Martin-Mcfarlane v. City of Phila.

Citation: 299 F. Supp. 3d 658Docket: CIVIL ACTION NO. 17–0118

Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania; October 26, 2017; Federal District Court

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Stellita Martin-McFarlane, a registered nurse, sued the City of Philadelphia and several correctional officers and healthcare entities after being assaulted by prisoner Justin Mackie during his escape attempt from Albert Einstein Medical Center (AEMC). Mackie, a high-risk inmate facing serious charges, was improperly treated, as he should have been classified as a "special security inmate" under Philadelphia's policies, which mandate heightened security measures. During Mackie's treatment on January 11, 2015, Correctional Officer C.O. Doman removed his restraints, allowing Mackie to overpower Doman and assault Martin-McFarlane, resulting in serious injuries. She filed her lawsuit on January 10, 2017, alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and numerous state law claims, including assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. The court is evaluating the defendants' motions to dismiss, which are granted in part and denied in part, based on whether the complaint adequately states a claim. Legal standards require that the complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to establish a plausible entitlement to relief, disregarding mere legal conclusions or conclusory statements.

Plaintiff asserts multiple claims against the City of Philadelphia, C.O. Cox, and C.O. Doman, including § 1983 claims related to constitutional violations, alongside various state law claims against hospital entities AEMC, AEHN, AEMA, and DPS. The analysis of the § 1983 claims focuses on two types of Fourteenth Amendment due process violations: a state-created danger claim against C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman and a Monell claim against the City. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges violations of her First and Fourth Amendment rights.

For the state-created danger claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that state actors engaged in conduct that violated constitutional rights. The plaintiff contends that C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman violated her substantive due process rights by failing to protect her from an assault by Mackie, who was a detainee charged with serious crimes. The due process principle generally does not require the state to protect individuals from private harm, but the state-created danger exception necessitates a four-part test: foreseeability of harm, shocking culpability of state actors, a relationship that identifies the plaintiff as a foreseeable victim, and affirmative conduct by the state that increased the danger.

Defendants argue that the complaint fails to meet the second and fourth elements of the test, claiming the behavior did not 'shock the conscience' nor render the plaintiff more vulnerable. However, the plaintiff alleges that C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman's actions—leaving an unrestrained violent prisoner in a public hospital and reducing security—could be considered to rise above mere negligence to a level that indeed shocks the conscience, warranting further examination as the case progresses.

The fourth element of the plaintiff's claim requires proof of affirmative conduct by state officials that increases the plaintiff's vulnerability to danger. The plaintiff contends that C.O. Cox failed to monitor Mackie in the hospital room and that C.O. Doman removed Mackie's restraints, facilitating an escape attempt. These actions are alleged to have endangered the plaintiff, who was responsible for caring for a potentially violent prisoner. Defendants C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman claim entitlement to qualified immunity, which protects officials from liability unless their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize. Qualified immunity serves to balance accountability for irresponsible power use against the need to protect officials from undue liability while performing their duties. At the pleading stage, immunity can be granted on a motion to dismiss (12(b)(6)) if it is evident from the complaint's face. The burden of proof lies with the official asserting qualified immunity. 

The qualified immunity analysis follows a two-step process: first, determining if the alleged facts, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, indicate a constitutional violation; second, assessing whether the right was clearly established at the time of the incident. The plaintiff claims violations of her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment due to the defendants' actions, which created a hazardous situation. The court must consider if it was apparent to a reasonable officer that their conduct was unlawful, emphasizing the specific context of the case rather than broad generalizations. More factual information is necessary to establish whether the officers’ conduct violated a clearly established right. Discovery regarding the rationale for leaving the hospital room or removing restraints is crucial for this determination. Therefore, resolving qualified immunity at this stage is deemed premature, as factual disputes need to be addressed first.

A Monell claim against the City of Philadelphia can establish municipal liability under § 1983 if a city policy or custom leads to a constitutional violation. A municipality may be liable for failure to train employees if such failure demonstrates deliberate indifference to residents' rights. Simply proving that an officer violated policy or that better training could have prevented harm is insufficient for liability. The plaintiff claims the City had a policy designating certain prisoners as 'special security inmates,' requiring medical restraints to remain in place unless for treatment. She alleges inadequate training of C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman regarding this policy, suggesting the City may be liable if they were untrained in security procedures for dangerous inmates.

Additionally, the plaintiff asserts other § 1983 claims for violations of her constitutional rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. However, her First Amendment claim fails due to a lack of factual support for allegations of retaliation or protected speech, leading to its dismissal with prejudice. Similarly, her Fourth Amendment claim fails as there are no facts indicating any unreasonable search, seizure, or use of force by the defendants, resulting in its dismissal with prejudice as well. Lastly, the plaintiff brings various state law claims against all defendants, including assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass, interference with state constitutional rights, negligence, gross negligence, and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision.

