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Trudel v. Suntrust Bank
Citation: 302 F. Supp. 3d 140Docket: Civil Action No. 15–1966 (JEB)
Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; March 22, 2018; Federal Appellate Court
James E. Boasberg, United States District Judge, denied a motion for default judgment against Gwynfe Holding Ltd, a Virgin Islands corporation, due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs, the estate and a son of deceased Ukrainian millionaires Yevgenyi Scherban and Nadejda Nikitina, allege that Gwynfe converted $282,000 from a SunTrust Bank account. The Court previously addressed the family’s history and claims against SunTrust, focusing on a suspicious 1996 wire transfer request—sent via fax, allegedly signed by a deceased Nikitina—which contained errors and did not utilize the bank's required form. Despite the plaintiffs' efforts to establish jurisdiction, the Court found insufficient evidence to demonstrate either general or specific personal jurisdiction over Gwynfe. The Court noted that Gwynfe was not incorporated or conducting business in the District of Columbia and that its affiliations with the state did not meet the threshold for general jurisdiction. As a result, the motion for default judgment was denied, and the plaintiffs were instructed to clarify the basis for jurisdiction or face potential dismissal of their claim against Gwynfe without prejudice. A non-resident defendant's specific personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia is determined by the D.C. long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423, which aligns with the due-process clause. To establish jurisdiction, a plaintiff must prove: 1) the defendant transacted business in D.C.; 2) the claim arose from that business; 3) the defendant had minimum contacts with D.C.; and 4) exercising jurisdiction would not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In this case, since the plaintiffs did not allege that Gwynfe conducted any business or had contacts within D.C., they failed to meet the first three requirements. Plaintiffs attempted to argue Gwynfe's subjectivity to Florida's long-arm statute, but personal jurisdiction must be established based on the court's location, which is D.C., not Florida. They also cited 28 U.S.C. 1391, which pertains to venue rather than personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the plaintiffs raised new claims regarding violations of federal antiracketeering statutes, but these were not included in their original complaint. Even if they had been, jurisdiction would still be questionable due to the likelihood of Gwynfe being subject to Florida's jurisdiction. The Court decided to deny the plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment and dismiss the case against Gwynfe without prejudice, noting it could dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction even without the defendant's appearance. The Court acted appropriately by addressing the jurisdiction issue sua sponte, as the plaintiffs were given the opportunity to establish jurisdiction but failed to do so. An order reflecting this decision will be issued.