Carter v. Sheriff of Cook County

Citation: 262 F. Supp. 3d 713Docket: Case No. 15 C 1407

Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; February 14, 2017; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Darryl Carter, a Cook County Sheriff's Officer since 1988, has filed a lawsuit against Sheriff Thomas J. Dart and Cook County, alleging discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Carter claims he was consistently denied promotions due to his race, despite being promoted to correctional sergeant in 2007 after raising concerns about racial discrimination in promotions. He unsuccessfully applied for higher positions multiple times, being informed of his ineligibility based on exam scores and job requirements. In addition to promotion issues, Carter reported harassment, including being disciplined for minor infractions not applied to non-African-American colleagues and being subjected to derogatory materials targeting him. Notably, in April 2012, he found a flier with offensive content and his address posted in his workplace, allegedly linked to two of his subordinates as retaliation for disciplinary actions he had taken. Although Superintendent Reyes addressed the issue by reminding staff of harassment policies and suggesting Carter pursue an official complaint, Carter delayed filing a formal complaint until December 2013. The Sheriff has moved for summary judgment on all claims, which has been partially granted and partially denied by the court.

On June 11, 2012, Daniel Moreci, an assistant executive director at the Sheriff's Office, filed a complaint regarding incidents involving Carter, who had declined three transfer opportunities between April and May 2012, citing personal conflicts and a belief that transfers would not resolve issues. A subsequent incident occurred on August 24, 2013, when Carter discovered derogatory images of himself displayed in Division 1's security and sergeant's offices, with insulting comments. Although Carter reported this incident, the response taken is unclear. In November 2013, Carter submitted memos to several officials, including OPR Director Johnathan Myslinski, alleging racial discrimination and a hostile work environment, claiming that disciplinary citations issued to African-American sergeants were being disregarded by superiors, while those for white and Hispanic employees were dismissed more frequently. This led to another complaint register filed by Carter, prompting a second OPR investigation. After transferring to Division 6 on July 29, 2014, Carter found additional inappropriate pictures of Black males displayed in the sergeant’s office, accompanied by derogatory comments. Lieutenant Joe Hurd investigated and determined that the employee responsible, Cordell Lyons, did not act maliciously, and Hurd warned staff against such behavior. Hurd also suggested that Carter's interactions with subordinates might have contributed to the situation. The OPR's investigation into the April 2012 incident concluded in April 2014, finding insufficient evidence against those Carter believed were responsible.

The OPR concluded in December 2015 that Carter's November 2013 complaint about racial disparities in disciplinary citations lacked sufficient evidence. Despite this, Carter continued to raise concerns through memos and filed a charge of discrimination on September 26, 2014, with the IDHR and EEOC, claiming he faced different employment conditions than non-Black employees, harassment, a hostile work environment, and retaliation for his complaints. He received a right-to-sue letter from the Department of Justice on November 19, 2014, and subsequently filed a lawsuit on February 13, 2015. 

Carter's complaint includes three counts: Count I alleges violations of Title VII for failure to promote, inadequate training, and a hostile work environment due to his race; Count II claims retaliation under Title VII; and Count III alleges a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the Sheriff's deficient complaint procedures.

Regarding Count I, the court noted that many of Carter's promotion claims are time-barred, as he must file a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged incident. Since his EEOC charge was filed on September 26, 2014, he cannot claim promotions denied before November 30, 2013. Although Carter argues that the 'continuing violations' doctrine should apply, which allows for considering timely all discriminatory actions related to a pattern of discrimination, the court clarified that failures to promote are discrete acts not subject to this doctrine. Consequently, Carter's claims for promotions denied in 2010, 2011, and 2012 cannot be considered, leaving only the denials from 2013 and 2015. However, even if those were timely, Carter's failure-to-promote claim is insufficient on the merits.

Carter opposes the defendants' summary judgment motion using the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework, which necessitates establishing a prima facie case of discrimination through four criteria: membership in a protected class, qualifications for the position, rejection for the position, and evidence that someone outside the protected class was promoted despite not being better qualified. Although Carter articulates the framework, he fails to meet its requirements. He claims the defendants did not prove their nondiscriminatory reasons for denying his promotion, questioning the involvement of John Konrad, who authored the denial memo. However, this argument is flawed as it addresses only the 2010 application denial, which is time-barred, and neglects the necessity of first establishing a prima facie case.

Carter provides no affirmative evidence of his qualifications for the chief or lieutenant positions and overlooks his failure to pass the lieutenant exam and the untimeliness of his applications. He does not identify any non-African-American candidates who were promoted and were no better qualified than he was. While he mentions three individuals—Sammie Young, Juan Diaz, and Prentiss Jones—who were promoted from sergeant to superintendent, these individuals do not serve as valid comparators, as two are African-American and all were promoted to a higher position that differs significantly from those he sought.

Carter argues that a "meritorious promotion" policy allows for promotions without examinations, citing Lieutenant Hurd's testimony that such promotions "can be done." However, Hurd later clarified that this is not a formal policy within the department. Thus, while Carter's assertion about merit promotions has some basis in Hurd's comments, it lacks strong evidentiary support.

Carter's failure to promote claim is dismissed because he did not demonstrate a prima facie case of racial discrimination. He did not prove his qualifications for promotion to lieutenant or chief, nor did he show that similarly-situated non-African-American employees were promoted despite being less qualified. The Seventh Circuit's standard requires evidence that a reasonable juror could conclude that Carter would have been promoted if he were of a different ethnicity; he presented no such evidence. The Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment is granted on this claim.

