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United States v. Cordero-Rosario
Citations: 252 F. Supp. 3d 79; 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76904Docket: CASE NO. 11-556 (GAG)
Court: District Court, D. Puerto Rico; May 18, 2017; Federal District Court
On February 1, 2013, Hilton Cordero-Rosario pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from two searches conducted by the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD). He was sentenced to 120 months in prison followed by 15 years of supervised release. Upon appeal, the First Circuit found the searches invalid due to lack of probable cause, violating Cordero-Rosario's Fourth Amendment rights, and remanded for a hearing to determine whether evidence obtained through consent from his former spouse was tainted by the unlawful searches. The Court was tasked with evaluating evidence under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine and relevant attenuation tests. The government presented independent evidence, including data from a family desktop computer, a 320 GB external hard drive, and live testimony from a minor involved in the case. A suppression hearing was conducted by Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreño-Coll, who recommended suppressing evidence from the computer search due to Martorell’s consent while allowing the admission of the other evidence. The District Judge accepted and adopted these recommendations regarding the suppression of the computer search evidence. Evidence obtained from a search of the family computer, including explicit images and chat conversations involving MMTH, is suppressed. Judge Carreño-Coll organized the relevant events for the suppression inquiry concerning Cordero-Rosario. The Court adopts Judge Carreño-Coll's findings of fact. Cordero-Rosario objects to the Report and Recommendation, claiming that both the 320 GB External Hard Drive and MMTH’s testimony are tainted and should be suppressed. He argues that the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the hard drive do not sufficiently demonstrate attenuation from the initial illegality. In response, the Government contends that the testimony of Martorell indicates intervening circumstances that sever the taint from the prior illegality. Martorell’s decision to voluntarily surrender the hard drive was motivated by a desire to identify additional victims and to support her daughter, PCM, who reported allegations against Cordero-Rosario. This motivation predates the contested searches. The Court will conduct a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s findings regarding the admissibility of the hard drive and MMTH's testimony. The Court may refer suppression motions to a Magistrate Judge for recommendations, allowing parties to object and prompting a de novo determination by the judge on those objections. A lack of objection implies agreement with the magistrate’s recommendations. Failure to object to a Report and Recommendation in a legal proceeding waives a party’s right to review in the district court, and claims not preserved through objections are barred on appeal, as established in multiple First Circuit cases. Specifically, objections are necessary to dispute findings in a magistrate’s recommendation, including omissions of additional findings. An appellant cannot receive a de novo review for arguments not previously raised. The Court must assess which evidence, if any, is affected by unlawful searches conducted by the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD). Magistrate Judge Carreño-Coll determined that Martorell’s consent to search the family computer was obtained through exploitation of the illegal search, as she had recently viewed disturbing images from the unlawfully seized computer prior to giving consent. This close temporal relationship indicated that the impact of the images was still fresh in her mind, influencing her mental state. Martorell described her emotional turmoil upon seeing the images, leading her to urgently investigate Cordero’s belongings. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Martorell's consent was not the result of "detached reflection," as it was affected by the illegal search, and therefore, the evidence obtained from the subsequent federal search of the computer must be excluded. The First Circuit has mandated that if the district court finds the PRPD's unlawful searches did not taint the federal search, it must then evaluate which evidence, if any, is solely derived from the PRPD's searches. If the Court finds that unlawful searches compromised the federal investigation, the District Court must determine which evidence the government intends to use should be suppressed due to this taint. The critical question is whether evidence obtained after an illegal search is the result of exploiting that illegality or if it is sufficiently distinct to avoid the taint. This analysis relies heavily on the specific facts of the case, making it particularly suitable for the district court's resolution. The concept of 'dissipation of the taint' refers to the point at which the adverse effects of illegal police actions become attenuated, reducing the justification for applying the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court in Brown identified relevant factors for this attenuation analysis: the time elapsed between the illegal act and the evidence acquisition, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the nature of the official misconduct. Indirect evidence related to an illegal search should be suppressed if it closely relates to the original illegality. However, suppression is not warranted if the connection between the unlawful