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Hosseinzadeh v. Klein
Citation: 276 F. Supp. 3d 34Docket: 16-cv-3081 (KBF)
Court: District Court, S.D. New York; August 23, 2017; Federal District Court
The court addresses whether critical commentary on a YouTube video constitutes copyright infringement. Matt Hosseinzadeh, the plaintiff, claims that Ethan and Hila Klein, the defendants, infringed his copyrights by creating a video (the "Klein video") that critiques his original work (the "Hoss video") while using clips from it. Hosseinzadeh alleges copyright infringement, misrepresentation in a counter-takedown notice under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and defamation. The court reviews motions for summary judgment from both parties, relying on the Klein and Hoss videos as key evidence. The court determines that the Klein video serves as critical commentary and does not substitute for the Hoss video in the market, qualifying its use of clips as fair use under copyright law. Additionally, the court finds that the defendants’ remarks about the lawsuit are either non-actionable opinions or substantially true, leading to the dismissal of the defamation claim. Consequently, the court grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denies the plaintiff's motion. Background details indicate that Hosseinzadeh is a filmmaker who produces original content, including the Hoss video, which features a character named "Bold Guy." The Klein video, posted on February 15, 2016, critiques the Hoss video with extensive commentary interspersed with clips, utilizing approximately three minutes of the original five-minute video. The Klein video is described as harshly critical, mocking aspects of the Hoss video, and likening it to a genre known for "cringe"-worthy content. Overall, the commentary resembles discussions typical in film studies. On April 23, 2016, the plaintiff issued a DMCA takedown notice to YouTube for the Klein video, leading to its removal the same day. In response, the defendants filed a DMCA counter notification arguing that the Klein video qualified as fair use and was noncommercial. Three days later, the defendants initiated the present lawsuit. On May 24, 2016, they released a video titled "We’re Being Sued," which criticized the plaintiff for the lawsuit. Subsequently, the plaintiff amended his complaint to include a defamation claim. Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment following a discovery period. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party provides admissible evidence demonstrating no genuine dispute over material facts, entitling them to judgment as a matter of law, as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). The burden lies with the moving party to show the absence of such disputes. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve any ambiguities in their favor, focusing solely on identifying triable issues rather than weighing evidence or resolving factual disputes. Fair use serves as an affirmative defense to copyright infringement, established in the Copyright Act of 1976. Courts evaluate whether a particular use qualifies as fair use by considering four non-exhaustive factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use (commercial vs. nonprofit educational), (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and (4) the effect on the market for the original work. No single factor is decisive, and fair use requires a case-by-case analysis without bright-line rules. When material facts are undisputed, fair use factors can be assessed as a matter of law, allowing courts to resolve fair use issues during summary judgment. The transformative nature of the use is paramount, focusing on whether the new work adds something new or alters the original with a different purpose or character. Transformative use must do more than simply republish the original work; it should provide justification for the taking, such as criticism or commentary. The Second Circuit often presumes that the first factor favors defendants when the use aligns with purposes like criticism or comment, as outlined in Section 107. Uses deemed as criticism or comment typically lead to a finding of fair use, supported by various cases where courts upheld fair use for transformative works aimed at critique or parody. The second factor in determining fair use examines the nature of the work, noting that artistic creations are more aligned with core copyright protections, which weighs against fair use if the work is fictional or creative. The third factor assesses the amount and substantiality of the portion used, requiring consideration of both the quantity and the qualitative significance of the copied material in relation to the original work. The extent of permissible copying is influenced by the use's purpose and character. The fourth factor evaluates whether the secondary use acts as a market substitute for the original work, focusing on the potential market harm caused by the alleged infringer and the broader impact of similar conduct on the original’s market. Courts differentiate between criticism or parody that diminishes demand without acting as a substitute and actual market harm that constitutes copyright infringement. If the allegedly infringing work is not a market substitute, this factor favors the defendant, as seen in cases like Google Books, where the use did not compete with the original works. Critiques of a seminar or organization generally do not substitute for the seminar itself or capture its market. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) outlines the process for copyright holders to notify online service providers about allegedly infringing material through "takedown notices," which must include a statement of good faith belief that the material is unauthorized by the copyright owner (17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(A)(v)). The DMCA also allows creators of allegedly infringing content to file "counter notifications" to appeal the removal of their work, requiring a similar good faith statement under penalty of perjury (17 U.S.C. 512(g)(3)(C)). Importantly, the DMCA prohibits knowingly misrepresenting that material is infringing or that it was removed due to mistake or misidentification (17 U.S.C. 512(f)). The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a copyright holder's subjective good faith belief in the infringement is sufficient for takedown notifications, meaning liability for misrepresentation does not apply if the belief is mistaken (Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145). The Court argues that the same subjective standard should apply to counter notifications to ensure fairness for creators appealing removal decisions, as both processes have similar statutory requirements. The DMCA's structure indicates liability for copyright owners arises only from knowing misrepresentations about infringing content. Under New York law, defamation requires the element of falsity, with truth serving as an absolute defense. A slanderous statement must be false, and truth can be considered substantially true if the gist or substance of the statement aligns with reality. Minor inaccuracies do not negate substantial truth, which is assessed based on whether the statement would have a different impact on the reader than the actual truth. Courts evaluate defamation claims by considering the entire publication and the context in which it was issued. Additionally, pure opinions are not actionable as defamation; however, opinions suggesting undisclosed facts may be deemed actionable as "mixed opinions." The critical factor is whether the statement can be interpreted as implying factual assertions about the plaintiff. Claim I for copyright infringement by the plaintiff is resolved in favor of the defendants based on the Court’s analysis of the Klein and Hoss videos. The primary fair use factor, "criticism," strongly supports the defendants. The Klein video exemplifies criticism, featuring remarks from Ethan Klein that address the Hoss video, including characterizations of the Bold Guy, critiques of the script, and mockery of certain elements such as the opening title sequence and character portrayals. Klein's commentary includes sarcastic observations about the clothing and the portrayal of female characters, with specific criticisms directed at the script and parkour scenes. Despite the subjective nature of the critiques, the Klein video is ultimately deemed as commentary on the Hoss video, aligning with precedents that favor fair use. Consequently, this first fair use factor decisively supports the defendants. The nature of the allegedly infringed work is evaluated, with defendants claiming that the Hoss video and plaintiff's "Bold Guy" skits are factual, as the plaintiff bases the character on personal experiences. However, the Court finds that the videos are scripted and fictional, asserting that classifying creative works as nonfiction based solely on personal inspiration would undermine the fiction genre. Thus, this factor indicates against fair use. The third factor assesses the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted material used. Defendants argue that the plaintiff's video constitutes a small portion of their video; however, the Court clarifies that the focus should be on the proportion of the copyrighted work used and its relevance to the transformative purpose of the defendants' commentary. The defendants used segments totaling three minutes and fifteen seconds from a five minute and twenty-four second video. The Court acknowledges that significant portions may be necessary for effective critique, and thus this factor is neutral, as the extent of copying was essential for the transformative commentary. The fourth factor examines the commercial impact on the demand for the Hoss video. It aims to establish whether the defendants' work usurps demand for the original. The Court concludes that the Klein video does not serve as a substitute for the Hoss video, as the viewer experience differs significantly. Consequently, the Klein video does not infringe upon the market for the original work, leading the Court to determine that this factor favors a finding of fair use. Claim II regarding DMCA misrepresentation is dismissed because the Klein video is deemed fair use and does not infringe on the plaintiff's copyrights. A statement cannot be considered a misrepresentation under 17 U.S.C. 512(f) if it is factually accurate. Even if the video were not fair use, the defendants demonstrated a subjective "good faith belief" that their video was non-infringing, supported by their understanding of fair use and established practices. The plaintiff failed to provide evidence indicating the defendants lacked this belief, leading to the dismissal of Claim II. Claim III, alleging defamation, is also dismissed. The Lawsuit video contains opinions that are protected under New York law, making them non-actionable. For instance, Ethan Klein's statement about the plaintiff's motivations is purely opinion-based and does not rely on non-public facts. The only other statement identified as defamatory—regarding the timeline of the plaintiff’s actions—is determined to be "substantially true" under New York law. The plaintiff's assertion that Klein's omission of a warning email renders his statement false is rejected, as it does not alter the statement's overall truthfulness or its impact on the audience. Ethan Klein's statement in the Lawsuit video, "nothing happened," reflects the defendants' surprise and disappointment regarding the plaintiff's lawsuit filed months after the video's release. In defamation cases, courts assess the entire publication and its context to determine its impact on the ordinary reader. The plaintiff's objection to the term "nothing" is deemed hyper-literal and misinterprets the video's focus on the lawsuit's initiation, suggesting that "nothing happened" may refer to the absence of legal action during that period rather than a lack of communication. Additionally, the mention of a warning email does not alter the perceived impact of the Klein video. If viewers interpret the plaintiff as a "trigger-happy litigant," knowledge of an email threatening legal action would likely not change that perception, as the truth in the email does not diminish the alleged defamatory implication of Klein’s statement—though the court disagrees that such an implication exists. The court concludes that the statements in question are either non-actionable opinions or legally true, leading to the dismissal of Claim III. Consequently, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in full, while the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied, terminating the action. The Klein video is part of the "reaction video" genre, which varies widely, and the court clarifies that not all reaction videos qualify as fair use. Lastly, the court previously deemed Claim II "exceptionally weak," and the plaintiff has failed to strengthen it since that ruling.