Knight First Amendment Inst. At Columbia Univ. v. Trump
Docket: 17 Civ. 5205 (NRB)
Court: District Court, S.D. Illinois; May 23, 2018; Federal District Court
The case evaluates whether a public official can block individuals from their Twitter account due to those individuals' expressed political views, specifically in the context of the President of the United States. The court concludes that such actions are not permissible under the First Amendment. The analysis begins with background on Twitter and the @realDonaldTrump account, followed by procedural history and jurisdictional considerations. The plaintiffs are found to have standing, as they experienced a legally cognizable injury linked to actions by the President and Daniel Scavino, with potential for judicial redress.
The court determines that the interactive space of the @realDonaldTrump account qualifies as a designated public forum and that blocking users based on their political speech constitutes viewpoint discrimination, violating the First Amendment. The court rejects the defendants' arguments that the First Amendment does not apply and that the President's personal interests outweigh those of the plaintiffs.
Regarding relief, while acknowledging the possibility of injunctive relief against the President, the court finds that a declaratory judgment suffices, reinforcing that no government official is above the law. The background facts are primarily drawn from a stipulation between the parties, which clarifies that Twitter is a social media platform with over 300 million active users, where users can post tweets limited to 280 characters and share multimedia content.
Twitter user webpages feature a brief bio, profile picture, header image, location, a private messaging button, and links to a gallery of posted photos and videos. By default, these pages are publicly visible online, but non-users cannot interact with them. Key interactions include retweeting, replying to tweets, liking tweets, mentioning users, and following accounts. Retweets appear unchanged on a user's timeline, while replies can include multimedia and are visible in the user's reply tab and under the original tweet. Users can express approval via likes and receive notifications for mentions. All interactions are controlled by the users who create them; no one else can modify the content of tweets, replies, or retweets, and users cannot prescreen references to their accounts. Each interaction can lead to further responses, forming comment threads that facilitate complex conversations. Users can limit interactions by blocking or muting others, preventing blocked users from accessing their content or engaging with them on the platform.
Blocking a user on Twitter prevents the blocked user from seeing tweets, mentions, or interacting directly with the blocking user’s content. The blocked user receives a notification if they try to follow or access the blocking user’s account, indicating that they have been blocked. However, the blocked user can still mention the blocking user, and any tweets mentioning the blocking user are visible to anyone who can view the blocked user's content. The blocked user can reply to others who have replied to the blocking user's tweets, although they cannot see the original tweet that prompted the replies. If the blocked user is not signed in, they can access public content on Twitter.
Muting, in contrast to blocking, allows users to remove another account's tweets from their timeline without the other user knowing. Muted accounts can still follow the muting user, and interactions such as replies and mentions may appear in the muting user’s Notifications tab, depending on whether the muting user follows the muted account.
The @realDonaldTrump account was established in March 2009 and has been used by President Trump to communicate with the public, particularly since his inauguration in January 2017. The account is publicly accessible, allowing anyone to view tweets without being logged in and to follow the account. There are no restrictions on the speech of those replying to his tweets, and the account is managed with assistance from Daniel Scavino, the White House Social Media Director, in his official capacity.
President Trump frequently utilizes the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account, often with assistance from Mr. Scavino, to announce and defend policies, promote legislative agendas, engage with foreign leaders, publicize state visits, and address media coverage. Notably, he has made significant announcements via this account, including the nomination of Christopher Wray for FBI director and the removals of Rex Tillerson and David Shulkin from their positions. The National Archives has classified these tweets as official records under the Presidential Records Act, necessitating their preservation.
Mr. Scavino assists in managing the account, including drafting tweets and engaging with followers. The account generates substantial public interaction, with tweets often amassing thousands of replies, retweets, and likes. For instance, a series of tweets regarding a military ban on transgender individuals received nearly 70,000 retweets and 180,000 likes shortly after posting.
