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Youth Justice Coalition v. City of Los Angeles
Citation: 264 F. Supp. 3d 1057Docket: CV 16-7932-VAP (RAOx)
Court: District Court, C.D. California; September 7, 2017; Federal District Court
Plaintiff Peter Arellano filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on October 31, 2016, seeking to halt the enforcement of a civil gang injunction against him by the City of Los Angeles. The City opposed this motion on December 16, 2016, and Arellano replied on January 9, 2017. Following a stay of proceedings for mediation, which was lifted on July 3, 2017, the Court considered the motion and granted it. The injunction in question, known as the "Echo Park Injunction," was obtained by the City against several alleged gang entities, including the Echo Park Locos, through a public nuisance action in California Superior Court. This injunction was issued by default on September 24, 2013, without the gang entities being represented. Arellano attempted to intervene in the state court case on October 2, 2013, arguing that the injunction would infringe on his civil liberties and that he had a vested interest in the matter. He also filed an ex parte application to stay enforcement of the injunction, claiming it violated his Constitutional rights under the First, Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and that it would be enforced without due process, as he was not named as a party to the case. Both his application and motion to intervene were denied by the superior court, which deemed them untimely and noted that the City had provided adequate notice. The court concluded that the existing permanent injunction judgment includes provisions for exceptions and exemptions, ensuring that no individual is currently in a position where their ability to protect their interests is compromised. On November 22, 2013, the Plaintiff filed for reconsideration, citing the Ninth Circuit's ruling in *Vasquez v. Rackauckas*, which asserted that the Due Process Clause mandates pre-deprivation rights to defend against permanent gang injunctions. The superior court denied the reconsideration motion on July 30, 2014, referencing its earlier decision that deemed *Vasquez* inapplicable, as it only restricted county prosecutors from enforcing an injunction against specific individuals denied due process, rather than invalidating the injunction itself. The court emphasized that the *Vasquez* case was concerned with aggressive enforcement in Orange County, contrasting it with expectations for lawful and fair implementation by Los Angeles authorities. It was noted that the *Vasquez* injunction lacked provisions for law-abiding citizens, and that federal rulings do not bind California courts. Regarding evidentiary matters, both parties requested judicial notice of certain facts related to their briefings, which the court approved. The court determined that in assessing irreparable harm for a preliminary injunction, it could consider non-admissible evidence due to the urgency of the situation, as established in relevant case law. Consequently, the court overruled specific objections raised by the Plaintiff concerning evidence related to his prior arrests while noting that it did not rely on any objectionable evidence for its ruling on the current motion. The Echo Park Injunction specifically targets active members of certain gangs, including Big Top Locos, Crazys, Diamond Street Locos, Echo Park Locos, Frogtown Rifa, and Head Hunters, as detailed in the case documents. Factors for determining active gang membership include: 1) admission of membership; 2) gang-related tattoos; 3) arrests while with active gang members; and 4) reliable informant testimony. Additional considerations like clothing and association with known gang members are relevant but insufficient alone. Part-time gang members can qualify as active if they meet the criteria. The LAPD must secure prior approval from a deputy city attorney before serving a gang injunction. Documented evidence is required to prove a suspected gang member's active status and significant participation in the last five years. The injunction includes a 'Do Not Associate' provision, prohibiting enjoined individuals from public gatherings with known gang members, with exceptions for school, religious, and lawful work settings. Other prohibitions include possession of firearms, trespassing, graffiti-related activities, and illegal substance use. The restrictions last for five years post-service, with the possibility of re-initiation after re-service. The Echo Park Injunction provides enjoined individuals with two processes to contest its enforcement: a judicial 'opt-out' provision and an administrative removal process. Through the opt-out provision, individuals served with the injunction can petition the superior court to not enforce it against them, provided they meet specific criteria. These criteria include an oath affirming they have not been associated with any enjoined gang, have no felony or misdemeanor arrests, have not acquired new gang-related tattoos, and have been consistently employed or in school for the past year. If granted removal, individuals can still be re-served if they later claim gang membership or violate the outlined conditions. Additionally, an administrative process allows enjoined individuals to apply for removal by submitting a petition to the City Attorney's Office. This petition is reviewed by a senior supervising