Roybal-Mack v. N.M. Dep't of Pub. Safety

Citation: 286 F. Supp. 3d 1226Docket: No. 17–CV–552–WJ–KK

Court: District Court, D. New Mexico; December 11, 2017; Federal District Court

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A Motion for Summary Judgment based on Qualified Immunity was filed on July 12, 2017, by the New Mexico Department of Public Safety and Officers Mark Quintana and Diego Mendoza, which the Court granted. The case involves a high-speed pursuit initiated by Officer Quintana in November 2016, targeting a speeding vehicle driven by Kyle Mawhorter, in which Kori Lynn Woods was a passenger. Mawhorter failed to stop, leading to a pursuit at speeds nearing 100 mph. During the chase, Mawhorter recklessly crossed into oncoming traffic, prompting the officers to discontinue their pursuit for public safety. Officer Mendoza attempted a Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT) maneuver, which ultimately stopped Mawhorter's vehicle, but he reversed and continued driving against traffic. The pursuit ended when Mawhorter crashed, resulting in Ms. Woods's death. The Plaintiff, representing Ms. Woods' estate, filed a five-count complaint in state court, which was removed to federal court. The Court dismissed the state law claims, concluding they were based on negligent conduct, insufficient for waiving immunity under the Tort Claims Act. Only the civil rights violation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remains active after the dismissal of the other counts.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would know. To overcome this defense during a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff must demonstrate two elements: (1) that their constitutional rights were violated, and (2) that the right in question was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. If the plaintiff fails to show either element, qualified immunity is granted. Should the plaintiff provide sufficient evidence indicating that the alleged violation should have been apparent based on existing law, the burden shifts back to the defendant to prove no material facts are in dispute that would negate their claim to qualified immunity. Summary judgment is assessed favorably for the nonmoving party, considering all reasonable inferences from the facts. 

Regarding the facts of the case, the plaintiff disputes the characterization of US 70 as a "heavily-travelled route," claiming minimal traffic during the police pursuit. However, dash-cam video evidence indicates significant traffic presence, as both officers involved perceived the traffic to be heavy. The evidence shows that numerous vehicles were encountered during the pursuit, contradicting the plaintiff's assertions. The court finds the video supports the conclusion that traffic was substantial throughout the event, undermining the plaintiff's attempts to contest this fact.

Plaintiff contests the assertion that the Chevrolet pick-up truck, traveling northbound in southbound lanes at speeds of 90-100 mph, posed a danger to southbound vehicles, claiming dash-cam footage shows all southbound traffic successfully pulled off the road. However, the footage also confirms that officers pursued Mawhorter with emergency lights and sirens, thereby mitigating public danger. The Court finds it implausible to argue that such reckless driving on a major highway does not pose a threat, especially at night with multiple vehicles present. 

Defendants assert that as Mawhorter approached Clovis, he continued to drive against traffic at high speeds, forcing approximately thirteen southbound vehicles to swerve to avoid collisions. Plaintiff disputes this speed claim but provides evidence indicating the truck was traveling at 80-90 mph, which still poses a significant risk. 

In response to Defendants' Fact 17, which states that officers could not attempt another PIT maneuver after Mawhorter turned onto Brady, Plaintiff argues it contradicts Officer Quintana's earlier statements. However, this is deemed a semantic disagreement without material factual dispute. Quintana's statement about attempting a PIT maneuver before Mawhorter crashed aligns with Defendants' account, indicating that while an attempt was made, it was not completed before the crash occurred. The dash-cam videos support both the Defendants' claims and Quintana's testimony, showing close pursuit and an attempt to execute the maneuver under dangerous conditions.