The individual plaintiffs—Rebecca Buckwalter, Philip Cohen, Holly Figueroa, Eugene Gu, Brandon Neely, Joseph Papp, and Nicholas Pappas—are Twitter users who tweeted critical messages in response to the President's tweets and were subsequently blocked from the account. The defendants do not dispute that these blocks were in response to the plaintiffs' criticisms. Consequently, the plaintiffs are unable to view the President's tweets, reply to them, or access associated comment threads while logged into their accounts.
Individual Plaintiffs can access tweets from @realDonaldTrump via an unblocked internet browser or a non-blocked Twitter account, and some have created secondary accounts for this purpose. Blocking does not fully prevent interaction with the President’s tweets; they can see and respond to replies, though they miss context without the original tweets. Previously, a third-party service called Favstar allowed blocked users to view and reply to tweets, but this is no longer possible. These alternative methods for accessing tweets are considered cumbersome, leading to infrequent use among the Individual Plaintiffs.
The Knight First Amendment Institute, which is not blocked from the @realDonaldTrump account, seeks to read comments from blocked individuals in response to the President's tweets. As of August 22, 2017, the Institute did not follow the Individual Plaintiffs on Twitter.
In July 2017, the Knight Institute and the Individual Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against the President and key White House officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. After a change in White House Press Secretaries, the new officials were substituted as defendants. Following the stipulation of facts, the defendants filed for summary judgment, which was met with a cross-motion from the plaintiffs. Oral arguments were held on March 8, 2018. The court emphasized the importance of confirming jurisdiction prior to addressing the case's merits, referencing constitutional constraints on judicial power.
Standing to sue is a fundamental requirement in federal cases, determining the court's jurisdiction to hear a claim. Article III standing consists of three essential elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, which is concrete and particularized; (2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and (3) the injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision. The burden of proving these elements rests with the plaintiff, who must provide sufficient evidence at various stages of the litigation, especially when responding to a summary judgment motion. In such cases, plaintiffs cannot rely on mere allegations but must present specific facts through affidavits or evidence. Moreover, for summary judgment to be granted in favor of the plaintiff, there must be no genuine issue of material fact regarding the plaintiff's standing.
Each plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought, and the standing inquiry must be conducted for each defendant in the case, as Article III prohibits suits against non-injurious defendants. To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show an invasion of a legally protected interest that is actual or imminent, rather than hypothetical. Previous illegal conduct does not, by itself, establish a current case or controversy for injunctive relief unless accompanied by ongoing adverse effects. Past wrongs may contribute to demonstrating a real and immediate threat of future injury, but cannot solely satisfy the injury requirement for seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.
A plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of future injury to establish standing under Article III. The concept of imminence, while somewhat flexible, cannot be overly broad; the alleged injury must be "certainly impending." A speculative theory of standing or a mere reasonable chance of injury does not meet this threshold. Additionally, the injury must be concrete and particularized, affecting the plaintiff personally rather than as a member of the general public. General grievances or special interests are insufficient for standing. However, the presence of a widespread injury does not preclude standing, as long as the injury is not merely a generalized grievance. Concreteness differs from particularization; a concrete injury must actually exist and can include intangible harms, such as First Amendment violations. In this case, the individual plaintiffs face specific limitations on their Twitter usage due to being blocked, preventing them from viewing, replying to, or engaging with the President's tweets, which constitutes a cognizable injury-in-fact, affecting their ability to communicate on the platform.
The individual plaintiffs, currently blocked from the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account, face ongoing limitations in their ability to communicate, particularly in interacting with the President's tweets. Their past and future harms are concrete and particularized, fulfilling the requirements for standing under Article III due to the direct impact on their First Amendment rights linked to their personal Twitter accounts. The future injuries they will suffer are deemed virtually certain unless the blocking functionality changes. The document explains that causation for standing can derive from both actions and omissions of the defendant, establishing a causal nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs' injuries.
Regarding specific defendants, the plaintiffs have not established standing against Sarah Huckabee Sanders, as she neither blocked them nor has access to the account in question, leading to the conclusion that their injuries are not attributable to her actions. Consequently, summary judgment is granted in favor of Sanders. In contrast, Daniel Scavino does have access to the @realDonaldTrump account, including the ability to block or unblock users, which distinguishes his situation and suggests potential liability concerning the plaintiffs' claims.
