Court: District Court, N.D. Florida; March 31, 2017; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs have challenged two ordinances enacted by Walton County, Florida, citing constitutional violations and seeking a preliminary injunction against one ordinance. The court, presided over by Chief Judge M. Casey Rodgers, has denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. The case originated when the Goodwins purchased beachfront property in 1971 and subsequently filed a complaint against a beach obstruction ordinance adopted in June 2016, claiming a First Amendment violation related to a sign ordinance. The county consented to a preliminary injunction against the sign ordinance while the case proceeded.
In October 2016, the county enacted the Customary Use Ordinance, effective April 1, 2017, which affirms public rights to utilize dry sand areas of beaches for recreational activities, while prohibiting interference with those rights and establishing a 15-foot buffer zone around private structures. Violations of the ordinance can result in a $500 fine. Following this, the Goodwins amended their complaint to include a Fifth Amendment taking claim against the Customary Use Ordinance and sought another preliminary injunction to delay its enforcement. The county responded with a motion to dismiss this facial challenge. The document also outlines the standard of review for motions to dismiss under federal pleading rules.
Legal conclusions unsupported by facts cannot be assumed true, as established in Twombly. The "plausibility standard" necessitates more than mere possibility for liability. In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, only the pleadings and incorporated documents are considered, with all allegations taken as true and viewed favorably toward the plaintiff.
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause mandates that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation. An unconstitutional taking can occur if government actions exceed police power or if just compensation is denied. The Takings Clause allows for property taking but requires compensation for lawful takings. Determining what constitutes a taking is complex, with various claims subject to different standards.
Classic takings involve eminent domain, while regulatory actions can also equate to takings when they significantly interfere with property use. Courts typically conduct factual inquiries using the multi-factor balancing test from Penn Central, assessing economic impact, government interference with investment-backed interests, and the nature of government action.
Two specific categories of per se regulatory takings exist: complete deprivation of economically beneficial use of property and permanent physical invasions by the government. Additionally, a physical regulatory taking may occur when government exactions for public access are imposed on private property.
The Goodwins contend that the County's Customary Use Ordinance constitutes a per se physical taking of their property, diverging from the usual "as-applied" challenge that evaluates the specific impact of government action on a property and necessitates just compensation if denied through state procedures. They assert that their situation allows for a facial takings challenge, which questions the legality of a statute or regulation's enactment, especially if it denies all economically viable use of land or authorizes a physical taking. The County counters that the Goodwins' facial takings claim is not ripe under the Williamson County ripeness doctrine, as they have not sought compensation through available state mechanisms. Furthermore, the County argues that the Goodwins have improperly framed their claim as a due process challenge or as an unripe as-applied claim, asserting that the ordinance has not yet been enacted. The County also claims the Goodwins have not sufficiently alleged conduct that constitutes a taking. In response, the Goodwins argue that the County has waived this argument and assert that they have adequately stated a facial physical takings claim, demonstrating a constitutionally protected property interest in the dry sand area of their beach, which they allege is unlawfully invaded by the ordinance's enactment. Thus, they have sufficiently pled a facial physical takings claim.
The Court rejects the County's assertion that the Goodwins' claim is an as-applied challenge, emphasizing that a complaint must present sufficient factual matter to establish a plausible claim for relief. The County's ordinance implementing the customary use doctrine on privately owned beaches is alleged by the Goodwins to be facially unconstitutional, as it permits public access to private land, infringing on property rights, which traditionally include the power to exclude others. The Goodwins assert that the ordinance constitutes a taking of their private dry sand beach and do not limit their claim to their specific property, reinforcing the facial nature of the challenge.
The County's argument that the claim is invalid as a "substantially advances" regulatory taking is countered by the Court, which notes that while the Supreme Court has abandoned this particular type of claim, other facial takings claims remain valid. The Goodwins' claim is identified as a facial physical invasion taking, not a "substantially advances" claim, and therefore cannot be dismissed on that basis.
The Court also addresses the ripeness of the Goodwins' claim under the Williamson County doctrine, stating that it does not apply to facial challenges, which are considered ripe upon the passage of the relevant ordinance. Unlike as-applied challenges focused on compensation for specific property impacts, facial challenges are not contingent on the economic use deprivation of individual properties.
A facial physical takings claim is assessed based on whether legislation causes a per se taking of property under the Fifth Amendment, as established in relevant case law. Such claims are immediately ripe since they seek relief beyond mere compensation. The Goodwins have asserted a facial challenge against the Ordinance, alleging it unlawfully allows public invasion of their property, thus rendering their claim ripe for consideration.
The Goodwins seek a preliminary injunction against the County’s Customary Use Ordinance, set to take effect on April 1, 2017. The County contends that injunctive relief is not a viable remedy for takings claims and argues that the Goodwins have not met the necessary burden for such relief. However, the Court must first determine if injunctive relief is permissible for facial takings claims, noting that while the Takings Clause primarily allows for compensation, facial challenges can warrant injunctive and declaratory relief.
Case law supports that injunctive relief can be granted in certain situations, particularly where procedures for obtaining just compensation are inadequate. The Court concludes that injunctive relief may be available for facial takings claims. The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is at the district court's discretion, requiring the moving party to establish: 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable harm without the injunction; 3) that the balance of harms favors the moving party; and 4) that the injunction would not negatively impact the public interest.
A preliminary injunction is recognized as an extraordinary remedy requiring the movant to satisfy all four elements to warrant its issuance. Courts aim to preserve the status quo until a case can be adjudicated on its merits. In this instance, the Court determined that the Goodwins failed to demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction. Even if the Customary Use Ordinance is found unconstitutional, the Goodwins' remedies would be limited to declaratory and injunctive relief, not monetary compensation. A temporary taking, if it were to occur, could be addressed through just compensation, which is not being sought here, thus negating claims of irreparable harm. The Court noted that injuries are only irreparable if they cannot be remedied financially. Furthermore, the Goodwins' assertion regarding harm to their First Amendment rights was dismissed, as a preliminary injunction concerning the related Sign Ordinance has already been granted. Ultimately, the public interest outweighs the Goodwins' claims in the balance of harms analysis.
A preliminary injunction, if granted by the Court, could harm the public's interest if the County proves longstanding customary use of the beach, as this harm would be non-compensable. The Goodwins have not met two of the four necessary prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief—specifically, they failed to demonstrate irreparable injury or a favorable balance of harms against the public interest. Consequently, the Court denies the Goodwins' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and also denies the County’s Motion to Dismiss. The stay of discovery is lifted, allowing 45 days for completion.
The County argues that the Goodwins' as-applied challenge is unripe under the Williamson County ripeness doctrine due to failure to exhaust state remedies; however, since the Goodwins did not raise such a challenge, dismissal on these grounds is unnecessary. The Court finds that the ripeness argument is better suited for a jurisdictional dismissal rather than a failure to state a claim. Additionally, the Court deems the Goodwins' facial takings claim ripe, despite the County's assertion that the related ordinance is not effective until April 1, 2017.
The Court recognizes a tension in declaring the facial challenge ripe without just compensation being sought, emphasizing that facial takings claims are a unique exception to the compensation requirement. The Goodwins have not pursued just compensation, which would otherwise be an unripe as-applied challenge. If a taking occurs due to the Customary Use Ordinance, the government remains obligated to provide compensation for that period, irrespective of subsequent governmental actions.
