Gallegos v. Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners
Docket: No. CIV 16-127 JB/WPL
Court: District Court, D. New Mexico; September 30, 2017; Federal District Court
Defendant Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 6, 2017, which the Court addressed at a hearing on June 2, 2017. The Court evaluated several key issues: (i) whether to convert the Motion into a summary judgment due to attached documents; (ii) the applicability of quasi-judicial immunity to Bernalillo County; (iii) Bernalillo County's liability for Plaintiff Martin Gallegos' federal constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (iv) whether Gallegos fulfilled the notice requirement under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA); and (v) the potential waiver of immunity under the NMTCA.
The Court ruled that: (i) the Motion would not be converted because the attached documents fell within an exception; (ii) Bernalillo County does not have quasi-judicial immunity, which only applies to individuals; (iii) Bernalillo County is not liable for Gallegos' claims as it is not vicariously liable under § 1983; and (iv) Gallegos failed to meet the NMTCA notice requirement, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction to consider the waiver of immunity. Consequently, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss.
The factual background indicates that Gallegos, a prisoner, was remanded to the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Detention Center (BCMDC) by a state court order for a methadone program to prevent life-threatening withdrawal symptoms. However, he was transferred to the New Mexico Department of Corrections shortly thereafter, where the remand order was ignored, leading to his suffering from withdrawal symptoms for nearly two months. The Court accepted Gallegos' allegations as true for the purpose of the Motion but did not endorse them.
Gallegos initiated a lawsuit in state court on August 27, 2015, asserting claims against Bernalillo County, BCMDC, the New Mexico Corrections Department, and John Does 1 through 5 for violations of NMTCA § 41-4-12. An amended complaint added federal claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, seeking compensatory damages and attorney fees. Bernalillo County and BCMDC removed the case to federal court within thirty days of receiving the amended complaint.
Bernalillo County filed a motion to dismiss Gallegos' claims under Rule 12(b)(6), claiming "absolute quasi-judicial immunity" due to reliance on facially valid court orders. The county argued that officials executing valid orders should not be liable for damages when judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity. It emphasized that a state district court issued orders sentencing Gallegos to custody, which were attached to the motion. Bernalillo County contended that it transferred Gallegos according to these valid orders, which were signed by his court-appointed attorneys.
The county maintained that even if an order is legally flawed, it can still be facially valid, asserting that the orders in this case were indeed valid. It pointed out that contesting a court order should be done via appeal rather than through a lawsuit against the executing official. Additionally, Bernalillo County argued against vicarious liability for constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stating that a plaintiff must show that each government official directly violated the Constitution, as the principle of respondeat superior does not apply in such cases.
Bernalillo County asserts that the Plaintiff, Gallegos, cannot pursue claims against the County based solely on vicarious liability for the actions of detention officers. The County emphasizes that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supervisors can only be held liable if there is an "affirmative link" between the constitutional violation and the supervisor’s personal involvement, control, or failure to supervise. They argue that Gallegos has not identified any unconstitutional policies or specific violations of County policy, claiming his allegations are based solely on the conduct of unidentified guards. Consequently, the County requests dismissal of Gallegos' § 1983 claims.
Additionally, the County contends that Gallegos' tort claims should be dismissed due to a lack of waiver of immunity under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA). They cite Section 41-4-4, which grants immunity to governmental entities and employees for torts unless specifically waived. The County states that there is no waiver for stand-alone negligence claims, referencing the Lessen ruling, and also claims immunity from medical negligence, as no specific waiver exists for that type of claim under the NMTCA.
Furthermore, Bernalillo County argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the NMTCA claims because Gallegos failed to provide the required written notice of his claims to the County within ninety days of the incident. They point out that a local governmental entity must receive written notice for the Court to have jurisdiction, or must have actual notice of the claim. The County asserts that Gallegos did not provide such notice and that mere discussions with BCMDC employees do not constitute actual notice of potential litigation, referencing relevant case law to support this position.