Mr. Scavino operates social media accounts for President Trump, including drafting and posting tweets on @realDonaldTrump. Despite his active role, this involvement alone does not establish a direct link to the plaintiffs' injuries necessary for standing. The evidence only indicates Scavino's general participation, with no indication that he blocked the plaintiffs. Courts, including the Second Circuit, have held that for claims seeking prospective relief, a defendant's lack of personal involvement in past constitutional violations does not disqualify them from being named defendants, provided they have a connection to ongoing violations. Relevant case law supports that action for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief is permissible against officials who are responsible for the alleged illegal actions, regardless of their direct involvement in past violations. This principle applies not only to state officials but also to federal officials, as historical context shows that federal courts can grant injunctive relief against both types of officials for ongoing constitutional violations.
The ability to seek injunctions against unconstitutional actions by state and federal officials is rooted in a long-standing tradition of judicial review, dating back to English law. There is no requirement for prior personal involvement in actions for prospective relief; rather, the connection of the official to the ongoing violation fulfills the traceability requirement. If an official, such as Scavino, has the ability to remedy an ongoing violation—like blocking plaintiffs from accessing their First Amendment rights—their failure to act contributes to future harm. Historical illegal conduct alone does not establish a current case for injunctive relief without continuing adverse effects.
In this case, Scavino's potential to unblock the plaintiffs means any future injury would be traceable to him. The President's actions directly blocking the plaintiffs from his Twitter account also establish a clear causal link to their injuries. For redressability, the court must find it likely that a favorable ruling would address the injury, which does not require absolute certainty but rather a reasonable expectation of improvement for the plaintiffs. Moreover, complete relief is not necessary to satisfy the redressability element of Article III standing, as a plaintiff is not required to prove that every injury will be fully remedied by a favorable decision.
The legal principles surrounding redressability establish that partial relief can be sufficient for standing purposes, as demonstrated in various case law. The Supreme Court allowed Massachusetts to challenge the EPA despite the absence of a guarantee that a favorable ruling would completely prevent future environmental damage. It is sufficient if a favorable decision alleviates some of the plaintiffs' issues, as noted in Consumer Data Indus. Ass'n v. King. The plaintiffs’ injuries could be remedied through declaratory or injunctive relief aimed at Scavino, as future injuries would be averted if the individuals are unblocked. The defendants’ argument regarding the President's ability to block individuals does not undermine this redressability; prior rulings confirm that relief against subordinate officials is adequate even if higher officials could theoretically counteract it. Furthermore, it is presumed that the President and executive officials would comply with court interpretations, which supports the likelihood of redressing the plaintiffs’ injuries.
Regarding the Knight Institute's standing, it must demonstrate an imminent and distinct injury that is directly traceable to the alleged actions and that a favorable outcome would provide redress. The Knight Institute has established an injury-in-fact by asserting its right to access comments from blocked individuals, which qualifies as a legitimate interest for standing. The desire to observe or utilize information is recognized as a cognizable interest sufficient for standing claims.
The Knight Institute's standing is supported by its following of one individual plaintiff, which establishes a direct injury relevant to its interest in the First Amendment. Contrary to the defendants' claims of an attenuated injury, the situation is clear: the individual plaintiffs are blocked from replying to the President's tweets, and the Knight Institute has a specific desire to access those replies. The defendants argue that the Knight Institute's grievance is too generalized; however, the record indicates that the Institute's interest is distinct and not shared by the broader public. Even if others desire to read the tweets, this does not negate the Knight Institute's standing.
The Knight Institute's established injury-in-fact supports its organizational standing, as its inability to read the replies is directly tied to the individual plaintiffs being blocked. The causation and redressability requirements for standing are satisfied because unblocking the individual plaintiffs would allow them to reply to the President, thus fulfilling the Knight Institute’s interest in reading those replies. The potential for the individual plaintiffs to engage if unblocked is bolstered by evidence of their previous attempts to circumvent the blocking.