conduct and the evidence is sufficiently attenuated. The First Circuit, in Cordero-Rosario, differentiated this case from others where a defendant sought to suppress his own confession following an unlawful search, noting that Cordero-Rosario aimed to suppress evidence obtained through consent given by a third party, his then-wife. The appeals court emphasized that the outcome of Cordero's suppression motion hinges on whether the evidence obtained through his wife's consent was tainted by prior unlawful searches, acknowledging that this inquiry is fact-specific and complex. The First Circuit also outlined factors for evaluating the attenuation of evidence acquired via third-party consent. The Court will evaluate both the Finucan and Brown factors in assessing motions to suppress evidence obtained via consent from third parties. This analysis aims to determine the extent of attenuation regarding the evidence from Martorell’s consent, particularly concerning a 320 GB External Hard Drive. Magistrate Judge Carreño-Coll ruled that this hard drive was not tainted by illegal searches conducted by the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) and should not be suppressed. Cordero-Rosario disputes this ruling, arguing that Martorell's consent to turn over the hard drive was not sufficiently independent from the initial illegality, as the hard drive was first discussed during a meeting where Martorell consented to a search of a previously tainted family computer. The Court's analysis hinges on the events surrounding Martorell’s April 15, 2011 meeting with federal authorities, during which Martorell consented to search the family computer and voluntarily offered additional devices for examination. Agent Agudelo confirmed that Martorell signed the consent form without coercion or promises made to her, expressing a desire for the federal investigation. Martorell expressed a strong desire for transparency in the investigation concerning her daughter, motivated by the discovery of child pornography by local authorities. She sought assurance that there were no other victims and trusted the federal investigation to uncover all relevant information. After consenting to the investigation, Martorell informed Agent Agudelo about various electronic devices, including leftover parts from a computer and old phones, urging her to examine these items for additional evidence. Following a meeting with ICE, Agent Agudelo arranged to collect the devices, including a 320 GB External Hard Drive, which Martorell had organized for retrieval. Agudelo noted Martorell’s willingness to cooperate, emphasizing her intent to assist in uncovering the truth. Martorell was concerned about the integrity of the local investigation due to a police officer's involvement, which influenced her decision to turn over the equipment. The close timing of her consent and the surrender of the devices is highlighted as a significant factor favoring the defense, as her emotional state was closely linked to the recent discovery of the images. The discussion of intervening circumstances is framed to assess whether any significant events could mitigate the impact of prior illegality on the evidence obtained. Intervening circumstances that could attenuate the taint of illegally obtained evidence must be significant enough to demonstrate that the evidence was acquired through a process independent of the illegal search. In this case, Magistrate Judge Carreño-Coll found such circumstances existed between the unlawful search and Martorell’s voluntary surrender of electronic devices. Key factors supporting this conclusion included: 1) Agents had no prior knowledge of the devices or their contents; 2) Six days elapsed between Martorell's meeting with Agent Agudelo and the turnover of the devices, during which she did not change her mind; and 3) Martorell actively organized the devices for return. However, the analysis also indicated that Martorell's actions were insufficiently detached from the original illegality. The judge noted that the six-day interval and Martorell's organizational efforts were still connected to the earlier unlawful search, undermining claims of independent decision-making. Her testimony suggested that her mental state was affected by the illegally obtained images, indicating she was following the agents' directions rather than acting with free will. The court ultimately found that Martorell’s consent to turn over the devices was not a result of "detached reflection" but rather a continuation of the influence exerted by the unlawful search. Thus, no significant intervening circumstances were identified that could purify her actions from the initial illegality, affirming that her consent was obtained through exploitation of the unlawful search. The exclusionary rule aims to deter police misconduct, which is a critical element in evaluating the admissibility of evidence in this context. The attenuation doctrine's third factor emphasizes the need for police misconduct to be purposeful or flagrant in order to warrant exclusion. This principle is grounded in the aim of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter such misconduct. Flagrant misconduct may be identified if either the impropriety was obvious or the official knowingly engaged in likely unconstitutional behavior, particularly if the misconduct was investigatory and aimed at uncovering evidence without sufficient legal basis. Factors influencing the assessment of flagrancy include whether the illegal conduct involved a physical entry into a home, a primary concern of the Fourth Amendment. In the case at hand, there is a dispute regarding how federal agents became aware of child pornography