Plaintiff references specific statements made by Mawhorter to DPS investigators, including details about his trip from Denver, Ms. Woods’ unawareness of the truck being stolen, and her emotional state during the incident. While Defendants do not contest Mawhorter’s statements post-crash, they argue these are irrelevant to the officers' knowledge and observations during the event. Plaintiff challenges the inference that Ms. Woods voluntarily stayed in the truck after it was stopped by officers, citing Officer Quintana’s observation that she did not attempt to exit and appeared to fasten her seatbelt. Plaintiff asserts it is undisputed that Ms. Woods wanted to leave the vehicle, based on Mawhorter’s statements, but even favoring Plaintiff’s perspective, a reasonable inference about her desire to exit cannot be drawn given the officers' accounts. During the brief stop, both occupants did not attempt to leave, and Mawhorter admitted that Ms. Woods was smoking marijuana during their flight, which was in the glovebox.

Plaintiff challenges Defendants' description of the pursuit as tense and dangerous but fails to undermine this characterization, as dash-cam footage supports the Defendants' account. Plaintiff also points out that officers intended to suspend the pursuit early on but resumed when Mawhorter entered oncoming traffic, which posed a significant risk to public safety. Mawhorter indicated he drove against traffic hoping the officers would retreat due to the danger, prompting the officers to continue the chase to warn other drivers. Officer Mendoza expressed concern for public safety, leading to the decision to attempt a P.I.T. maneuver to stop Mawhorter’s vehicle.

Officer Quintana noted their attempt to alert the southbound public about a vehicle, highlighting Mawhorter's decision to endanger others, which prompted officers to continue their pursuit. The plaintiff's arguments in paragraphs (j) through (r) regarding violations of the New Mexico Law Enforcement Safe Pursuit Act (LESKA) and related agency policies do not support claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as established in Davis v. Scherer and Tanberg v. Sholtis. Specifically, violations of police regulations alone cannot form the basis for a 1983 excessive force claim. Under LESKA, high-speed pursuits are to be abandoned when the driver's identity is known and public danger outweighs the need for immediate action; however, these factors are not determinative in assessing whether the officers violated constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court will treat the defendants' factual statements as undisputed. The defendants argue that Count I fails to state a claim against the New Mexico State Police (NMSP) and the officers in their official capacities, as well as against Officers Quintana and Mendoza individually, regarding both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff claims violations of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and excessive force, along with a Fourteenth Amendment claim concerning deprivation of life or liberty without due process.

The Fourth Amendment is applicable only when a seizure has occurred, and established case law indicates that high-speed police pursuits resulting in injury or death do not constitute "seizures." Citing relevant precedents, the court asserts that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred during the pursuit. Video evidence shows that after a second PIT maneuver by Officer Mendoza stopped Mawhorter's vehicle, he reversed and continued driving against traffic until crashing into a fence, further supporting the conclusion that a Fourth Amendment claim cannot be asserted in this case.

An interval of nearly two minutes occurred between Officer Mendoza's second PIT maneuver, which momentarily halted Mawhorter's vehicle, and the subsequent crash. The crash was not a result of police action or an unlawful seizure, but rather due to Mawhorter losing control of the vehicle. Legal precedent indicates that a police pursuit without the fleeing individual's submission does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment; thus, only the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the claims presented. 

For Count I, the excessive force claim also falls under the Fourteenth Amendment, analyzed through substantive due process principles, as it arises outside the context of a seizure. The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from state actions that deprive them of life, liberty, or property without due process. The evaluation of whether force was excessive requires consideration of three factors: (1) the relationship between the force used and the need presented, (2) the extent of injury inflicted, and (3) the motives of the state actor. Excessive force characterized by malice or an abuse of power that shocks the conscience can be addressed under this amendment.

The parties dispute the level of culpability required to meet the "shocks-the-conscience" standard, with the Plaintiff advocating for "deliberate indifference" while Defendants argue for a requirement of intent to harm. The Tenth Circuit has previously concluded that "deliberate indifference" applies when officers have time to deliberate, whereas "intent to harm" is relevant in urgent situations where decisions are made under pressure. The applicable standard depends on whether officers had the opportunity for calm and reflective judgment or were required to act quickly.

