Court: District Court, D. Connecticut; January 4, 2018; Federal District Court
Anwar Shakir, Sr. is incarcerated at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Institution and has initiated a civil rights action pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 against Derby Police Detective Charles Stankye, DCF Supervisor Kathie Marotta, and DCF Social Worker Michele Fratta. The court is considering Motions for Summary Judgment from both Fratta and Marotta, and Stankye, with Fratta and Marotta's motion granted and Stankye's motion granted in part and denied in part.
Shakir originally filed a complaint on December 15, 2011, including multiple defendants, but had claims against Assistant State's Attorney Charles Stango dismissed on March 31, 2015. An amended complaint was filed naming only Stankye, Marotta, and Fratta. The court denied Shakir’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, making the first amended complaint the operative document.
On March 31, 2016, the court partially granted and denied motions to dismiss from Stankye, Fratta, and Marotta. Following these rulings, claims remained against Stankye for conspiracy, Fourth Amendment violations, Fourteenth Amendment due process, and Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement. Against Fratta and Marotta, claims included procedural and substantive due process and conspiracy.
On September 26, 2016, both Stankye and Fratta/Marotta filed motions for summary judgment. The court later appointed pro bono counsel for Shakir and allowed a reopening of discovery, but no supplemental briefs were filed on his behalf. The court will decide the motions based on Shakir's initial filings.
A motion for summary judgment is granted only when there are no genuine disputes regarding material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, per Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must demonstrate the absence of evidence supporting the opposing party's case, shifting the burden to the nonmoving party to present specific evidence indicating a genuine issue for trial. Conclusory allegations or speculation are insufficient. The court must view the evidence favorably towards the nonmoving party and determine if a genuine factual dispute exists without resolving factual questions. Summary judgment is inappropriate if admissible materials suggest the claim has merit. When a party is pro se, their arguments are interpreted liberally, although unsupported allegations cannot create a material issue. Only admissible evidence is considered in summary judgment rulings.
Relevant facts include that Stankye was employed by the Derby Police Department, while Fratta and Marotta worked for DCF. Gandy has two children, Anwar Shakir, Jr. (A.S.) with Shakir, and Taeja Gandy (T.G.), whose father is not Shakir. Gandy left Connecticut with T.G. in 2008, leaving A.S. with Shakir. Gandy returned to Connecticut in December 2008 and reported to Stankye on January 5, 2009, that Shakir had sexually assaulted T.G. during their cohabitation.
Stankye reported Gandy's allegations to the Department of Children and Families (DCF), leading Marotta to assign Fratta to investigate. On January 12, 2009, Stankye witnessed T.G. undergo a forensic interview at the Yale Clinic. The following day, Fratta, Marotta, and DCF Program Manager Grayson determined that A.S. faced imminent physical harm due to living with Shakir, who was similarly situated to T.G. On January 14, Fratta conducted a minimal facts interview with A.S. and Shakir but found no evidence of abuse or unsafe conditions in Shakir's home, concluding that A.S.'s safety was not at immediate risk. Subsequently, Shakir signed a DCF Service Agreement requiring A.S. to undergo a forensic interview at the Yale Clinic and allowing A.S. to stay with his paternal grandmother pending further investigation. Disputes arose regarding the interpretation of the agreement: Fratta and Stankye believed it required A.S. to stay with Khalila Shakir Browning and for her to care for him, while Shakir argued that he was to continue providing care. A forensic interview scheduled for January 20, 2009, did not occur due to Shakir's tardiness and the clinic's refusal to proceed with him present. Although DCF agreed to reschedule and Shakir consented to have Browning bring A.S., he claimed DCF never contacted him about the rescheduling. On February 4, 2009, based on evidence against Shakir regarding T.G., Stankye prepared an application for a warrant for Shakir's arrest on charges of first-degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child.
A warrant for Shakir's arrest was issued on February 6, 2009. Stankye claims to have informed Gandy of this warrant and that she was in Connecticut and prepared to take custody of A.S. Shakir disputes the timing of this call, asserting that Stankye had been in contact with Gandy in California and delayed executing the warrant until Gandy was back in Connecticut. Stankye and another detective attempted to serve the warrant at Shakir's workplace but found him absent, as Shakir contends he was taking A.S. to a doctor's appointment. Stankye acknowledges being informed by A.S.'s school that Shakir had picked up A.S. that day but was unaware of the doctor's appointment.
Subsequently, Stankye, accompanied by a police lieutenant and four officers, went to Shakir's residence to serve the warrant. Before executing the warrant, Stankye called Browning to ascertain A.S.'s location and was told A.S. was with Browning and A.S.'s aunt. Stankye asked Browning to bring A.S. to Shakir's residence for a safety confirmation; however, Browning did not communicate this to Shakir. After waiting an hour without A.S. being brought to the house, the officers knocked on Shakir's door, but he did not respond initially, allegedly to comfort his son, who was frightened by the noise.
After 15-20 minutes, Shakir exited voluntarily, was handcuffed, and placed in a police vehicle. Stankye inquired about A.S.'s location, but Shakir refused to answer. Stankye later learned that A.S. was not with Browning but did not confirm this in his affidavit, which only noted the inability to verify A.S.'s presence with Browning. Due to the uncertainty of A.S.'s whereabouts, Stankye and the officers demanded entry into Shakir's home to search for A.S., despite not having a warrant for that entry. Shakir argues that Stankye was previously informed of A.S.'s doctor's appointment and disputes the rationale for the officers' entry into his home.
Shakir and Stankye present conflicting accounts regarding the circumstances of a police entry and search. Stankye claims that Rasheed Shakir, Shakir's brother, opened the door voluntarily in response to police demands, while Shakir asserts that Rasheed opened it only under threat and that Stankye and the other officers were aware of his identity. Both parties agree that officers, including Stankye, entered the residence and found bags with A.S.'s clothes, subsequently escorting A.S. to a police vehicle. Shakir and A.S. were transported separately to the Derby Police Department (DPD), with Stankye confirming he did not transport Shakir but allegedly moved him from the police vehicle to the lockup area.