during a local investigation. Agent González testified to learning about it through news reports, while Cordero-Rosario asserts she received a tip from local police. The presiding judge found González's account credible. Despite the source of the information, González expressed concerns about the adequacy of local search warrants and initiated a separate federal investigation. This investigation closely followed the local one, suggesting a lack of independence in the federal approach. Federal agents were instructed to seek consent to search a computer previously seized by local authorities, indicating a coordinated effort rather than a truly independent investigation. The decision indicates that federal agents utilized information acquired from PRPD searches to inform their own investigation. Magistrate Judge Carreño-Coll stated that establishing a "taint team" was insufficient to mitigate the initial illegality, emphasizing that Agudelo's outreach to Martorell for consent to search the PRPD-held computer suggested a reliance on the tainted evidence. The Government contends that the Court should not find misconduct in the federal agents' separate investigation, arguing that the exclusionary rule is overly punitive and intended to deter unlawful actions by federal officers, asserting there was no "lawless conduct" to deter. While the Court does not condemn the Government's independent investigation, it notes that federal authorities acted with insufficient caution, highlighting the collaborative nature of federal and state crime-fighting efforts in Puerto Rico. The Court concludes that the federal investigation's lack of independence reflects the behavior the exclusionary rule aims to deter. In assessing the Finucan factors, the first factor indicates that the investigators' knowledge about third parties and what to ask was likely informed by the illegal search, suggesting a reliance on tainted evidence that supports exclusion. The second factor also favors exclusion, as Martorell expressed her willingness to assist but did not approach authorities until contacted, indicating the federal authorities exploited the illegality in engaging her. Overall, these findings underscore the exclusionary rule's purpose of deterrence. The exclusionary rule is designed to deter constitutional violations by removing incentives for disregarding constitutional rights, though it does not apply to all proceedings or individuals. Its application involves balancing the benefits of deterrence against the societal costs of suppressing reliable evidence, which can lead to the release of guilty individuals. In this case, the Court determined that the 320 GB External Hard Drive was obtained through exploitation of illegal searches, warranting its exclusion due to its tainted nature. Regarding MMTH’s live testimony and the CyberShot Camera, a stricter link between the illegality and the testimony is necessary. The Magistrate Judge recommended admitting MMTH's testimony, believing she would have come forward independently or through her mother's encouragement. Evidence suggested MMTH’s willingness to cooperate was genuine and not significantly influenced by the illegal conduct leading to her discovery. The Government supported this, citing testimonies indicating her voluntary cooperation, including her alerting authorities to the existence of the CyberShot Camera. The analysis indicates that the more willing a witness is to testify voluntarily, the less justification there is for illegal searches to uncover such testimonies. The degree of free will necessary to negate the influence of illegality is more likely present in live-witness testimony compared to other evidence forms. The initial questioning conditions of the witness may foster genuine cooperation and detached reflection, diminishing the impact of any illegal discovery related to the witness. In this case, MMTH, when contacted by Agudelo, willingly participated in an interview without signs of coercion. During the interview, she disclosed significant details about her interactions with Cordero and acknowledged having possession of the camera that captured the incriminating images, which was previously unknown to the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD). This interview occurred three months after the PRPD unlawfully seized Cordero’s computer. The second Finucan factor evaluates whether third parties would have volunteered information without investigator prompting. The undersigned agrees with Magistrate Judge Carreño-Coll's assessment that MMTH would have independently come forward, indicating her testimony is sufficiently disconnected from the initial illegality. Consequently, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's findings regarding the admissibility of MMTH's live testimony and the Sony Cybershot Camera. The Court reviews the recommendations and decides to suppress evidence obtained from the illegal search of Cordero's family computer and external hard drive, while admitting MMTH's live testimony and the camera. The procedural background notes that Defendant Hilton Cordero-Rosario faced federal charges for child pornography following accusations of lewd acts against a minor. On February 25, 2012, a second search led to the seizure of additional electronic equipment from Cordero's residence. Following this, on June 25, 2012, Cordero filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during both searches conducted by the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD), which was denied without a hearing. Cordero subsequently pled guilty to possession of child pornography, while reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. After sentencing, he filed