attorney, who considers evidence from a gang expert and the prosecuting deputy city attorney before making a decision. In June 2015, the LAPD served the Plaintiff with the Echo Park Injunction, and since then, he has faced multiple arrests and threats for alleged violations. A preliminary injunction is considered a significant legal remedy that is not automatically granted. A plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, potential irreparable harm without relief, a favorable balance of equities, and that the injunction serves the public interest. The Ninth Circuit's sliding scale approach allows for the issuance of an injunction even if serious legal questions exist, provided other criteria are met. This approach helps maintain the status quo when complex legal issues require more thorough examination. The City asserts that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from raising due process claims based on the Vasquez case because he previously raised identical issues in a failed attempt to intervene in superior court. However, the court finds this argument unconvincing, emphasizing that the City must prove each element of collateral estoppel. For this doctrine to apply, the same legal or factual issue must have been adjudicated in a prior case. The court highlights that an issue is considered "actually litigated" if it was properly presented and determined in the earlier proceeding. In the current motion, Plaintiff argues that the City violated his due process rights by enforcing the Echo Park Injunction without giving him a proper opportunity to contest his gang member designation, referencing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Vasquez. The City contends that the superior court addressed and decided these due process issues in three specific orders, but overlooks critical differences between Plaintiff's previous arguments and his current stance. Previously, Plaintiff claimed that the City’s procedures were theoretically insufficient to provide due process; the superior court found these procedures adequate. Now, Plaintiff seeks to prevent the City from enforcing the injunction against him, arguing that the procedures, as implemented, do not afford sufficient due process. His claims focus on the application of the injunction rather than its initial issuance, indicating a shift in the basis of his due process argument. The City’s reliance on earlier pleadings illustrates that Plaintiff's previous due process challenges were directed at the issuance itself, not its individual application. Facial upholding of a law does not bar future as-applied challenges, as established in various case law including In re Cao and Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC. The Ninth Circuit in AFGE v. Martin confirmed that an as-applied challenge was permissible despite a facial ruling. Even if prior arguments by the Plaintiff implied an as-applied challenge to City procedures, the superior court's lack of decisive findings permits the Plaintiff to raise the challenge now, as seen in Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola. The superior court mischaracterized the Plaintiff's claim as time-barred and did not issue findings preventing an as-applied equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court will analyze the merits of the Plaintiff's motion based on the likelihood of success, focusing on procedural due process claims, which are assessed in two steps: first, identifying whether the State has interfered with a liberty or property interest; second, evaluating the constitutionality of the procedures accompanying that deprivation. This analysis follows the factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, which consider the affected private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation through current procedures, and the Government's interests, including administrative burdens. The Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the interference claim is drawn from parallels with the Vasquez case, where a public nuisance action led to default judgments against individuals who had attempted to defend themselves, highlighting concerns around unrepresented juveniles. The current situation appears to mirror these circumstances, suggesting similar interference with liberty interests. Four months after the county served an injunction, four individuals filed the Vasquez action in district court, claiming the county's dismiss-and-serve strategy violated their due process rights. They did not contest the injunction's terms but questioned their opportunity to contest its application. The plaintiffs represented two classes: 1) adults and minors who were named defendants in the state case and voluntarily dismissed by the county; and 2) minors without appointed guardians who were similarly dismissed. After an eleven-day bench trial, the district court found that the county deprived the plaintiffs of constitutionally protected liberty or property interests without adequate procedural protections. The court enjoined the county from enforcing the superior court order against the class members but did not dictate the nature of any state court hearing. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, emphasizing the procedural history of the state case. It concluded that the injunction interfered with liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause, highlighting the strong private interests at stake and the significant risk of erroneous deprivation from the procedures used. The court noted that the county failed to demonstrate any substantial burden in providing a procedure for the plaintiffs to contest gang membership determinations before the injunction was imposed. The Echo Park Injunction shares substantial similarities with the Vasquez injunction, as both prohibit associations among suspected gang members, without exceptions for family members or First Amendment-protected activities. The court acknowledged that the Echo Park Injunction also implicates liberty interests, including rights to free movement, association, and speech, and that the City’s actions interfere with these interests. The plaintiff argued that, following Vasquez, he is likely to succeed in claiming that the City violated due process by enforcing the Echo Park Injunction without pre-deprivation process. The City sought to distinguish its case from Vasquez based on procedural differences, but the court found this distinction immaterial, noting that the County's previous actions effectively obstructed the plaintiffs' use of constitutionally sufficient state court procedures. The City initially refused to identify individuals suspected of gang membership in a public nuisance complaint and subsequently opposed their attempts to intervene against an injunction order. The court notes that the ability to file an opposed motion to intervene does not sufficiently guarantee due process. The City argues that there are factual differences between this case and the Vasquez decision to claim that the plaintiff was afforded adequate process. Both the Echo Park Injunction and the Vasquez injunction restrict associations among suspected gang members, significantly impacting private interests. The City points out distinctions, including: 1) the Echo Park Injunction specifies factors for determining gang membership and allows for an adjudication process; 2) it provides exceptions for school, work, and religious activities, alongside a hardship provision; 3) it does not impose increased bail for violations, unlike Orange County; and 4) it expires after five years, unlike the Vasquez injunction. However, these distinctions are deemed insignificant. While the Echo Park Injunction outlines criteria for active gang membership, it lacks a clear procedure for making such determinations. The City would likely oppose any attempt by the plaintiff to utilize the 'opt-out' provision due to his prior arrests. Despite its exceptions, the injunction still severely limits the plaintiff's ability to engage in various public and social activities. Additionally, while the City does not seek increased bail amounts, the plaintiff claims he lacks financial resources for bail in the event of a violation. The five-year expiration does not mitigate the serious impact on the plaintiff's rights, as re-service is possible immediately after the term ends. Thus, the Echo Park Injunction, like the one in Vasquez, imposes significant restrictions on the plaintiff’s liberty and involves substantial interests. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that identifying active gang members carries a high risk of erroneous deprivation due to the informal nature of gangs and the subjective criteria involved, noting that the assessment process in Orange County was unilateral and one-sided. The City unilaterally determines active gang membership without input from individuals labeled as members, mirroring the issues noted in Vasquez regarding fairness in secret determinations. The City contends that its procedures are less prone to error than those in Vasquez due to established criteria approved by the superior court, a detailed removal process, and service of a removal petition with each injunction. However, expert testimonies from Professors Malcolm Klein and Diego Vigil, who were also cited in Vasquez, argue that the dynamic nature of gangs complicates membership determinations. They assert that the criteria used by the City—such as close association and joint criminal activity—are subjective and unreliable, as non-gang members may maintain relationships with gang members or falsely claim membership due to peer pressure. The City has not provided substantial evidence to counter these claims. Additionally, the removal procedures do not adequately address the infringement of the Plaintiff's liberty interests. The Plaintiff's arrest record poses a barrier to opting out, and his familial and social connections to suspected gang members further limit his eligibility for removal. Even if the Plaintiff manages to opt out, the risk of re-service exists if he associates with individuals deemed gang members post-removal. Furthermore, the Plaintiff is ineligible for a presumption of removal due to a prior arrest for a gang injunction violation, which shifts the burden of proof onto him; he must demonstrate he is not a gang member following any arrest, even if unrelated to gang activity. A critical defect exists in the requirement that individuals must prove they are not active gang participants, shifting the burden from the State, which typically must demonstrate active participation by clear and convincing evidence. The City’s administrative process fails to present evidence against enjoined individuals, leading to a scenario where those with disqualifying arrest records must prove their non-membership without any supporting evidence, rendering the process inadequate. The administrative method lacks necessary pre-deprivation