With both the individual plaintiffs and the Knight Institute having standing, the focus shifts to the First Amendment implications of a public official blocking individuals on Twitter, particularly regarding the nature of the forum involved.
The analysis begins by determining if the speech the individual plaintiffs wish to engage in is protected under the First Amendment, referencing case law such as *Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Educ. Fund, Inc.* and *International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee*. If the speech is found to be protected, the next step involves assessing whether the forum in question is subject to forum analysis. Not all government properties qualify as forums, and specific identification of the forum is crucial to determine its classification—public or nonpublic.
The speech in question is political and pertains to matters of public concern, which are central to First Amendment protection. It is noted that the plaintiffs' speech does not fall into categories that are not protected, such as obscenity or incitement. Therefore, it is concluded that the plaintiffs' speech is protected.
Regarding forum doctrine, it is emphasized that the space must be government-owned or controlled for forum analysis to be applicable. Access to public property or private property intended for public use is essential to raise First Amendment issues. Furthermore, the application of forum analysis must align with the property's intended use. If applying this analysis would effectively close the forum, then it is deemed inappropriate. The Supreme Court's guidance suggests that the identification of the forum should focus on the access sought by the speaker, indicating that general access to public property encompasses that property as the forum.
In analyzing access to specific forums, the Supreme Court has adopted a more nuanced approach when limited access is sought. Key cases illustrate this: in Cornelius, the forum in question was a fundraising drive within a federal workplace, not the workplace itself. Similarly, in Perry Education Ass'n, the focus was on a public school's internal mail system, while in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the relevant forum was the advertising space on city buses. This careful delineation is crucial; for example, a public park is recognized as a forum for assembly and communication but not for installations like permanent monuments.
In the context of the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account, it is incorrect to view the entire account as the forum. The plaintiffs do not seek comprehensive access to the account but rather specific interactions, such as accessing tweet content, timelines, comment threads, and interactive features. For a space to qualify as a forum, it must be owned or controlled by the government. Legal precedents indicate that government control can establish forum status even without ownership. The First Amendment concerns arise only when access is sought to public or publicly dedicated private property, and it does not guarantee access merely due to government ownership or control.
The excerpt evaluates the nature of the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account in terms of public forum analysis, referencing relevant case law. It establishes that a privately owned platform can serve as a public forum if governmental control over its access and content is significant. Here, although Twitter is a private entity, the President and Scavino exercise substantial control over the account, including dictating tweet content and blocking users, which satisfies the governmental control criterion. The account is identified as belonging to Donald J. Trump, the 45th President, and the tweets are classified as official records under the Presidential Records Act. Moreover, these tweets are utilized in formal executive functions such as appointments and foreign policy, reinforcing the governmental nature of the account despite its private ownership.
The President's removal power is linked to the constitutional duty to ensure laws are executed faithfully, as outlined in Article II, section 3, clause 5. The President uniquely communicates with foreign governments, and the @realDonaldTrump account is presented as a presidential rather than personal account, indicating governmental control exercised by the President and Scavino. Defendants argue that the blocking action does not meet the "governmental control-or-ownership" criteria necessary for First Amendment scrutiny, referencing precedents from 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They assert that blocking is a feature available to all Twitter users, thus lacking state law authority. However, the distinction between public and private forums indicates that actions taken in public forums are often considered state actions subject to First Amendment limitations. Although further analysis may be necessary when a nongovernmental entity controls the forum, in this case, the President and Scavino act in their official capacities, making the Brentwood Academy factors less applicable. The argument that blocking is a general capability of Twitter users overlooks the context of exclusion within the public forum and is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedents, which recognize the government's role in managing property it controls similarly to a private owner.
The State possesses the authority to manage its property similarly to private owners, particularly through the right to exclude others. This right is fundamental to property interests and is applicable to both government and private entities. The case highlights that the context of exclusion matters, indicating that a public official blocking a constituent from a personal account—unrelated to official duties—would not invoke forum analysis. The defendants’ arguments related to the historical establishment of an account before the official's election are unconvincing. Forum analysis must consider current characterizations, not just historical context, as demonstrated in past rulings where the nature of a location could shift based on its use. For instance, a site initially classified as a military base might be reassessed as a public park post-decommissioning. The current governmental use of the @realDonaldTrump account is more significant in this analysis than its origin as a private account. Thus, while the President and his aide utilize the account for official functions, this does not extend their control over the comment threads initiated by tweets from that account.