a notice of appeal regarding the suppression denial and the imposed sentence. The Circuit Court ruled that the evidence obtained by the PRPD lacked probable cause and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine if federal agents’ evidence was also tainted. The District Court then asked the government to confirm whether it would proceed with prosecution and if it had independent evidence supporting the charges. The government asserted it had such evidence, which Cordero opposed. A hearing took place on April 13, 2016, where Cordero requested the government itemize untainted evidence. The presiding Judge decided against itemization, allowing both parties to present extensive evidence, leading to post-hearing memoranda. During this period, a second superseding indictment was issued against Cordero, including a new charge of sex trafficking of children. In November 2016, Cordero sought release from custody, prompting the District Court to include Speedy Trial findings in the Report and Recommendation. The Speedy Trial Act mandates that defendants be tried within seventy days of indictment or appearance before a judicial officer, with certain delays—such as those resulting from pretrial motions—excluded from this calculation. The act does not impose specific time limits for pretrial motion hearings, but the Supreme Court has interpreted it to indicate that only delays deemed "reasonably necessary" for these motions are excludable. On September 9, 2015, the court referred the Government’s Motion regarding evidence suppression and the defense’s opposition to the Magistrate Judge for an evidentiary hearing. This hearing took place on April 13, 2016, during which the time from September 9, 2015, to April 13, 2016, was deemed automatically excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) as it pertained to a pretrial motion. Following the hearing, the defendant was given five working days to submit a brief, which was filed on April 20, 2016, followed by the government’s response on April 29, 2016. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to strike this response on May 4, 2016, to which the government also responded. The statute allows for time to be excluded after a hearing when awaiting additional filings necessary for proper motion disposition. The excludable timeframe extends from April 4, 2016 (the day the defendant was ordered to file his brief), until June 4, 2016 (30 days post-last filing). The First Circuit has indicated that the 30-day exclusion does not apply strictly when multiple motions are involved. The court noted that the case involved complex legal issues requiring thorough consideration. Additionally, while the Report and Recommendation was pending, a second superseding indictment was filed against the defendant, prompting the court to reassess the implications on the ongoing motions. The delay in resolving these motions was justified given their interconnectedness. Consequently, the period during which the Report and Recommendation was pending was also deemed excludable under the Speedy Trial Act (STA). The filing of the second superseding indictment reset the STA clock, leading to a new effective STA date of March 20, 2017. The First Circuit’s prior opinion of May 4, 2015, is referenced as guiding subsequent proceedings on the suppression issue. The First Circuit determined that the PRPD's searches on February 4 and February 26 were unconstitutional, infringing on Cordero's Fourth Amendment rights (United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d 64, 71-72). The critical issue is whether the evidence underlying the federal charges has an independent basis. The First Circuit instructed the District Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to assess if the earlier searches compromised the evidence obtained later through consent from Cordero's then-wife. If suppression is warranted, the court must identify the specific evidence to be excluded. The First Circuit also emphasized the importance of a thorough factual background, encouraging the District Court to investigate historical facts as necessary. At the evidentiary hearing, the government bears the burden to prove that the evidence is untainted. The factual timeline begins on Thanksgiving 2010 when Martorell discovered her husband's lewd acts against their daughter. In January 2011, she asked Cordero to leave their shared home. In February 2011, PCM reported the incident to a teacher and social worker, triggering an investigation by the Department of Family and resulting in a protective order on February 4, 2011. That same day, PRPD agents interviewed PCM, leading to an affidavit for a search warrant to seize electronic devices from Cordero's residence, which was executed, uncovering child pornography. A second affidavit filed on February 25 sought additional evidence, resulting in another search on February 26, which also yielded more electronic devices. Notably, Martorell learned of the child pornography allegations while hospitalized in March 2011. Images recovered from a computer belonging to Cordero included explicit pictures of a minor female, identified as Martorell’s neighbor, MMTH. Martorell had been informed by state prosecutors that there might be sexually explicit photos on the computer but did not expect them to involve a minor. Following her hospital discharge, she reviewed these images with state prosecutors and became distressed, prompting her to search through Cordero’s belongings and request that federal authorities be notified. In April 2011, Rébecca Gonzalez, a Group Supervisor at Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), learned from the news that child pornography had been discovered