Claims against the City of Philadelphia, C.O. Cox, and C.O. Doman include allegations of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. 

1. **Assault and Battery**: Plaintiff claims liability for assault and battery, defined under Pennsylvania law as harmful or offensive contact without consent. However, the complaint lacks factual allegations indicating that the defendants touched the plaintiff or intended to instill apprehension of immediate battery. Consequently, these claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

2. **False Imprisonment**: To establish false imprisonment, the plaintiff must show detention and its unlawfulness. The complaint does not sufficiently allege that the plaintiff was detained or how the defendants were involved in any detention, leading to dismissal with prejudice.

3. **Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress**: This claim requires demonstrating extreme and outrageous conduct that is intentional or reckless, causing severe emotional distress. The plaintiff alleges inadequate training of employees, negligence in monitoring a potentially dangerous individual, and failure to restrain him in a hospital setting. These allegations may constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, suggesting recklessness rather than intent. Therefore, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is permitted to proceed.

4. **Trespass**: The claim of trespass involves intentional intrusion upon land. The connection of this claim to the case facts is unclear, and it does not present an independent cause of action. Thus, the trespass claim will also be dismissed with prejudice.

A claim of 'interference with state constitutional rights' against the City and individual officers, C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman, is dismissed with prejudice due to the lack of identified specific rights allegedly violated and the absence of a recognized private right of action for monetary damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 

Negligence claims are asserted against C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman, as well as a negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision claim against the City. Under Pennsylvania law, a negligence claim requires proof of a breach of duty causally connected to damages. Gross negligence exceeds ordinary negligence but does not equate to intentional indifference. The plaintiff provides plausible facts indicating that Cox and Doman failed to monitor a prisoner, Mackie, leading to an assault on the plaintiff. The complaint also suggests the City failed to properly train Cox and Doman on safe prisoner transport. 

However, defendants claim governmental immunity, which protects municipal employees from civil liability unless they act with willful misconduct. The Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) serves as the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, insulating employers from lawsuits arising from such incidents, unless a 'personal animus' or 'third party attack' exception applies. The plaintiff contends the third-party exception should apply, arguing that the attack was motivated by personal animosity rather than employment-related factors.

Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts to suggest that Mackie's assault was motivated by personal reasons unrelated to his employment. Instead, the assault occurred while Plaintiff was performing her duties as a nurse, specifically when she attempted to call security, which impeded Mackie's escape. The court concludes that the personal animus or third-party attack exception does not apply, leading to the dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims against her employers AEMC, AEHN, and AEMA, which are preempted by the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA).

Moreover, the complaint lacks specific claims against DPS, which is only identified as a corporation associated with the premises where the incident occurred. This insufficient connection leads to DPS's dismissal as a defendant.

Plaintiff will not be granted leave to amend the complaint, as any proposed amendments would be futile due to the lack of legal or factual basis for the claims. The court emphasizes that leave to amend is not required when the amended complaint would still fail to state a claim.

In conclusion, the motions to dismiss by the defendants are partially granted, with claims against AEMC, AEHN, AEMA, and DPS dismissed. Claims for false arrest and verbal abuse under the Fourth Amendment are also dismissed due to a lack of supporting facts, while the claim for false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law is yet to be addressed.

The document references several key legal precedents regarding qualified immunity and First Amendment rights. It cites Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, emphasizing the nuanced nature of qualified immunity assessments, which may hinge on unresolved factual disputes (Curley v. Klem). It discusses the "two-step inquiry" in qualified immunity, highlighting its complexity and the need for fully developed facts (Pearson v. Callahan). The text also outlines that a state prisoner can assert a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, as demonstrated in Mitchell v. Horn, where allegations involved a corrections officer's retaliatory actions. Additional references to Fourth Amendment claims and various cases illustrate the evolving legal standards in assessing governmental liability and individual rights, including specific citations from Pennsylvania and Third Circuit law that address liability, negligence, and the standards for establishing claims against public entities and officials. Overall, the excerpt underscores the intricate interplay between constitutional protections and the standards for qualified immunity in civil rights litigation.

A finding of "willful misconduct" under Pennsylvania law requires actions exceeding gross negligence or recklessness, as established in Lancie v. Giles. Negligence claims against police officers have been dismissed, with 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. 8541 and 8542 allowing for specific types of negligence suits, including vehicle liability. An employer's liability under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) is exclusive, replacing all other employee liability claims. The plaintiff argues against the dismissal of state law claims, asserting there are no allegations of employment with the security provider. However, this argument is deemed unpersuasive, as the plaintiff cannot circumvent WCA preemption by suggesting another entity's responsibility for security. Defendants, including the City of Philadelphia and specific officers, contend that many of the plaintiff's claims lack legal and factual grounds, leading to their dismissal with prejudice. The court does not entertain the plaintiff's unconventional legal theories related to these claims.