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Fox v. Pittsburg State University
Citation: 258 F. Supp. 3d 1243Docket: Case No. 14-CV-2606-JAR
Court: District Court, D. Kansas; June 26, 2017; Federal District Court
Martha Fox successfully sued Pittsburg State University for hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII and Title IX, with a jury awarding her $100,000 and $130,000 for the respective claims. The case stemmed from incidents of sexual harassment between April 2012 and March 2014, allegedly perpetrated by her supervisors and not adequately addressed by management despite her complaints. Fox claimed emotional distress damages and contended that proper investigations were not conducted, including a lack of witness interviews. The Court is now addressing Fox's Motion to Alter Judgment regarding attorneys' fees and costs, granting it in part and denying it in part, while also denying the Defendant's Motion to Strike her reply brief. The background includes extensive discovery, with the Defendant producing 5,000 documents and filing multiple motions, including a motion for summary judgment, which was partially granted, dismissing retaliation claims but upholding the harassment claims. The case involved significant pre-trial motions, including the exclusion of an expert and multiple motions in limine. Following a seven-day trial, the jury's verdict was reached despite the Defendant's renewed motions for judgment and a new trial after the verdict. The post-trial briefing totaled 199 pages, excluding exhibits. The Court responded with a nearly 70-page order addressing numerous arguments presented. The Defendant employed excessive briefing tactics, submitting two lengthy responses to the Plaintiff's single motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Specifically, the Defendant’s response to the attorneys’ fees motion was 29 pages long, accompanied by 73 pages of exhibits, while the response to the costs request was 19 pages with 7 pages of exhibits. Additionally, the Defendant filed a motion to strike the Plaintiff's reply concerning both motions, arguing it contained new arguments and excessive exhibits. However, the Court determined that the reply was not a "pleading" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(f) and found no new arguments that warranted striking the reply. The Defendant's motion to strike was consequently denied. Regarding attorneys’ fees, the Plaintiff requested $278,808 for legal services from counsel and a legal assistant, asserting entitlement as the "prevailing party" under Title VII and Title IX. The Defendant contested both the Plaintiff's prevailing status and the fee's reasonableness. The Plaintiff demonstrated compliance with the District of Kansas Local Rule 54.2(a) concerning the duty to confer prior to filing for statutory fees, providing evidence of a consultation held on November 7, 2016. The Court acknowledged the Defendant’s abusive and unprofessional litigation tactics, which contributed to the high attorneys’ fees awarded to the Plaintiff, exceeding typical amounts for similar claims. Plaintiff and Defendant exchanged documentation regarding attorneys' fees but were unable to reach an agreement. On November 8, 2016, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it would not stipulate to any fees, confirming that the parties attempted to confer. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not the prevailing party for attorney fee purposes since two of her retaliation claims were dismissed. However, prevailing status is defined by success on any significant issue in litigation. According to the Tenth Circuit, a party is not disqualified as a prevailing party simply because it lost some claims; unsuccessful claims distinct from successful ones can be excluded when calculating reasonable fees. Conversely, if related claims are interwoven, success on a significant claim warrants full fee recovery, regardless of failures on others. Despite the dismissal of her retaliation claims, Plaintiff is deemed the prevailing party due to the interrelated nature of her successful sexual harassment claims, which shared a common factual basis with the retaliation claims. The Court emphasizes that fee determination should focus on the overall relief achieved—a $230,000 verdict—rather than a claim-by-claim analysis. Plaintiff's counsel requested fees for approximately 798.8 hours of work, totaling $278,808. The Court will calculate reasonable fees based on the 'lodestar figure,' which is the product of hours reasonably spent multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The burden lies with the party seeking fees to demonstrate the hours worked and the reasonableness of rates. Upon establishing the lodestar, the Court will consider any necessary adjustments based on the specifics of the case and its outcome. Courts evaluate adjustments to attorney fees using the twelve factors established in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. These factors include considerations such as the time and labor required, the complexity of the legal questions, the skill needed, and the customary fee