Bernalillo County asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Gallegos' claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) due to Gallegos' failure to comply with the notice provision, urging dismissal of his claims. The County clarifies that this dismissal would not affect Gallegos' claims against the New Mexico Department of Corrections. In response, Gallegos contends that the motion is actually one for summary judgment, as it includes attachments beyond the pleadings, and he provides supporting exhibits, including depositions. He does not directly address the legal arguments concerning quasi-judicial immunity but emphasizes the relevance of the deposition transcripts, arguing that the defendants did not rely on a valid order since key participants did not support such a claim.
Gallegos highlights that he raised concerns about the adherence to a titration order and cites the deposition of County Records Supervisor Alexis Iverson, who clarified that officers should not ignore the order but should report it to records. He insists that this case does not involve a facially valid order due to the lack of acknowledgment from involved parties.
Regarding vicarious liability, Gallegos indicates he intends to name specific supervisors and parties implicated in the denial of his rights, claiming he is now prepared to amend his complaint to include these individuals. He argues for the allowance of these amendments given the recent deposition discoveries.
In addressing the motion's immunity claims under the NMTCA, Gallegos argues that the term "operation and maintenance" has a broad interpretation by the New Mexico Supreme Court, applying beyond just physical defects, to include the operation of a methadone maintenance program. He asserts that this context invokes a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Lastly, Gallegos challenges the motion's notice defense, claiming he fulfilled NMTCA notice requirements by informing officers Kline and King of his wrongful treatment and life-threatening withdrawal symptoms through a court order. He argues that the existence of this order implies that the agency should have anticipated litigation arising from its violation, thereby satisfying the notice requirement.
Gallegos asserts that he contacted his attorney, who reached out to the Department of Corrections Chief Legal Officer and the medical department at BCMDC, leading him to believe that litigation was intended. He claims to have sent a written tort claim notice to the State Risk Management within the required 90-day period, arguing this satisfies the NMTCA notice requirement and requests the Court to deny the Motion to Dismiss. Gallegos also seeks permission to amend his complaint to name specific individuals for his § 1983 claim.
In response, Bernalillo County argues that Gallegos improperly attempts to convert the Motion to Dismiss into a summary judgment motion, emphasizing that the district court should only consider the complaint itself. The County notes exceptions for documents incorporated by reference, those central to the claim, and documents subject to judicial notice. Bernalillo County claims the exhibits attached to its Motion are state district court orders central to Gallegos' claims and undisputed in authenticity, thus not converting the Motion.
Bernalillo County further contends that Gallegos does not challenge its quasi-judicial immunity, failing to provide legal authority against it. The County outlines the criteria for such immunity, stating that for immunity to apply, the judge must be immune, officials must act within their jurisdiction and per the order, which must be facially valid. Bernalillo County asserts that it complied with valid court orders in transferring Gallegos to the New Mexico Corrections Department, and Gallegos does not dispute the validity of these orders.
Lastly, Bernalillo County argues that there is no legal basis for Gallegos' constitutional claims against it, asserting that a government agency can only be held liable under § 1983 for its own unconstitutional policies, not for the actions of its employees. Since Gallegos does not allege any unconstitutional policies or violations of specific Bernalillo County policies, the County claims it cannot be held liable under § 1983.
Bernalillo County argues that there is no waiver of immunity under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) for Gallegos' state law tort claims. The County contends that Gallegos' reliance on NMSA 41-4-6 as a basis for waiving immunity is unfounded and that his citation of Espinoza v. Town of Taos is inappropriate, as it concluded there was no waiver of tort immunity. Bernalillo County asserts that the case is more comparable to Lessen v. City of Albuquerque, which involved a single administrative decision rather than a public safety issue. The County argues that since Gallegos’ situation affects only him and not a broader group, the reasoning in Lessen should apply, negating any claim under 41-4-6.
Additionally, the County notes that Gallegos concedes he is not alleging a TCA claim for "medical negligence" under NMSA 41-4-9 and 41-4-10, and asserts that these provisions do not apply as it is neither a "medical facility" nor a "health care provider." Consequently, Bernalillo County concludes that Gallegos' NMTCA claims should be dismissed due to a lack of immunity waiver.
In addressing Gallegos' arguments about actual notice, Bernalillo County claims that his pleadings fall short of the requirements established in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. The County points out that Gallegos does not specify with whom he communicated his notice or the circumstances surrounding any verbal statements, nor does he establish that he notified the County of potential litigation. Therefore, Bernalillo County requests the dismissal of Gallegos' NMTCA claims.