at Cordero's residence during a state investigation into lewd acts against his biological daughter. Gonzalez, familiar with Cordero from law enforcement meetings, contacted Inés Carrau, the District Attorney in Carolina, to discuss the evidence. During a meeting on April 11, 2011, Carrau presented Gonzalez with explicit images of MMTH extracted from Cordero's computer, although Gonzalez initially did not know the identity of the victim. Upon reviewing the search warrants used by the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) to seize Cordero's belongings, Gonzalez determined they lacked probable cause for searching for child pornography. Concerned, she convened a meeting with her superiors and representatives from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, leading to a decision for federal agents to seek Martorell’s consent to search the computer independently of the state investigation. This marked the beginning of a "pre-investigation" phase, with no formal case number or resources allocated yet. Special agents Lillian Agudelo Doval and Alek Pacheco were subsequently assigned to the case. Agudelo aimed to assign agents unfamiliar with Cordero and the previous meeting with Carolina prosecutors to the case. Working in the cybercrimes team at ICE, Agudelo learned from González that child pornography had been found on a computer seized by local authorities in the Cordero investigation. Shortly thereafter, she was designated as a case agent in the "taint team" and instructed to seek consent from Martorell to search the computer. The computer was in the possession of the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD). González indicated that without Martorell's consent, the investigation would have required further discussions with her supervisors. On April 15, 2011, Agudelo and Pacheco met with Martorell, where Agudelo introduced herself and discussed the allegations against Cordero. She sought to ascertain Martorell's authority to consent to the search, confirming that Martorell was Cordero's wife and shared a residence with him. Martorell described the computer as accessible to the family, not password protected, and explained that the internet service was registered in her name, for which she paid. Agudelo concluded that Martorell had common authority to consent to the search and presented her with a consent form, which Martorell signed willingly. Martorell expressed concerns about the local investigation and indicated she had additional electronic devices to surrender. Although the agents did not show her any recovered images, González was unaware that state prosecutors had already displayed some to her. Following the meeting, Agudelo contacted Martorell to arrange the pickup of the additional devices. On April 21, 2011, Agudelo visited Martorell's home, where Martorell had placed the devices on the dining table, including an external hard drive that Agudelo identified and requested to take. Agents seized multiple electronic devices and media from Cordero's residence, including two Blackberry and two Pantech mobile phones, a charger, another Blackberry with a SIM card and 2GB card, a black and red Trascend USB, nine CDs, one DVD, and an external hard drive. Agudelo secured the evidence pending a search warrant for the digital devices. She received a preview of explicit images of a minor, MMTH, from forensic agent Luis Colón, though it was unclear if Colón extracted them or if they were provided by state authorities. After viewing the images, Agudelo contacted local prosecutors and met with them to discuss the images and how to contact MMTH. On May 12, 2011, Agudelo interviewed MMTH, who was 19 years old and arrived with her parents. MMTH identified herself as Cordero's neighbor and a friend of his daughter, PCM. She disclosed that Cordero had previously asked her to walk around her apartment in her underwear for his viewing pleasure, and she had complied in exchange for money. During the interview, MMTH confirmed that the images shown to her were some of those she had sent to Cordero. She also mentioned a Sony Cyber-Shot camera given to her by Cordero, which she still possessed. Agudelo later obtained this camera from MMTH’s mother, who stated it was a family camera that had been missing for years. Agudelo sought a search warrant for the items collected from Cordero’s property, excluding the camera since consent had been given for its search. The search warrant was issued on May 24, 2011. Douglas Skinner, an agent in the Cybercrimes Unit, conducted a digital forensic analysis of a computer from July 25-29, 2011, which revealed 145 graphic images, 102 of which were pornographic, involving a minor. The analysis also included a Sony memory stick with 29 non-pornographic images and a desktop folder containing pornographic images from a camera. An external hard drive showed evidence of child pornography that had previously been stored but was later deleted. On January 4, 2012, Skinner performed further analysis on a 320 GB Western Digital external hard drive from the defendant Cordero’s residence, which contained child pornography, and identified pornographic images on a memory card from a seized Blackberry. Idalia Hornedo, mother of the minor involved, became aware of the case when federal agents contacted her about an interview related to alleged sexual crimes involving her daughter. Initially unaware of the situation, she suspected something was wrong as the interview progressed. During subsequent interactions with local prosecutors, Hornedo learned of resistance to transferring the case to federal jurisdiction. After discussing the matter with her daughter's father and receiving advice from federal