Alabama State Conference of the NAACP v. Alabama

Citation: 264 F. Supp. 3d 1280Docket: CASE NO. 2:16-CV-731-WKW

Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama; August 31, 2017; Federal District Court

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Alabama utilizes at-large elections for its appellate judges, allowing all eligible voters to cast ballots for every seat, which differs from geographically limited voting in legislative elections. Despite African-Americans constituting approximately 26% of Alabama's population, they have seldom attained election to the 19 appellate court positions, with only two African-American candidates ever winning at-large elections, both following gubernatorial appointments. Plaintiffs, consisting of the Alabama State Conference of the NAACP and four African-American voters, argue that this election system dilutes the black vote and violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301, which prohibits election practices that result in racial discrimination. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief to abolish the at-large election system and implement single-member districts.

The State of Alabama and Secretary of State John Merrill have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court affirms jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 due to the VRA basis for the action, with no disputes over personal jurisdiction or venue. To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must present sufficient factual content that establishes a plausible claim for relief. The court applies the standard from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, emphasizing that well-pleaded factual allegations should be assumed true to assess their plausibility for entitlement to relief.

Section 2 of the VRA prohibits election practices that cause racial discrimination, including the dilution of minority votes, as highlighted in relevant case law such as Thornburg v. Gingles and Allen v. State Board of Elections.

The right to vote can be compromised by both the dilution of voting power and outright denial of the ability to vote. Judicial elections are included under Section 2, as established in *Chisom v. Roemer*. For a vote dilution claim under Section 2, plaintiffs representing a protected class must demonstrate three factors: (1) the minority group must be large and compact enough to form a majority in a single-member district, (2) the group must be politically cohesive, and (3) the majority must vote as a bloc sufficient to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates. In the Eleventh Circuit, the first factor also requires showing a viable remedy for the alleged dilution. The Gingles factors are necessary but not solely sufficient for establishing a claim. The evaluation of these claims is fact-intensive, with no single statistic serving as a definitive measure. Courts must assess whether minority group members enjoy the same political participation opportunities as other voters, as articulated in prior case law. The defendants challenge the plaintiffs' Section 2 claim on three bases: (1) failure to propose a proper remedy, (2) the argument that the state's interest in its electoral system outweighs potential vote dilution, and (3) claims of lack of standing and sovereign immunity. The court will address each of these arguments systematically.

Plaintiffs must articulate a facially plausible remedy in their Section 2 vote dilution claims, as established by Eleventh Circuit precedent, specifically the Nipper case. While Plaintiffs argue that they only need to satisfy the Gingles factors at this stage, the Eleventh Circuit has made it clear that remedy considerations are integral to the prima facie case. The burden for Plaintiffs is not heavy; they need to demonstrate facial plausibility for their suggested remedy, which can withstand a motion to dismiss.

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have not pleaded a plausible remedy, arguing that subdistricting is precluded by established case law in the Eleventh Circuit. They reference four cases that criticize subdistricting, all of which primarily concern trial judge elections. However, no Eleventh Circuit decision has expressly rejected subdistricting as a remedy for vote dilution in appellate judicial elections, indicating a potential distinction. The Nipper case, while rejecting subdistricting for trial judges, implies that appellate elections may warrant different considerations. The court noted the importance of diversity in representation on appellate courts, suggesting that the reasoning against subdistricting in trial court elections may not directly apply to appellate contexts, thus advising against premature dismissal of the case based on the remedy at this stage.

The court expressed concern that subdistricting would dilute minority influence in trial court elections more significantly than in collegial bodies, as trial judges operate independently, unlike judges in appellate courts who decide cases collectively. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion acknowledges that appellate courts may be more similar to legislative bodies in this context, suggesting a need for in-depth analysis when considering remedies under Section 2. Both Nipper and SCLC were decided post-bench trial, underscoring the necessity of a detailed factual record for Section 2 determinations, and cautioning against straightforward application of their rulings to the current case. White, which challenged Alabama’s appellate judicial elections, did not explore the possibility of subdistricting as a remedy; thus, its conclusions should not be seen as a blanket prohibition against such remedies. The court emphasized that subdistricting does not necessarily change the size of elected bodies, which White explicitly rejected, and therefore, does not preclude its consideration. Davis similarly addressed the at-large elections of trial judges and upheld precedents from Nipper and SCLC, but did not significantly alter the landscape for Section 2 challenges. Overall, the court indicates that existing precedents provide guidance but do not definitively resolve the viability of subdistricting as a remedy in appellate judicial elections.

The court did not determine the applicability of certain rules to appellate judicial elections, acknowledging that while cases like Nipper raise important considerations, they do not conclusively support the idea that subdistricting cannot serve as a remedy in Section 2 vote dilution claims. Defendants argue that subdistricting could harm state interests, such as judicial independence and voter representation, but they have not demonstrated that these concerns override the potential benefits of subdistricting in addressing vote dilution. The court emphasized that assessing a plaintiff's proposed remedy involves a comprehensive evaluation of the circumstances, balancing state interests against the plaintiff’s claims. Defendants' assertion that the state’s interest in its electoral system outweighs any alleged vote dilution is flawed, as it could undermine the validity of Section 2 claims altogether. Historically, claims of vote dilution have been recognized under Section 2, and the judicial election context is similarly subject to scrutiny. The court concluded that dismissing the plaintiffs' case without allowing for discovery would require an unsupported legal precedent, which does not exist, thus upholding the plaintiffs' ability to propose subdistricting as a potential remedy.