During a motion hearing on June 2, 2017, the Court expressed skepticism regarding a waiver of New Mexico sovereign immunity under the Tort Claims Act for the County and indicated a tendency to grant the motion. The County clarified that it wished to avoid the conversion of its Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment and noted that it would not contest the validity of the court orders presented, arguing that proper procedure for challenging such orders would be through an appeal.
Gallegos argued that his negligence claim under 41-4-6 hinges on whether he failed to adhere to a policy designed to protect inmates at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), asserting that such negligence violates the operational and maintenance clause. The Court indicated a tendency to grant a Motion to Dismiss.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court can dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This rule assesses the sufficiency of allegations based solely on the complaint's text, accepting all factual allegations as true, and viewing them favorably towards the non-moving party. Complaints must provide sufficient factual context to support a plausible claim for relief, moving beyond mere labels or conclusory statements. The Tenth Circuit emphasizes that allegations must not be overly broad, as general claims fail to meet the plausibility standard.
Rule 12(b)(1) pertains to a court's limited jurisdiction and the requirement for a plaintiff to demonstrate this jurisdiction. A motion under this rule can challenge either the sufficiency of the complaint's jurisdictional allegations or the actual jurisdictional facts. In cases of facial attacks, the court treats the allegations as true, while in factual attacks, the court does not assume their truthfulness.
A court has broad discretion under Rule 12(b)(1) to permit affidavits and other documents, as well as limited evidentiary hearings, to address disputed jurisdictional facts. Unlike Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, referencing evidence outside the pleadings in a 12(b)(1) motion does not convert it to a summary judgment motion. The authority to weigh evidence is fundamental because jurisdictional issues pertain to the court's power to hear the case. There is no presumption of truthfulness for the plaintiff's claims, and disputed material facts do not prevent the court from assessing jurisdictional merits. Parties can challenge jurisdictional facts beyond initial complaint allegations by presenting affidavits or other evidence. If jurisdictional matters are intertwined with case merits, the court should address them under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56. Typically, the sufficiency of a complaint is determined solely by its contents. The Tenth Circuit restricts district courts to the complaint's facts when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, allowing only three exceptions: documents incorporated by reference, documents central to the claim if authenticity is undisputed, and matters subject to judicial notice. Improper reliance on external materials can lead to mischaracterizing a 12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment, as seen in Tenth Circuit cases like Gee v. Pacheco and Nard v. City of Okla. City.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that an untimely filed charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is analogous to a statute of limitations and concluded that the district court should have evaluated the case under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than treating the charge as jurisdictional. The court noted that the district court improperly considered evidentiary materials outside of the complaint, which necessitated treating the motion as one for summary judgment. The court also referenced a precedent that prohibits using external evidence, such as interviews and letters, when assessing whether to toll a statute of limitations for fraud claims unless the documents are incorporated by reference in the complaint. In securities class actions, however, documents central to the claims may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion.
Regarding quasi-judicial immunity, the Tenth Circuit established that government officials executing valid court orders enjoy this immunity. This applies to both discretionary and ministerial acts performed under a judge's direction, as seen in cases involving pretrial service officers and law enforcement executing facially valid warrants. For officials to claim quasi-judicial immunity, the underlying court order must be valid on its face, the officials must act within their jurisdiction, and they must adhere strictly to the order's terms, as emphasized in the case of Moss v. Kopp.
An order may be considered facially valid even if it is deemed infirm under state law, as facial validity does not equate to legality. State officials should not act as appellate courts by scrutinizing judges' orders, as holding them liable for executing such orders could lead to harassment through litigation. It is essential for state officers to execute court orders without the fear of legal repercussions for actions beyond their control, ensuring the court's authority and functionality are preserved. A narrow view of facial validity would undermine the quasi-judicial immunity that protects officials carrying out judicial orders, potentially leading to reluctance in executing those orders. The Tenth Circuit emphasizes that absolute immunity for officials executing facially valid orders is necessary to maintain public trust in the judicial system. Cases cited support this notion, highlighting the importance of protecting officials from lawsuits when enforcing valid court orders. Additionally, Section 1983 of Title 42 provides a framework for accountability under state law but must be balanced against the need for judicial process integrity.
Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises when a person, acting under state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Section 1983 does not create substantive rights; it enforces existing rights. To establish a valid claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) deprivation of a federal right, (2) that the deprivation was caused by someone acting under state law. Courts require plaintiffs to plead that government officials, through their individual actions, violated constitutional rights, as there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Supervisors can be held liable only for their own unconstitutional policies or if they were aware of and disregarded the risk that their conduct would lead to constitutional violations. Non-supervisory defendants might also be liable if they knew or should have known their actions could result in such deprivations. The Tenth Circuit has emphasized the need for an affirmative link between a supervisor's actions and the constitutional violation, requiring personal participation or failure to supervise effectively.
Supervisory liability under Section 1983 requires proof that a supervisor's own actions or policies were a deliberate choice leading to constitutional violations, as established by the Tenth Circuit. Liability cannot be based on the actions of subordinates alone; the plaintiff must show that the municipality was the "moving force" behind the alleged injury through deliberate conduct. The Tenth Circuit clarified that while the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal limited the scope of supervisory liability, it did not eliminate it entirely. A plaintiff must demonstrate a direct link between a supervisor's actions and the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates, with the possibility of liability arising from the creation or enforcement of policies that lead to rights deprivations. This principle was illustrated in the case of Rizzo v. Goode, where a deliberate plan by officials linked them to police misconduct. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that municipalities cannot be held liable solely based on the actions of their officers. The New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) was enacted to address the inequities of sovereign immunity.
Governmental entities and public employees in New Mexico are primarily protected from liability under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA), which limits their liability in tort cases to specific exceptions outlined within the Act. The NMTCA is grounded in traditional tort principles, emphasizing the duty of care akin to what a reasonably prudent person would exercise. Immunity is granted to governmental entities and public employees while acting within their official duties, except where the immunity is explicitly waived by statutes such as the New Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act or specific provisions of the NMTCA.
Plaintiffs are restricted from suing governmental entities or their employees unless their claims fall under the exceptions defined by the NMTCA. Waivers of immunity must be clearly stated, as consent to be sued cannot be implied. Furthermore, claims based on alleged violations of rights under the New Mexico Constitution are also barred unless a waiver under the NMTCA exists. The courts have consistently upheld this restriction, dismissing cases where no specific waiver can be identified, thereby reinforcing the limited circumstances under which governmental entities may be held liable.
The New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) serves as the sole legal recourse for tort claims against governmental entities or public employees when immunity has been waived. Claims must fall within the specific exceptions outlined in the NMTCA; otherwise, they cannot be pursued. This includes barring claims related to violations of the New Mexico Constitution unless a waiver is explicitly provided by the NMTCA. Section 41-4-6 of the NMTCA allows for liability relating to bodily injury, wrongful death, or property damage caused by public employee negligence in operating or maintaining government property. However, it maintains a general immunity for governmental entities, waiving that immunity only in defined instances, primarily related to unsafe conditions on government-owned property. New Mexico courts have clarified that this waiver does not cover negligent supervision, design, inspection, or inmate classification within prison settings. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that the terms "operation" and "maintenance" regarding penitentiary premises do not extend to inmate security and custody matters.
Section 41-4-6 of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity for public employees engaged in negligent administrative functions. In Archibeque v. Moya, Chris Archibeque, an inmate, was transferred to the New Mexico State Penitentiary and informed intake officer Moya-Martinez of an enemy, inmate Gallegos. Moya-Martinez erroneously stated that Gallegos was no longer at the prison, leading to Archibeque being placed in the general population where he was assaulted. Archibeque sued Moya-Martinez and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the NMTCA, but the district court held that Section 41-4-6 did not waive immunity for negligent security and custody. The Tenth Circuit certified a question to the New Mexico Supreme Court regarding whether the statute provided immunity for the alleged negligence in Archibeque's release. The Supreme Court concluded that Moya-Martinez's actions did not constitute the operation of the penitentiary as defined by Section 41-4-6, but rather an administrative function, thus maintaining her immunity. The Court emphasized that interpreting the statute to waive immunity in this context would contradict its plain language and purpose.
