K.G. ex rel. Gosch v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School District

Citations: 244 F. Supp. 3d 904; 2017 WL 1098829; 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42171Docket: No. C 15-4242-MWB

Court: District Court, N.D. Iowa; March 23, 2017; Federal District Court

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The legal document addresses a case involving an incident where a special education teacher allegedly dragged a seven-year-old autistic child, KG, across a classroom, resulting in significant carpet burns. The core issues include the reasonableness of the teacher's actions and whether the parents’ claims are merely unexhausted claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) or valid claims under various legal frameworks, including constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and state common law.

The factual background outlines the Gosch family's circumstances, including parents Kevin and Suzie Gosch, their three children, and KG's adoption and health challenges related to autism. The defendants are identified as the Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School District and two school officials, Miranda Riediger and Kelly Adams. While Riediger is acknowledged to have special education training, the Gosches contest her qualifications, highlighting that she lacked specific "Mandt training" for managing problem behaviors prior to the incident.

The document also emphasizes the necessity of applying the United States Supreme Court's decision in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools to determine the exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA for non-IDEA claims. The procedural background details the administrative and judicial proceedings leading to the current motion for summary judgment, including the parties' arguments and the legal standards applicable to the case.

KG had minimal issues at Mapleton school, though he occasionally cried on the floor. The Gosches assert that no one at home or school had ever physically restrained him before moving to Sergeant Bluff. They claim that KG enjoyed his first semester teacher but disliked the special education room with Riediger, whom he described as "mean," a claim the defendants deny. The Gosches allege three prior incidents where school staff physically restrained KG, which the defendants dispute. KG had an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) and a Functional Behavior Assessment (FBA) identifying concerning behaviors such as crying and hitting, followed by a Behavior Intervention Plan (BIP) implemented in October 2013, which included a "Safety Plan" for escalating behaviors.

The incident in question occurred on January 30, 2014, when KG, resistant to transitioning from drawing to writing, lay on the floor. Riediger attempted various de-escalation techniques, including the "Incredible Five Point Scale" and "first/then" cards, but KG remained unresponsive, displaying flailing and whining behavior. As KG's behavior escalated, Riediger and paraprofessionals positioned themselves between him and the other students, who were not removed from the classroom during the incident. Disputes exist regarding the timing of student removal, the extent of KG's movement from the floor, and whether Riediger adjusted KG's shirt for safety or coverage. The interaction lasted approximately ten minutes.

Riediger intervened when KG appeared to be moving towards a heavy desk, attempting to guide him to an open area by placing her arms under his armpits. KG reacted by resisting, flailing, and kicking, prompting Riediger to grab his legs and move him. There is a dispute between the parties regarding the extent of KG’s movement, with the defendants asserting he was moved only four feet, while the Gosches claim he was dragged further due to Riediger's height. During this incident, KG cried out in pain, specifically stating, “ow, my back,” despite not having complained of back pain prior. Following the incident, KG was evaluated by medical professionals, who noted injuries consistent with forceful dragging, suggesting significant inflicted injuries beyond typical disciplinary actions. The defendants do not contest the medical findings but argue against the notion that KG's injuries were inflicted. 

Post-incident, KG exhibited increased behavioral issues, which the defendants attribute to factors unrelated to the incident, while the Gosches claim these changes are indicative of PTSD and other psychological effects stemming from the incident. The Gosches have since moved KG to a different school district. 

Procedurally, the Gosches filed an administrative complaint with the Iowa Department of Education (IDOE) on February 17, 2014, alleging violations related to the incident, including improper intervention by KG’s special education teacher and failure to follow his Behavior Intervention Plan (BIP). They contended that these actions denied KG a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and violated his procedural safeguards. The IDOE dismissed this complaint on July 7, 2014, and neither party sought judicial review of that decision. The defendants argue that the administrative proceedings are relevant to their claim that the Gosches did not exhaust administrative remedies.

On December 1, 2015, the Gosches initiated legal proceedings by filing a Complaint asserting six claims related to an incident on January 30, 2014. The claims include: 1) excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, against defendants Riediger and Adams under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) discrimination under Title II of the ADA, against the District; 3) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, against the District; 4) general negligence under Iowa common law, against Riediger, Adams, and the District; 5) intentional tort of battery under Iowa common law, against Riediger; and 6) intentional infliction of severe emotional distress under Iowa common law, against Riediger, Adams, and the District. 