in the community. While courts may consider these factors, the primary focus should be on the lodestar calculation, which is based on the reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. In this case, the Plaintiff's counsel logged a total of 798.8 hours, predominantly attributed to Mr. O’Laughlin (593.5 hours) and Ms. Maloney (142.3 hours), with Ms. Henshaw contributing 68 hours primarily for trial preparation. The Defendant raised objections to these hours, categorizing them into ten areas, including issues of vagueness, clerical work, duplicative efforts, and excessive hours. Specifically, the Defendant claimed some time entries were vague, but upon review, the court found that many of these objections lacked merit. For example, entries related to the preparation of exhibit lists and review of client emails were deemed sufficiently clear, even if specific details could not be disclosed due to attorney-client privilege. The court also addressed objections concerning time spent on deposition preparation and legal research, finding these entries to be adequately justified. Mr. O’Laughlin's and Ms. Maloney's billing statements contain no impermissibly vague entries, as they pertain directly to issues raised in the Defendant’s motion in limine. The court overrules objections claiming vagueness. Purely clerical or secretarial tasks, such as filing, organizing, and making copies, should not be billed at paralegal or attorney rates. The court identifies that factual investigation tasks, like interviewing witnesses and assisting with document production, are appropriate for paralegal work. Arguments labeling Mr. O’Laughlin and Ms. Maloney's work as clerical are dismissed, as tasks like summarizing deposition testimony and reviewing court orders require legal expertise. Conversely, Ms. Henshaw's hours for clerical tasks, such as collecting and labeling exhibits, are deemed non-compensable, resulting in a deduction of 30.5 hours. Additionally, the court highlights the need to avoid duplicative billing, referencing Tenth Circuit guidance on assessing the reasonableness of hours billed, particularly regarding the number of attorneys present for hearings. Ms. Maloney's contributions to the case are divided into two main categories: reviewing and editing documents, and serving as co-counsel during the trial. In the reviewing and editing category, she dedicated various hours to editing essential documents, including 0.4 hours on the Complaint, 2 hours on discovery, 3 hours on the proposed pretrial order, and substantial time on responses to motions, with the total amounting to 28.2 hours. The Court determined these hours were not duplicative of Mr. O’Laughlin’s work and overruled the Defendant's objection regarding these billing hours. In the trial category, Ms. Maloney participated actively, preparing for cross-examinations, direct examinations, and closing arguments. Mr. O’Laughlin's hours related to some witness preparations were deemed duplicative of Ms. Maloney’s efforts, leading to a reduction of 1.9 hours from his billing. Despite billing for her entire time at trial, even when Mr. O’Laughlin was presenting, the Court found this appropriate, noting that both attorneys actively participated in various trial functions. The presence of multiple attorneys was justified given the number of witnesses involved. Regarding background research, the Court ruled that time spent on familiarization with the law is generally unreasonable for billing unless tied to specific case motions. It identified 11 hours in 2015 and 2.2 hours in 2016 from Mr. O’Laughlin, plus 0.9 hours from Ms. Maloney in 2014 as background research that must be deducted from their billable hours. The Court emphasized that the time spent on legal education by inexperienced counsel should not be charged to the losing party. Defendant contends that counsel's travel time should not be compensated at full hourly rates due to its unproductive nature, proposing a 50 percent recovery instead. The Court agrees, noting reductions in travel time claimed by Ms. Maloney and Mr. O’Laughlin. The Court finds these reductions appropriate and overrules the objection. Regarding block billing, the Court defines it as combining multiple tasks into a single time entry without specifying hours for each task. Although the Tenth Circuit discourages this practice, the Court finds no improper block billing in the entries challenged by the Defendant, thus overruling the objection. On the motion to compel, the Defendant argues against the recoverability of attorneys' fees for time spent on a discovery matter where the Plaintiff was compelled to produce documents. The Court cites Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc. to support that hours spent on non-frivolous motions are recoverable. Since the Plaintiff's actions were justified and the motions to compel were partially granted, the Court will not deduct these hours. The Court also addresses the Defendant's objections regarding hours related to previously dismissed retaliation claims, finding that Plaintiff's counsel made reasonable reductions in their billing. The Court overrules