Carter's failure-to-train claim is also dismissed as untimely, given that the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred in 2010 and falls outside the applicable time frame without the benefit of the continuing violation doctrine. Additionally, he did not include this claim in his EEOC charge, which is a prerequisite for pursuing Title VII claims. His complaints relate to promotion and harassment, not training inadequacies, making them unrelated. Furthermore, Carter failed to provide evidence supporting the essential elements of a failure-to-train claim, which include being part of a protected group, eligibility for training, and denial of training under discriminatory circumstances. Thus, the Sheriff is entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well.

Lastly, regarding the hostile work environment claim, Carter must establish that he experienced unwelcome harassment based on his race that was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment, along with a basis for employer liability. The Sheriff acknowledges the incidents described as unwelcome and sufficiently severe to alter Carter's work conditions.

The Sheriff asserts that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the harassment experienced by Carter was racially motivated or that the Sheriff is liable as an employer. To establish employer liability for a hostile work environment, it must be shown that the employer's supervisors were directly involved in the harassment or that the employer was negligent in addressing it. Carter does not claim supervisor involvement, thus he needs to prove negligence by showing a failure to take prompt and appropriate corrective action.

Evidence exists indicating that the Sheriff may have been negligent, particularly regarding an April 2012 incident where 180 to 200 offensive pictures were displayed for a week. A jury could reasonably infer that Carter's superiors were aware of the display and did not act until Carter complained. Similarly, in a July 2014 incident, Lieutenant Hurd, Carter's supervisor, failed to provide the necessary discrimination/harassment form as required by policy, believing the incident was not malicious despite contrary witness testimony. This suggests potential negligence by Hurd in failing to adequately address Carter’s prior harassment issues, supporting a finding of employer liability.

On the issue of racial motivation, the Sheriff claims there is no evidence linking the harassment to racial animus, noting that the individuals suspected of posting the pictures were also African-American and that Carter did not initially characterize the harassment as racially motivated. However, when viewing the evidence favorably for Carter, a jury could reasonably conclude that the harassment was racially based. The absence of explicit racial references in the pictures does not negate this possibility, as other evidence may support an inference of discrimination. Superintendent Martinez acknowledged during his deposition that the July 2014 pictures could be seen as discriminatory, indicating that there may be a legitimate basis for Carter's claims of racial harassment.

Carter's claim of racial harassment is supported by the legal understanding that an individual can discriminate against a member of their own racial group. The record indicates ambiguity regarding the races of individuals involved in the harassment incidents, particularly regarding events in August 2013 and July 2014. Despite granting the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment on Carter’s failure-to-promote and failure-to-train claims, the court denies the motion concerning the hostile work environment claim, citing sufficient evidence of negligence in addressing the harassment and its racial motivation.

In Count II, Carter alleges retaliation for his complaints about discrimination and harassment. To establish a Title VII retaliation claim, he must demonstrate a protected activity, an adverse action by the employer, and a causal link between them. The Sheriff contests that Carter was not qualified for the promotions he was denied, implying no adverse employment action occurred. However, Carter argues that the hostile work environment he experienced also constitutes an adverse action. The Sheriff claims a lack of evidence linking Carter's complaints to the harassment, noting the timeline of complaints and harassment incidents; however, Carter’s informal complaints also qualify as protected activity, which the Sheriff overlooks. Ultimately, the evidence does not establish a causal relationship between Carter's complaints and the subsequent harassment incidents, particularly due to the significant gap between his earlier complaints and the harassment episodes.

Carter's retaliation claim fails because he cannot demonstrate a causal link between the harassment he experienced and the memos he circulated in 2014, as the memos were distributed after the harassment incidents. While there is some temporal proximity between an April 2014 memo and a July 2014 incident, Carter fails to provide evidence that the harassment intensified following his complaints, which is necessary to support a causation inference. 

Regarding the Monell claim against the Sheriff, Carter must show he suffered a deprivation of a federal right due to an express policy, widespread custom, or deliberate act by a decision-maker. He argues that the Sheriff's lack of procedures for handling employee complaints indicates a pervasive issue. However, he provides no evidence beyond his own experience to substantiate this claim. Although he references inspections by the U.S. Department of Justice, the testimony of Commander Thomas does not link these inspections to the handling of employee complaints, suggesting they were routine and unrelated. Therefore, the Sheriff is granted summary judgment on Carter's Monell claim.

In conclusion, summary judgment is granted to the Sheriff for Count I (failure-to-promote and failure-to-train theories), Count II (retaliation claim), and Count III (Monell claim), while the motion is denied only concerning Carter's hostile workplace claim.

Claims under Title VII can only be brought against an individual's employer, which in Carter's case is the Sheriff, not the County. Therefore, the County cannot be independently liable for the alleged Title VII violations or Monell violations, as these fall under the Sheriff’s purview in managing the Cook County Jail. The County's involvement as a defendant is solely for indemnification purposes, as it must cover any judgments against the Sheriff. Carter's application for the chief position was denied as untimely, and he is uncertain about Reyes's involvement in the incident, although Reyes is mentioned in Carter's internal complaint. Importantly, Carter denies any involvement of his supervisors in his harassment claims. In response to the Sheriff's statements of material fact, Carter provides unsupported denials, leading to the acceptance of the Sheriff’s claims as admitted. The distinction between administrative transfers and other types is not clarified, and it is acknowledged that the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) did not contact Carter regarding his complaints. Although the exact date of Carter's 2013 lieutenant application is unclear, it is recognized as timely. No evidence indicates that any action was taken following the August 2013 incident, which may suggest negligence by Carter's supervisors. The County contends it should be dismissed from the case due to a lack of liability findings against the Sheriff; however, because Carter's hostile work environment claim is still valid, the Sheriff may still be liable, necessitating the County's continued presence in the litigation as an indemnitor.