The defendants filed an Answer on December 23, 2015, denying the allegations and claiming several affirmative defenses, including failure to exhaust administrative remedies and immunity for both individual defendants and the District regarding common-law claims. A trial is scheduled for May 30, 2017. 

Subsequent to the initial proceedings, the defendants submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 23, 2016, followed by a Corrected Motion on January 20, 2017. Their motion contended that the Gosches failed to exhaust remedies under the IDEA, lacked factual support for the excessive force claim, that the individual defendants enjoyed qualified immunity, and that the Gosches did not demonstrate a denial of benefits based on disability for their disability claims. Additionally, the defendants argued that the common-law tort claims were insufficient. The Gosches submitted a Resistance to the motion on February 10, 2017, with the defendants replying on February 17, 2017. The legal analysis will address the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment concerning all claims, including the claim of failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA.

Summary judgment is granted only when the record, including pleadings, depositions, and affidavits, demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, per Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The movant must inform the court of the motion's basis and pinpoint evidence showing the absence of any genuine issues. The nonmovant, in turn, must present specific facts to establish a genuine issue for trial, rather than merely suggesting doubt about the material facts. The district judge assesses whether a genuine dispute exists while considering the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Credibility assessments and evidence weighing are jury responsibilities. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence does not support a finding for the nonmovant, and only disputes that could impact the case's outcome under the law prevent summary judgment. It is particularly suited for cases involving solely legal questions. 

In the context of the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, they argue that the Gosches cannot pursue their claims due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA, asserting that the Gosches’ non-IDEA claims effectively seek remedies available under IDEA, thus necessitating exhaustion. The Gosches counter that their claims do not require exhaustion under prevailing law and assert they have satisfied any requirement by filing a state complaint.

The analysis addresses the issue of administrative exhaustion requirements under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools. The author notes that the parties' briefs were submitted before the Fry decision, and thus only the implications of Fry on the Gosches' claims will be considered, avoiding any superseded authorities. Fry clarified the exhaustion requirement for claims under laws other than the IDEA, stating that exhaustion is not required if the core issue of the suit lies outside the IDEA's guarantee of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 

Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, emphasized that while the IDEA does not limit rights provided by other federal laws, plaintiffs must exhaust IDEA's administrative procedures if seeking relief available under the IDEA. The Eighth Circuit has applied the Fry decision in J.M. v. Francis Howell School District, but has not definitively addressed whether Fry overrules previous exhaustion tests in the Circuit. The upcoming analysis will evaluate the Fry test, its application in J.M., and its relevance to the current case.

Justice Kagan clarified that the first portion of 1415(l) acknowledges the independence of federal statutes like the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act as valid legal avenues for protecting the rights of disabled children, complementing the IDEA. Importantly, it allows plaintiffs to pursue claims under these laws even if they relate to the denial of appropriate public education, as established in *Smith v. Robinson*. However, the latter half of 1415(l) introduces an exhaustion requirement, mandating that claims under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act must first exhaust IDEA’s administrative processes if they seek relief also available under the IDEA.

The case in question involves the Frys, whose child, E.F., was denied access to her service dog in school, prompting them to file an administrative complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, alleging violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The OCR supported their claim, yet the family chose to enroll E.F. in a different public school due to concerns about the original school’s administration. Subsequently, they filed a lawsuit against the local school districts, alleging discrimination and emotional harm.

The district court dismissed the case for failing to exhaust IDEA claims, a decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. The Supreme Court took up the case to clarify the exhaustion requirement under 1415(l). Justice Kagan summarized the Court's conclusion that plaintiffs must exhaust IDEA procedures before filing under the ADA or similar laws when seeking relief for a denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). The determination of whether a suit seeks such relief hinges on the substance of the complaint.

Justice Kagan clarified that under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the exhaustion requirement outlined in 1415(l) is triggered only when a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). If a plaintiff claims a FAPE denial, they must first seek resolution from an IDEA hearing officer, regardless of the statute under which the lawsuit is filed, such as the Rehabilitation Act. Conversely, if a lawsuit addresses issues unrelated to FAPE, such as different forms of harm stemming from a school’s conduct, the exhaustion of IDEA procedures is not necessary, as a hearing officer would not provide relief for those issues. 