this objection as well. Lastly, the Court dismisses the Defendant's three objections to trial preparation and attendance hours, asserting that the preparation of materials and the time spent waiting for the verdict are valid billable activities. Thus, all objections raised by the Defendant are overruled. Mr. O’Laughlin and Ms. Maloney's billing for trial preparation, including work product for a lengthy list of witnesses, is justified and reasonable. The Defendant's objections regarding the preparation for cross-examination of witnesses who did not testify are dismissed since these witnesses were on the witness list and were subpoenaed, necessitating preparation in anticipation of their potential testimony. The objection to both attorneys attending trial daily, despite only one questioning at a time, is also overruled, as both contributed productively by taking notes and assisting with exhibits. The Court agrees that it is appropriate for both to be compensated for their time in the courtroom. Additionally, the Court finds the charges for waiting for the jury verdict acceptable, acknowledging that such waiting is part of the trial process, and notes that the attorneys reduced their waiting time billed. Regarding the Defendant's claims of excessive hours, the Court finds no merit in the objections concerning specific tasks: the 17.4 hours for responding to summary judgment was reasonable due to the volume of statements; the 13.2 hours for discovery responses were justified given the complexity and quantity of material; and the 5.5 hours for drafting opening and closing statements were necessary and not formulaic as claimed. Finally, the Court reiterates that to establish the reasonableness of hours worked, detailed and contemporaneous time records must be provided by the Plaintiff's counsel. A district court may reduce the number of hours billed by an attorney if their time records are deemed 'sloppy and imprecise' and fail to adequately document large blocks of time. The court must assess whether the attorney exercised appropriate billing judgment, which involves distinguishing between hours actually worked and those reasonably billed. Hours that would not be charged to a client cannot be billed to an opposing party. The court evaluates the reasonableness of hours expended based on case complexity, strategies employed, responses to the opposing party's actions, and potential duplication of efforts. While the court is not required to justify each disallowed hour, it can make general reductions to reach a reasonable total. In this case, the court found the time records submitted by Ms. Maloney and Mr. O’Laughlin to be meticulous and contemporaneous, dismissing the need for reductions on that basis. Both attorneys demonstrated billing judgment by eliminating nearly 10% of their claimed hours for tasks such as administrative emails and reviewing court orders. The court deemed the hours spent reasonable, considering the aggressive litigation tactics of the defendant, which necessitated comprehensive responses from the plaintiff's counsel. The defendant's extensive motions and filings in a relatively straightforward employment discrimination case contributed to the increased hours, affirming the reasonableness of the plaintiff's counsel's billing. Plaintiff's counsel's time spent on various tasks was deemed reasonable by the Court. Specifically, 58.5 hours were dedicated to preparing for and conducting eight depositions, including that of expert Dr. Anderson. An additional 43.2 hours were spent preparing a Daubert motion and reply brief, which is atypical for employment discrimination cases. The response to a summary judgment motion took 71.1 hours, addressing approximately 40 pages of arguments and 152 statements of fact. For trial preparation, including pre-trial briefings and objections, counsel spent around 200 hours. Ms. Henshaw's hours, after court-imposed reductions, were also considered reasonable in the lead-up to and during the trial. Regarding hourly rates, the Court found that Plaintiff's requested rates were too high and needed adjustment. Mr. O’Laughlin's proposed rates ranged from $350 to $375 from 2014 to 2017, while Ms. Maloney's rates ranged from $360 to $400 during the same period. Ms. Henshaw's rate was proposed at $65. The Court emphasized that reasonable rates should reflect those prevailing in the local community for similar legal services, taking into account the skill and experience of the lawyers involved. The Court noted that it could not solely rely on the parties' market evidence and should consider all relevant factors, including the quality of representation. The Court addressed the relevant market for determining these rates, rejecting the Defendant's assertion that it should be limited to Kansas City, Kansas. The litigation occurred in Kansas City, Kansas, but the proximity to Missouri and the practice habits of local attorneys, who often operate across state lines, justified considering rates from both Kansas and Missouri. Therefore, evidence of attorney rates from both Kansas City locations was deemed pertinent. Plaintiffs have provided substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of their counsels' hourly rates, claiming these rates align with the prevailing market for attorneys of similar skill and experience in the Kansas City area. Mr. O’Laughlin, with approximately fifteen years of experience and a focus on employment litigation, has achieved multiple favorable verdicts, including an $850,000 award for a race discrimination case. His hourly rates have varied over the years, starting from $225-$250 while associated with civil defense firms, to $350 as Of Counsel, and reaching $375 as a partner in his own firm established in 2016. He asserts that his current rates are reasonable for an attorney with his background. Ms. Maloney, who has around seventeen years of experience, has similarly concentrated on employment litigation. Her background includes clerking for a federal judge and working at a law firm where she handled numerous employment discrimination cases. She has also secured favorable verdicts, including a $362,000 award, and has maintained a charging range of $280 to $500 per hour since 2008, increasing to $400 initially and then to $500 in 2016. She claims her rates are justifiable based on her experience and the market. Additionally, the Plaintiff provides Ms. Henshaw’s rate of $65 per hour, but does not offer details regarding her qualifications or experience. The Defendant has submitted an affidavit suggesting that paralegal rates in Kansas typically range from $35 to $95, indicating that $65 is a reasonable rate based on this context. The Plaintiff also includes an affidavit from Richard Ralston regarding customary rates. Richard Ralston, a member of the Missouri bar and former United States Magistrate Judge (1976-1988), has been in private practice since 1988 and founded Ralston Law Group LLC in 2009, where he serves as a trial attorney, mediator, and arbitrator. He is familiar with the trial and appellate practices of attorneys Mr. O’Laughlin and Ms. Maloney, whom he has known for five and seven years, respectively. Ralston attests that the hourly rates requested by O’Laughlin and Maloney are fair and comparable to rates charged by other attorneys in the Kansas City market. He cites several employment cases that support this claim, including: 1. **Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (2012)**: Hourly rates approved ranged from $600 to $325. 2. **Koehler v. Freightquote.com, Inc. (2016)**: An hourly rate of $400 was approved for an attorney with nine years of experience. 3. **Barbosa v. National Beef Packing Co. (2015)**: Approved rates included $425, $325, and $250 for attorneys with varying experience. Although these cases involve FLSA matters, they are cited as persuasive precedents for establishing reasonable rates in employment litigation contexts. In contrast, the defendant offers an affidavit from Ms. Casement, an Assistant Attorney General, claiming a rate of $130 per hour. However, the court finds her affidavit unpersuasive due to several factors: - Casement lacks evidence of relevant experience in employment litigation. - Her practice location in Topeka suggests different market rates compared to Kansas City. - She does not demonstrate comparable credentials or experience to O’Laughlin and Maloney, including any trial experience or successful jury verdicts. Ms. Casement, an attorney for the State of Kansas, does not represent a private market rate as her hourly charge of $130 lacks relevance to Ms. Maloney and Mr. O’Laughlin's rates. The defendant submitted affidavits from David Cooper and Todd Thompson to counter Mr. Ralston's affidavit. Cooper, a partner in a Topeka law firm, charges $225 per hour for 2014-2015 and $250 for 2016, noting his lower rates are due to being retained by liability insurers. Thompson, a senior attorney in Lawrence, states the prevailing rates in northeast Kansas range from $190 to $270 for attorneys with 15 to 25 years of experience. However, the Court finds their affidavits unpersuasive for several reasons: both attorneys do not specialize in employment litigation, their rates reflect civil litigation generally, and Cooper’s lower rates are attributed to insurer retention, contrasting with the contingency basis of Maloney and O’Laughlin. Consequently, the Court concludes that these affidavits do not represent the prevailing rates for similarly skilled attorneys in Kansas City in 2017. Additionally, a 2012 Kansas Bar Association survey indicates that the median hourly rate in Kansas City, Kansas is $200, with a mean of $228, while Kansas City, Missouri has a mean and median rate of $250. Overall, the rates in Kansas City are consistent with or exceed those across the state, where the employment field averages median rates of $250 and means of $264. Rates for attorneys in the Kansas City metropolitan area, particularly in employment law, are found to be higher than the average across all legal fields. While the Defendant referenced older cases approving hourly rates between $155 and $165 for Title VII litigation, the Court determined these figures are outdated and do not reflect the specialization of the Plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Maloney and Mr. O’Laughlin. The Court addressed the impact of the contingency fee arrangement on the attorneys' fee award, noting that the Supreme Court has established that such agreements do not cap recoverable fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court conducted a lodestar calculation, taking into account the financial risk taken by the Plaintiff's counsel due to delayed payment and the contingency nature of their agreement. It was noted that enhancing the lodestar for contingency would lead to double counting since the risk is already considered in the higher hourly rate. The quality of representation by the Plaintiff's counsel was highlighted, with the Court acknowledging their professionalism amidst discourteous behavior from opposing counsel. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the rates requested by Ms. Maloney and Mr. O’Laughlin are reasonable when compared to similarly skilled attorneys in the Kansas City area, given their specialization in employment litigation. The requested rates for legal services are deemed customary and reasonable within the Kansas City market, as attested by Mr. Ralston, a former judge and current attorney/mediator. The rates align with those previously approved by the court in similar employment litigation cases. The hourly rates reflect the contingency nature of the work, which carries inherent risks, and the Defendant has not provided sufficient evidence to challenge their reasonableness. The lodestar calculation totals $271,114.00, with no adjustments deemed necessary by the Court, as the factors considered were either included in the lodestar or neutral. Key factors analyzed include: - **Time and Labor Required**: Addressed in the lodestar calculation. - **Novelty and Difficulty**: The case is straightforward under Title VII and Title IX, with a unique legal issue that is reflected in the hourly rates. - **Skills Required**: Plaintiffs’ attorneys are experienced in employment discrimination, which is accounted for in the rates. - **Preclusion of Other Employment**: Not applicable, as conceded by the Plaintiff. - **Customary Fee**: Addressed in the lodestar calculation. - **Fee Structure**: Addressed in the lodestar calculation. - **Time Limitations**: Not applicable, as conceded by the Plaintiff. - **Amount Involved and Results**: Addressed in the lodestar calculation. - **Experience, Reputation, and Ability**: Counsel's expertise is reflected in the reasonable rates. - **Undesirability of the Case**: The Court found this factor neutral despite the limitations on damages, as the Plaintiff secured a $230,000 jury verdict. - **Professional Relationship**: No evidence of a pre-existing relationship, and its relevance to the fee calculation is unclear, making this factor neutral. - **Awards in Similar Cases**: No recent cases cited granting attorney fees in Title VII or Title IX trials were found. Overall, the Court concludes that the hourly rates are reasonable and the lodestar calculation is appropriate without the need for adjustments. The Court reviewed several cases to establish appropriate hourly rates for attorneys' fees, finding the rates and hours requested by Plaintiff's counsel reasonable despite being on the higher end of typical awards. The Court then addressed the Plaintiff's request for $7,853.72 in costs, distinguishing between taxable and nontaxable expenses. It noted that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(A), nontaxable expense claims must be included in motions for attorneys’ fees. The Court upheld the inclusion of expert witness fees, specifically awarding $1,500 for the retainer for Dr. Anderson, as this expense was deemed reasonable and necessary for the Daubert motion. Taxable costs were not addressed at this time, but the Plaintiff was advised to file a bill of costs if successful on appeal. The Court concluded by affirming the total award of $272,614.00 in attorneys' fees and expenses, granting part of the Plaintiff's motion and denying the Defendant's motion to strike the reply. A Second Amended Judgment will be filed to reflect this award. Fifty pages of briefing were submitted on a motion without response or reply, which included a new jurisdictional argument in post-trial motions. Additionally, thirty pages were submitted on another motion without response. Ms. Maloney's role at trial was downplayed, despite her conducting witness examinations and closing arguments. Mr. O’Laughlin's experience was incorrectly assessed, attributing only five years to him due to his Kansas bar admission in 2010, ignoring his nearly 14 years of Missouri bar admission. Plaintiff's counsel requested reimbursement for travel time in his Mercedes, questioning the time taken for what appeared to be routine presentations. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure emphasize the need for just, speedy, and inexpensive case resolution. Time records were revised to account for time spent in 2017 for attorney fees and expenses, along with various attachments including emails and declarations responding to arguments about costs and customary rates in other cases. Relevant legal precedents were cited including 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) for Title VII fees, and 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) for Title IX fees, alongside case law establishing that the overall relief won by the prevailing party is the primary focus for determining attorney's fees. The document references several cases illustrating that related claims can influence fee awards, even if some claims are unsuccessful. Defendant argues for a 50% reduction in the fee award, citing Plaintiff's loss of 50% of her claims. This argument is deemed flawed as the retaliation claims were closely linked to the sexual harassment claims and were dismissed prior to the incurrence of most attorney fees. The Court noted that counsel had already adjusted their billing to exclude time spent on the retaliation claims, demonstrating reasonable billing practices. Specific reductions in time for drafting the Complaint and summary judgment were highlighted, indicating careful attention to billing accuracy. The Court emphasized that it is not required to reduce fees if it finds the attorney’s billing reasonable. Defendant's claim regarding the clerical nature of tasks performed by Ms. Maloney was rejected, as selecting exhibits for trial necessitated legal expertise. The Court distinguished this case from precedent where vague billing entries were disallowed, asserting that the entries related to analyzing depositions were sufficiently specific. Overall, the Court supports the adjustments made by counsel and finds the billing practices reasonable in light of the intertwined nature of the claims. The choice of who summarizes depositions is influenced by legal strategy, and the court will not intervene at this stage. The defendant employed a college student for summarization, likely as a cost-saving measure, but Mr. O’Laughlin and Ms. Maloney, with their substantial legal training, were able to efficiently summarize the deposition testimony, identifying critical passages for trial. The plaintiff submitted emails that required legal analysis, indicating they were tasks for an attorney, not merely clerical work, as they involved substantive legal issues and were handled directly by Ms. Casement. The court highlighted that motions for extensions and filings require attorney signatures. While Ms. Maloney and Mr. O’Laughlin billed for preparing exhibits, the court assumed Ms. Henshaw performed clerical tasks related to document management. Previous case law supports reducing hours billed due to attorney inexperience and overbilling. The defendant misinterpreted a precedent regarding travel time compensation, as the cited case allowed for reductions when alternative local counsel were available, which was not applicable here. The court found that the time billed for travel was reasonable, considering potential peak hour delays, and deemed a reduction from 5 to 2 hours appropriate. The court also noted that it would not reduce hours based on an unsuccessful motion if there was a reasonable basis for the arguments presented. Defendant challenges the reasonableness of the trial preparation timeline, contending that it is impractical for counsel to receive witness lists only the night before testimony, especially without prior depositions of many witnesses. The Court references several precedents supporting the notion that timely disclosure of witnesses is crucial for adequate preparation. Despite Defendant's objections to the depositions of Sandra Brown and Blake Cameron, which were labeled as “friendly” witnesses, the Court finds them necessary for addressing summary judgment issues and deems the time billed for these depositions reasonable. The Court emphasizes the reasonableness of hours billed based on the significant time it invested in crafting a lengthy order on post-trial motions, reinforcing its assessment of counsel's efforts. Additionally, it addresses the appropriateness of legal fees, citing Kansas Supreme Court Rule 1.5(a) which mandates that attorney fees must be reasonable. The Court argues against disparate billing rates for litigation occurring a short distance apart within the Kansas City metropolitan area, citing various cases that establish lower hourly rates in nearby jurisdictions. An hourly rate of $175 has been established for legal services in Topeka; however, this figure is deemed irrelevant as it does not reflect the Kansas City market, which commands higher rates. The court recognizes a consistent disparity where Topeka rates have lagged behind those in Kansas City and Wichita. It is clarified that assumptions equating Topeka attorney rates to those in Kansas City are unfounded. The court dismisses the defendant's claim that Mr. O’Laughlin’s relevant experience should only count from his Kansas admission in 2010, noting he has practiced law in Missouri since 2002. Additionally, the court emphasizes that Title VII and Title IX do not necessitate familiarity with Kansas-specific cases. The defendant's argument regarding Mr. Ralston's ability to testify about Kansas rates is rejected based on three factors: the relevant market includes the entire Kansas City metropolitan area, Mr. Ralston’s familiarity with both states' rates, and his assertion that the rates are reasonable for Kansas. Previous cases have established lower reasonable rates for legal assistants and paralegals, noting that rates from 2012 have likely increased over time. In various legal cases from the District of Kansas, courts have established standards for attorney fees based on experience and the nature of the case. For example, in *Bell v. Turner Recreation Commission*, a court approved a $250 hourly rate for an attorney with thirty years of experience in an employment discrimination case. Similarly, in *Moore v. Amsted Rail Co.