Keles v. Yearwood

Citations: 254 F. Supp. 3d 466; 2017 WL 2313472; 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81259Docket: 15-cv-03880 (NG)

Court: District Court, E.D. New York; May 26, 2017; Federal District Court

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Resat Keles filed a lawsuit against LaGuardia Community College (LCC) claiming violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), and state contract law. Keles alleges that LCC discriminated against him based on age by not hiring him for a full-time faculty position and by failing to assign him courses as an adjunct professor. He also claims retaliation for filing a discrimination complaint with his union and asserts that Yearwood, the Chairman of the Natural Sciences Department, aided LCC in its discriminatory practices. The defendants sought to dismiss all claims except for the age discrimination claim regarding the full-time position. They did not contest the merits of Keles's claims related to age discrimination for that position or Yearwood's alleged involvement. The court's decision partially granted and partially denied the defendants' motion. Keles, aged 66 at the lawsuit's initiation, worked as an adjunct at LCC from 2009 to 2012, having received reappointment letters from his supervisor, including one for the Fall 2012 semester, which he accepted.

Plaintiff signed and returned a letter to the human resources department and subsequently applied for a full-time associate professor position at LCC, despite being qualified for the role. He alleges age discrimination, claiming that LCC hired a less qualified candidate under forty. Evidence presented includes an interviewer’s inappropriate comments about his age during the interview and discrepancies in the evaluation process, such as a written recommendation for him being altered to "Do Not Recommend," while a younger candidate's evaluation was changed to "Recommend." The plaintiff also reported overhearing disparaging remarks about older adjunct professors in the department. Following his non-selection for the position, plaintiff was denied teaching assignments for the subsequent semester, with courses assigned to younger professors. He lodged a complaint about age discrimination with his union on August 10, 2012, which led to a formal complaint filed on September 6, 2012. The plaintiff did not notify LCC of his complaints prior to this formal filing. He completed an intake questionnaire with the EEOC on September 21, 2012, followed by a Charge of Discrimination on October 19, which included allegations of retaliation. The EEOC complaint was served to LCC on December 5, 2012, and the notice of claim was served on July 18, 2013. The plaintiff initiated this lawsuit within ninety days of receiving his right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion requires that the complaint must present sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible claim for relief, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.

The court's role is to assess the legal sufficiency of the complaint rather than weigh evidence that may be presented at trial. It can consider the complaint and documents integral to it, such as the Reappointment Letter and the September 6 union complaint submitted by both parties. Defendants assert that the plaintiff's claims are barred due to a failure to file a timely notice of claim as required by New York Education Law 6224(1). This law mandates that state notice of claim requirements apply to state claims in federal court. However, the court finds that Section 6224(1) pertains only to tort claims, as it incorporates the notice of claim requirements from General Municipal Law sections 50-e and 50-i. Section 50-e specifies that a notice of claim must be served within 90 days for tort claims against public corporations or their employees, while Section 50-i outlines the types of actions that necessitate such notice, focusing on personal injury, wrongful death, or property damage due to negligence. The New York Court of Appeals has determined that human rights claims do not fall under tort actions requiring a notice of claim. Consequently, the court concludes that the notice of claim requirement in Education Law 6224(1) is limited to torts, aligning with the historical legislative intent prior to its enactment in 1979, which only mandated such notice for negligence claims resulting in personal injury or property damage by community college employees.

In 1979, the New York legislature revised the Education Law, specifically Section 6224(1), which retains the requirement for plaintiffs in tort actions against community colleges to comply with General Municipal Law 50-e's notice of claim provisions. However, two courts have interpreted 6224(1) more broadly, applying it to all claims against community colleges, a view the author disputes, arguing that the statute's plain language and legislative history do not support such an interpretation. 

The author contrasts 6224(1) with County Law 52 and Town Law 67, both of which explicitly require compliance with 50-e for various claims, including discrimination claims. The Court of Appeals noted in Margerum that the service of a notice of claim is not a prerequisite for Human Rights Law actions when only General Municipal Law 50-e and 50-1 are applicable. Unlike these laws, 6224(1) does not establish additional notice of claim requirements. 

Consequently, the author concludes that the plaintiff's discrimination and breach of contract claims are not barred under 6224(1) as he was not obligated to file a notice of claim within 90 days of the claims' accrual. The defendants also contend that the plaintiff did not comply with 6224(2), which mandates that a demand for adjustment be presented to the city university at least 30 days prior to initiating a legal action involving a community college, and that the university must have neglected or refused to address the demand within that timeframe.

Defendants acknowledge that the plaintiff waited over thirty days after submitting a demand to the College, which subsequently failed to fulfill it. They contest, however, that the plaintiff did not adequately plead his compliance with statutory requirements. The statute mandates that such compliance must be clearly stated in the complaint or related documents, and since both parties have included the plaintiff's demand as exhibits, he has satisfied the statutory requirement under 6224(2).

