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Leon v. Cont'l AG
Citation: 301 F. Supp. 3d 1203Docket: Case No. 16–20572–CIV–WILLIAMS
Court: District Court, S.D. Florida; March 17, 2017; Federal District Court
Four motions to dismiss are currently before the Court, involving defendants Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA) and Daimler AG; American Honda Motor Co. Inc. (Honda); Atmel Corporation; and Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. A hearing on these motions was held on September 9, 2016, resulting in the Court granting all motions to dismiss. The case centers around defective airbag control units (ACUs) in various vehicles, with 630,004 vehicles under warning or recall as of September 8, 2016. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) anticipates that up to five million vehicles may be affected. A faulty electrical connection in the ACUs leads to failure in deploying airbags and safety systems during collisions and causes unexpected deployments. Defendants Honda and Mercedes Benz manufacture vehicles with these defective ACUs, including specific models from 2008 to 2010. Continental produces the defective ACUs, while Atmel supplies the ASIC component responsible for the defect. The plaintiffs, comprising thirteen individuals who purchased affected vehicles, seek to represent a nationwide class and various state sub-classes. They allege that the defendants had prior knowledge of the defects, with Continental reportedly aware since 2008 after examining an ACU from a vehicle with an airbag warning light issue. Despite purported countermeasures to address the defect, they allegedly failed to resolve the issue. The Complaint outlines a timeline and key events between 2008 and 2015, suggesting that the Defendants—Continental, Atmel, Mercedes Benz, and Honda—were aware of defects in Airbag Control Units (ACUs) prior to informing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Significant incidents include: - In early 2011, multiple companies, including Continental and Mercedes Benz, recognized two unexpected airbag deployments in vehicles with defective ACUs. - In March 2013, Mercedes Benz initiated a recall campaign outside the U.S. for defective ACUs but did not take similar actions domestically. - In early 2014, Continental faced litigation related to a recall affecting millions of General Motors vehicles due to a defect linked to their airbags. - Late 2014 saw Audi recall around 850,000 vehicles over a separate issue with Continental-manufactured airbags. - By early 2015, Continental, Atmel, and Honda identified additional vehicles with ACUs that failed to deploy airbags, including incidents leading to lawsuits and complaints to NHTSA. - In August 2015, NHTSA began investigating the defective ACUs in Honda vehicles. The Plaintiffs argue that all Defendants concealed their knowledge of the defects, asserting that Continental, Atmel, and Mercedes Benz knew by 2008, and Honda by early 2015. The Complaint presents multiple causes of action, including violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, fraudulent concealment, RICO violations, and breaches of various state consumer protection laws across different classes and sub-classes. Specifically, it includes: - Four causes of action against MBUSA - Five causes against Honda - Ten causes against Continental - Thirteen causes against Atmel These claims encompass both nationwide and state-specific statutes, indicating a broad spectrum of alleged legal violations related to consumer protection and fraud. Plaintiffs seek extensive relief, including: 1) certification of proposed classes and subclasses; 2) a declaration identifying the ACUs as defective; 3) a declaration assigning financial responsibility to Defendants for informing class members about the defects; 4) an injunction against Defendants' deceptive practices related to the defective ACUs and a requirement for complete repairs and removal of these ACUs; 5) compensatory, exemplary, and statutory damages; 6) reimbursement of purchase prices for affected vehicles and associated expenses; 7) a Defendant-funded program for claims related to the defective ACUs; 8) a declaration for Defendants to return profits gained from selling or leasing defective vehicles; 9) attorneys' fees and costs; 10) pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and 11) permission to amend the Complaint based on evidence from discovery and trial. The legal standard for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction allows for both facial and factual challenges. In factual attacks, courts can consider evidence beyond the pleadings, while plaintiffs must be given the chance for discovery and a hearing. For facial attacks, allegations in the complaint are accepted as true. A Rule 12(b)(2) motion regarding personal jurisdiction requires the court to accept allegations as true to assess if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. This involves determining if the defendant's actions meet Florida's long-arm statute and if exercising personal jurisdiction aligns with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. If a plaintiff's claim is based on a federal statute, the court can assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant, provided it aligns with the statute's parameters and Fifth Amendment due process. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must present sufficient facts to establish a claim that is "plausible on its face." The court's assessment is confined to the allegations made, accepting all factual claims as true and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. However, allegations should not merely recite the elements of a cause of action but must surpass a speculative level of detail. Conclusory statements and unwarranted factual assumptions will not preclude dismissal. Moreover, fraud-based claims, such as civil RICO claims, are governed by the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b), which requires specificity regarding the fraudulent circumstances while allowing general allegations about intent or knowledge. The requirements include detailing the fraudulent statements, the time and place of occurrence, the misleading nature of the statements, and the benefits gained by the defendants. In the case at hand, four of the five defendants—Honda, MBUSA, Atmel, and Continental—filed motions to dismiss, which the court grants. Honda's motion is considered separately from MBUSA's, while Continental's and Atmel's motions are discussed together due to similar legal issues. Honda faces allegations across five counts: violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), fraudulent concealment for both a nationwide class and a Florida sub-class, violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA). Honda successfully challenges the allegations in the Complaint, asserting that they do not demonstrate personal jurisdiction in the Court. The Court concurs and dismisses all claims against Honda without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(2). To assess personal jurisdiction, the Court evaluates whether Honda's activities meet Florida's long-arm statute and comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements. The burden initially lies with the Plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction, which requires sufficient factual pleading to withstand a directed verdict regarding Honda's connection to Florida's long-arm statute. Florida allows two avenues for personal jurisdiction: general and specific. General jurisdiction applies if a defendant has engaged in "substantial and not isolated activity" in Florida, making them amenable to all claims, regardless of their Florida activities. However, a foreign corporation can only be subject to general jurisdiction if its activities in the forum closely mirror those typical of its place of incorporation or principal business location. Specific jurisdiction applies to claims directly arising from the defendant's contacts with Florida, which must fit within one of the nine categories specified in the statute. The Plaintiffs' Complaint lacks the necessary factual allegations to establish either general or specific personal jurisdiction over Honda under Florida law. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Daimler, which rejected broad personal jurisdiction based on a subsidiary's contacts, the Court emphasizes that a foreign corporation must have significant and pervasive affiliations with the forum state to be subject to jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit's application of Daimler in the Carmouche case further illustrates that minimal connections, such as having a bank account or addresses in Florida, are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction. The court ruled that the connections between Honda and Florida were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. The court referenced the standard from Daimler, indicating that Honda was not "at home" in Florida, as it is incorporated and has its principal place of business in California. The plaintiffs' complaint lacked substantial allegations linking Honda to Florida, stating only that Honda conducts business in the district without providing factual support. The court noted that general jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute aligns with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process limits, suggesting that exercising such jurisdiction could infringe on Honda's rights. Regarding specific personal jurisdiction, the plaintiffs cited three provisions of Florida's long-arm statute but failed to adequately show Honda's business operations or any tortious acts committed within Florida. The plaintiffs' reliance on a "stream of commerce" argument was deemed too generalized and not sufficiently tied to Honda's actions. The complaint described Honda's operations in vague terms and did not establish that Honda committed a tortious act or caused injury in Florida, as required by the statute. Overall, the lack of specific factual allegations led to the conclusion that personal jurisdiction over Honda could not be established. The Complaint fails to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Honda as it does not allege that purchases or leases occurred through a Honda-affiliated dealer in Florida, undermining the application of the "stream of commerce" theory. Plaintiffs' reliance on Bolton v. Bunny's Pride is inappropriate, as that case involved specific allegations of delivery into Florida through a contractual relationship, which is not present here. Instead, Plaintiffs only infer Honda's involvement in the Florida market without sufficient factual support. Consequently, Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 against Honda are dismissed without prejudice, allowing Plaintiffs the opportunity to provide adequate factual allegations for personal jurisdiction. Regarding MBUSA, the Complaint includes four counts: violations of the MMWA (Count 1), fraudulent concealment for a nationwide class (Count 2) and a Florida sub-class (Count 5), and violations of FDUTPA (Count 