Shakir accuses Stankye of taunting him about his bail, requiring him to strip, and leaving him in a holding cell where he claims the air conditioning was excessively cold, causing him to become ill. Although Shakir did not see Stankye adjust the air conditioning, he infers responsibility due to Stankye's involvement earlier that day. Stankye denies any physical contact or knowledge of air conditioning adjustments at the DPD.
While in the holding cell, Stankye contacted Fratta and Grayson to inform them of A.S.'s presence at the DPD, with Fratta asserting that Grayson authorized an interview of A.S., which Stankye claims he did not participate in or observe. Shakir contends that Stankye was present during the interview, which A.S. did not report any abuse. After the interview, there is a dispute over who authorized A.S.'s release into Gandy's custody, with Stankye alleging that Fratta consented, and Fratta stating that Stankye informed her of the arrangement to avoid a confrontation.
Shakir claims that Stankye, Fratta, and Marotta knew Gandy planned to bring A.S. back to California and conspired to facilitate this. Later, upon learning of Shakir's release on bond, Fratta expressed concern for A.S.'s safety if placed in Shakir's custody. Fratta communicated her concerns to Marotta, who consulted Grayson. Grayson deemed a service agreement unnecessary, confirming Gandy's legal custody of A.S. and that DCF had no safety concerns regarding her. Shakir disputes Grayson's conclusions but acknowledges the communication took place.
After his release, Shakir sought police assistance to regain custody of A.S. He visited Gandy's mother's home but did not enter. He alleges that police advised him to leave A.S. with Gandy, as she could retain custody provided she stayed within the state. Fratta and Marotta refute this, asserting they received no hotline calls from the police during the relevant period, and claim other DCF social workers interacted with police officers.
On February 7, a police officer visited Gandy's mother's home but found neither Gandy nor A.S. On February 11, Gandy informed Fratta that they were in California, prompting Fratta to relay case information to California Child Protection Services. DCF initially substantiated neglect allegations against Gandy but reversed this on appeal, while it upheld allegations of sexual abuse against Shakir.
On February 25, Shakir attended a Derby Probate Court hearing regarding his application for temporary custody of A.S. The judge denied his application, explaining that, due to the absence of court orders or custody agreements, both Shakir and Gandy had equal legal rights to A.S. Shakir disputes this assertion, claiming his attorney indicated that A.S. should not have been taken out of Connecticut without a court order and should be returned immediately.
Stankye presents eight arguments for his Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that: 1) Shakir's request for declaratory relief is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment; 2) Shakir lacks standing to claim unlawful seizure on behalf of his son; 3) Shakir does not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the legality of the entry into his residence; 4) Shakir fails to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding violations of his procedural due process rights; 5) Shakir does not raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning violations of his substantive due process rights; 6) the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to Stankye's actions prior to Shakir's conviction; 7) Shakir fails to demonstrate Stankye's participation in a conspiracy to violate his rights; and 8) Stankye claims entitlement to qualified immunity regarding Shakir's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
Fratta and Marotta submit five arguments in their Motion, contending that: 1) Shakir fails to establish that Marotta was personally involved in any constitutional rights violation; 2) Shakir does not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding violations of his procedural due process rights; 3) there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning violations of his substantive due process rights; 4) Shakir fails to demonstrate Fratta and Marotta's participation in a conspiracy to violate his rights; and 5) they assert entitlement to qualified immunity.
Due to the similarities in the arguments presented, the court addresses both motions collectively. Marotta specifically contends that Shakir has not provided evidence of her personal involvement in any due process rights violation. The court cites established legal precedent indicating that personal involvement is essential for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, particularly for supervisory defendants, who may demonstrate involvement through various means, including direct participation, failure to remedy known violations, policy creation allowing unconstitutional practices, gross negligence in supervision, or deliberate indifference to plaintiffs' rights.
A supervisory official cannot be held liable merely based on their position within a hierarchy or under the doctrine of respondeat superior, as established in Lewis v. Cunningham. The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal clarified that liability requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that each government official defendant has violated the Constitution through their individual actions. The Second Circuit has indicated that Iqbal may raise the standards for proving a supervisor's personal involvement in constitutional violations, but it has not yet defined the implications for the supervisory liability framework set forth in Colon. Consequently, in the absence of specific Second Circuit guidance, courts will continue to apply the Colon categories of supervisory liability.
In the case at hand, Shakir claims that Marotta was personally involved in violating his constitutional rights in three ways: (1) by allegedly instructing the New Haven Police Department (NHPD) to leave A.S. in Gandy's care, (2) by being aware of a conspiracy to deprive him of custody and failing to act, and (3) by creating a policy that permitted such violations. However, under the first category of direct supervisory liability, Shakir does not provide evidence that Marotta was involved in A.S.'s removal from his home or in the interview process. He cites a statement attributed to Marotta instructing NHPD Officer Mastriano to "stand down," yet he fails to substantiate this claim with admissible evidence. Marotta's affidavit states she only spoke with Gandy once, in January, and was not present during relevant communications on February 6, 2009. She learned of the situation only after the fact and asserts that it was Grayson, not her, who advised Gandy regarding police contact if Shakir attempted to reclaim custody of A.S.
NHPD Officer Josh Kyle and Officer Mastriano reportedly had discussions with DCF Social Worker Kerry Cayward and other DCF personnel regarding the care of A.S. In contrast, Shakir claims that Officers Kyle and Mastriano were informed by Marotta to leave A.S. with Gandy, citing his own Affidavit and Marotta's interrogatory responses. However, Shakir's statement is considered inadmissible hearsay and thus cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact. Marotta's partial denial regarding her interactions with the officers does not support Shakir’s claims, as it neither confirms nor denies any communication regarding A.S.'s care. Shakir's interpretation of Marotta's answer relies on speculation rather than admissible evidence, failing to demonstrate her direct involvement in any alleged constitutional violation. Additionally, under the second Colon category, Shakir asserts that Marotta was aware of a conspiracy to violate his rights but has not provided admissible evidence of her knowledge regarding the conspiracy or related violations. Marotta's Affidavit and responses indicate she was not informed of the arrest warrant or involved in the care decisions before they occurred, and her later awareness of events does not imply knowledge of any constitutional violations. Therefore, Shakir has not presented sufficient evidence to challenge Marotta's claims or establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding her alleged participation or awareness of violations.