agents, Hornedo sought to file a complaint with ICE, believing a federal case would be initiated. The key issue in this case is whether the evidence obtained through Martorell's consent was compromised by prior unlawful searches conducted by the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD). The defense argues for the suppression of evidence obtained through Martorell’s consent, claiming it is tainted by prior unlawful searches, invoking the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. This legal principle asserts that evidence derived from an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible due to its connection to a previous Fourth Amendment violation. Key cases are cited, including *Nardone v. United States*, which establishes that both primary and derivative evidence from illegal searches is subject to exclusion. The standard set in *Wong Sun v. United States* clarifies that not all evidence linked to illegal police actions is automatically considered tainted; instead, the focus should be on whether the evidence was obtained through exploitation of the illegality or by means that sufficiently distance it from the initial wrongdoing. The analysis of illegality involves examining both causation and attenuation. A mere 'but for' relationship between unlawful conduct and the evidence is insufficient for suppression; the inquiry must determine if the evidence was obtained through exploitation of the illegal act. Factors influencing attenuation include the temporal proximity of the evidence to the illegal conduct, any intervening circumstances, and the nature of the police misconduct. Other considerations involve whether a witness voluntarily testifies, if the testimony has an independent source, or if the evidence would have been discovered inevitably without the illegal actions. Additionally, courts weigh the social costs of exclusion against the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. The excerpt outlines the legal principles surrounding the exclusionary rule and attenuation analysis in relation to consent obtained after prior unlawful searches. The Supreme Court case Ceccolini emphasizes that the exclusionary rule's protective principles must be considered in evaluating whether the taint of prior illegality affects later evidence. The First Circuit, referencing cases like Cordero-Rosario and Finucan, rejected the government's argument that voluntary consent negated the taint from earlier illegal searches. Instead, the court suggested examining if the prior illegality significantly influenced the later consent, citing specific factors from Finucan, such as the reliance on illegally obtained information and whether the investigators would have identified third parties independently of the illegal search. The government also pointed to State v. Lane, asserting the consent analysis should focus on whether it was obtained through exploitation of prior illegality. Lane emphasizes that if consent is tainted, then any evidence obtained thereafter is also tainted. The court in Lane evaluated the voluntariness of consent and exploitation under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, considering factors like temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the nature of official misconduct. The Lane court concluded that if consent was given with a desire to be cooperative, it might indicate sufficient intervening circumstances to break the causal chain from the prior illegality. Martorell’s consent to search the computer was compromised by prior illegal actions taken by law enforcement. Following the discovery that state search warrants lacked probable cause for child pornography, González directed Agudelo to obtain consent from Martorell. González had previously discussed the case with others and seen preliminary evidence, thus influencing her actions. The existence of a "taint team" did not sufficiently eliminate the initial illegality's impact. González indicated that without Martorell’s consent, an alternative plan would have been necessary. Agudelo’s outreach to Martorell was not an independent investigation; rather, it was influenced by illegally obtained evidence. Martorell's consent, while given voluntarily, was affected by the prior unconstitutional actions, as she had recently viewed some of the illicit images. The timing of her consent, shortly after seeing these images, and her emotional response to them, suggests that her mental state was significantly altered. Additionally, the court briefly considered State v. Lane, which involved illegal police entry leading to arrests, as the government sought to use it as a comparable case, although no strong parallels were drawn. Policemen sought consent from Lane's girlfriend to search their residence, leading to the discovery of methamphetamines. Lane moved to suppress this evidence, arguing it was tainted by an earlier illegal search of a garage. The court distinguished Lane's case by noting that his girlfriend was unaware of the original illegality, whereas Martorell, who consented to the search of a computer, had seen images resulting from an unlawful search. The court emphasized that the locations of the searches were different, which also separated the circumstances. Martorell’s consent was deemed tainted because it directly stemmed from the initial illegal search, lacking the "detached reflection" necessary to attenuate the taint. Consequently, evidence from the computer search was to be excluded. However, the case also involved a 320 GB Western Digital external hard drive, which Martorell voluntarily offered to federal agents after the illegal search. Unlike the consent for the computer search, this offer occurred