*, an hourly rate of $295 was granted for a senior associate in a Family and Medical Leave Act case. These rates significantly exceed the $155-$165 range suggested by the Defendant. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff should provide a contingency fee agreement as part of the fee application, citing customary practices. However, the court noted that there is no legal requirement for such disclosure. The Plaintiff's counsel affirmed the existence of a written agreement, supported by affidavits, which the court accepted as evidence of a contingency arrangement. In discussing fee calculations, the court pointed out that the lodestar method is to be used, even if the attorney does not bill hourly, as established in cases like *Garcia v. Tyson Foods* and *City of Burlington v. Dague*. The Defendant incorrectly argued that contingency arrangements should not be considered, while the cited *Delaware Valley* case clarifies that the lodestar is presumed reasonable, with enhancements for risk of nonpayment applicable only in exceptional circumstances. Additionally, Judge Crabtree has approved rates of $600, $400, and $450 in Fair Labor Standards Act cases, reflecting a trend of higher fee approvals based on attorney expertise and case complexity. Hourly rates approved in various disability discrimination and employment-related cases in the District of Kansas show a range of fees for attorneys and paralegals. In Ross v. Rothstein, rates were set at $400 for senior attorneys, $315, $270, and $200 for other attorneys, with paralegals at $125. In Barbosa v. National Beef Packing Co., hourly rates approved were $325 to $425 for experienced attorneys, $180 for less experienced attorneys, and $75 for paralegals. Moore v. Amsted Rail Co. saw a senior associate’s rate approved at $295. In the case of Mr. Electric Corp. v. Khalil, a fifth-year associate's rate was set at $305, reflecting their progression during a lengthy litigation. Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. HV Props. of Kan. LLC indicated rates of $325 for partners, $200 for associates, and $125 for law clerks. Judge Lungstrum in Paradigm Alliance, Inc. v. Celeritas Technologies, LLC approved rates of $400 for highly experienced lawyers down to $90 for paralegals. In Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., rates included $300 for a trial lawyer with significant experience and $180 for less experienced associates. Ice Corp. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. featured rates of $300 for an equity shareholder with 28 years of experience and $185 for a 7-year associate. Lastly, in Bell v. Turner Recreation Commission, an attorney’s rate of $250 was approved for a 30-year veteran, and University of Kan. v. Sinks reflected rates pertinent to trademark infringement actions in the Kansas City market. Overall, the document highlights that rates vary based on experience, case complexity, and geographical location, with specific figures provided for various precedents. Attorney fees are established at rates ranging from $315 to $300 for experienced partners, $150 to $210 for associates based on experience, and $75 for legal assistants, referencing *Case v. Unified School District No. 233* and *Ramos v. Lamm*. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), courts may award reasonable attorney's fees, including expert fees, to the prevailing party, with the Commission and the United States liable for costs as a private individual would be. Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows for the inclusion of expert fees in attorney fee awards related to sections 1981 or 1981a. The defendant argued that Dr. Anderson's fee should be restricted to the $40 per day witness fee, potentially referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1821, which stipulates attendance fees for witnesses. However, expert witness compensation is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing compensation at a reasonable rate for time spent responding to discovery. The plaintiff urges the court to prioritize the substance of the fee request over its form, citing case law permitting consideration of both taxable and nontaxable costs despite appeals. The court, however, declines this approach, stating it does not align with local rules, assigning the Clerk the responsibility of considering taxable costs. The plaintiff is instructed to re-file taxable costs in accordance with D. Kan. Local Rule 54.1.