Shakir cites Stankye's deposition as evidence that Stankye informed Marotta about an arrest warrant, but the deposition only indicates that Stankye contacted "DCF" without specifying the recipient. Shakir fails to provide corroborating evidence that the person Stankye spoke to was Marotta. He assumes that since Marotta supervised Fratta, all relevant information was conveyed, but this assumption lacks evidentiary support and relies on speculation, as Shakir has no personal knowledge of their communications. Furthermore, no evidence indicates that Marotta was aware of any wrongdoing or constitutional violations, negating any claim of her personal involvement in such matters. Shakir also argues that Marotta established a policy allowing constitutional violations, citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, which pertains to municipal liability rather than supervisory liability and is thus inapplicable. He offers no evidence of a policy or custom created by Marotta, merely attributing Fratta's actions to her due to the supervisory relationship. Consequently, Shakir has not demonstrated any genuine issue of material fact regarding Marotta's liability, leading to her entitlement to summary judgment. The court grants Fratta and Marotta's Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims against Marotta, while the remaining rulings address claims against Fratta and Stankye.
Shakir alleges that Stankye and Fratta violated his procedural due process rights by depriving him of custody of A.S. without a hearing. Both Stankye and Fratta argue that their actions did not constitute a deprivation of custody and, therefore, did not implicate Shakir's procedural due process rights. Stankye further asserts that even if his actions did implicate these rights, a pre-deprivation hearing was unnecessary due to emergency circumstances. Both defendants also claim qualified immunity, arguing that their actions were objectively reasonable, which could protect them from liability even if a factual issue exists regarding the violation of Shakir's due process rights.
Shakir identifies four actions by which he alleges Stankye and/or Fratta deprived him of custody and management of his child, A.S. First, Shakir claims Stankye deprived him of custody by physically removing A.S. from his home following Shakir's arrest. Second, he argues that Fratta's interview of A.S. at the Detroit Police Department, which Stankye allowed, infringed on his liberty interest since he did not consent to the interview. Third, he contends that Stankye and/or Fratta wrongly released A.S. to Gandy, violating their Service Agreement. Finally, Shakir accuses Stankye and Fratta of conspiring with Gandy to relocate A.S. to California.
The court notes that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, individuals cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process. To succeed on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate they possessed a protected interest and that the procedures were constitutionally inadequate. Parents have a constitutionally protected interest in their children’s custody, and due process usually requires a court proceeding for any deprivation of this interest. However, if no actual deprivation of custody has occurred, a parent's procedural due process rights are not implicated, and thus no inquiry into the adequacy of due process is necessary.
Officials may temporarily remove a child from a parent's custody without consent or a court order in emergencies, which include risks of sexual abuse, lack of supervision, or immediate threats to the child's safety, as established in Robison v. Via and Southerland v. City of New York. Even if a plaintiff's procedural due process rights are violated, a government official may avoid liability through qualified immunity, which protects officials if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize. Qualified immunity can be established by demonstrating either that the conduct did not violate a clearly established right or that it was objectively reasonable for the official to believe their actions were lawful. A right is considered clearly established if every reasonable official would understand that their actions violate that right, with courts considering only Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedents at the time of the conduct in question. The existence of a clearly established right must be specific to the case's facts, and a broad general principle does not suffice. Furthermore, in child removal cases, a caseworker may claim qualified immunity if reasonable officers could disagree on the legality of the actions in the context of the specific facts. In the case discussed, it is acknowledged that after Shakir's arrest, officers entered Shakir's home, removed A.S., and took him to the police station.
Fratta disputes her involvement in Stankye's actions, but the court finds it unnecessary to determine the extent of Fratta's involvement since Stankye's actions did not deprive Shakir of a protected liberty interest. The Second Circuit has indicated that physical removal of a child from a parent's custody implicates a parent's liberty interest, yet it has not clearly defined what constitutes "custody" in the child abuse context. The court refers to Black's Law Dictionary, which defines custody as the care and control of a child, comprising legal custody (decision-making authority) and physical custody (caregiving authority). The court notes that existing case law on procedural due process in scenarios where a child is removed following a parent's arrest is limited. An example from the Second Circuit involving emergency child placement is distinguished from Stankye's actions, which were taken after Shakir's arrest. Consequently, Shakir has not demonstrated a genuine dispute regarding the deprivation of legal or physical custody, as his legal rights remained unchanged after Stankye's actions and he was not in physical custody of A.S. at the time of removal.
Shakir left his son A.S. in his brother's care before his own arrest, acknowledging he could not maintain custody while detained. This admission indicates that Shakir has not raised a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Stankye deprived him of custody when removing A.S. to the police station. Consequently, the evidence suggests that no deprivation of custody occurred, negating any due process violation and entitling Stankye to judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, even if Stankye's actions constituted a deprivation, he is entitled to qualified immunity, as the law regarding custody removal in such circumstances was not clearly established at the time.
Shakir also contends that Fratta's interview of A.S. at the police station, conducted without his consent, deprived him of the care and management of his son. While it is agreed that the interview occurred, the extent of Stankye's involvement remains disputed. However, the court finds that there is no genuine issue of fact regarding whether the interview constituted a deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Citing precedents, the court concludes that an unconsented interview by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) does not equate to a deprivation of parental rights under the Due Process Clause.