six days later and was characterized by Martorell's active decision-making, indicating sufficient attenuation from the original illegality. Agents had no prior knowledge of the hard drive, and Martorell organized the devices to hand over, demonstrating "detached reflection and a desire to be cooperative." The conduct of the agent, Agudelo, was not flagged as improper, as she acted under her supervisor's instructions, further supporting the attenuation of the evidence related to the hard drive. The individual in question was not present during the meeting with state prosecutors and had not reviewed the search warrants or images from the computer at that time. When Mar-torell proposed to provide additional devices, she did not anticipate any consequences from prior illegal actions. Agudelo delayed the forensic analysis of the external drive until obtaining a search warrant, and on January 4, 2012, forensic expert Skinner produced a report on the drive's contents. The presence of intervening circumstances indicated a break in the chain of events from the initial illegal act to the evidence subsequently collected. Hence, the evidence from the external hard drive, identified by serial number WMAM1543470, was determined to be sufficiently distinct from the unlawfully obtained evidence to avoid suppression. The government also intends to utilize the live testimony of MMTH, which was initially prompted by a PRPD agent who issued a summons to MMTH and her mother, Hornedo. Following interviews, Hornedo sought federal involvement, believing a federal investigation into Cordero would commence. Agudelo identified MMTH's location through other sources rather than Hornedo's information. In evaluating whether MMTH's testimony was a "fruit of the poisonous tree," the factors from Ceccolini were applied, which emphasized the significance of the witness's willingness to testify freely. The greater the willingness, the less likely the incentive for illegal searches to locate the witness. The record indicated that MMTH would have likely come forward independently or through her mother's encouragement, supported by Hornedo's proactive outreach to federal authorities. MMTH did not refuse to be interviewed by Agudelo, and there was no evidence of coercion. During the interview, she provided details about her experiences with Cordero and mentioned possessing the camera used to take the seized images, information previously unknown to the PRPD. This interview occurred three months after the illegal seizure of Cordero’s computer, suggesting that her statements were the result of careful consideration and a willingness to cooperate. The record indicates that the illegality surrounding the discovery of MMTH did not significantly influence her decision to testify, suggesting that her live testimony is sufficiently distanced from the initial constitutional violation. The Ceccolini case’s second factor highlights the potential harm of excluding a witness's testimony, emphasizing the human cost of preventing the victim from discussing relevant facts. Balancing the social costs of exclusion against the deterrent effect of illegal conduct, the conclusion favors allowing testimony to uphold justice principles. Additionally, the discovery of the Sony Cyber-Shot camera through MMTH's voluntary statements is deemed admissible due to the lack of temporal proximity and intervening circumstances, as MMTH had no prior knowledge of the camera before her cooperation with authorities. The delay between her offer and the camera's delivery indicates a thoughtful decision rather than coercive pressure. Finally, the analysis found no exploitation related to the government’s actions, as there is no evidence that the officials acted with knowledge of potential unconstitutionality or in hope of finding incriminating evidence. In conclusion, while Martorell's consent for the federal search of the seized computer is tainted by the unlawful state search, the evidence obtained from the 320GB external hard drive, MMTH's live testimony, and the Cyber-Shot camera should not be suppressed due to sufficient attenuation from the initial illegality. The court recommends granting in part and denying in part the government's motion at Docket No. 135. Parties have 14 days to file objections; failure to do so waives the right to appeal. The report references key cases, Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee and United States v. Valencia-Copete, regarding the waiver of appeal rights. Counts 1-20 of the superseding indictment against Cordero-Rosario involve child pornography production under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), while Counts 21-22 address possession under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The government agreed to dismiss the production charges and Count 22 per a conditional plea agreement. A Second Superseding Indictment added charges for sex trafficking of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and possession of child pornography, linked to images on an external hard drive. An urgent motion for release pending a motion to suppress is pending from Cordero-Rosario, opposed by the government. Cordero-Rosario requested the preparation of the suppression hearing transcript for adequate objections, which the court ordered. The excerpt discusses the exclusionary rule, which renders evidence inadmissible if obtained from an illegal search, referring to relevant case law on the doctrine, including United States v. D'Andrea and Segura v. United States, emphasizing that both direct and derivative evidence from unconstitutional conduct is subject to exclusion. The court is tasked with determining whether evidence was obtained through