interrogations should be suppressed. The first interrogation, occurring during a traffic stop, is deemed custodial under Miranda v. Arizona, leading the court to presuppose that Shine's statements from this phase should be suppressed, as they are largely repetitive of later statements and unnecessary for the government's case. In contrast, the second interrogation at the police station is ruled admissible, following the precedent set by Missouri v. Seibert, which permits such statements when they do not violate constitutional protections.

Shine faces charges for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and he filed a motion to suppress based on Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, leading Shine to object, particularly challenging the finding that he was not in custody during the first interrogation and that Seibert did not apply to the second interrogation. The court conducted a new evidentiary hearing, independent of the magistrate's findings.

During the factual evaluation, the court referenced video and audio evidence from the stop. Officers approached Shine’s vehicle based on alleged traffic violations and mistakenly assumed an expired tag. During the stop, a digital scale was observed in the truck's console, and the smell of marijuana prompted further questioning. Shine was detained but initially informed he was not under arrest. Following a series of searches and questions regarding the scale, officers discovered a handgun in the truck. Shine, handcuffed and under questioning, was admonished for not disclosing the weapon to the officers.

Ritchie questioned Shine regarding his criminal history, gang involvement, and drug activity. Shine acknowledged being a convicted felon but denied gang affiliation and drug selling. During a search of Shine's vehicle, Ritchie discovered a razor blade and white powder residue on a digital scale. Ritchie then interrogated Shine, emphasizing respect and repeatedly inquiring about the razor blade, scale, and drug use. Shine admitted to using cocaine but not selling it. After a brief period, Ritchie moved Shine to the patrol car for further questioning, where he pressed Shine for information about drug purchases, suggesting that failure to cooperate could lead to additional charges. Ritchie clarified that Shine was not under arrest and did not administer Miranda warnings during this initial interrogation, which lasted approximately 13 minutes.

After Shine's formal arrest, he was taken to the Montgomery Police Department, where Agent Jeffrey Ioimo provided Miranda warnings before questioning him again. During this second interrogation, Shine admitted ownership of the handgun discovered in his vehicle and reiterated his status as a convicted felon. Consequently, he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The document also outlines the standard of review for district courts regarding magistrate judge reports, emphasizing that a district judge may accept, reject, or modify recommendations and can overturn factual findings if conducting a new evidentiary hearing. The discussion focuses on the implications of Shine's statements made during both interrogations. The court determined that the statements from the first, non-Mirandized interrogation were cumulative and not essential to the government's case. However, Shine's claims regarding the second, Mirandized interrogation could influence the case's outcome. The court presumes custody during the first interrogation for analysis purposes but identifies legal errors in the prior recommendation concerning the custody issue.

The magistrate judge's recommendation appropriately references United States v. Street to evaluate whether Shine was 'in custody' during a traffic stop, defining 'custody' for Miranda purposes as occurring only with a formal arrest or a significant restraint on freedom of movement. The determination of such restraint considers the 'totality of the circumstances,' including officer conduct (e.g., display of weapons or coercive language). However, the recommendation misapplied the Street test by introducing an additional criterion that a reasonable person in Shine's situation would feel completely at the mercy of the police, which is inconsistent with established case law. Furthermore, the recommendation conflated the Fourth Amendment inquiry regarding arrest with the Fifth Amendment's custody analysis, downplaying the impact of handcuffing under Miranda principles.

The misapplication includes quoting United States v. Acosta, which suggests that custody requires a belief of vulnerability to police coercion, a standard not supported by Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has clarified that 'custody' under Miranda includes both formal arrest and significant restraint, as seen in cases like California v. Beheler and Berkemer v. McCarty, which addressed the nature of traffic stops. Berkemer acknowledged that while traffic stops restrict movement, they do not automatically require Miranda warnings, as the temporary nature of such detentions mitigates coercive pressures.

Roadside detentions typically last only a few minutes, with motorists expecting brief interactions involving questions and checks of their license and registration, often concluding with a citation. The nature of these stops does not leave motorists feeling completely at the mercy of the police, as they occur in public settings. The Supreme Court's decision in Berkemer emphasizes that routine traffic stops do not equate to formal arrests, and Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect's freedom is curtailed to a degree similar to that of an arrest. The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Acosta determined that a reasonable person would not feel entirely at the mercy of the police during a traffic stop, thus no Miranda warnings were necessary. Acosta's language regarding a suspect's perception of their situation was not meant to establish a new standard for custody but to clarify the circumstances of that particular case. Subsequent cases, including Street and Luna-Encinas, have not adopted a new standard for traffic stops based on Acosta. Ultimately, the recommendation in the current case mistakenly applied Acosta's language as an additional requirement, deviating from established Eleventh Circuit precedent, leading to the conclusion that the defendant was not in custody.

The imposition of the Acosta language as a distinct standard for determining custody in traffic stops contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The Berkemer decision established that a motorist during a typical traffic stop does not feel completely under police control, which contributes to the determination that such stops are not normally custodial. Courts have recognized that factors like being handcuffed can indicate custody, as a reasonable person may conclude that their detention is not temporary. The Berkemer Court highlighted that the distinction between a traffic stop and being in custody relies on the motorist's expectation of being allowed to leave, rather than requiring each condition to be negated to establish custody. While a person feeling "at the mercy of the police" suggests custody under Miranda, this level of coercion is not necessary to define custody.