Shakir contends that prior case law, which distinguishes interviews conducted at schools from those at police stations, does not support his claims regarding parental rights. Notably, one case emphasized the significance of a child's physical removal from school as a trigger for parental due process rights, a situation not mirrored here since A.S. was already at the police station. The court previously established that Shakir's custody was not deprived when A.S. was taken to the station. Consequently, the sole issue pertains to the interview conducted by Fratta. The court notes that while no precedent in this Circuit addresses police station interviews specifically, the location does not fundamentally alter the impact on parental rights. The court in Phillips indicated that parents do not have a constitutional right to prevent children from being interviewed by authorities in a particular manner, focusing on the nature of the interview rather than its setting. Therefore, the occurrence of the interview alone does not suggest a deprivation of Shakir's protected liberty interest, entitling Fratta to summary judgment. Furthermore, even if Shakir's rights were infringed, Fratta would be protected by qualified immunity, as the law regarding interviews at police stations was not clearly established at that time. The court highlights that while in-school interviews have been ruled not to infringe on parental rights, the applicability of this ruling to interviews in more restrictive settings remains unaddressed by the Second Circuit. Lastly, Shakir also questions the defendants' decision to release A.S. to Gandy while he was detained.
A.S. was placed in Gandy's custody after an interview with Fratta, but there is a dispute regarding who authorized this transfer. Both Stankye and Fratta contend that releasing A.S. to Gandy was appropriate, asserting that Gandy held joint guardianship rights equal to Shakir's, which the court agrees with, concluding that no custody deprivation occurred. Under Connecticut General Statutes § 45a-606, both parents have equal rights and responsibilities regarding their minor child. Shakir acknowledges that no court order had modified these rights before Gandy assumed custody on February 6, 2009. Although Shakir had petitioned to remove Gandy as a joint guardian prior to this date, the probate court had not made a ruling, and the hearing was scheduled for February 25, 2009. Thus, as of February 6, 2009, Gandy retained her status as a joint guardian. Shakir argues that Gandy's rights were forfeited due to alleged abandonment, citing § 45a-610, which allows for removal of a guardian only through probate court proceedings based on clear and convincing evidence. Since such a determination had not been made, Shakir's claims regarding abandonment do not impact Gandy's status, and hence, no genuine issue of fact exists regarding the equal guardianship rights. Consequently, Stankye and Fratta did not deprive Shakir of custody by allowing A.S. to be released to Gandy.
Shakir was unable to take physical custody of A.S. at the time of his detention, and the transfer of custody did not affect his legal rights, as he could seek clarification of custodial rights in probate court. His dissatisfaction with the court's ruling does not influence the assessment of Stankye and Fratta's actions. Had they refused to return A.S. to Gandy, they could have been liable for interfering with Gandy's custody rights. Consequently, Stankye and Fratta are entitled to summary judgment, as there is no genuine issue of fact regarding the deprivation of Shakir's liberty interest. Furthermore, even if their actions did deprive Shakir of custody, the law was not clearly established at that time to trigger his procedural due process rights. There is no binding precedent from the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit indicating that releasing a child to one parent with joint legal custody infringes on the other parent's custodial rights. While some Ninth Circuit district courts have addressed similar issues, they do not establish clear law applicable for qualified immunity in this District. Therefore, Stankye and Fratta are entitled to summary judgment on this basis as well.
Regarding Shakir's conspiracy claim, he alleges that Stankye and Fratta conspired with Gandy to facilitate A.S.'s relocation to California. Evidence cited includes their awareness of Gandy's plans and advice given to avoid conflict with Shakir. However, Stankye and Fratta contend that Shakir has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding a violation of his due process rights, which is necessary to support a conspiracy claim. They also argue that Shakir has not provided evidence of an agreement to violate his rights. Lastly, they assert entitlement to qualified immunity, arguing their actions were reasonable under the circumstances. The court concurs that Shakir has failed to present evidence indicating a genuine issue of material fact regarding a violation of his due process rights.
The court does not find it necessary to determine whether a genuine issue exists regarding an agreement, as a conspiracy claim under section 1983 requires three elements: 1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; 2) concerted action to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and 3) an overt act furthering that goal, resulting in damages. Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate an actual violation of the underlying constitutional right. The Second Circuit has established that if substantive claims fail on their merits, the civil conspiracy claim fails as well. In this case, the court has already concluded that Shakir was not deprived of a protected liberty interest through actions taken by Stankye and Fratta regarding A.S. Therefore, the alleged deprivation of custody centers on Gandy's decision to relocate A.S. to California. Shakir has not cited case law indicating that one parent's relocation decision constitutes a deprivation of the other parent's protected liberty interest, which would trigger procedural due process. Generally, such actions involve a private actor rather than the state, thus rendering the Fourteenth Amendment inapplicable. The court notes that Connecticut law provides certain restrictions on relocation in custody cases, requiring a relocating parent to justify the move, but these provisions do not apply to Shakir's situation. There was no formal court order governing custody between Shakir and Gandy at the relevant time, and the custody action Shakir initiated was in Derby Probate Court, not the Connecticut Superior Court. Consequently, Gandy was not obligated to seek court approval prior to relocating with A.S.
The Connecticut Superior Court Rules' automatic order does not apply to Shakir's case, nor has Shakir provided evidence of a similar order from the Derby Probate Court. Consequently, state family law does not dictate where a child should reside or the circumstances under which a parent may relocate. Gandy, as A.S.'s parent and guardian, acted within her rights to move him to California, and Shakir has not claimed that Gandy has restricted his access to A.S. post-relocation. Gandy's actions did not terminate or modify Shakir's legal rights; he could seek a court order to address custody or request A.S.'s return if dissatisfied. Although the Derby Probate Court ruled against Shakir regarding temporary or sole custody, affirming Gandy as a joint legal guardian, Shakir asserts that the probate judge commented on the necessity of a court order for A.S.'s out-of-state relocation. However, Shakir's assertion relies on inadmissible hearsay, as he cites a statement from his lawyer rather than direct evidence. Thus, no admissible evidence supports the claim that the probate court deemed A.S.'s relocation a violation of Shakir's custodial rights. Additionally, a Ninth Circuit ruling indicates that one parent's relocation of children, supported by a state actor, does not violate the other parent's constitutional rights. This court finds no authority in the Second Circuit that would suggest allowing one parent with equal rights to take custody infringes on the other parent's due process rights, even if it leads to relocation, and Shakir has not provided relevant case law to the contrary.