exploitation of prior illegality or by means sufficiently distinct to remove the taint. Prior unlawful searches by Puerto Rico police do not eliminate concerns regarding taint and exploitation when federal authorities obtained consent from a third party, as established in Cordero-Rosario and Finucan. González instructed that obtaining consent was essential, admitting an alternate plan would be necessary if consent was not secured. The hard drive was later recovered in a search authorized by Cordero's wife, Deborah Martorell. A motion to suppress is defined as a pretrial motion under 18 U.S.C.A. 3161, with time from filing until court advisement automatically excluded, as referenced in U.S. v. Cobb. During a hearing, Martorell testified about events leading to her consent for the search of the computer and other devices, addressing whether her consent was influenced by prior illegal searches. Her daughter, PCM, reported to Martorell that Cordero had inappropriately touched her while she slept. Following this, Martorell asked PCM if she wished to report to police or seek psychological help, to which PCM opted for assistance. Cordero continued living in the house until police served a protective order. Upon Martorell's return, she discovered the house in disarray and the computer seized. Martorell's testimony included PCM's observation of Cordero viewing pornography on the family computer. It remains unclear whether a federal agency was independently notified or if agents were referring to a prior meeting involving González and Carrau. Under Puerto Rico law, a person can be charged with lewd acts if they subject someone under sixteen to actions that satisfy their sexual desire. During cross-examination, the defense questioned González about the source of his knowledge regarding child pornography found in Cordero's possession, suggesting it may have stemmed from a tip from the Puerto Rico Police Department. During an interview on May 16, 2011, the defense highlighted that Gonzalez received information about child pornography materials directly from the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) rather than through the news. Gonzalez asserted that it is uncommon for reports of investigation (ROI) to state when information comes from the news, and she maintained that she first learned about the materials through media coverage. Initially, she intended to assign the case to Salvador Santiago, but after he attended a meeting with state prosecutors, she reassigned it to Agudelo, who had no prior contact with the PRPD regarding the matter. The defense attempted to challenge Agudelo's credibility by referencing her grand jury testimony, where she indicated she received a referral from the PRPD. However, Agudelo clarified that she meant the referral was received by her agency, not personally, and she was unaware of the investigation's specifics beyond what Gonzalez informed her. The Consent Form dated April 15, 2011, indicated that Martorell authorized a search of her computer, acknowledging her right to refuse and stating that consent was given voluntarily. Martorell expressed dissatisfaction with local authorities' handling of the case, noting that the police had tipped off the press about the investigation while PCM was still at the station. Agudelo confirmed that the seized desktop was under state authority's custody, although she was uncertain whether it was managed by the PRPD or the local Forensic Sciences Department. Martorell testified that balconies of her residence and Cordero's apartment faced each other and mentioned that MMTH had previously given her a camera to pass to her father, instructing her not to look at the pictures. Additionally, Hornedo learned about the hearing through her mother and recalled reading press coverage about PCM's allegations against Cordero, though she did not remember the meeting's date. Justice Frankfurter originated the term related to the exclusionary rule in *Nardone*. The Supreme Court's examination of police misconduct's tainted fruits was further developed in *Brown v. Illinois*, which analyzed the attenuation exception. Brent D. Stratton's article provides a detailed historical perspective on this exception. The First Circuit, in *United States v. Navedo-Colón*, supported this analytical approach, also referencing *United States v. Maldonado-Espinosa*. Martorell testified she saw incriminating images post-release from Hospital Panamericano in March 2011 and consented to their review on April 15, 2011. When questioned about her suspicions regarding child pornography on the computer, she expressed certainty based on previous findings by state agents. The government argued that Martorell’s consent marked the beginning of the taint's dissipation; however, legal analysis requires consideration of whether the consent itself was a "fruit of the poisonous tree." This view aligns with the First Circuit's 2015 opinion, which rejected the notion that her consent immunized the evidence obtained by police. The images on the computer supported multiple counts in the superseding indictment concerning the production and possession of child pornography, alongside evidence from an external hard drive for additional charges. Hornedo did not recall specific dates regarding interviews, and there were concerns about potential obstruction from local authorities due to Cordero's status as a high-ranking law enforcement official in Puerto Rico. The disclosure of a potential witness's name to police does not inherently carry evidentiary weight, as the individual’s characteristics will ultimately influence their testimony. This emphasizes the exclusionary rule's primary purpose: deterring police misconduct.