4). MBUSA argues for dismissal based on the Plaintiffs' lack of Article III standing, asserting that the company's recall program renders some claims moot, and that Plaintiffs cannot assert claims for different vehicle models. The Court finds that while Plaintiffs have standing for most claims, all counts against MBUSA fail to sufficiently state a claim. Specifically, it agrees with MBUSA that only the argument pertaining to the inability of Plaintiffs to represent owners of different vehicle models is valid. Thus, Leon, Paz, and Morrow can pursue claims except for those on behalf of GLK-class vehicle owners. Article III of the U.S. Constitution restricts federal court jurisdiction to "Cases" and "Controversies," which inherently includes the mootness doctrine to limit the judiciary's power. The Supreme Court mandates that federal courts must assume the merits of a plaintiff's claim when assessing Article III standing. However, even if standing is established, courts can exercise discretion to deny declaratory relief based on prudential mootness, which applies when circumstances have changed such that meaningful relief is no longer possible. MBUSA argues that due to its voluntary recall and repair program, plaintiffs Leon and Paz lack Article III standing regarding Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, or alternatively, that these claims should be dismissed as prudentially moot. MBUSA cites the declaration of its Product Analysis Engineer, Timothy Lowery, indicating that Leon's vehicle was repaired at no cost and that Paz was notified about his repair eligibility but has not pursued it. The case of Hadley v. Chrysler Group LLC is referenced, where the Sixth Circuit upheld a dismissal for lack of standing after Chrysler offered free repairs for a defect, which the plaintiffs were unable to obtain due to parts availability delays. New Chrysler informed the plaintiffs about available parts after they filed suit, and the district court concluded that this repair negated their Article III standing. The Sixth Circuit upheld this ruling, determining that the plaintiffs could not claim diminished value against New Chrysler since it did not manufacture their vehicles; that responsibility lay with Old Chrysler. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument regarding diminished value in cases of significant defects, emphasizing that their suit was not against the original manufacturer based on defects present at purchase. Additionally, the plaintiffs' requests for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief were deemed moot as they sought no equitable relief beyond what had already been remedied by New Chrysler. In contrast, Leon and Paz's claims involve vehicles manufactured by Mercedes Benz, asserting those vehicles were defective from the time of purchase. They seek damages for lost value and a range of remedies that extend beyond what was addressed in Hadley and the repairs conducted. Unlike the plaintiffs in Winzler and Cheng, who only sought declaratory and injunctive relief, Leon and Paz aim for economic compensation, which the court found justifies their claims and distinguishes their situation from those prior cases. Consequently, MBUSA's recall does not render their claims moot, allowing potential recovery for economic losses. Additionally, MBUSA challenges Morrow's standing, noting her vehicle was not included in the 2015 recall program. Lowery's declaration asserts that Morrow's vehicle, produced on April 24, 2009, features a control unit module manufactured differently from those involved in the 2015 Mercedes Benz recall. This statement challenges the Complaint's claim that Morrow's vehicle is subject to the recall but does not affect the Court's standing analysis. The Complaint indicates that some vehicles with defective ACUs have not been recalled, noting that the manufacturing defect dates back to at least 2006 and persisted through 2010, and that measures taken to address the defect post-March 2008 were ineffective. Thus, the Court cannot conclude at this stage that Morrow's vehicle lacks a defective ACU or that Morrow lacks standing to sue MBUSA. MBUSA contends that Leon, Paz, and Morrow, who purchased C-Class vehicles in Florida, lack standing to bring certain claims on behalf of GLK-Class owners, citing case law that requires a class representative to have purchased the same product to assert claims for others. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit mandates that a named plaintiff must demonstrate Article III standing for each class sub-claim. Although plaintiffs argue that the same defective ACU was in both C-Class and GLK-Class vehicles, allowing claims for products not purchased by the plaintiff is not accepted in the Eleventh Circuit, despite contrary rulings in other jurisdictions. The precedent in this District reinforces that a named plaintiff cannot assert claims for products they did not purchase. A plaintiff in a consumer class action lacks standing to contest a product not purchased, as there is no injury-in-fact related to that product, even if the plaintiff bought a similar product. This principle was reaffirmed in Toback v. GNC Holdings, Inc., where the court determined that the plaintiff could only assert claims regarding the Vitapak product he purchased. Consequently, claims on behalf of vehicle owners for models not purchased by the plaintiffs cannot be raised. Additionally, MBUSA contends that certain Florida plaintiffs cannot bring claims on behalf of a nationwide class. The plaintiffs argue that the claims related to implied