The comment thread on Twitter, which includes initial tweets, direct replies, and further replies, does not qualify as a public forum. The President and Scavino can manage interactions by restricting who can reply or retweet the original tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account, but they cannot control the ongoing conversation within the comment thread. Even plaintiffs who have been blocked can still view and reply to comments made in response to @realDonaldTrump tweets. This lack of control over comment threads, as opposed to the initial tweet and the associated interactive space, means they do not meet the criteria for a forum.
The analysis further considers whether applying forum doctrine aligns with the purpose and structure of the @realDonaldTrump account, which is subject to government control. The forum doctrine applies where government property can accommodate numerous public speakers without impairing its primary function. However, it is not suitable when the government has significant discretion in deciding which private speech to present publicly, as established in various Supreme Court cases. For instance, in cases involving public broadcasters and the National Endowment for the Arts, the Court declined to apply forum analysis due to the necessity of editorial discretion. Consequently, applying forum analysis could impede legitimate governmental purposes, particularly when it may lead to the closing of the forum. Therefore, government speech, such as that from the @realDonaldTrump account, is exempt from forum analysis under the First Amendment.
The Free Speech Clause limits government regulation of private speech and does not apply to government speech. Distinguishing between government and private speech can be complex, particularly when private entities contribute to speech that is then adopted by the government. Cases such as Pleasant Grove City and Walker illustrate that even privately financed monuments or specialty license plates become government speech when accepted or issued by governmental bodies. Conversely, private speech does not transform into government speech simply due to the government's provision of a platform for that speech.
The Supreme Court has identified three factors to determine if speech is government speech: (1) historical use by the government to convey state messages, (2) public association of the speech with the government, and (3) the degree of government control over the conveyed messages. These factors were reaffirmed in Matal v. Tam and are critical to the government-speech doctrine.
The content of the President's tweets is deemed government speech, as they are used to announce policies, promote legislation, and engage in official communications. Consequently, the timeline of tweets from the @realDonaldTrump account is not subject to forum analysis, as it solely aggregates government speech. However, interactive elements such as replies and retweets are distinct, as they are associated with the replying user, who maintains control over their content. This differentiation suggests that replies are not closely identified with the original governmental tweet, thus complicating the application of government speech analysis.
Replies to the President's tweets are considered private speech of the replying user, as the government does not control their content unless the user is blocked. The mere association of a reply with a government tweet does not qualify it as government speech. The interactive nature of tweets allows for public engagement without restriction based on political affiliation, similar to how public venues accommodate multiple speakers. The record indicates that tweets can attract extensive public interaction, supporting the notion that this interactive space functions as a forum for private speakers. When a user is blocked, their primary limitation is the inability to interact directly with the blocking user's tweets, although they can still access content through alternative means. Ultimately, the interactive space of tweets should be analyzed under forum doctrine rather than categorized as government speech.
Classification of fora for expressive activity is categorized into three types according to Supreme Court precedents. Traditional public fora are spaces historically devoted to public assembly and debate, such as streets and parks, which have a long-standing public use. A forum cannot be deemed traditional without a well-established history of public dedication. The second type, public property opened for expressive activity, requires the government to intentionally designate the space as generally available for public discourse. Mere inaction or limited permission does not create a public forum. The third type, nonpublic forums, lacks traditional or explicit designation for public communication.
Applying this classification to the interactive space of a tweet from @realDonaldTrump, it is concluded that it does not qualify as a traditional public forum due to the absence of historical practices for public speech on Twitter. Although the Supreme Court has recognized the internet as a significant venue for discourse, the lack of historical context is critical. Therefore, the analysis shifts to whether the interactive space constitutes a designated public forum, which hinges on the government's intent discerned through various objective factors, including policy, past practices, and the nature of the property.