procedures, as exemplified by the rejection of Orange County’s process for not providing a basis for gang membership conclusions. In evaluating the government's interest, the focus should be on whether the City has a significant interest in not providing extra procedural protections rather than its interest in combating gang violence. The City argues that pre-deprivation hearings would delay gang injunction enforcement, yet such administrative burdens are expected in governance. Furthermore, other California jurisdictions provide some pre-deprivation processes, undermining the City’s claims of substantial administrative burden. In conclusion, the Plaintiff has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success regarding the inadequacy of the City’s procedures. Additionally, the Plaintiff must prove a likelihood of irreparable harm without preliminary relief. The City’s argument against this is countered by the Court's stance that delay alone shouldn't preclude relief, especially in the face of ongoing, worsening injuries, indicating that the Plaintiff's past inaction does not negate the need for immediate relief. Plaintiff's reluctance to engage in the "opt-out" procedure or the City's administrative removal process is justified due to concerns about not qualifying because of his arrest record and family ties. The determination of irreparable harm is closely linked to the likelihood of Plaintiff's success on the merits, which he has demonstrated by showing violations of his due process and First Amendment rights. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, even temporarily, is recognized as irreparable harm. Regarding the balance of equities and public interest, Plaintiff has shown that these factors favor him. The effectiveness of gang injunctions is disputed; however, the City’s interest in swiftly enforcing the injunction does not outweigh Plaintiff’s right to due process. The City failed to counter Plaintiff's claims that its procedures pose a significant risk of wrongful deprivation of rights. Thus, the potential risks of gang violence do not justify continuing the use of constitutionally inadequate processes. The public’s interest in ensuring due process and accurately identifying high-risk offenders supersedes the City’s interest in enforcing the injunction. The injunction must specifically address the harm alleged, and an overbroad injunction would constitute an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff seeks an order preventing the City from enforcing the Echo Park Injunction against him. Given the likelihood of establishing that due process was not afforded and that such enforcement would lead to irreparable harm, along with the favorable balance of equities and public interest, the Court finds Plaintiff's requested remedy to be reasonable. A plaintiff must typically post security for a preliminary injunction to cover potential costs and damages to any party wrongfully enjoined, as stated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). This requirement serves to discourage frivolous injunction requests and ensures defendants can be compensated if an injunction is later deemed inappropriate. Courts have discretion regarding the amount of security, and in this case, neither party has addressed the need for a bond. However, the plaintiff's request is not based on tenuous legal grounds, and the City, as an institutional defendant, has less need for compensation assurance. The City did not contest the bond requirement during the hearing. The plaintiff expressed financial difficulties, indicating an inability to pay a bond, which aligns with precedents allowing for waiver of the bond requirement when equity favors the plaintiff or when the plaintiffs are financially disadvantaged. Consequently, the court grants the plaintiff a preliminary injunction against the City of Los Angeles from enforcing the Echo Park Injunction, while allowing the City to seek further orders in state court regarding the plaintiff's compliance. Additionally, the plaintiff's opportunity to intervene in prior court proceedings does not guarantee adequate due process, as argued by the City. The City argued that an objection to an "opt-out" application does not deny an applicant due process, emphasizing that applicants can still persuade the superior court of their non-gang membership, thus receiving adequate process. However, this position contradicts the injunction's language, which allows the City to object to opt-out applications based on behaviors like claimed gang membership or association with known gang members. Such behaviors also enable the City to re-serve the gang injunction on previously removed individuals, indicating a zero tolerance policy. The effectiveness of the "opt-out" provision is questioned due to ongoing restrictions for those removed. The parties dispute whether post-deprivation remedies are adequate, but the court finds it unnecessary to resolve this issue at this stage. Additionally, a plaintiff's declaration states he and his family were arrested in January 2016 for allegedly leaving a neighbor's yard, while the City claims the arrest was for public intoxication at a gang-related event. Notably, the plaintiff has not been charged with any crime related to that arrest. Although he could have sought removal during the six months after the City served the injunction, prior arrests for serious offenses likely disqualified him from removal consideration during that time.