Brettel v. Omron Scientific Techs., Inc.

Citation: 302 F. Supp. 3d 460Docket: CIVIL ACTION NO. 14–13936–JGD

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; March 27, 2018; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Judith Gail Dein, United States Magistrate Judge, presides over the case involving plaintiff Kristen Brettell, who sustained injuries while operating a laminating machine at her employer Madico, Inc. Brettell alleges negligence against defendants Omron Scientific Technologies, Inc. and Omron STI Machine Services, Inc. (collectively "Omron") for their inspection and servicing of the machine. Omron has filed a Third-Party Complaint against Madico for contractual indemnification and breach of contract. 

Currently before the court is Omron's Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Madico's modifications to the equipment after Omron's work constituted an intervening cause absolving them of duty and liability. The court denies Omron's motion, citing material facts in dispute. 

In the facts presented, Madico manufactures laminating and coating films at its Woburn, Massachusetts facility and hired Omron for a machine safeguarding assessment in August 2009, specifically for the LC-3 laminating line. Omron's responsibilities included evaluating safety in accordance with OSHA, ANSI, and NFPA standards, identifying risks, and recommending safety measures. Omron's assessor, David Semenchuk, conducted an inspection from September 1-3, 2009, identifying a "HIGH" risk of injury related to the LC-3 laminating machine. Disputes arise regarding whether Madico informed Semenchuk about the need for worker access to the machine area during operation for cleaning purposes and whether enclosing the area was discussed as a safety measure.

The revised report recommended an alternative safety measure for the LC-3 laminating platform, with contention between the parties regarding whether the initial or revised report identified the area of Ms. Brettell's injury as a potential risk. The plaintiff claims that Omron failed to recognize the transport idlers as a crush point, while Omron denies this allegation. There is also disagreement on the viability of Omron's safety recommendations and their potential impact on machine operation. After the revised report, Omron was not retained for further work, and Madico's controls engineer, Paul Malburg, implemented some of the recommendations independently. Madico, with consultant Gary Blaney, designed a "clean air enclosure" around the LC-3, which Omron argues contributed to Ms. Brettell's injury, although the plaintiff asserts it did not encompass the injury area. Blaney and Omron were unaware of each other's work. In January 2011, Madico purchased and installed Omron-branded safety mats, which the plaintiff claims were installed with Omron's approval, contrary to Omron's assertion that they were designed by Malburg without reference to Omron's reports. On April 4, 2013, Ms. Brettell sustained a crush injury while cleaning the LC-3 machine, with disputed facts surrounding her positioning and actions at the time. The analysis section notes that summary judgment aims to clarify whether a genuine trial is necessary, with the moving party required to demonstrate a lack of material fact disputes.

Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must present specific facts demonstrating a genuine, triable issue. The opposing party cannot avoid summary judgment merely by relying on allegations or denials; they must provide properly supported evidence of material facts in dispute. Conclusory allegations, unsupported speculation, or evidence that lacks significant probative value are not given any weight by the court. The non-moving party must present competent evidence and specific facts to counter a motion for summary judgment.

In the case at hand, Omron claims it is not liable for Ms. Brettell's injuries because Madico's installation of a clean air enclosure was the proximate cause, an event not foreseeable by Omron, and an intervening cause. However, material facts are disputed, preventing summary judgment on this issue. A plaintiff alleging negligence must establish duty, breach, causation, and proximate cause. Under Massachusetts law, for proximate cause, it is necessary to demonstrate that the injuries were within the foreseeable risks linked to the defendant's negligence. Generally, the negligent actions of a third party do not absolve the original tortfeasor from liability if such actions were foreseeable. The determination of proximate cause is typically for a jury, except when evidence leads to only one conclusion. In this case, disputed facts regarding whether the clean air enclosure caused the accident prevent a legal conclusion that Madico's actions absolve Omron of liability.

The plaintiff argues that Omron failed to identify the area where Ms. Brettell was injured as a hazard, which, if acknowledged, would have prompted Madico to mitigate the risk. A jury could infer that the installation of the clean air enclosure was foreseeable, despite its potential contribution to the injury. There are disputed facts regarding discussions between Omron and Madico about enclosing the laminating area, suggesting that Madico's actions could be deemed foreseeable by Omron. Consequently, material facts surrounding Omron's duty of care and the causation of the accident are in question, making summary judgment inappropriate.

Omron contends it owed no duty of care to Ms. Brettell, but the claims indicate that Omron's failure to identify risks could have led Madico to implement safety improvements, exposing employees to potential harm. The existence of a duty of care, typically a legal question, is influenced by policy considerations, and it is reasonable to assert that a duty extends to Madico's employees, given Omron's role in identifying safety risks.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognizes that tort claims can arise from contractual relationships, holding that a defendant may be liable to third parties foreseeably exposed to danger due to negligent failure to fulfill contractual obligations. While the duty stems from the contract, breaches are assessed under tort principles focused on negligent performance rather than mere contractual failure.

In the case at hand, parallels are drawn to Parent v. Stone, Webster Eng'g Corp., where the plaintiff, an electrician, sustained injuries due to a lack of appropriate labeling on an electrical panel. The court found that Stone, Webster, as the project manager, had a duty to identify hazards during their evaluation of the electrical system, which they failed to do. The SJC reversed a summary judgment for Stone, Webster, indicating that the evidence suggested they either discovered or should have discovered the dangerous condition of the panel. This reasoning applies to the current case involving Omron, which similarly failed to identify the hazardous condition leading to the plaintiff's injuries. The court concluded that Omron did not demonstrate that it could not foresee the risks of negligent performance affecting plant employees, thus ruling against summary judgment. Furthermore, even if the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 324A were applicable, Omron could still be liable as a jury might find that its negligence increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff, suggesting a duty of care existed.

Omron contends it has no duty of care to the plaintiff because she cannot demonstrate reliance on its services. Relevant case law indicates that tort liability towards a potential beneficiary of a contractual obligation arises when the plaintiff’s harm is a foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence, specifically when the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s services, and the defendant was aware or should have anticipated such reliance. Assuming these principles apply, a jury could determine that employees of Madico, including the plaintiff, relied on Omron to identify safety risks, and that Omron should have anticipated this reliance. The record indicates that Ms. Brettell was aware of Omron's involvement in a safety study at the plant, which may support a finding of sufficient reliance to establish Omron's duty of care. As a result, summary judgment is deemed inappropriate. Consequently, the Omron Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The court acknowledges the factual basis is drawn from the parties' submitted statements and exhibits.