Furthermore, treating the Acosta language as a separate standard aligns more closely with the threshold for determining involuntary confessions, which hinge on coercive police conduct affecting the accused's free choice. The Acosta standard suggests that a reasonable person would believe they must confess or face consequences, indicative of coercion. This is a more stringent requirement than the custody standard, which only necessitates a significant restraint on freedom of movement akin to a formal arrest. If the Acosta language were applied as a new evidentiary standard, it would effectively necessitate proof of involuntary confession to establish custody, undermining its role in determining custody status. The purpose of Miranda warnings is to mitigate the risk of coerced confessions, even those not classified as involuntary.

The recommendation incorrectly merged Fourth and Fifth Amendment analyses regarding Shine's handcuffing. It focused on Officer Ritchie's authority under the Fourth Amendment, assessing whether he had reasonable grounds to handcuff Shine for officer safety, instead of evaluating whether Shine was 'in custody’ under the Fifth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment addresses the legality of police actions based on probable cause, while the Fifth Amendment's purpose is to prevent coerced confessions. The 'in custody' determination hinges on whether a reasonable person in Shine's position would feel a restraint on their freedom akin to a formal arrest. The recommendation failed to consider Shine's perspective, which included being handcuffed, searched, and questioned, all of which suggest a level of restraint consistent with custody.

Shine argues for the suppression of his statements made during a second interrogation at the police station, claiming they should be excluded under the Seibert exception. However, the court finds this exception inapplicable. The legal standard established in *Oregon v. Elstad* allows for a suspect who initially makes non-Mirandized statements to later provide admissible statements after being properly Mirandized. The *Elstad* case concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not necessitate the exclusion of post-warning confessions simply because a prior unwarned statement exists, as the suspect, once properly warned, can voluntarily decide whether to speak to authorities.

In contrast, the *Seibert* case introduced a narrow exception where a second confession must be suppressed if it is tainted by a prior unwarned statement obtained through a deliberate police strategy aiming to circumvent Miranda rights. The *Seibert* plurality determined that such "question-first" tactics undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings, as suspects may feel pressured to confess again after being confronted with their earlier statements. Justice Kennedy's concurrence further refined this by stating that suppression is warranted only in rare cases of intentional undermining and that post-warning statements might still be admissible if officers take corrective measures, like ensuring a significant break between interrogations or providing a clarifying warning about the inadmissibility of the earlier statement. Justice Kennedy's opinion is considered controlling due to its narrower approach.

In evaluating whether police officers employed a deliberate two-step interrogation strategy, the court considers the totality of circumstances, including timing, setting, completeness of pre-warning interrogation, continuity of police personnel, and overlapping content of statements. Shine argues for suppression of his statements based on the 'Seibert exception,' claiming that the initial non-Mirandized interrogation compromised the effectiveness of subsequent warnings. He contends that the two separate interrogations indicate a deliberate strategy, particularly noting Officer Pendley’s communication with Agent Ioimo before arriving at the station.

The government counters that there is no evidence of such a strategy, asserting that the Elstad ruling applies. During an evidentiary hearing, Officer Ritchie explained that the Montgomery Police Department's policy requires officers to gather information without making arrest decisions, suggesting that the lack of Miranda warnings was consistent with this policy. The court finds insufficient evidence of a calculated two-step technique aimed at undermining the Miranda warning, affirming that the Elstad rule governs. 

Considering the totality of circumstances, the court notes a 90-minute gap between interrogations, with no evidence of questioning during that period. The first interrogation occurred roadside, while the second took place at the station, indicating a change in setting and personnel that favors the government. Although the completeness of the first interrogation weighs slightly in Shine's favor due to its extensive questioning, it is not decisive. The content of the pre-and post-warning statements does not significantly assist Shine; Agent Ioimo confronted Shine with information obtained from prior officers, which aligns with typical police procedure.

Facts gathered by officers during a traffic stop were not obtained from any confession from Shine during pre-warning interrogation. The subsequent use of these observations in a second interrogation does not indicate a deliberate two-step strategy, as seen in Seibert. The court expressed concern over Officer Ritchie's testimony regarding the MPD's policy of information gathering without Miranda warnings, which could complicate matters under Seibert, particularly if such gathering occurs while a suspect is in custody. It emphasized that if someone is in custody, they are entitled to Miranda warnings before questioning, and that policy cannot circumvent this requirement. Despite the presumption that Shine was in custody during the initial interrogation, there was insufficient evidence to suggest that the MPD policy was designed to undermine Miranda rights. Consequently, Shine's statements made after receiving Miranda warnings will not be suppressed. The court accepted in part and rejected in part the magistrate judge's recommendation, granting Shine's motion to suppress only concerning the period after he was handcuffed and moved to the patrol car, while denying it in other respects. The court noted that the 'in custody' standard under Miranda is more stringent than the 'free-to-leave' standard used in Fourth Amendment analyses, requiring either formal arrest or a significant curtailment of freedom akin to formal arrest.