Stankye and Fratta's actions in assisting Gandy to take A.S. to California do not constitute a conspiracy to violate Shakir's constitutional rights, as Gandy's removal of A.S. did not deprive Shakir of a protected liberty interest. Furthermore, there was no clear legal precedent at the time regarding the alleged deprivation of custody requiring due process. As a result, Stankye and Fratta are granted summary judgment on Shakir's conspiracy claim based on qualified immunity, as he has not established a genuine issue of material fact regarding a protected liberty interest.
In relation to Shakir's substantive due process claims, while he asserts that their conduct violated his rights, the court confirms that the first prong, identifying a fundamental right, is satisfied since family members have a substantive right to remain together without state interference. However, the second prong is not met because there was no actual loss of custody; hence, no substantive due process claim can be established. The court has determined that Shakir failed to prove that Stankye and Fratta deprived him of custody or conspired to do so, leading to summary judgment in their favor for these claims as well. They are also granted qualified immunity for the same reasons, negating the need to assess whether their actions were sufficiently egregious under the Due Process Clause.
Lastly, Shakir's remaining claims against Stankye involve allegations of unlawful entry and search of his residence and the seizure of A.S. on February 6, 2009.
Stankye contends that Shakir lacks standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim related to the seizure of his son, A.S., as Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be vicariously claimed. While a child can assert a Fourth Amendment claim regarding their seizure, the claim must be brought by the child or a parent on the child's behalf. Shakir, however, did not file the action on A.S.'s behalf, and as a result, lacks standing. Although Shakir acknowledges he cannot assert a violation of his own rights regarding A.S.'s seizure, he requests the court to appoint counsel to add A.S. as a plaintiff. However, Shakir's attempt to amend the complaint to include A.S. came after the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims had expired, as the incident occurred over six years prior, and the court previously denied his motion to amend based on his status as a pro se litigant. Although the court appointed counsel for Shakir later, it declined to allow the amendment at this stage, noting that adding A.S. would delay proceedings and prejudice the defendants. Shakir also sought to introduce two new unlawful seizure claims related to the manner of entry into the residence, but these claims were not included in the Amended Complaint and thus were not considered by the court.
A claim must be explicitly outlined in pleadings to ensure defendants have adequate notice of the plaintiff's allegations, making it improper to introduce new claims in opposition to a summary judgment motion. In the case referenced, the court declined to consider new claims raised by the plaintiffs during summary judgment. Furthermore, a party (Shakir) lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of another individual (Rasheed) or a minor (A.S.), resulting in the granting of Stankye's motion regarding Shakir's Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim.
Regarding the Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim against Stankye, Shakir alleges that Stankye violated his rights by conducting a warrantless search of his home. Stankye contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding his assertion that exigent circumstances justified the search without a warrant and argues for qualified immunity by claiming the search was objectively reasonable.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant, considered presumptively unreasonable unless well-established exceptions apply. One such exception is exigent circumstances, which allow law enforcement to act without a warrant in situations requiring immediate action, such as providing emergency aid or preventing imminent harm. Courts assess the totality of circumstances to determine if an emergency warranted the warrantless entry, with law enforcement carrying a significant burden to justify such actions.
The central issue is whether a reasonable officer would believe there was an urgent need to take action at the time of entry without a warrant. The officer's objective reasonableness is critical, while subjective motivation is not considered. It is acknowledged that Officer Stankye entered Shakir's home on February 6, 2009, without a warrant. Stankye argues that exigent circumstances warranted this action due to concerns for the well-being of A.S., Shakir's son, who might be at risk after Shakir's arrest. Stankye cites several factors: the serious nature of the charges against Shakir, the absence of a forensic interview for A.S., Shakir's prior felony conviction, his refusal to disclose A.S.'s location, and Shakir's inability to care for A.S. while in custody. Previous case law supports the notion that exigent circumstances can exist when a child is left unsupervised at home. However, some courts require additional indicators of danger beyond mere unattended status. For instance, in one case, the potential risk of a child being left alone overnight was deemed sufficient for police intervention, while another court found no exigent circumstances when a baby was simply heard crying, emphasizing that immediate need for aid, not mere possibility of danger, justifies warrantless entry.
Concern for children's welfare can justify police action only if there is reasonable certainty of abandonment and belief in imminent danger. A mere suspicion that children might be home alone does not suffice to bypass Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches. In this case, while a dispute exists regarding whether Stankye had a reasonable belief that A.S. was alone, summary judgment is inappropriate. Notably, Shakir, after being arrested, did not disclose A.S.'s whereabouts when questioned by Stankye. Earlier, Stankye had been informed that A.S. was absent from school. However, it remains unclear if Stankye confirmed A.S.’s presence with Browning before entering. Stankye claimed to have contacted Browning, who stated A.S. was with her, and directed her to bring A.S. to the residence. Yet, there is no evidence that Stankye learned A.S. was not with Browning prior to entering the home; he only expressed uncertainty about A.S.'s whereabouts. Fratta's affidavit indicated misinformation regarding A.S.'s location, but Shakir was unaware of Stankye's call. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Stankye's knowledge of A.S.'s situation, which affects the assessment of the exigency needed for a warrantless search. Favoring Shakir's perspective, a reasonable juror could find that the circumstances did not constitute sufficient exigency.
Summary judgment is deemed inappropriate for Stankye's defense based on qualified immunity due to unresolved factual disputes regarding exigent circumstances. Stankye claims he reasonably believed such circumstances existed; however, the same disputed facts that affect the exigent circumstances also impact the qualified immunity argument. Because the determination of reasonableness is fact-dependent, a finding of qualified immunity cannot be made without resolving these factual disputes. The court emphasizes that summary judgment should only be granted on qualified immunity if no reasonable jury could find the actions objectively unreasonable under established law. Consequently, Stankye's motion for summary judgment is denied concerning Shakir's Fourth Amendment claim of unreasonable search.
