Court: District Court, D. New Mexico; November 28, 2017; Federal District Court
Defendant Juan Carlos Villalobos-Macias is charged in a four-count Indictment with carjacking (Count 1) and attempted carjacking (Count 2) under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, as well as using a firearm during a violent crime (Counts 3 and 4) under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Counts 1 and 3 pertain to actions in Pueblo County, Colorado, while Counts 2 and 4 relate to incidents in Mora County, New Mexico.
On December 28, 2016, at the Pinon Rest Stop in Pueblo, Colorado, Defendant allegedly pointed a revolver at victim P.J., fired the weapon, and shattered her vehicle's window. As P.J. fled, she dropped her purse, which Defendant collected before driving away in her vehicle. Later, while still in possession of the vehicle, Defendant attempted to carjack another vehicle in New Mexico, firing the revolver and injuring victim J.K. before fleeing. Defendant was arrested after a brief pursuit approximately three hours post-incident in Colorado.
Count 1 specifically accuses Defendant of carjacking P.J. with intent to cause serious harm, resulting in injury to J.K. The carjacking statute outlines penalties based on the severity of the crime. Defendant's motion to dismiss Count 1 claims that New Mexico is not the appropriate venue for this charge, but the Court denies this motion.
The right to be tried in the jurisdiction where a crime occurred is constitutionally protected by Article III, § 2, cl. 3, and the Sixth Amendment, which mandate that trials be held in the state and district of the offense. This is further reinforced by Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, stating that prosecution must occur in the district where the offense was committed. For crimes spanning multiple districts, 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) allows prosecution in any district involved in the crime's commission. Determining proper venue involves assessing the nature of the alleged crime and the location of its acts, guided by judicial interpretation, particularly focusing on the statutory verbs. While the verb test serves as a tool for interpretation, it is not the sole method to establish venue. Venue is also valid when an essential element of the crime occurs in the charging district. When evaluating a motion to dismiss for improper venue, courts are limited to the indictment's allegations, which are presumed true, and should not consider external evidence.
The government has the burden to prove that the crime occurred in the correct venue for each count of an indictment. In this case, Count 1 alleges a carjacking in Colorado that resulted in serious bodily injury to J.K. but fails to specify that the injury occurred in New Mexico, rendering the venue allegation inadequate. The court will require the government to provide a bill of particulars to clarify how it intends to establish venue in New Mexico, allowing the defendant to renew a motion to dismiss if the allegations remain insufficient.
The defendant argues that New Mexico is not the proper venue, claiming that the carjacking ended when the vehicle was taken in Colorado and asserting that, even if the crime continues, it concluded when he reached "temporary safety." In contrast, the government contends that carjacking extends beyond the initial taking, analogous to robbery, and that it continues until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety. The government also maintains that New Mexico is a proper venue because relevant elements of the crime occurred there.
Defendant argues that carjacking is defined as the immediate taking of a vehicle from its owner, citing United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, which emphasizes that the essence of carjacking involves the forcible "taking" of a motor vehicle. However, this interpretation overlooks the broader analysis offered by the court, which clarifies that carjacking is not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety after taking the vehicle. Various courts have provided different perspectives on the temporal limits of carjacking, with some focusing on the duration of control the perpetrator has over the victim and the vehicle, while others consider the point of separation between the victim and the car. For instance, Figueroa-Cartagena indicates that carjacking continues while the carjacker maintains control over the victim and the vehicle. Some jurisdictions interpret carjacking as a continuing offense, where dispossession occurs not only when the victim is forcibly removed but also when the perpetrator exerts control through intimidation. Additionally, carjacking is recognized as a form of robbery that extends through the escape phase, as affirmed by the First Circuit, which aligns carjacking with robbery principles, highlighting that the act includes the flight with the vehicle.
The absence of Tenth Circuit case law on the duration of carjacking is noted, but existing robbery law indicates that the escape phase is integral to the robbery itself. The Tenth Circuit recognizes a continuing offense theory, which applies to both robbery and carjacking, as the latter is modeled after the former. The Court asserts that the carjacking extends as long as the Defendant is in flight, and determining when that flight ends is a factual issue for the jury. The Government contends that New Mexico is the proper venue for Count 1 since the carjacked vehicle moved from Colorado into New Mexico. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, carjacking involves taking a vehicle from another by force or intimidation. The Government's argument for venue being proper wherever any element of the crime occurs lacks persuasion. The distinction between essential conduct elements and other elements is crucial; venue is appropriate only in the district where the criminal acts are performed, not where any element occurs. This principle is supported by case law, which emphasizes that venue is determined by the location of the criminal conduct rather than the presence of essential elements.
Venue for a criminal offense may be established in any district where an "essential conduct element" of the offense occurred, rather than merely based on a circumstance element. In carjacking cases, the essential conduct elements are the "taking" of a vehicle and the use of "force or intimidation." While proof of a vehicle's travel in interstate commerce is necessary for the crime, it does not qualify as an essential conduct element and cannot serve as a basis for venue. The Government's reliance on United States v. Lowe is misplaced, as that case involved unique facts where the perpetrator took both the victim and the vehicle across state lines, establishing a continuing carjacking. The current case involves only the vehicle being taken from a rest stop in Colorado, and whether any part of the carjacking occurred in New Mexico is a factual question for the jury to determine.
The Court denied the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Indictment for Improper Venue, allowing for the possibility of renewal later. Additionally, if a superseding indictment is not filed by January 2, 2018, the Government must provide a bill of particulars detailing the facts it intends to present at trial to support venue in this District for Count 1. The incident timing is noted, with the carjacking occurring at approximately 5:00 a.m. in Colorado and police being notified about an incident in New Mexico around 7:55 a.m. The statute requires that the vehicle in question must have been transported in interstate commerce before the theft, which the Defendant acknowledges occurred. However, some courts have held that subsequent transport of the vehicle following the theft can satisfy this requirement, although the resolution of that issue is not necessary for this case.