In addressing the plaintiff's age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the standard requires the plaintiff to show that adverse employment action occurred and that age was the "but-for" cause of that action. The Second Circuit has tentatively applied this standard to claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) but evaluates claims under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) separately, allowing for a broader interpretation. Under the NYCHRL, it suffices for a plaintiff to demonstrate that discrimination was a motivating factor.

While defendants concede that the plaintiff has presented adequate facts for his age discrimination claim regarding the denial of a full-time faculty position, they argue that his claim related to not being assigned adjunct courses lacks sufficient support. The plaintiff contends that younger professors received the assignments he was qualified for. Additionally, he reports overhearing disparaging comments about older adjuncts and faced age-related queries during his full-time position interview, which he argues indicate a pattern of age discrimination that likely influenced all hiring decisions within the department. Given that both hiring decisions were made in close temporal proximity and within the same department, the plaintiff's allegations collectively suggest that age bias may have affected the assignment of adjunct courses as well. Thus, he has sufficiently established that age was a motivating factor, and potentially a "but-for" cause, in LCC’s decision not to assign him courses.

A plaintiff claiming retaliation must demonstrate that their employer took adverse employment action due to their complaint of discrimination. In this case, LCC learned of the plaintiff's age discrimination complaint on September 6, 2012, after it had already rescinded his appointment for the fall semester. Consequently, the plaintiff cannot prove that the rescission was retaliatory since it occurred prior to LCC's awareness of his complaint. The plaintiff also contends that LCC retaliated by not offering him reappointment in subsequent semesters, but he failed to apply for those positions. The previous practice of LCC offering him reappointment does not obligate the institution to continue doing so indefinitely. Therefore, the plaintiff has not substantiated any adverse actions by LCC in the later semesters, leading to the dismissal of his retaliation claims.

Regarding the breach of contract claim, defendants assert that it should be dismissed due to the absence of a signed, enforceable contract. They argue the alleged contract is invalid as it is either too indefinite or illusory, pointing out that the reappointment letter uses the word "intends" without specifying classes or binding conditions. Under New York law, contracts should not be interpreted as illusory if the parties intended to be bound. While enforceability requires some degree of certainty, it does not necessitate perfection. A contract can be valid if it provides reasonable certainty for a court to ascertain the parties' agreements. The reappointment letter required the plaintiff to indicate acceptance by signing and returning it, suggesting an intent to create a binding agreement.

The letter contains a clear acceptance clause where the plaintiff acknowledges the terms of appointment. Both the plaintiff and LCC’s Vice President of Academic Affairs signed and dated the letter, indicating mutual intention to be bound by the agreement. The court finds that the language regarding LCC's intent to reappoint the plaintiff, despite being non-specific about courses and conditioned on various factors, does not render the contract illusory or indefinite. The agreement outlines specific conditions for class assignments, and the plaintiff’s qualifications and previous interactions with LCC may provide context for interpreting the agreement. 

Defendants argue that conditions to the plaintiff’s reappointment were conditions precedent to contract formation, while the plaintiff contends they are conditions to performance. The determination of the parties' intent, as per established case law, indicates that without explicit language stating conditions as precedent to formation, they are treated as conditions to performance instead. 

Defendants also assert that plaintiff's breach of contract claim should be dismissed due to alleged unmet conditions precedent. However, the plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that courses he could teach were assigned to others, implying that conditions were met. Additionally, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's own failure to prepare for a course excuses LCC’s performance; this argument is rejected, as the contract does not impose an obligation on the plaintiff to fully prepare before being assigned a specific course. 

Lastly, the plaintiff's claim of interference with a protected right under the New York City Administrative Code is dismissed because he does not allege that any threats were made against him, which is required to substantiate his claim.

Defendants' motion to dismiss is partially granted, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims for retaliation and interference with a protected right. However, other claims remain active, including age discrimination under the ADEA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL related to a full-time position and an adjunct position in Fall 2012, a breach of contract claim, and a claim under the NYCHRL against Yearwood for aiding and abetting age discrimination in hiring. During the oral argument on March 29, 2017, the plaintiff agreed to withdraw his employer liability claim under the NYCHRL and a tortious interference claim, but not the aiding and abetting claim against Yearwood. The plaintiff incorrectly asserts compliance with the notice of claim requirement under 6224(1), as his claims accrued when LCC failed to extend him a reappointment offer for Spring 2013, which was before the required notice was served. The court clarifies that LCC was not obligated to offer employment and that the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, age discrimination, and retaliation accrued more than 90 days prior to the filing of the EEOC complaint. Defendants contended the claims were implausible due to ongoing communications regarding course assignments, but the court noted that such communication does not negate the possibility of age discrimination.