Regarding the Eighth Amendment claims, Shakir alleges excessive force and unconstitutional conditions of confinement, asserting these violations occurred prior to his conviction. Stankye argues that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pre-conviction claims, as it only protects against cruel and unusual punishments post-conviction. The court agrees, stating that Shakir's allegations relate to his arrest before any conviction, thus granting Stankye's motion for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claims. Despite Shakir's mischaracterization of his claims, the court interprets them under the appropriate legal standard.
Claims of excessive force during an arrest are evaluated under the Fourth Amendment, while challenges regarding conditions during pretrial detention fall under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has not clearly defined the boundary between arrest and pretrial detention. However, courts in this circuit tend to apply the Fourth Amendment standard to excessive force claims occurring after arrest but before arraignment. The legal framework divides the continuum from arrest to incarceration into three phases: the period of arrest (governed by the Fourth Amendment), the pretrial detention phase post-arraignment (governed by the Fourteenth Amendment), and the post-conviction phase (governed by the Eighth Amendment).
In Shakir's case, there is a significant factual dispute regarding the timing of his arraignment in relation to the alleged constitutional violations, specifically when he was forced to strip and when the air conditioning was activated in the holding cell. Neither party has clarified the timing of the arraignment in their statements. Shakir asserts that the request for a $150,000 bond occurred after he was made to strip, but the organization of his affidavit raises questions about the chronological order of events. Stankye, another party involved, claims he had no role in Shakir's booking or bail setting, which further complicates the timing issue. Both parties agree Shakir was released on bond later that evening. Consequently, the court cannot ascertain whether the alleged actions took place before or after Shakir's arraignment, necessitating a favorable interpretation of the evidence for the non-moving party.
The court determines that the incomplete evidence suggests the conduct in question may have occurred before arraignment, impacting the legal standard for the Motion for Summary Judgment. Shakir's claim is characterized as alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the DPD rather than excessive force by Stankye. The central allegation is that Shakir was stripped of clothing and left in a freezing holding cell, allegedly due to Stankye's actions. The court notes uncertainty regarding whether claims concerning pre-arraignment conditions of confinement fall under the legal principles established in Powell, which primarily addresses excessive force.
District courts within the Circuit exhibit a split on whether to apply the "deliberate indifference" standard from the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fourth Amendment's standard for claims of denied medical care to arrestees. Some courts, like in Goodwin v. Kennedy, apply the Fourteenth Amendment, while others, such as Lewis v. Clarkstown Police Department, apply the Fourth Amendment. The rationale for the Fourth Amendment's applicability is that it holds law enforcement to an objective standard of reasonableness prior to judicial determination of custody status, regardless of the claim type.
The court finds the reasoning favoring the Fourth Amendment persuasive, asserting that it should apply uniformly across various claims related to arrestees. It contrasts this with courts applying the Fourteenth Amendment, which did not adequately address the applicable standards for pre-arraignment claims. The court references Second Circuit precedents that have used the Fourteenth Amendment for medical care claims without explicitly resolving the standard for pre-arraignment cases, suggesting a potential inconsistency in their application.
The court addresses the distinction between pretrial detainees, governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and convicted prisoners, governed by the Eighth Amendment, noting that prior cases did not clarify the line drawn by Powell at arraignment. Consequently, the court applies the Fourth Amendment to Shakir's claims regarding his pre-arraignment confinement conditions. To establish a Fourth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer's actions were "objectively unreasonable," requiring a balance between the severity of the intrusion and the governmental interests. Factors influencing this reasonableness include the crime's severity, any immediate threat posed by the suspect, and whether the suspect resisted arrest.
Shakir's Amended Complaint makes a general allegation of excessive force by Officer Stankye, but Shakir does not assert that Stankye used physical force against him during his arrest or after. Instead, Shakir claims violations occurred during his detention, alleging Stankye ordered him to strip to one layer of clothing, taunted him, placed him in a holding cell, and turned up the air conditioning, leading to illness from cold temperatures.
While Shakir provides sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue regarding whether Stankye made him strip to his underwear, there is no evidence supporting that Stankye turned on the air conditioning. Stankye's affidavit claims he had no involvement with Shakir during his transport, booking, or at the DPD on the arrest date. However, Shakir's own affidavit contradicts this, asserting that Stankye ordered him to strip and left him without clothing in a cold cell. The court finds a genuine issue exists regarding Stankye's involvement in making Shakir strip, but concludes there is no factual dispute about Stankye's role in causing the cold temperature in Shakir's cell.
Stankye's Affidavit asserts he did not modify the air-conditioning on the relevant date, lacks knowledge of anyone else doing so, and did not authorize any adjustments. Shakir fails to provide admissible evidence to counter these claims, relying instead on his perception of temperature change and the sound of the air conditioner, without witnessing its activation. Although Shakir's Affidavit claims he knows Stankye turned on the air conditioning, this assertion lacks personal knowledge and is based on inferences from Stankye's prior behavior towards him and his authority in other contexts. The court finds Shakir's inferences insufficient, noting other officers could have influenced the temperature change and that Stankye's role in ordering arrests does not imply control over cell conditions.
Consequently, the court focuses on Shakir's Fourth Amendment claim regarding his alleged striping and exposure to cold without clothing. It references precedents indicating that prolonged exposure to cold without clothing constitutes an unconstitutional condition of confinement under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, while temporary deprivation does not. The court highlights the significance of duration in assessing such claims and notes that the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard differs from the Eighth Amendment's subjective analysis.
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments impose a requirement for officers to exhibit a necessary level of culpability concerning unconstitutional conditions. Under the Eighth Amendment, there are both objective and subjective components, with the subjective component defined as actions demonstrating "wantonness." The Fourteenth Amendment's second prong necessitates a showing of "deliberate indifference" to serious conditions of confinement. The objective standards under both amendments are more stringent than those of the Fourth Amendment, which requires proving an unreasonable risk of serious harm. To succeed in a claim regarding confinement conditions, a prisoner must demonstrate "extreme deprivations," as mere discomfort is part of the punishment for crimes.