The case Paulsen v. County of Nassau establishes that the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account is considered a designated public forum. This conclusion is supported by several factors: the account is publicly accessible without restrictions based on political affiliation, anyone can view tweets, and those who are not blocked can engage by replying or retweeting. The account has been explicitly presented as a direct communication channel from the President to the American people, facilitating expressive activities that are fundamental to the Twitter platform.
The document further explores the implications of viewpoint discrimination within a designated public forum. It cites that government regulation in such forums must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, and viewpoint discrimination is generally prohibited. In this case, the blocking of individual plaintiffs was deemed viewpoint discrimination, as it occurred shortly after they posted critical comments about the President. The defendants did not contest the plaintiffs' claims that they were blocked specifically for their critical tweets.
The exclusion of individual plaintiffs based on their viewpoints is deemed impermissible under the First Amendment. While defendants assert that the President has a personal First Amendment right to choose whom to associate with and may ignore individual plaintiffs, these arguments do not justify the blocking of those plaintiffs constitutionally. Public officials retain their First Amendment rights upon taking office, and the First Amendment protects the public's interest in hearing all sides of public issues. No group can claim a constitutional right to prevent government officials from exercising their rights. Additionally, the First Amendment does not obligate government policymakers to listen to or respond to individuals' communications on public matters, and no constitutional harm arises from the government ignoring a speaker. However, if the government actively restricts an individual's right to speak and advocate ideas, it violates the First Amendment. The distinction between Twitter's muting and blocking features is significant; muting allows a user to ignore an account without severing the connection, while blocking represents an active restriction of interaction, which raises constitutional concerns regarding free speech.
A muted account can still engage with a muting account by replying to tweets, but the muting user generally does not see these replies. In contrast, blocking prevents the blocked user from seeing or replying to any tweets from the blocking user, effectively limiting the blocked user's ability to communicate. While both muting and blocking allow a user to ignore certain speakers, muting does not restrict the muted account's right to speak, unlike blocking. The court finds the defendants' claim that muting and blocking are equivalent unconstitutional, highlighting that replies to tweets are visible to others, thus broadening the audience beyond just the sender. Consequently, blocking infringes upon the blocked user's ability to speak to this broader audience. The court concludes that blocking individuals based on their political views violates the First Amendment, emphasizing that even minimal infringements on First Amendment rights are significant, as established in various legal precedents. The court acknowledges the President's First Amendment rights but underscores that these cannot infringe upon the rights of those who criticize him.
Defendants assert that individual plaintiffs retain the ability to access and interact with the President's tweets, but blocking them limits their direct interaction, which constitutes a violation of the Constitution. The plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief. Defendants argue that the court lacks authority to enjoin the President, but this view is rejected; the separation-of-powers doctrine does not prevent judicial jurisdiction over the President in suitable circumstances. Supreme Court precedents indicate that the President is not absolutely immune from judicial process, and judicial review is permissible when balancing the constitutional interests against potential intrusions on executive authority. While typically courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin the President in official duties, there remains the possibility for judicial injunctions concerning purely ministerial duties. In this case, an injunction to unblock the plaintiffs would pose minimal intrusion on executive prerogative, as it would not compel the President to execute laws in a particular manner or pursue specific policy goals. The duty to unblock, following a ruling of unconstitutionality, is seen as ministerial, aligning more closely with a non-discretionary task rather than an executive duty requiring discretion.
An injunction to unblock the individual plaintiffs would more closely align with the "ministerial duty" defined in case law, contrasting with the discretionary duties outlined in Mississippi v. Johnson. The law mandates specific acts, and no government official can act unconstitutionally. Although the potential for injunctive relief against the President is uncertain, relief against subordinate officials like Scavino is permissible and presents fewer separation-of-powers issues. Courts generally prefer to direct legal processes toward lower executive officials, as seen in various precedents. While injunctive relief may be warranted, the court opts for declaratory relief instead, believing it will effectively achieve the desired outcome. The Supreme Court advises assuming that executive officials will comply with authoritative constitutional interpretations, supporting the decision to issue a declaratory judgment based on applicable factors.
