Bartos v. PDC Energy, Inc.

Citation: 275 F. Supp. 3d 755Docket: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:16-CV-167

Court: District Court, N.D. West Virginia; July 28, 2017; Federal District Court

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The Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order regarding cross motions for summary judgment in the case involving Plaintiff Betty Darlene Bartos and Defendant PDC Energy, Inc. Bartos filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, while the Defendant submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment shortly thereafter. After reviewing the motions and responses from both parties, the Court granted the Defendant's motion in part and denied it in part, while denying the Plaintiff's motion entirely.

The underlying action stems from Bartos's termination, which she claims was due to age discrimination, retaliation, and violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA). Bartos, employed by PDC Energy from 1985 until her termination in 2014, was one of fourteen employees let go during a workforce reduction associated with a corporate divestiture. Notably, twelve of the fourteen terminated employees were over the age of forty, contradicting the Defendant's assertion of a balanced age demographic among its workforce.

In evaluating the motions, the Court applied the standard for summary judgment as outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, emphasizing that a genuine dispute over material facts must exist for the case to proceed to trial. The Court determined that the Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, leading to the denial of her motion. Furthermore, the WVHRA prohibits workplace discrimination related to various employment aspects, including compensation and hiring practices.

Discrimination under W. Va. Code § 5-11-9(c) refers to the exclusion from equal opportunities based on age, specifically for individuals aged forty and above. Claims of discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) follow the burden-shifting framework established by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly as set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) membership in a protected class, 2) an adverse employment decision by the employer, and 3) that the adverse decision would not have occurred "but for" the plaintiff's protected status. Evidence linking the employer's decision to the plaintiff's protected status can include examples of disparate treatment or the elimination of legitimate reasons for the decision. Under the "substantially younger" rule from O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., a plaintiff over forty may also establish the third prong by showing replacement by a significantly younger individual or more favorable treatment of a younger employee engaged in similar conduct. The 'but for' test for discriminatory motive is a preliminary inquiry that allows for an inference of discrimination. Once a prima facie case is established, the employer must provide a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse decision, which does not need to be strong or convincing. The plaintiff may then challenge this reason as a pretext for discrimination. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has addressed age discrimination in the context of economically-driven reductions in force, indicating that discrimination is presumed when older employees are discharged while younger employees are retained.

In reduction-in-force cases, the termination of qualified older employees is not inherently suspicious unless they are replaced by younger employees. The focus is not on the reasons for discharge but on whether age was a factor in the selection process. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (SCAWV) outlines a formula for establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination: 1) the claimant is over 40; 2) a negative action (termination) occurred; 3) the claimant was qualified; and 4) younger employees were treated more favorably. The SCAWV emphasized that its standards do not narrow the analysis compared to federal courts. In age discrimination cases, summary judgment may be granted if no significant factual disputes exist, allowing the case to be resolved without trial.

Similar analytical frameworks apply to claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA), utilizing the McDonnell Douglas standard. For FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate engagement in a protected activity, an adverse action by the employer, and a causal connection between the two. If established, the employer can provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the action, after which the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove this reason is pretextual. Additionally, retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy is recognized in West Virginia as an exception to at-will employment, as established in Harless v. First National Bank, where discharges motivated by contravening public policy may render the employer liable.

A cause of action for retaliatory discharge in West Virginia cannot proceed without an alleged violation of a substantial public policy, as established in Harless. Determining whether such a public policy exists is a legal question for the court. Established principles from the state’s constitution, legislative measures, regulations, and judicial rulings can aid in this determination, but typically, Harless claims rely on legislative articulations of public policy. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has affirmed that the public policy cited must be substantial. Federal courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have refrained from recognizing new theories of substantial public policy without explicit direction from West Virginia's Supreme Court. However, one federal court has identified the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as providing a substantial public policy that could support a retaliatory discharge claim under West Virginia law, noting that the FMLA does not preempt state law claims. Furthermore, the FMLA offers specific guidance that allows for liability without being overly vague, enabling plaintiffs to invoke it as a public policy basis for retaliatory discharge claims.

In analyzing the case at hand, the court found sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's claims for age discrimination, retaliation under the FMLA, and retaliatory discharge based on public policy, warranting the denial of the defendant's summary judgment motion. The plaintiff met the initial requirements of the McDonnell Douglas test for age discrimination, being over forty and facing adverse employment action due to termination. However, the defendant challenges the assertion that the plaintiff's age was the reason for her termination, acknowledging the inherent difficulty in proving discrimination due to its subjective nature. The court indicated that the motion for summary judgment should only be granted concerning the plaintiff's claim for disability discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights Act.