The court notes that precedents indicating no constitutional violations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not negate Shakir's Fourth Amendment claim. When viewing the facts favorably for Shakir, a jury could reasonably find that Officer Stankye's actions resulted in objectively unreasonable conditions. The Fourth Amendment involves balancing the nature of the intrusion against governmental interests. Although a strip search may be justified for security, continued deprivation of clothing in a cold environment after the search could be deemed unreasonable. Stankye did not present a countervailing interest for his actions, asserting no contact with Shakir at the police station. Such factual disputes are for a jury to resolve, leading to the denial of Stankye's summary judgment motion regarding this claim.
Additionally, Shakir seeks a declaratory judgment against Stankye for unconstitutional conduct related to his arrest and the seizure of A.S. The court previously dismissed similar requests against other defendants and Stankye contends that the declaratory relief against him in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal lawsuits against states without their consent or congressional abrogation, extending this immunity to state agencies and officials in their official capacities. An exception exists under Ex Parte Young, allowing lawsuits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief related to ongoing violations of federal law. However, this exception does not apply to claims for past violations or declaratory relief concerning prior actions. Shakir's request for a declaration regarding alleged violations of his constitutional rights by Stankye in 2009 is not considered "prospective" since it does not address ongoing violations or future threats. Therefore, such a request is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Additionally, Shakir lacks Article III standing to pursue this declaratory judgment, which requires demonstrating an injury in fact, a causal connection to the alleged conduct, and a likelihood of redress from a favorable court decision. The court has an independent duty to ensure standing exists for each form of relief sought.
Shakir's request for a declaratory judgment is insufficient because he fails to demonstrate a likelihood of future injury, as required by legal precedent. His claims are based solely on past violations occurring around February 6, 2009, and he does not allege any ongoing conduct that could lead to future harm. The court emphasizes that a declaratory judgment cannot remedy past injuries; instead, monetary damages are appropriate for such violations. Shakir contends that the alleged rights violations contributed to his current conviction and sentence, but the court points out that the focus must be on the likelihood of future constitutional violations, not the lingering effects of past ones. His current incarceration does not convert his retrospective claims into prospective ones. The court concludes that Shakir's request for declaratory relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that he lacks standing. As a result, Stankye is granted summary judgment on this request. Additionally, the motions for summary judgment filed by Fratta and Marotta are also granted.
Shakir's federal conspiracy claim, Fourteenth Amendment due process claims (both procedural and substantive), Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim, Eighth Amendment claim, and claim for declaratory relief are granted. In contrast, his Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim and claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement are denied. The court relies on various Local Rule 56(a) statements of undisputed facts from both parties and notes discrepancies in the labeling of facts as undisputed. Shakir frequently disputes facts without providing sufficient evidence to counter the underlying content. While he challenges the validity of probable cause findings, he does not dispute that such findings were made. Additionally, he disputes the bases of findings of physical neglect and substantiation of sexual abuse but does not contest the outcomes. Stankye's claim to qualified immunity is noted, focusing on the reasonableness of actions taken without addressing Shakir's conditions of confinement. Shakir briefly mentions gross negligence and deliberate indifference in supervisory liability but fails to substantiate these claims, prompting the court to concentrate its analysis on the three primary categories of supervisory liability.
Shakir's L.R. 56(a)2 statement references an "unconsented" interview of A.S. conducted by Marotta after Fratta's interview at the DPD, but Shakir lacks personal knowledge of this interview as he was detained at the time. He cites a DCF report indicating that ISW met with Anwar Jr. at the DCF office, but the report does not clarify that "ISW" refers to Marotta, and there is a suggestion that "DCF" may be a typographical error. Shakir does not address this alleged interview in his opposition to Marotta's involvement and fails to present admissible evidence that it took place. Consequently, the court's analysis is limited to Marotta's statements to the NHPD. Marotta's statement to Officer Kyle is not considered hearsay as it qualifies as a statement by a party opponent, while Officer Kyle's statement to Shakir is deemed hearsay and lacks an exception. The court examines the definitions of guardian and custodian under state family and probate law, noting that state law does not confer a constitutional liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Connecticut General Statutes define "guardianship" as including care obligations and decision-making authority regarding a minor's welfare. Additionally, Connecticut courts differentiate between guardianship and custody, with custody encompassing the day-to-day care and supervision of a child. The Second Circuit's decision in Duchesne illustrates a deprivation of custody when the Bureau of Child Welfare assumed custody of children placed with a neighbor before their mother's hospitalization, emphasizing that the Bureau's actions were not merely temporary removals but involved a formal custody assumption that led to the placement of the children in foster care against the mother's wishes.
The court determined that a liberty interest was violated, requiring post-deprivation judicial proceedings to validate the custody deprivation, despite the existence of emergency circumstances that excused pre-deprivation hearings. The case referenced, Duchesne, primarily examined the Bureau's refusal to return children after the mother's release and did not directly address the current matter, which involved the denial of the family's right to live together due to the refusal to return the children to their mother. The court acknowledged the trial court's findings regarding the initial removal of the children during the mother's hospitalization as justified by emergency conditions.
It contrasted the actions of Stankye, who did not take steps for custody or emergency placements but temporarily brought a child, A.S., to a police station before releasing him to his mother, with the Bureau's actions in Duchesne. The court noted that Shakir's transfer of A.S. to his brother Rasheed was not disputed, while the interpretation of a Service Agreement requiring A.S. to stay with Browning during a pending investigation by the DCF was contested by Shakir. The court emphasized that the right to custody is constitutionally protected, yet must be analyzed in relation to specific circumstances. The legal standard requires assessing whether a reasonable officer at the time would recognize that removing a child after the parent's arrest constituted a custody deprivation that triggered due process requirements. The court did not consider Duchesne relevant to the current case, as it involved formal custody assumptions and placements, and Shakir's claims regarding an alleged second interview at DCF were not substantiated by evidence or personal knowledge, as he was detained during that time.
