Court: District Court, W.D. New York; June 12, 2017; Federal District Court
Defendant Matthew Nix filed a motion on June 5, 2017, requesting that Juror No. 3, known as 'J.B.', be charged criminally without immunity, the appointment of a special prosecutor for the investigation of Juror No. 3, and the recusal of the prosecution from his criminal case. Nix also raised issues related to discovery and conflicts during a hearing. In a subsequent affirmation on June 9, he requested a stay of the evidentiary hearing regarding Juror No. 3’s alleged bias if his motion was denied. The Court denied Nix’s motion and his request for a stay.
Nix and co-defendant Earl McCoy were convicted on March 17, 2017, of multiple counts related to home invasions, and after the verdict, they filed post-trial motions arguing Juror No. 3's ineligibility due to undisclosed felony convictions, which they claimed required a new trial due to juror bias. The Court planned an evidentiary hearing on this issue. During a prior hearing, Juror No. 3 was warned about the potential for criminal prosecution for perjury due to failure to disclose felony convictions. Nix argued that he was harmed by Juror No. 3's actions, claiming victim status under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) and alleging a conflict of interest for the Government in prosecuting him while potentially immunizing the juror. Nix also sought the prosecution's recusal based on alleged misconduct.
Nix raises issues regarding discovery and an alleged conflict, to which the Government responded on June 8, 2017. The Government's key arguments include: (1) Nix has not proven that Juror No. 3 committed a federal offense, and asserts he is not a victim under the CVRA; (2) there is no legal basis for appointing a special prosecutor or disqualifying the U.S. Attorney’s Office; (3) Nix's motion merely reiterates previously rejected arguments; (4) discovery requests have already been addressed; and (5) there is no justification for substituting Nix's counsel. Nix's counsel filed an affirmation on June 9, 2017, requesting a stay of any evidentiary hearing pending a Court of Appeals review if the motion is denied. The Court denied Nix’s motion and the stay request.
Under the CVRA, victims have specific rights, including timely notice of proceedings, the right to be heard, the right to confer with the Government's attorney, and the right to restitution and fair treatment. The Court must ensure these rights are upheld. However, the Court determined that Nix does not qualify as a 'crime victim' under the CVRA, defined as someone directly harmed by a federal offense. Nix claims victim status based on alleged harm from Juror No. 3’s non-disclosure of prior felonies, asserting it deprived him of a fair trial and led to emotional distress and continued incarceration. Nevertheless, the Court found that Nix's claims do not meet the criteria for victim status as outlined in the CVRA.
Nix is not considered a crime victim under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) because the alleged harm, specifically his conviction, was not a direct result of any perjury by Juror No. 3. Nix failed to demonstrate that disclosing Juror No. 3's felony convictions would have changed the outcome of his trial, as the jury's unanimous decision indicated that the other jurors concurred with Juror No. 3's findings. Additionally, Nix's claims of emotional distress and continued incarceration are not directly linked to Juror No. 3's alleged non-disclosure, as Nix's incarceration stems from other legal issues, including a pending drug prosecution.
Even if Nix were deemed a crime victim, the relief he seeks—prosecution of Juror No. 3 and denial of immunity—is not permissible under the CVRA, which restricts victims' rights and explicitly preserves prosecutorial discretion. The CVRA does not grant victims the authority to dictate prosecution decisions or government strategies. Courts have consistently interpreted the CVRA to ensure that victims have a voice but not a veto over prosecutorial actions, emphasizing that decisions regarding the prosecution and resource allocation are within the government's discretion and not subject to CVRA review.
Nix's demand to prosecute Juror No. 3 and deny immunity is rejected, as it conflicts with the prosecutorial discretion outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). The court emphasizes that government prosecutors cannot be directed by a crime victim. Although Nix requested a stay of court proceedings to petition the Second Circuit for a writ of mandamus, this request is denied. The statute does not automatically grant a stay when relief is denied, and the court evaluates Nix's request against four traditional stay factors: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, potential injury to other parties, and public interest. The court underscores that the first two factors are critical, noting Nix's failure to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success or irreparable harm. Additionally, Nix did not provide arguments addressing these factors, failing to meet his burden to justify a stay. Consequently, the court finds that no stay is warranted, as Nix's claims under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) are without merit, given he is not recognized as a victim and the statute does not allow interference with prosecutorial discretion.