Moya-Martinez’s misclassification of Arehibeque was deemed negligent but did not create an unsafe condition for the general prison population, as clarified by the Supreme Court of New Mexico. The court emphasized that allowing a waiver of immunity under Section 41-4-6 for every instance of negligence affecting an individual would contradict the intent of the Tort Claims Act, which aims to limit government liability. A single instance of risk to one inmate does not equate to a broader unsafe condition warranting immunity waiver. Chief Justice Richard Ransom concurred, noting that the injuries suffered by Archibeque were due to a specific administrative decision rather than a hazardous condition of the prison environment. He suggested that Archibeque could have been placed in administrative segregation instead of being released into the general population. In contrast, the Court of Appeals in Callaway v. New Mexico Department of Corrections found sufficient grounds to waive immunity when the Corrections Department was aware of dangerous conditions created by violent gang members, indicating that the risk to inmates was foreseeable. The court highlighted that the dangerous nature of the inmate assailant was known to prison authorities, further supporting its ruling.
The Plaintiff's claim against the Defendants is partially supported by allegations that the Defendants were aware or should have been aware of a dangerous condition, invoking Section 41-4-6 waiver. Section 41-4-16 outlines the notice requirements for claims against the state or local public bodies under the Tort Claims Act, mandating that a written notice detailing the time, place, and circumstances of the incident be presented within ninety days. Failure to provide this notice, or to have the governmental entity possess actual knowledge of the likelihood of litigation, bars any suit. The notice period excludes time when the injured party is incapacitated. Defendants bear the burden of proving non-compliance with the notice requirement. Courts have established that actual notice must indicate the possibility of litigation, not merely awareness of the incident. Prior cases emphasize that knowledge of an occurrence is insufficient if the governmental entity does not also recognize the likelihood of a claim. Proper notice is deemed jurisdictional, necessitating precise adherence to the Tort Claims Act’s stipulations.
Bernalillo County's motion should not be treated as a motion for summary judgment because the documents attached qualify for an exception to the general rule regarding the sufficiency of a complaint. Specifically, quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to counties, only to individuals. Additionally, Bernalillo County cannot be held vicariously liable for Gallegos’ federal constitutional claims under § 1983. Gallegos failed to satisfy the notice requirement of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) as he did not provide written notice, nor did the County have actual notice. Since the notice requirement is jurisdictional and Gallegos did not comply, the court lacks jurisdiction to determine if the NMTCA waives the County's immunity.
The court clarifies that while generally, the sufficiency of a complaint is based solely on its content, there are exceptions allowing consideration of certain documents without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. These exceptions include documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, those essential to the claim, and matters that are publicly acknowledged and can be judicially noticed. The court finds that the state district court orders attached by Bernalillo County do not require conversion of the motion, as they fall within the judicial notice exception.
The Tenth Circuit faced a dispute regarding whether a district court ruling should be considered a dismissal or a summary judgment, as it involved evidence beyond the pleadings. The district court treated it as a motion to dismiss, affirming its decision to take judicial notice of materials from the state court's file, which was upheld by the Tenth Circuit. Consequently, the court determined that it would not convert the motion from Bernalillo County into one for summary judgment.
Bernalillo County was found not to possess quasi-judicial immunity, a doctrine that protects individuals executing judicial duties, not entities. The purpose of this immunity is to shield officials from legal accountability for actions taken in the course of their duties. Tenth Circuit precedents emphasize that quasi-judicial immunity applies to individuals, as seen in cases involving prosecutors and law enforcement officers, rather than to entities like counties. Therefore, Bernalillo County, which operates through individuals, does not benefit from this immunity.
Additionally, Bernalillo County is not liable for federal constitutional claims made by Gallegos, as clarified by the Supreme Court, which established that there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983. Vicarious liability does not apply in this context.
To establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each government official defendant personally violated the Constitution through individual actions. An employer cannot be held liable merely due to an employee-employer relationship. The Tenth Circuit has clarified that while the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal limited supervisory liability, it did not eliminate it entirely. Supervisory liability under Section 1983 may apply if a supervisor is responsible for a policy that leads to constitutional violations by subordinates. There must be an "affirmative link" between the unconstitutional actions of subordinates and the supervisor's policies or approvals.
