Gniewkowski v. Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises, Inc.

Citation: 251 F. Supp. 3d 908Docket: 16cv1898; 17cv0006; 17cv0031

Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania; April 21, 2017; Federal District Court

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A Motion for Dismissal has been filed by Churchill Downs Incorporated under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with the Plaintiff opposing it and submitting additional briefs. Similarly, AmeriServe Financial Bank has filed a Motion for Dismissal under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), also facing opposition from the Plaintiff. The court must now adjudicate these motions.

Regarding Rule 12(b)(1), a motion challenges the court's jurisdiction to hear the case, placing the burden on the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the claims are properly before the court. There are two types of attacks: facial and factual. A facial attack questions the sufficiency of the pleadings, requiring the court to accept the Plaintiff's allegations as true, while a factual attack allows the court to evaluate the merits of jurisdictional claims without presuming the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations. In factual attacks, the court may consider evidence beyond the pleadings.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the standard focuses on notice pleading, which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim" to inform the defendant of the grounds for relief. The court follows a three-step process to assess the complaint's sufficiency: identifying necessary elements for a claim, discerning non-credible conclusory allegations, and assuming the truth of well-pleaded factual allegations to evaluate if they plausibly support entitlement to relief.

The Court evaluates claims to determine if the facts presented establish a "plausible claim for relief" as per Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials. Legal conclusions must be backed by factual allegations, and a Complaint cannot be dismissed simply because the likelihood of proving the facts seems low. Instead, the focus is on whether the facts raise a reasonable expectation that discovery could uncover evidence supporting the claims. A Complaint is likely to survive a Motion to Dismiss if it adequately details "how, when, and where" the alleged facts occurred. 

In this case, Plaintiffs, who are blind or visually impaired, allege that Defendants’ websites are inaccessible, violating Title III of the ADA. They seek a permanent injunction to ensure accessibility. AmeriServe, a federally-chartered bank, provides financial services through its website, while Churchill, a Kentucky corporation, operates racetracks and online gaming. Both Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss. 

AmeriServe argues that Plaintiffs lack standing, claiming they have not sufficiently demonstrated an "injury in fact" or a "real and immediate threat of future injury" necessary to maintain their lawsuit.

The United States Supreme Court defines the constitutional minimum for standing as comprising three essential elements: (1) the plaintiff must demonstrate an "injury in fact" that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's actions, with the injury traceable to the defendant rather than an independent third party; (3) it must be likely that a favorable court decision will redress the injury. The burden of establishing these elements lies with the party invoking federal jurisdiction, and at the pleading stage, general allegations of injury may suffice. 

In the current case, Plaintiff Frazier, a legally blind resident of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, has encountered access barriers on AmeriServe’s website while using screen reading software. Plaintiff New, legally blind and President of Access Now, Inc. (ANI), also uses this software. ANI, a non-profit organization advocating for blind individuals, aims to ensure public accommodations are accessible. The Complaint indicates that both Frazier and New experienced barriers on AmeriServe's website that hindered their ability to access personal banking services, thereby alleging discrimination based on their disabilities. AmeriServe does not dispute ANI’s purpose or the claims made by the plaintiffs.

AmeriServe's affidavits submitted in support of its 12(b)(1) Motion do not contest the Complaint's claims that barriers on its website hinder access to public content for Plaintiffs’ software. One affidavit acknowledges that account holders have enhanced access, while non-account holders can view public pages. Additionally, it states that AmeriServe’s physical locations comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act for customers who are blind or visually impaired. The Court, recognizing that the case is in its preliminary stages, concludes that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated an injury in fact, as they were unable to access website content due to barriers affecting their screen reader software, impeding their ability to compare financial services. 

Plaintiff ANI argues it has standing to sue on behalf of its members, following the precedent established in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com’n, which outlines criteria for association standing. The Court finds that ANI meets these criteria: its members have standing, the interests align with the organization’s purpose, and individual member participation is not necessary. Given these findings, the Court determines that ANI has standing to proceed with the lawsuit against AmeriServe, leading to the denial of AmeriServe’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).

AmeriServe contends that its website does not qualify as a "place of public accommodation" under Title III of the ADA, asserting that any alleged discrimination against Plaintiffs is unfounded if the website is not categorized as such. To establish a claim under the ADA, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the discrimination pertains to a "place of public accommodation," as defined in 42 U.S.C. 12182(a). The ADA outlines various private entities considered public accommodations, including banks, which AmeriServe acknowledges it is. However, AmeriServe argues that this designation applies solely to its physical locations and not to its website.

AmeriServe's position is based on three key points: first, while the website allows account holders to conduct transactions, Plaintiffs, who are not account holders, cannot claim harm due to their inability to access the website. Second, the information available on the website can also be obtained at physical locations or through phone calls, which makes the website's inaccessibility less significant. Third, AmeriServe disputes the Plaintiffs' characterization of the website as a "place of public accommodation," deeming it a legal conclusion rather than a factual assertion that the court must accept.

In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that the website does constitute a public accommodation, referencing similar legal precedents from the Third Circuit and a ruling from the District of Vermont. The court's analysis of this issue is informed by the ADA's purpose as articulated by Congress, highlighting the ongoing discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities across various life areas, which underscores the importance of ensuring access to public accommodations, including digital platforms.