The Court determined that Nix would not incur irreparable injury without a stay and will conduct an evidentiary hearing on Juror No. 3’s qualifications, requested by Defendants due to post-verdict motions for a new trial. The Court believes this hearing will be more informative if Juror No. 3 testifies with immunity rather than invoking Fifth Amendment rights. Delaying these post-verdict proceedings is deemed unnecessary and contrary to public interest, leading to a denial of Nix’s stay request.
Nix also sought the appointment of a special prosecutor for the investigation of Juror No. 3, citing a conflict of interest due to the prosecutors’ roles. However, he failed to provide legal authority for this request. Under 28 U.S.C. § 515(a), the authority to appoint a special prosecutor lies solely with the Attorney General, making Nix's request inappropriate. Courts typically reject such requests, affirming that prosecutorial discretion is an executive power not subject to judicial compulsion.
Additionally, Nix’s request for the Government to recuse itself from his prosecution was based on allegations that the prosecution aims solely for conviction rather than justice. His claims, which have been previously dismissed, lack legal support and do not clarify whether he seeks disqualification of the entire U.S. Attorney's office or specific prosecutors. Consequently, this motion was also deemed frivolous.
The Second Circuit employs a cautious stance regarding disqualification motions against prosecutors, emphasizing that litigation should proceed unless there is a significant risk of trial tainting, with remedies for unethical conduct being addressed through bar disciplinary systems. In *United States v. Cain*, disqualification of an AUSA was denied despite claims of violations in unrelated cases, as there was no evidence that such violations could affect the current trial. Nix's arguments for disqualification are deemed meritless, as the alleged improprieties either lack relevance, are conclusory, based on inaccuracies, or reiterate previously rejected legal arguments. Disqualifying the U.S. Attorney's office or the AUSAs would unnecessarily disrupt the litigation process, leading to the denial of Nix’s motion for recusal.
Additionally, Nix sought records for an evidentiary hearing on Juror No. 3's qualifications. The Court mandated the disclosure of any publicly available information related to the juror's background by a specified deadline. The Government provided a criminal history sheet that was not publicly accessible, exceeding the Court's directive. Consequently, the Court will not address Nix's further record requests. Nix’s counsel expressed a potential conflict of interest, concerned that the Court's approach to the juror bias hearing might be influenced by his efforts to investigate alleged biases related to Nix's case. Counsel indicated a duty to inform Nix of this potential conflict.
Counsel for Mr. Nix has engaged in conduct that violates court rules and established precedent, as outlined in the Court’s Decision and Order regarding defendant Earl McCoy’s recusal motion. However, this conduct was aimed at furthering Nix’s interests and does not create a conflict of interest, unlike situations described in case law where unethical actions by defense counsel directly conflicted with client representation. The Court clarified that Nix is not receiving less process due to his counsel's identity, and the procedures for the evidentiary hearing are being maintained despite concerns over counsel's actions. The Court found no genuine indication of a possible conflict of interest requiring further inquiry.
The Court denied Nix's motion and his request for a stay in its entirety. Additionally, a correction was made regarding the identification of a juror previously misidentified as Juror No. 4; the correct Juror No. 3 was noted. The Court expressed skepticism about the applicability of the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) in this case, suggesting that the alleged perjury by Juror No. 3 does not constitute an offense "against" Nix, but rather against the court itself. The Court emphasized that the federal perjury statute is designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process, casting doubt on the relevance of the CVRA and any obligations under it in this instance.
The Court differentiates between whether Nix experienced direct and proximate harm from Juror No. 3’s alleged perjury under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) and whether Nix’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated due to Juror No. 3’s alleged bias. The latter issue remains unresolved and will depend partly on testimony from an upcoming hearing on June 12, 2017. Additionally, pursuing prosecution against Juror No. 3 could complicate Nix's motion for a new trial, for which he holds the burden of proof. To successfully argue for a new trial based on juror bias, Nix must demonstrate that the juror provided dishonest answers during voir dire and that a truthful response would have warranted a challenge for cause, as established in McDonough Power Equip. Inc. v. Greenwood. If Juror No. 3 is prosecuted, he might invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during the hearing, making it challenging for Nix to fulfill the burden of proof required for his motion.