In the case at hand, Gallegos failed to allege that Bernalillo County created or maintained a harmful policy or that any affirmative link existed between the actions of John Doe defendants and a Bernalillo County policy. His claims focus on the failure of John Doe defendants to follow a court order regarding a methadone program, but do not connect their actions to any unconstitutional Bernalillo County policy. The court concluded that Gallegos was essentially arguing that while the county had a beneficial policy, it was not followed in this instance, which does not satisfy the requirements for a Monell claim against Bernalillo County. Therefore, the county cannot be held liable for Gallegos' constitutional claims.
Gallegos failed to meet the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) notice requirement, as he did not provide Bernalillo County with the necessary written notice of his claims, nor did the County have actual notice. According to N.M. Stat. Ann. 41-4-16(A), a claimant must present written notice, including details of the incident, to the county clerk within ninety days following the occurrence that gives rise to the claim. If this requirement is not satisfied, courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case, as established in N.M. Stat. Ann. 41-4-16(B). Although Bernalillo County filed a motion under rule 12(b)(6), the court must first consider jurisdiction under rule 12(b)(1) due to the jurisdictional nature of the notice requirement. A party can challenge jurisdiction by referencing evidence beyond the complaint, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. In this case, Gallegos provided notice to the Risk Management Division for his claim against the state, but not to Bernalillo County, as there is no evidence or claim that he notified the county clerk. Gallegos's response only refers to notice to the state, thereby failing to comply with the NMTCA’s requirements. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Bernalillo County had actual notice of the likelihood of litigation, which extends beyond mere awareness of an incident.
Actual notice under Section 41-4-16(B) does not require that a claim explicitly indicate that a lawsuit will be filed against the state; it must instead alert the state to the possibility of litigation, enabling an investigation into the merits of the claim. In the case at hand, Bernalillo County lacked actual notice, as the mere showing of a titration order to county employees, who allegedly disregarded it, only informed them of an incident rather than a potential lawsuit. In detention facilities, mere notification of an incident is insufficient for actual notice, which must include indications of potential legal action.
Gallegos’ assertion of providing oral notice of his claim, both personally and through his attorney, fails to meet the pleading standards established in Iqbal, as it constitutes a mere threadbare recital without specific details regarding when and to whom notice was given, as well as the content of that notice. Gallegos' deposition includes instances where he mentioned the court order to a corrections officer and a nurse, and expressed intent to file a lawsuit, but he later partially recanted his statement about pursuing legal action. This insufficient notice means Bernalillo County did not have actual notice under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA).
Gallegos indicated he would contact a lawyer but did not explicitly state he planned to file a lawsuit, as noted in his deposition. His affidavit confirms he informed his lawyer of the situation. Merely telling a guard about contacting his lawyer does not constitute actual notice of impending litigation. Douglas Wilber, Gallegos's attorney, recalled a phone call with a BCMDC medical staff member who was aware of a methadone issue but did not perceive a likelihood of litigation arising from it. The court emphasized that actual notice must indicate a likelihood of litigation, not just awareness of an accident or injury. Consequently, the court found insufficient evidence to establish that Bernalillo County had actual notice as required under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA). The court granted Bernalillo County's motion to dismiss the case. Additionally, the document references the non-precedential nature of unpublished opinions from the Tenth Circuit, which may still be cited for persuasive value in relevant cases.
Municipal entities and local governing bodies are not granted the same common law immunities as government officials for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Unlike officials, municipalities, including local officials and counties, do not have absolute immunity from such suits. The New Mexico Corrections Department has been ruled to possess sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunity, but Bernalillo County does not share this immunity.
A report indicates that medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder is rarely provided to incarcerated individuals, with significant barriers including strict federal laws and ideological opposition to such treatment. The Court has dismissed all federal claims against Bernalillo County, typically leading to a lack of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims; however, it has allowed the plaintiff, Gallegos, to amend his complaint to include claims against guards at the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Detention Center (BCMDC).
As the Court retains federal-question jurisdiction over the new § 1983 claims, it will also address the state law claims against Bernalillo County. Although previously dismissing the state from the case, the Court suggests that Gallegos may struggle to fit his claim within the New Mexico Tort Claims Act’s premises liability waiver, as his grievance arises from a specific incident rather than a broader policy issue.
