Levin v. City & County of San Francisco

Citation: 257 F. Supp. 3d 1092Docket: No. 3:14-cv-03352-CRB

Court: District Court, N.D. California; May 30, 2017; Federal District Court

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The Court denied a motion for relief from a previous judgment declaring an ordinance by San Francisco unconstitutional. Following the Court's ruling, the City amended the ordinance, which effectively mooted the ongoing appeal. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to determine whether the judgment should be vacated due to the City's voluntary actions. The Court must first assess if the case became moot because of this voluntary amendment or due to external circumstances. If mootness stems from the City's actions, the Court has discretion to decide if vacatur is warranted based on equitable considerations. Conversely, if mootness is due to uncontrollable factors, vacatur is generally required. The discussion highlights that when a legislative body amends a law, leading to mootness of a case against the executive, courts typically treat this situation as if the executive is responding to unforeseen circumstances rather than controlling the outcome. Thus, the Court does not presume the legislative action was intended to benefit the executive's position.

Vacating judgments has become a recognized practice in various cases where legislative action has mooted ongoing litigation. Notable examples include: Helliker v. State (463 F.3d 878-79), where a statute preempted a challenged law; Log Cabin Republicans v. United States (658 F.3d 1162, 1165, 1168), where Congress repealed "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"; Khodara Environmental Inc. v. Beckman (237 F.3d 186, 192, 195), following Congress's amendment of landfill construction statutes; and Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige (211 F.3d 112, 121), where state legislation changed toxic waste disposal laws.

The principle that only the legislature can enact legislation is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, which is fundamental to the federal and state governmental structures. The U.S. Constitution establishes three independent branches of government: legislative (Congress), executive (President), and judicial (Supreme Court). While the Constitution does not mandate a specific structure for state governments, it assumes they will have separate legislative and executive branches.

The Domestic Violence Clause of the Constitution requires the federal government to protect states against internal unrest at the request of state legislatures or executives. This necessitates the President's determination of the rightful legislative and executive bodies of a state. Consequently, each state has its own legislature and governor.

In San Francisco, the City argues that separation-of-powers principles are practically applied, as its government structure allocates distinct powers. The Board of Supervisors, elected by the public, can only act through ordinances and is restricted from interfering in administrative matters, while the mayor serves as the chief executive responsible for law enforcement. This system differs from San Jose, where a city council exercises all city powers and appoints a city manager for daily operations.

Portland's city council possesses broad powers, excluding the delegation of legislative functions, as outlined in the Portland (Oregon) Charter, § 2-104. Both San Jose and Portland have mayors who are council members, contrasting with San Francisco's structure. The City’s argument would necessitate courts to analyze town charters individually to assess the separation of powers of lesser public bodies, a complex task. Additionally, there is skepticism about whether such entities should be treated similarly to the federal government and states regarding legal standing. Supreme Court rulings indicate that while the federal government and states enjoy sovereign immunity, lesser public bodies, like the City, do not and are considered "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Consequently, the City does not qualify for the same privileges as sovereigns. Case law from at least two circuits supports the notion that a city’s repeal of a law does not automatically result in the vacatur of judgments against it, irrespective of its governmental structure. The court finds that the City’s voluntary actions have rendered the case moot and will now consider the equities involved. Balancing the finality of judgments against the right to relitigate disputes, the court notes the City’s adherence to injunctions and its push for appellate review. Furthermore, the City argues that both the original and revised ordinances are effectively nullified by state law, making the court's constitutional review unnecessary. Despite these points, the court remains unpersuaded that they sufficiently warrant vacatur.

The City attempted to amend an ordinance to address its constitutional issues and successfully paused an appeal for this purpose. After being denied review of the amended ordinance, the City requested vacatur on mootness grounds that it had created. The Court declined to grant this request, emphasizing that rewarding such actions would undermine judicial integrity and the value of precedents. The Court highlighted that judgments should not be vacated lightly, particularly since the plaintiffs might be entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, given that they are likely prevailing parties despite the case's mootness on appeal. Vacating the judgment could jeopardize the plaintiffs' claims for these fees. While the issue of fees will be resolved at a later date, the Court is cautious about inadvertently hindering the plaintiffs' chances of recovery. The Court denied the City’s motion for relief from judgment without oral argument and vacated the scheduled hearing. The Court confirmed its authority to consider the City’s request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) but noted that both legislative and executive actions are presumptively legitimate. However, the Ninth Circuit has previously declined to vacate judgments when mootness resulted from the actions of the parties involved.

The document references a prior unpublished opinion concerning a lesser public body (99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency) to illustrate that the legitimacy of government actions does not automatically justify vacatur when such actions lead to mootness. It emphasizes the importance of recognizing the distinct branches of government, as highlighted by San Francisco’s charter, which mandates that legislative acts be conducted by ordinance, indicating that the Board may perform non-legislative acts.

Section 1983, which provides a private right of action against individuals acting under state law to deprive others of federal rights, does not extend to federal entities or officials, as established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. Tribal governments are acknowledged as sovereigns with presumptive immunity, and while they are not required to follow separation-of-powers principles, some tribes, like the Yavapai-Apache Nation, have adopted such structures.

The document critiques the City’s references to In re City of El Paso and Nat'l Black Police Ass’n v. Dist. of Columbia, noting that these cases do not apply to the current context, particularly since the former acknowledged that the City contributed to mootness. The unique status of the District of Columbia is highlighted, noting its legislative authority under Congress and its treatment under Section 1983. The document argues that the City's concerns about collateral consequences are exaggerated, and it distinguishes the case of Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, where vacatur was ordered due to Congress repealing the challenged statute, rather than a direct judicial determination of equitable considerations. Finally, it clarifies that the Plaintiffs are not failing to be prevailing parties due to a lack of direct benefits from the judgment.