The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) aims to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities, invoking Congressional authority to address daily discrimination faced by this population. The ADA establishes a national mandate for this purpose, particularly under Title III, which seeks to integrate individuals with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life by ensuring equal access to goods and services offered by private establishments. 

In examining case law, specifically Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., the Third Circuit clarified that while an insurance office qualifies as a public accommodation, the insurance policies provided there do not fall under Title III protections. The court ruled that the plaintiff, who was unable to perform her job due to a mental illness, could pursue a claim under Title I of the ADA regarding her disability benefits. However, claims related to disparities in insurance benefits for mental and physical disabilities were not actionable under Title III since such benefits are part of employment terms, which are governed by Title I. The ruling emphasized that public accommodations refer to the services offered at a physical location, not the broader services provided by the lessor, indicating that benefits related to employment do not qualify under Title III. Additionally, it noted that a television broadcast is not covered by Title III.

The excerpt addresses the interpretation of "public accommodations" under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). It establishes that public accommodations refer specifically to physical locations, as outlined in 42 U.S.C. 12181(7). Ford, who received disability benefits through her employer, Schering, is determined not to have established a connection to MetLife's insurance office, thus not being subject to discrimination related to public accommodations. The excerpt also discusses a case involving Peoples v. Discover Financial Services, where the plaintiff claimed ADA violations after being overcharged for services rendered by a prostitute. The district court ruled in favor of DFS, concluding that DFS did not control the location where the transaction occurred, as it did not own or operate the apartment. The appeal court affirmed this decision, noting a split among circuit courts on whether "public accommodation" could extend beyond physical structures. However, it emphasized adherence to its prior ruling in Ford, reiterating that the ADA strictly defines public accommodations in terms of physical places. Consequently, the court found that DFS's actions related to the fraud claim investigation did not constitute discrimination under the ADA, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims.

The Court of Appeals declined to broaden the definition of "place of public accommodation" to include locations related to insurance policies or credit card processing terminals, noting that in previous cases (Ford and Peoples), the discrimination occurred at sites not owned or controlled by the involved parties. In contrast, the alleged discrimination in the current case involves AmeriServe's website, which AmeriServe owns, operates, and controls. As a result, this situation is distinct from Ford and Peoples, leading the Court to deny AmeriServe’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), affirming that the Plaintiffs have made a legally valid claim under Title III of the ADA.

AmeriServe further argued for dismissal based on several points: (1) Plaintiffs' counsel has previously filed many similar cases, which AmeriServe deemed irrelevant to the current motion; (2) the Complaint's clarity regarding the Plaintiffs' attempts to use the website was questioned, as they are not account holders; however, the Court found that the website's home page offers services accessible to non-account holders; and (3) AmeriServe claimed the Complaint failed to demonstrate how the Plaintiffs were deterred from using the website, yet this argument was counterproductive since the Plaintiffs are challenging the website's accessibility, not physical branches.

Churchill also sought dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that the Complaint lacks an "injury-in-fact," which undermines the Plaintiffs' standing. However, the Court found the facts of the Plaintiffs' interactions with Churchill's website analogous to those with AmeriServe's website, dismissing Churchill's standing argument.

The Complaint against Churchill alleges that Plaintiffs, two blind individuals, faced access barriers on Churchill's websites, hindering their ability to fully utilize the facilities, goods, and services offered. These barriers have not only denied them equal access in the past but also deterred them from using the websites or visiting physical locations that Churchill advertises. The Court finds that these allegations sufficiently demonstrate an injury in fact, as Plaintiffs experienced an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, preventing their screen reader software from accessing website content and impacting their ability to visit physical locations. 

Regarding Plaintiff ANI, the Court acknowledges that ANI has standing to pursue the lawsuit, as its members would benefit from the sought injunction. Churchill's argument for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), claiming Plaintiffs did not meet the "intent to return" standard, is rejected. Churchill’s cited case, Garner v. VIST Bank, outlines a three-part test for standing that the Court finds inapplicable here due to factual distinctions and the absence of a connection between the website and a physical location. The Court emphasizes that the proximity requirement is irrelevant in this case and notes that the three-part test has not been adopted by the Third Circuit, diverging from Supreme Court criteria concerning standing.

The Court emphasizes reliance on Supreme Court precedent to assess the standing of Plaintiffs in this case. Churchill's argument that Plaintiffs fail to meet the "deterrent effect test" is rejected, as it relies on inapplicable case law concerning physical structures, while the plaintiffs' inability to access Churchill's websites renders attempts to return futile. Furthermore, Churchill's claims regarding the standing of Plaintiffs Frazier, New, and ANI mirror arguments made by AmeriServe, which also fail for the same reasons. As a result, both Churchill's and AmeriServe's Motions to Dismiss are denied. 

The Court acknowledges a four-part standing test proposed by AmeriServe, which evaluates the likelihood of a plaintiff returning to a public accommodation based on criteria such as proximity, past patronage, plans to return, and frequency of nearby travel. However, the Court chooses not to apply this test due to its inapplicability to cases involving websites, differing factual circumstances from cited cases, and the fact that the test has not been recognized by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court notes that this four-part test diverges from the three-part criteria established by the Supreme Court regarding standing.