Determining whether a plaintiff's complaint seeks relief for a FAPE denial hinges on the essence or gravamen of the complaint, not merely on the language used. Courts must focus on the actual claims rather than superficial wording, as the gravamen must reflect a need for redress related to a FAPE. A complaint framed under a different statute without the specific IDEA terminology does not automatically circumvent the exhaustion requirement, as the substantive issues at stake must be assessed. Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion when the core complaint relates to a school's failure to provide a FAPE, regardless of the form of pleading.

A court must consider various statutes related to persons with disabilities, including the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The IDEA provides tailored educational services, while Title II of the ADA and Section 504 ensure nondiscriminatory access to public institutions. Justice Kagan emphasized two hypothetical questions to determine the essence of a complaint against a school: whether a similar claim could be made at a non-school public facility and whether an adult could raise the same grievance. If the answer is yes, the complaint likely does not involve a denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). Conversely, if the answer is no, it likely pertains to a FAPE issue, as only children in school settings have claims rooted in FAPE obligations.

Additionally, the history of proceedings can indicate whether the gravamen of a suit is a FAPE denial. A plaintiff's prior use of IDEA's administrative procedures may suggest the intent to seek relief for a FAPE denial, even if the term is not explicitly used. However, a shift to judicial proceedings before exhausting administrative remedies could reflect strategic decisions rather than a change in the nature of the claim. The Court noted that prior pursuit of administrative remedies often indicates a FAPE-related claim. The Court found that the lower decisions did not apply this analysis and remanded the issue for further examination. Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, expressed concern that Justice Kagan's two clues might confuse lower courts regarding the relationship between IDEA claims and other federal claims, suggesting that they could lead to misunderstanding about available relief.

The excerpt critiques a proposed clue for lower courts regarding the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), suggesting that the abandonment of IDEA procedures by parents may not indicate a lack of merit in their claims. It argues that parents might shift to other legal avenues, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act, due to a lack of available relief under IDEA, changing legal advice, or a change in their desired remedies. The author expresses concern that courts might misinterpret these "clues" as definitive tests, potentially overlooking the true nature of plaintiffs' claims, which should focus on the substantive issues rather than procedural technicalities.

The excerpt also references the Eighth Circuit's handling of the Fry case, particularly in J.M. v. Francis Howell School District, where a parent alleged that her disabled child faced excessive physical restraints without her knowledge. Initially asserting multiple claims, the parent ultimately focused on claims under the Equal Protection Clause and various disability rights statutes. The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's conclusion that the complaint centered on a denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under IDEA, as the allegations clearly indicated a claim of educational denial related to the child’s disabilities, consistent with the definitions provided in the Act.

The ADA and Section 504 prohibit discrimination based on disability in public entities and federally funded programs, but the complaint in this case does not center on disability discrimination, except for Count IV related to the MHRA claim. Instead, the complaint focuses on the failure to provide adequate supportive services that would allow J.M. to benefit from education, resulting in a denial of access to public education. Although the plaintiff did not formally invoke the IDEA's procedures, prior complaints included IDEA claims, indicating the core issue relates to the denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). The court noted that the plaintiff voluntarily removed common-law tort claims for noneducational injuries and emphasized that the child’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) was central to the litigation, as it was alleged that the defendants violated the IEP by using isolation and restraint, which were not permitted. An unresolved issue from the Supreme Court’s Fry decision is whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required when a plaintiff seeks monetary damages for emotional distress rather than educational services, with the Eighth Circuit affirming that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement generally applies regardless of the type of relief sought. The plaintiff’s choice to pursue compensatory and punitive damages instead of educational services does not exempt them from this requirement. The complaint also references the IDEA, asserting K.G.'s eligibility for special education services due to his disability and identifying Riediger as a special education teacher.

Responsibilities outlined for the involved parties included providing the necessary structure for K.G., a child with emotional, cognitive, and developmental disabilities, to access appropriate education and progress academically, emotionally, and behaviorally. Specifically, Adams was tasked with hiring, training, and supervising school staff to ensure equal access to public education for all students at Primary School. The Complaint emphasizes the need for special education services and the duty to guarantee equal access, but it does not assert a denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as a central dispute. 

Among the 29 paragraphs of factual allegations, only one addresses a violation of K.G.'s Individualized Education Program (IEP) or Behavior Implementation Plan (BIP) under the IDEA. This paragraph alleges that Defendant Riediger unlawfully used physical force against K.G. on January 30, 2014, despite K.G. not posing an emergency threat that would justify such actions. Riediger acknowledged to police that K.G. did not make contact with her or other students before the incident. The Complaint asserts that Riediger's forceful actions contravened K.G.'s IEP, which did not allow for such measures, and outlines the appropriate de-escalation procedures in the BIP.