warranty and fraudulent concealment are uniformly applicable across states, suggesting that these claims should proceed despite MBUSA's motion to dismiss. The court, without assessing the uniformity of state laws, agrees that dismissal on standing grounds is premature at this stage, emphasizing that choice-of-law issues should be addressed later in the litigation process. The court confirms that the plaintiffs possess Article III standing for claims against MBUSA, except for those relating to vehicles they do not own. The court dismissed claims concerning the Mercedes Benz GLK Class for lack of standing. Upon reviewing MBUSA's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court found the plaintiffs' allegations inadequate to support their claims for implied warranty, fraudulent concealment, and FDUTPA. Specifically, the implied warranty claim fails due to the absence of contractual privity, the fraudulent concealment claims are barred by Florida's economic loss rule, and the FDUTPA claim lacks sufficient detail. Consequently, the court dismissed the remaining claims against MBUSA, including the implied warranty claim grounded in the MMWA, which was tied to Florida law. For claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), courts rely on state law to define implied warranties. In Florida, privity of contract is necessary for an implied warranty to exist in both sales and lease transactions. Plaintiffs claim to have established privity through direct dealings with the defendants or their dealerships; however, this assertion lacks sufficient factual support as they only state they purchased Mercedes Benz vehicles in Florida without identifying the sellers. Consequently, they cannot establish privity with Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), leading to the dismissal of their implied warranty claim. The ruling in the Takata case reinforces this requirement, as the court found that a plaintiff could not maintain a breach of implied warranty claim against an automotive distributor, like Mazda, without privity. Similarly, since MBUSA is not a dealer, the plaintiffs have not provided adequate grounds for establishing privity, thus barring their MMWA claim. In their defense, plaintiffs reference the Florida Supreme Court case Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., which previously allowed recovery for implied warranty without privity. However, this precedent was later abrogated when the court adopted strict liability in tort, which eliminated the no-privity breach of implied warranty cause of action for personal injury. Therefore, under current Florida law, privity is required to sustain a breach of implied warranty claim, substantiating the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against MBUSA. Privity is essential for asserting a breach of implied warranty claims in Florida, as established by Florida appellate courts. Cases such as Cerasani v. Am. Honda Motor Co. and Rentas v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. demonstrate that claims lacking sufficient allegations of privity are subject to dismissal. In the current case, Plaintiffs failed to allege privity with the automobile manufacturer, MBUSA, and their claim as intended third-party beneficiaries of MBUSA's warranty is unsupported by factual allegations regarding the acquisition of their vehicles or any control exerted by MBUSA. Regarding Counts 2 and 5, which involve claims of fraudulent concealment, MBUSA argues these claims are barred by Florida's economic loss rule, which prevents recovery of economic damages in tort without property damage or personal injury. The Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Tiara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. emphasized this distinction between contract and tort law. Plaintiffs' claims for diminished value damages, lacking specific allegations of property damage or personal injury, fall within this prohibition. Although Plaintiffs attempt to recharacterize their claims as fraudulent inducement, citing potential exceptions to the economic loss rule, their arguments do not sufficiently establish a basis for overcoming the rule's applicability in this context. Counts 2 and 5, characterized as "fraudulent concealment" actions, are dismissed under Florida's economic loss rule, which does not permit exceptions for fraudulent inducement in products liability cases. Courts in this Circuit have consistently ruled that claims based on the same allegations as warranty claims cannot survive under this rule. Regarding Count 4, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) claim, the defendant (MBUSA) contends that the plaintiffs lack specificity as required by Rule 9(b). Plaintiffs argue that Rule 9(b) does not apply to FDUTPA claims. While some courts have determined that Rule 9(b) is not applicable to FDUTPA claims based on unfair trade practices, the court asserts that FDUTPA claims involving fraud must meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). This is supported by precedent indicating that Rule 9(b) is necessary to inform defendants of the specific fraudulent conduct alleged against them. Consequently, the court concludes that the plaintiffs' FDUTPA claim, which is grounded in fraud, must be pled with particularity. The court references multiple cases to establish that the plaintiffs’ claims under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) must comply with the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) due to allegations of fraudulent conduct. The plaintiffs’ general assertions that the defendants' actions were deceptive lack specific factual support, resulting in a failure to meet Rule 9(b) requirements. Additionally, the complaint does not provide particularized allegations against MBUSA, instead grouping all defendants together, which fails to satisfy the more lenient standards of Rule 8. The court concludes that while the three Florida plaintiffs have Article III standing for claims concerning their Mercedes Benz vehicles, the economic loss rule prevents their fraudulent concealment claims against MBUSA, and insufficient specificity bars their FDUTPA claims. Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot pursue implied warranty claims against MBUSA due to a lack of demonstrated privity. Consequently, Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 are dismissed against MBUSA. Regarding Atmel and Continental, the complaint includes thirteen causes of action, but the court finds that none survive the motions to dismiss from the Airbag Manufacturer Defendants. Although the court determines it lacks personal jurisdiction over these defendants under the traditional test, it can assess the RICO claim. However, this claim also fails to state a valid case. As a result, the court dismisses all claims against the Airbag Manufacturer Defendants, lacking the ability to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. To establish personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, two criteria must be met: the defendant's activities must fall within the statute's provisions, and the exercise of jurisdiction must align with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements. The Court found that the Airbag Manufacturer Defendants did not meet the criteria of the Florida long-arm statute, thus precluding personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction based on three provisions: (1) conducting business in Florida, (2) committing a tortious act within Florida, and (6) causing injury in Florida due to actions outside the state. The Court determined the Complaint lacked sufficient detail to support jurisdiction under provisions (1) and (6). Specifically, there were no claims that Atmel or Continental engaged in business operations or had a presence in Florida as required by provision (1), nor any allegations of personal injury or property damage necessary for provision (6). Plaintiffs attempted to invoke a "stream of commerce" theory, noting that Atmel and Continental distributed airbag components that ended up in vehicles owned by Florida residents. They cited advertisements and press releases to bolster their claim of tortious acts in Florida to support specific personal jurisdiction under provision (2). However, the Court compared this situation to a precedent case (Bolton), where a defendant delivered products directly into Florida, and found insufficient evidence that Atmel or Continental had similarly placed their products into Florida’s commerce. The Complaint against the Airbag Manufacturer Defendants fails to establish personal jurisdiction, as it merely states that these defendants distributed their products in the U.S. This is inadequate under the relevant legal standards. The plaintiffs reference the case Vermeulen v. Renault, wherein extensive contacts by a foreign manufacturer with the U.S. were found sufficient for personal jurisdiction based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). In that case, the defendant had designed products for the American market, advertised in the U.S., and maintained a distribution network there, leading to the conclusion that it had purposefully availed itself of U.S. laws. However, this precedent does not apply to the current case under Florida's long-arm statute, which requires a specific focus on the state as the relevant forum. The court distinguishes Vermeulen by noting that the Airbag Manufacturer Defendants' alleged connections to Florida are superficial, consisting only of general distribution and internet advertising, with no evidence of purposeful engagement or intent to serve the Florida market. As such, the allegations do not support a finding of specific personal jurisdiction in Florida, making the plaintiffs' reliance on Vermeulen inappropriate and insufficient for their claims. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, a party must demonstrate more than merely placing a product into commerce, as clarified in J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro. The case lacks the requisite "something more" that would connect the Airbag Manufacturer Defendants to Florida, such as tailored design or marketing efforts in the state. Although eight Florida Plaintiffs purchased or leased vehicles with components from these manufacturers, this does not meet the jurisdictional threshold under Florida's long-arm statute or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the Airbag Manufacturer Defendants regarding the RICO claims due to the statute's nationwide service of process provision and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. This is supported by precedent, such as Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, where federal statutes can establish personal jurisdiction without the traditional analysis. As Atmel and Continental are domestic corporations engaged in business in the U.S., the statutory basis for jurisdiction is satisfied. The constitutional implications differ when a federal statute is involved, as they derive from the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth. Courts must weigh the burdens on the defendant