Plaintiff contends that the "deliberate indifference" standard should apply because Defendants had time to consider their actions before allegedly violating Plaintiff's rights. However, the evidence indicates that the officers faced an urgent situation when Mawhorter unexpectedly drove into oncoming traffic at high speeds, necessitating a rapid response. The officers had initially been directed to cease the chase but were compelled to reassess their actions due to Mawhorter's dangerous driving. Consequently, the Court determines that the "intent to harm" standard is more appropriate for analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Regarding qualified immunity, the Court has discretion in determining whether to first assess if a constitutional violation occurred or if the right was clearly established. The case follows the two-prong analysis from Saucier v. Katz, first examining whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. The evidence, particularly from dash-cam footage, strongly supports the Defendants' account, contradicting Plaintiff's assertion that he was unconscious during the events. Despite the tragic outcome for Ms. Woods, the injury resulted from Mawhorter's decisions to flee and drive recklessly, not from the actions of the Defendant officers. The evidence shows a direct correlation between the force used by the officers and the necessity of their response during the high-pressure chase.

The videos indicate that officers were required to make immediate decisions without deliberation during a pursuit aimed at preventing potential harm to other motorists from Mawhorter's reckless driving. The force employed was directed at stopping Mawhorter, with officers notifying dispatch and supervisors and obtaining approval for the PIT maneuvers, which were executed cautiously to minimize risk to other drivers. The evidence demonstrates that the officers prioritized public safety, particularly as Mawhorter drove against traffic on US 70. Contrary to the Plaintiff's claims that Mawhorter's actions posed no danger, the visual evidence suggests otherwise, notably a moment when officers passed stopped vehicles at high speed with emergency signals active, highlighting the risk that could have arisen without their intervention. This evidence counters the assertion of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment, as the officers' intent was not to harm but to protect the public.

Regarding the question of whether the law was clearly established, the Court found no need to address this after determining that the officers did not violate the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. On the issue of claims against the Department of Public Safety (DPS) and officers in their official capacities, the Court noted that while local governing bodies can be sued under Section 1983, the specific legal context remains unresolved in this case. The Court referenced the Supreme Court's decisions in Monell and Will, clarifying that Monell applies only to local government units distinct from state entities for Eleventh Amendment purposes.

The Eleventh Amendment protects the Michigan Department of State Police and its director from lawsuits, as established in Monell v. Department of Social Services. The Supreme Court clarified that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not considered "persons" under § 1983, limiting immunity to entities deemed "arms of the State." This interpretation is supported by case law, indicating that local governing bodies with specific powers are not entitled to such protections. 

The determination of whether the New Mexico State Police (NMSP) and the Department of Public Safety (DPS) qualify as local governmental bodies or "arms of the State" hinges on their statutory creation within the state government. The DPS, established in the executive branch with subdivisions, is deemed an "arm of the state," rendering it immune from suit under § 1983. Consequently, the lawsuit against DPS and NMSP must be dismissed, along with claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities, as these are effectively suits against the state itself. 

The court recognizes the tragic circumstances surrounding Ms. Woods' death but asserts that liability lies with Kyle Mawhorter, not the involved officers.

The Court determined that the force employed by Officers Quintana and Mendoza did not meet the "shocks the conscience" standard, thus ruling it as non-excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Qualified Immunity was granted. The ruling highlighted that the vehicle crash involved a metal fence and noted undisputed facts, with the Plaintiff failing to adhere to local rules regarding the presentation of responsive and additional facts. Video evidence showed that a failed PIT maneuver occurred shortly before the crash, and the pursuit began earlier, with dispatch advising officers to discontinue the chase. The Court referenced precedents indicating that no seizure occurred under the Fourth Amendment, and despite discussions on both amendments, the conclusion remained consistent under both analyses. The Court applied an "intent to harm" standard, stating that even under a deliberate indifference standard, the Plaintiff's claims would not succeed. Evidence indicated that the officers acted with public safety in mind, and prior cases supported the immunity of law enforcement under similar circumstances.