The court concluded that the blocking of individual plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account, based on their political views, constitutes a violation of the First Amendment. It emphasized the judiciary's role in interpreting the law and confirmed that no government official, including the President and Daniel Scavino, is above the law. The plaintiffs demonstrated legal injuries linked to the actions of the President and Scavino, establishing jurisdiction for the dispute, while lacking standing to sue Sarah Huckabee Sanders and Hope Hicks, both of whom were dismissed as defendants.
The court held that the plaintiffs' intended speech is protected under the First Amendment and that the President and Scavino control certain aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account, which qualifies as a designated public forum. The exclusion of the plaintiffs from this forum based on their viewpoints is prohibited by the First Amendment and cannot be justified by the President's personal First Amendment rights. The court partially granted and denied both the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Clerk of the Court was instructed to terminate the pending motions.
Additionally, the court acknowledged the parties' cooperation in stipulating to the facts, which facilitated addressing the legal issues without extensive discovery. The excerpt mentions the historical context of Twitter's character limits and the parties' agreement to judicially notice information from Twitter's support materials.
Plaintiffs are seeking only prospective relief against Hicks, who was sued in her official capacity. Hicks's resignation necessitates summary judgment in her favor, as her successor has not yet been appointed, preventing substitution under Rule 25(d). Consequently, Hicks will be dismissed as a defendant, with the case caption amended accordingly. The absence of future injury also undermines redressability, which is crucial for standing, particularly for injunctive relief, as the plaintiff alleges merely past infractions and not a continuing violation. The Court proposed that a potential resolution could involve unblocking and muting individual plaintiffs, allowing them to interact with the @realDonaldTrump account while maintaining the President's ability to ignore unwanted interactions. However, the lack of such a resolution indicates that the plaintiffs will continue to face the alleged harms. The legal precedents from cases against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are relevant here, emphasizing that a plaintiff has standing as long as the claim is viable. The government's argument regarding standing related to Scavino, based on no duty existing, misapplies the analysis by addressing merits before standing. Jurisdiction remains intact despite the potential for the claims to fail. Rule 19(a) requires joining additional parties if complete relief cannot be granted without them, as long as it does not affect subject-matter jurisdiction. The case focuses solely on the First Amendment, rendering the government's references to cases involving multiple laws irrelevant.
Plaintiffs’ actions may be limited by an unchallenged law, regardless of their success in contesting it. The potential for redress for individual plaintiffs through relief directed at Scavino is not contingent upon his status as a defendant. The All Writs Act allows for relief against individuals who can impede court orders, even if they are not parties to the original action or have not actively obstructed justice. Relief could be directed at Scavino even if he were not a defendant, consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), which binds not only parties but also their associates.
For organizational plaintiffs, associational standing permits them to sue on behalf of members if those members could sue individually, the claims align with the organization's purpose, and member participation in the lawsuit is unnecessary. However, the Knight Institute does not claim associational standing, and skepticism about such a claim is noted.
The distinction between the applicability of forum analysis and the type of forum is emphasized, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Brentwood, which examined whether a non-profit organization acted with state action in regulating member schools. The Court determined that a close connection between the state and private behavior could constitute state action, analyzing factors such as state coercion, public function, and significant state encouragement. The conclusion also references relevant case law and Justice Breyer's views on the inapplicability of forum analysis to internet access in public libraries.
The content of retweets by government officials, specifically those from @realDonaldTrump, raises questions about whether they qualify as government speech. Retweets of government tweets are clearly government speech, while retweets of private tweets may still be considered government speech due to the context of retweeting, akin to government acceptance of privately originated messages. However, a private individual's retweet of a government tweet is likely private speech.
Exclusion of individuals from a nonpublic forum, such as social media interactions, must be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable. The blocking of individuals who criticized the President is deemed viewpoint-discriminatory and unconstitutional under the First Amendment, irrespective of the forum designation. The analysis does not separately address the claim that blocking violates the right to petition the government, as both speech and petition rights are fundamentally linked, and this case does not present unique concerns warranting separate consideration.