against the federal interests at stake in the litigation. This balancing act is only necessary if the defendant demonstrates that their liberty interests are significantly infringed, requiring a compelling case against the reasonableness of jurisdiction. The Panama Court determined that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over out-of-state corporate defendants despite their limited contacts with Florida, as they failed to prove that litigating in Miami would significantly impair their defense. The court reversed a prior dismissal of RICO claims against these defendants, emphasizing that recent case law supports similar conclusions where defendants did not demonstrate substantial difficulties in litigating in the jurisdiction. Consequently, the court exercised personal jurisdiction over the RICO claims, referencing the nationwide service provision under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. Furthermore, the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction allows the court to assert jurisdiction over related state law claims without conducting a traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, provided the federal statute allows nationwide service and the claims arise from a common nucleus of facts. However, for this doctrine to apply, the RICO claim must first survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The RICO claim, as outlined in Count 3 of the complaint, alleges violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which prohibits conducting enterprise affairs through racketeering activity. RICO provides a civil cause of action for individuals injured by violations, having been enacted to combat racketeering linked to interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has clarified that the RICO statute, originally intended to combat organized crime, should be interpreted broadly to fulfill its remedial objectives, as noted in H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co. However, civil RICO plaintiffs must still meet the pleading standards set by Iqbal and Twombly. To establish a civil RICO claim, plaintiffs must allege four key elements: (1) operation or management of an enterprise by the defendants; (2) the existence of an enterprise characterized by purpose, relationships among associates, and sufficient longevity; (3) a pattern of racketeering activity demonstrated by at least two related predicate acts; and (4) engagement in racketeering activity, which includes crimes such as mail and wire fraud as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Mail or wire fraud requires intentional participation in a fraudulent scheme using the postal or electronic communications systems. Due to the fraud-based nature of civil RICO claims, plaintiffs must provide detailed factual allegations, including the specific statements or misrepresentations made, the timing and context of these statements, how the statements misled the plaintiffs, and the benefits gained by the defendants from the alleged fraud. The Eleventh Circuit has upheld dismissals of RICO claims for insufficient specificity, emphasizing the necessity for clear articulation of each defendant's involvement and the particulars of the fraudulent actions. Reliance on "material misrepresentations" without detailing how the statements misled the plaintiffs undermines their claims. The Eleventh Circuit upheld a district court's dismissal of civil RICO claims in Brooks due to the plaintiffs' failure to specify distinct allegations against individual defendants, thereby violating Rule 9(b)'s requirement for fair notice. The court emphasized the necessity for details regarding the time, place, and manner of specific acts of fraud, which were lacking in the complaint. Under the frameworks of Ambrosia Coal and Brooks, the current Complaint does not fulfill Rule 9(b)'s specificity requirements for a RICO claim. The plaintiffs assert that eight facts support their claims, including vague countermeasures by Atmel and Continental regarding defective airbag control units (ACUs), material statements made about safety from 2007 to 2008, and shipments of parts without proper documentation. They also cite a 2009 press release on improving safety, awareness of defective ACUs by the enterprise in 2011 and 2015, and regular communication among Airbag Manufacturer Defendants from 2008 to 2016. However, the plaintiffs' assertion that these facts indicate an "association-in-fact enterprise" among the defendants lacks the necessary distinction between Atmel and Continental, failing to provide each with fair notice of the specific claims against them. Plaintiffs fail to specify which Defendant implemented countermeasures or when they became aware of the unexpected airbag deployments in 2011 and the defective ACUs in early 2015. The allegations do not demonstrate the existence of a RICO "enterprise," as there is insufficient detail regarding the "regular contact" between Airbag Manufacturer Defendants from 2008 to 2016, including the identities of the individuals involved, the content of their communications, and the context of their interactions. The Complaint lacks the necessary specificity required by Rule 9(b) to support claims of "purpose, relationships, and longevity" among the Defendants. Allegations of predicate acts, such as mail and wire fraud, also do not meet the requisite detail, as the Complaint does not specify who shipped defective goods, the timing and location of these shipments, or how they constituted a fraudulent scheme. Claims regarding a breach of duty to disclose information to NHTSA under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act cannot serve as RICO predicate acts, as established in Ayres v. General Motors Corp. Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not explain what each Defendant stood to gain from the alleged fraudulent acts or how these acts specifically deceived them. The Complaint also fails to adequately describe the nature of public statements or internal communications that contributed to the concealment of defective ACUs. Consequently, the Complaint does not establish a "pattern" of racketeering activity as required by Rule 9(b), leading to the dismissal of Count 3. Without a valid RICO claim to support pendent personal jurisdiction, the Court cannot address the remaining state law claims. Pendent personal jurisdiction applies when federal claims with nationwide jurisdiction are combined with state or federal claims without such jurisdiction. In this case, all federal claims against the Airbag Manufacturer Defendants have been dismissed, leaving no basis for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Consequently, the Court dismisses these state law claims, as established in prior case law, which requires that if the only jurisdictionally sufficient claim is dismissed, related pendent claims must also be dismissed. The Court emphasizes that plaintiffs must demonstrate jurisdiction based on the relationship between each defendant, the forum, and the claims. The Court's conclusion orders the dismissal of motions from MBUSA, Honda, Atmel, and Continental, while denying the plaintiffs' motion for limited relief from a discovery stay as moot. A status conference is scheduled for April 18, 2017. Additionally, Daimler AG has been granted an extension to file a responsive pleading within 30 days of any amended complaint. The document also lists several plaintiffs, all residents of Florida or New Jersey, detailing their vehicle purchases and the timing of their awareness of an airbag recall. Plaintiff Chrystina Asman, a Macomb County, Michigan resident, purchased a 2009 Chrysler Town and Country and learned of an airbag recall in February 2016. Other plaintiffs include Kimberly Battle, also from Michigan, with a similar vehicle and recall knowledge from February 2016; Kristen Ward from Suffolk County, New York, who bought a 2009 Honda Accord and learned of its recall in December 2015; Donald Galloway, Jocelyn Cintron, and Colleen Morrow, all from Palm Beach County, Florida, who purchased 2008 and 2009 Honda Accords and a Mercedes Benz C Class, respectively, also discovering recalls around December 2015; and Glenda Johnson from Louisiana, who bought a 2009 Dodge Journey and learned about the recall in March 2016. Three additional plaintiffs—Angel Henriksen, Maria McArdle, and Manuela Valentina Churi Hernandez—were dismissed due to lack of standing, as their vehicles did not have the defective airbag components. Plaintiffs claim Honda does not contest that they purchased their vehicles from Honda-affiliated dealerships in Florida and relied on Honda's misrepresentations. However, the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction lies with the plaintiffs, and their argument that Honda regularly concedes personal jurisdiction in Florida was deemed insufficient. The court noted that consent to jurisdiction in other lawsuits does not establish general personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, despite plaintiffs claiming substantial business conducted by defendants in the district. The Complaint lacks sufficient detail regarding Honda's contacts with Florida to establish specific personal jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(a)(1). Economic injury allegations do not suffice to demonstrate the requisite personal injury or property damage within Florida as per Section 48.193(1)(a)(6). The court references case law, emphasizing that the long-arm statute requires actual physical injuries or damage. The Plaintiffs' assertion that they purchased Honda vehicles through Florida agents is not supported by the Complaint. Consequently, the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over claims from Florida Plaintiffs against Honda, resulting in a lack of basis for pendent jurisdiction over claims from New York and New Jersey Plaintiffs, which show no connection to Florida. MBUSA argues for the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims, invoking preemption and primary jurisdiction due to an ongoing NHTSA investigation. They cite cases where courts dismissed requests for recalls that conflicted with NHTSA's authority. The preemption argument suggests that claims for injunctive relief related to defective vehicles may be redundant to the NHTSA-supervised recalls mentioned in the Complaint, indicating that the Plaintiffs' requests may be duplicative of existing regulatory actions. The Court declines to apply preemption or primary jurisdiction doctrines to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint at this time, as the requested relief surpasses what is covered by the NHTSA investigation, and the claims may be dismissed for other reasons. The Court notes a strong presumption against invoking primary jurisdiction, referencing Sanchez-Knutson and Phillips, which declined to dismiss claims where the relief sought exceeded that offered by NHTSA's recall. The Court also highlights the lack of evidence showing any conflict between the Plaintiffs' claims and the NHTSA investigation. Regarding the application of Florida law to the Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) claim, the