The court's analysis centers on the interview at the DPD, indicating that the conclusions would remain unchanged even with a second interview. A district court case from 2014, which supports Shakir's interpretation, is noted as not being known to reasonable officials in 2009. The distinction between "guardian" and "custodial parent" is highlighted, referencing a Connecticut Appellate Court case that defines a custodian as a person responsible for a child's care, while a guardian may not necessarily be a custodial parent. The previous court's findings regarding custodial rights in neglect proceedings are acknowledged, but it did not address whether a guardian's rights are diminished when not acting as a custodian. Disputes exist over the probate court's custody determinations and judicial comments regarding Gandy's custody rights. The court will later assess whether there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning these disputes in relation to Shakir's conspiracy claim. The probate court's conclusions are deemed irrelevant to evaluating Fratta and Stankye's actions on February 6, 2009, after A.S. was placed in Gandy's custody. Shakir's reference to section 17a-610 of the Connecticut General Statutes is corrected to section 45a-610. The court clarifies that state family law does not serve as a measure for federal constitutional violations, emphasizing that violations of state law do not equate to federal civil rights claims. State law is referenced to illustrate the autonomy of custodial relationships between parents absent a court order, which was applicable in this case as no order had been issued when Gandy took custody of A.S.
Absence of a party agreement for a record of proceedings in the Connecticut probate court means the court's decision is not a final judgment and can undergo de novo review by the Connecticut Superior Court, per Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-186(a) and Gardner v. Balboni. Shakir, after being released on bond, sought help from the New Haven Police Department to regain custody of his son, A.S., but did not attempt direct contact with A.S. or Gandy and reported no communication since his arrest, which may be due to his incarceration. The parties dispute Stankye's knowledge regarding A.S.'s absence from school due to a doctor's appointment taken by Shakir. Shakir's employer, Nancy Lee Dishereits, stated she informed Stankye about the situation, indicating a genuine issue of material fact exists. However, the court finds this fact minimally relevant concerning exigent circumstances, as A.S.'s school absence remains the primary concern. Additionally, there is a dispute over whether Stankye recognized Shakir's brother in the house, but the court deems evidence Shakir presents to establish this claim inadmissible. Stankye affirmed the male present at the door was unknown to him, while Shakir contended otherwise. Shakir's claim about sharing this information at multidisciplinary meetings lacks personal knowledge, as he was not present at those meetings.
Statements made by Gandy and Rasheed to Shakir are deemed inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 802, as they do not fall under any exceptions. Conversely, statements made by Gandy and Rasheed to Stankye are not classified as hearsay since they are presented to demonstrate Stankye's awareness of Rasheed's identity, not for their truth. Shakir lacks direct evidence from Gandy or Rasheed to substantiate that such statements were made, resulting in no admissible evidence to contest whether Stankye knew Shakir's brother's identity during the search. The court emphasizes that only admissible evidence is considered in summary judgment motions.
In evaluating emergency circumstances, the court notes that assessments should be made from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the time, without hindsight. Factors such as the time of day (midday rather than night) and the absence of indications of criminal activity weaken claims of exigent circumstances. Although A.S. was in the residence, Shakir was already arrested and removed from the home, which diminished any immediate danger he posed to A.S. Prior interviews revealed no evidence of abuse or unsafe conditions in the home. Stankye does not challenge whether Shakir's rights were clearly established in terms of qualified immunity, which must be interpreted liberally in pro se filings.
Some courts in this Circuit have determined that the Fourth Amendment applies based on when a judicial officer reviews a plaintiff's detention for probable cause. This reasoning is consistent with the Second Circuit’s treatment of pre-arraignment excessive force claims and aligns with the Supreme Court's definition of a pretrial detainee as one who has had a judicial determination of probable cause following arrest. Courts have expressed that the Fourth Amendment governs claims related to the treatment of arrestees detained without a warrant until they are either released or found to be legally in custody due to probable cause. There is a suggestion that the treatment of pre-arraignment detention may differ based on whether the arrest was warrant-based or warrantless, but the court refrains from expanding this interpretation without Circuit guidance. Most cases in this District have established that the relevant legal threshold occurs at arraignment or bail setting. Generally, excessive force claims prior to arraignment or formal charges are governed by the Fourth Amendment. Some courts interpret relevant precedents to require Fourth Amendment application until a judicial officer issues an order regarding pretrial custody or bail. The court has previously applied this standard in cases involving pre-arraignment excessive force. The pivotal factor in this case is whether the individual has been arraigned, rather than whether probable cause has been determined. If evidence shows that arraignment occurred prior to the alleged misconduct, the Fourteenth Amendment standard would then apply. Allegations of verbal taunting related to excessive bail are unlikely to constitute a constitutional violation without evidence of specific injury, as established by the Second Circuit’s ruling on verbal harassment not qualifying for claims under section 1983.
Allegations of verbal harassment alone are inadequate to support a Section 1983 claim without demonstrating specific injury, as established in Gibson v. Travaglin. The court shifts its focus to Shakir's claims regarding being forced to strip and left in a cold holding cell. The precedent set in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital establishes that the Due Process Clause applies to pretrial detainees, but the distinction between pre-arraignment and pretrial detainees is crucial. The Darnell court highlights that the Supreme Court's ruling in Kingsley v. Hendrickson redefined deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is distinct from the Fourth Amendment's excessive force claims. The standard requires proof that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly regarding the conditions of confinement, posing excessive risks to health or safety. Stankye does not address Shakir’s conditions of confinement claim in relation to qualified immunity; however, even if he did, summary judgment on qualified immunity would be inappropriate due to factual disputes surrounding the reasonableness of the conditions. The existence of genuine disputes necessitates that a factfinder resolves the issues before qualified immunity can be granted, as shown in O'Bert v. Vargo.