Direct evidence is not required to establish a case of discrimination; rather, circumstantial evidence must link the employer's decision to the plaintiff's membership in a protected class, suggesting that the decision was based on unlawful discrimination. The Court has determined that the Plaintiff has met the necessary criteria for a prima facie case of age discrimination, as outlined in McDonnell Douglas. Key factors include the need for the plaintiff to demonstrate qualification for her role and that younger employees were treated more favorably. The Defendant has not contested the Plaintiff's qualifications, noting her performance evaluations met expectations. 

The Court found that younger employees were retained or transferred while the Plaintiff was terminated. Testimony from the Plaintiff's supervisor indicated that the only direct report terminated was the Plaintiff, while others were reassigned. The Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff was both overqualified and not a good fit for alternative positions, though these claims lack supporting evidence. 

Concerns arose regarding the lack of witness depositions from key decision-makers involved in the termination process, but the Court concluded that it would still reach the same decision regardless. The decision-maker, John Delawder, admitted to not reviewing the Plaintiff's performance evaluations or considering her salary when deciding her termination, and he also lacked the expertise to assess her professional competency. Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s supervisor was not consulted about the termination decision. Delawder explained that the Plaintiff was likely overlooked for transfer opportunities due to concerns about her potential dissatisfaction. Overall, the Court found that the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of age discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA), and the Defendant must now provide a non-discriminatory justification for her dismissal.

The court's analysis centers on the Plaintiff's termination, which the Defendant claims was part of a reduction in force following the sale of 3,000 wells. The Defendant's rationale is deemed facially nondiscriminatory, prompting the Plaintiff to rebut this claim and demonstrate that the reason is a pretext for discrimination. The Plaintiff had a long tenure of nearly thirty years, with significant employment prior to the Defendant's acquisition of the wells in 2007, which were intended for resale within five years. Despite this, the Defendant argued a lack of need for the Plaintiff's skills post-sale.

The Plaintiff's direct supervisor was not consulted regarding potential alternative positions for the Plaintiff, while younger employees were retained and reassigned. Additionally, shortly after the Plaintiff's termination, the Defendant hired a new employee, Sabrina Benedum, for a role that the Plaintiff previously held, raising questions about whether this hiring was a direct replacement. The court notes that the absence of clear evidence on this matter leaves it as a disputed fact for a jury.

In addressing the Plaintiff's claims of FMLA retaliation, it is established that the Plaintiff's job title and responsibilities were altered while she was on leave, leading to a prima facie case of retaliation. The court finds there is a genuine dispute regarding whether these changes constituted a loss of an equivalent position. However, the Plaintiff's claim of discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) based on disability does not withstand scrutiny for summary judgment.

The Plaintiff asserts a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) in response to the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. However, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence supporting her claim, as she does not reference any relevant depositions, documents, or other materials that could substantiate her assertion. Consequently, the Court grants the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding the disability discrimination claim.

Conversely, the Court denies the Defendant’s motion concerning the Plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim, which is based on an alleged violation of public policy. The Plaintiff argues that violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) constitute a substantial public policy under West Virginia law. The Court agrees, referencing a persuasive ruling from a related case that supports the notion that the FMLA provides clear guidance for reasonable expectations of employer conduct, thus allowing the retaliatory discharge claim to proceed.

In conclusion, the Court grants the Defendant's motion in part, dismissing the disability discrimination claim, while allowing the remaining counts, including age discrimination and retaliatory discharge, to advance to trial. Additionally, both parties are prohibited from submitting any pretrial filings that are past their deadlines, except for Rule 26(a)(3) disclosures, which must be submitted by August 1, 2017. Noncompliance with these orders may lead to further sanctions.

The Clerk of Court is instructed to send copies of the Order to all counsel involved. The Court did not consider the Plaintiff's statistical arguments due to their incompleteness, specifically lacking data on the age distribution of employees terminated from the Defendant's Bridgeport office. The critical analysis hinges on comparing the percentage of terminated employees over forty with the overall percentage of employees over forty in the selection pool. A historical Fourth Circuit case establishes a prima facie case for age discrimination in reduction-in-force scenarios based on four criteria regarding performance and selection processes. In response to the Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's position was eliminated due to her job duties and performance level. While the Defendant briefly mentions performance scores, Mr. Delawder's testimony indicates he did not consider these evaluations in the termination decision. Notably, the Plaintiff had a higher score than a younger employee who was retained, and the Defendant continued hiring post-termination. Despite the Defendant lacking sufficient evidence to support its motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff's counsel is warned that her argument was minimally supported, making it difficult for the Court to deny the motion for summary judgment based solely on the provided materials. Nonetheless, the Court reviewed the entire record to reach its conclusion.