Court confirms that the lex loci contractus rule applies, supporting the use of Florida’s implied warranty laws since all Plaintiffs are Florida residents who purchased their vehicles in the state. However, the Plaintiffs' failure to allege sufficient facts establishing privity of contract is a basis for dismissal under Florida law, as established in relevant case law. The Court points out that there are no allegations indicating that the Plaintiffs purchased their vehicles from MBUSA. Although the Plaintiffs attempt to bring claims on behalf of a nationwide class, the Court evaluates the fraudulent concealment claim under Florida law, noting that the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants concealed defects and engaged in deceptive trade practices, with knowledge of the defect dating back to 2008. Plaintiffs allege that if they had known about the deception regarding defective vehicles with faulty ACUs, they would not have purchased them or would have paid less. The complaint states that Mercedes-Benz delayed notifying vehicle owners about the defects until months after informing regulators and claimed that necessary parts were not available. Additionally, it is noted that Mercedes-Benz initiated a campaign outside the U.S. to address these defects in March 2013. The plaintiffs do not claim that manufacturers Atmel or Continental are subject to general personal jurisdiction under Florida law. The court determines that neither manufacturer has sufficient affiliations with Florida to warrant all-purpose jurisdiction. The mere availability of press releases on their websites does not establish personal jurisdiction in Florida under the relevant statutes or the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has previously established criteria for specific personal jurisdiction based on tortious conduct occurring in Florida. However, the plaintiffs' injuries stem from the presence of defective parts in their vehicles, not from the accessibility of press releases online. The Eleventh Circuit's rulings indicate that simply having a website accessible in Florida is insufficient for establishing jurisdiction. The case of Mosseri further emphasizes that a connection to Florida must be more substantial than mere accessibility, such as facilitating sales to Florida customers. Additionally, some plaintiffs have no apparent connection to Florida, raising further jurisdictional concerns. The Eleventh Circuit has differentiated between the requirements for establishing jurisdiction and those for surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, indicating that a lack of federal controversy may lead to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. In cases where Plaintiffs assert rights under the federal RICO statute, the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) is more stringent than under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs must demonstrate standing by alleging: 1) a requisite injury to business or property, and 2) that this injury was caused "by reason of" a RICO violation. The Airbag Manufacturer Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to show the necessary injury, as it claims "diminished value" damages and none of the Plaintiffs have sold their vehicles or experienced a defect. They assert the diminished value resulted from the airbag control units (ACUs) themselves, rather than an alleged conspiracy to conceal defects. Plaintiffs counter that they experienced injury upon purchasing or leasing their vehicles under false pretenses regarding the ACUs' functionality, claiming their purchases were directly linked to the Defendants’ failure to disclose defects, which conflicts with Eleventh Circuit rulings that the Safety Act does not create civil liability under RICO. They argue that overpayments at the time of sale or lease are recoverable. However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' RICO injury and causation theories lack clarity and do not meet the four necessary elements for a RICO claim, leading to a decision not to address the standing issue. Plaintiffs reference a Second Circuit case to argue that their allegations of an "enterprise" do not need to meet Rule 9(b) standards, asserting that generalized claims about the Defendants' use of communications are sufficient. They also seek leniency in applying Rule 9(b) due to lack of specific knowledge about ongoing actions of the Defendants. Nonetheless, the Court does not accept that vague or conclusory allegations can satisfy the heightened pleading requirements for civil RICO claims established in the Eleventh Circuit. In *Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp.*, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the importance of Rule 9(b), which mandates heightened specificity in claims to inform defendants of the specific misconduct alleged against them, thus protecting them from unfounded accusations of fraudulent behavior. The court held that the plaintiff's RICO claim must adhere to this heightened specificity requirement, as established in relevant Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence. Additionally, allegations made by the plaintiffs regarding interactions between Atmel and Continental were found to be related to separate claims under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act and Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), rather than the RICO claim. The plaintiffs' assertion of communications between Atmel and Continental lacked supporting details in the cited paragraph of the Complaint.