The totality-of-the-circumstances analysis requires courts to consider all relevant evidence when evaluating vote dilution cases under Section 2, as established in Johnson. These cases are fact-intensive, necessitating a comprehensive review beyond the Gingles threshold factors. However, in the current litigation stage, no discovery has been conducted, limiting the evidentiary record available to the court. Defendants' request for a ruling based on the totality of circumstances is untenable, as their cited cases relied on extensive evidentiary records developed after lengthy trials.

Regarding standing, the court affirms that Plaintiffs possess standing to sue. Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs must identify specific judicial candidates they could not elect due to race is rejected; standing is established if a plaintiff shows any impairment of their voting rights. Plaintiffs have alleged residency in specific counties and membership in a protected class whose electoral strength is diluted, fulfilling the requirements to proceed past the motion to dismiss.

Additionally, the Alabama NAACP's organizational standing is upheld as the individual members have standing to sue, the interests align with the organization's purpose, and the case does not necessitate individual member participation. Defendants' claim that the Complaint is silent on these matters is unfounded, as the individual plaintiffs' standing confirms the first prong of organizational standing is met.

The Complaint details the Alabama NAACP's mission to promote political, educational, social, and economic equality for African Americans, eliminate racial discrimination in the electoral process, and enforce voting rights laws. The court finds these interests align with the organization's purpose, thus fulfilling the second prong of the relevant legal test. It notes that the lawsuit seeks prospective or injunctive relief, negating the need for individual member participation, as established in United Food, Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.

Regarding the State of Alabama's claim of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, which generally protects nonconsenting states from being sued in federal court, the court acknowledges that Congress can abrogate this immunity through legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. The analysis focuses on whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) effectively abrogates Alabama's sovereign immunity. Courts have recognized Section 2 as a legitimate exercise of congressional power to uphold the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The court concludes that it is challenging to interpret Section 2 without acknowledging its intent to abrogate state immunity, as the statute prohibits states from imposing voting qualifications that deny or abridge the right to vote based on race or color. Thus, the right for private litigants to sue under Section 2 has been clearly established by Congress since 1965.

The excerpt examines the implications of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) on state sovereign immunity, asserting that private litigants have the right to sue states despite potential limitations. The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Mixon v. State of Ohio established that Section 2 abrogates state sovereign immunity, which is central to the ability of private individuals to seek remedies against state actions. The court notes that the VRA is primarily an exercise of Congress's authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, which complicates its standing in terms of sovereign immunity, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Sixth Circuit drew on Supreme Court precedents—specifically, City of Rome v. United States and City of Boerne v. Flores—to argue that Congress can indeed abrogate state sovereign immunity via the Fifteenth Amendment, as the enforcement provisions are similar to those in the Fourteenth Amendment. This interpretation underscores that Congress has the authority to regulate state voting practices under the VRA, thus allowing private plaintiffs to sue states without the defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Consequently, the court ruled against the State of Alabama's motion to dismiss the case, mandating a response to the complaint by September 14, 2017. The statute itself prohibits any voting practices that deny or abridge the right to vote based on race or color, establishing a framework for evaluating potential violations under Section 2.

Members of a protected class being elected to office is a relevant factor in evaluating election practices, but it does not guarantee proportional representation. The White court briefly mentioned single-member subdistricting as a potential remedy for vote dilution without substantial analysis. It highlighted the need for different considerations in judicial elections compared to legislative elections, suggesting that the specific context of appellate judicial elections warrants further examination. The district court concluded that an existing settlement agreement was a better remedy for African-American voters than single-member districts. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted potential arguments for replacing at-large elections with single-member districts but ultimately rejected the settlement for reasons unrelated to those arguments. The court expressed skepticism about applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to at-large judicial elections, reflecting a disagreement with an earlier en banc decision in Nipper. This skepticism is seen as weak since it contradicts established law. The Davis decision did not address the specific issue of subdistricting in appellate judicial elections, and there is no precedent supporting the notion that subdistricting cannot remedy vote dilution in such cases. The Attorney General has the authority to sue on behalf of voters under the Voting Rights Act, and state defendants can be sued for prospective relief under Ex Parte Young.

The suit against the State of Alabama will continue regardless of any preliminary discussions, focusing on whether private litigants can sue under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity challenges the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, which is addressed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6). In a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1), the court assesses whether the plaintiff has adequately established a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, using standards akin to those for Rule 12(b)(6).

A notable argument raised by the defendants suggests that the VRA could function solely with enforcement actions by the Attorney General, as explicitly authorized in the VRA’s enforcement provision, 52 U.S.C. 10308(d). However, this position is countered by the plaintiffs, who assert that the VRA provides individual citizens the standing necessary to enforce compliance with voting laws, reflecting Congress's intent to address inadequacies in existing remedies for protecting voting rights. The Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections underscores this by emphasizing that the VRA was designed to enable all citizens to ensure state compliance with anti-discrimination provisions, rather than relying solely on the Attorney General.

Additionally, while the Supreme Court has tightened standards for inferring private rights of action since Allen, the current action seeks injunctive relief rather than damages, which distinguishes it from cases discussed in Ziglar v. Abbasi. The court finds no binding authority against a right of action under Section 2 of the VRA and maintains that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity through the Fourteenth Amendment, although the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on whether this applies under the Fifteenth Amendment.