The primary issue raised in the Complaint is not the violation of IDEA but rather the unlawful and unreasonable use of physical force against K.G. The allegation regarding the IEP and BIP serves to highlight the unreasonableness of Riediger's actions rather than forming the basis of the wrongful conduct. The central claims for relief focus on violations of K.G.'s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, asserting that Riediger's actions constituted unjustified and excessive force, with an emphasis on the objective unreasonableness of her conduct relative to K.G.'s educational goals.

The excerpt addresses several legal claims against SBLCSD and its staff regarding the treatment of KG, a student with disabilities. The allegations focus on the unreasonableness of actions taken by Riediger, specifically the use of unjustified and unreasonable force against KG. The claim under § 1983 highlights Adams's deliberate indifference to the risks posed by inadequate training and supervision regarding the use of force and restraint on special education students.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim centers on discrimination and the creation of a hostile educational environment for KG due to his disabilities. The SBLCSD is accused of failing to provide equal access to educational services as required under Title II, contributing to a hostile environment.

Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act claim asserts that the Gosches faced denial of equal access and a hostile educational environment, violating KG's rights under Section 504. The common-law negligence claim alleges that KG was subjected to unwarranted physical force, along with negligent supervision and failure to ensure his safety, all exceeding the obligations of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE).

Additionally, the claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are based on threats of violence and physical harm, independent of any FAPE requirements. Riediger is specifically accused of intentionally threatening KG, causing him physical injury, and placing him in reasonable apprehension of harmful contact.

The allegations against the defendants include intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming their conduct was reckless, outrageous, and showed a wanton disregard for the rights and safety of the plaintiff, K.G. The essence of the Gosches' claims diverges from seeking relief for a denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), as suggested by Justice Kagan's framework in Fry. The claims could have been made regarding excessive force and discrimination even if the incidents occurred elsewhere, indicating that the complaint may not genuinely pertain to FAPE denial. Although the Gosches initially pursued administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for violations of K.G.'s Individualized Education Program (IEP) and Behavioral Intervention Plan (BIP), they later abandoned these proceedings. This shift suggests that their grievances extend beyond the IDEA's scope, as noted by the Fry majority and concurring justices, who indicated that parents may realize their claims relate to other legal remedies after consulting with counsel. Consequently, the Gosches' decision to pursue claims outside the IDEA framework is valid, focusing on the wrongful conduct and appropriate relief available under different laws.

Regarding the Section 1983 claims, the defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment, asserting the Eighth Circuit aligns with other circuits by applying a “shocks the conscience” standard under the Fourteenth Amendment for excessive force by school officials, rather than a “reasonableness” standard from the Fourth Amendment. They contend that Riediger's actions in responding to K.G. were neither shocking nor irrational, framing her response as a reasonable, split-second decision made to prevent potential harm. The defendants assert there is no evidence of malice or bad faith in Riediger’s actions.

The Gosches argue that their claims under the Fourteenth Amendment for excessive force are legally insufficient, primarily because the defendants have only sought summary judgment on this claim, while the Gosches maintain they have valid claims under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They assert that a Fourth Amendment claim is applicable due to an unreasonable seizure, illustrated by Riediger's action of dragging KG toward the “chill out zone.” The Gosches cite Eighth Circuit precedent which establishes that claims against school officials can be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard concerning restraints and seclusion, and under the Fourteenth Amendment's standard when actions "shock the conscience."

Specifically, the Gosches contend that Riediger's actions were clearly unreasonable, highlighted by expert testimony stating that dragging a student was inappropriate according to "Mandt training." They also argue that the use of force was unnecessary in this situation, emphasizing the serious physical and psychological injuries suffered by KG, who has pre-existing autism and communication disorders. Furthermore, there is a suggestion of malice in Riediger's pattern of behavior.

The Eighth Circuit has recognized that both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims can arise from the actions of school officials. A litigant may assert a Fourth Amendment violation by demonstrating an unreasonable seizure, and the protections of this amendment extend to public school officials’ actions. Additionally, a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment can be made if a school official's conduct is both violative of fundamental rights and shocking to the conscience. The defendants' claim that a Fourth Amendment violation cannot be established in this context is incorrect as a matter of law. The court will analyze the Gosches' claims to determine if they can withstand the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Context is critical for analyzing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, particularly in school settings, where there is a custodial and tutelary responsibility over students. A “seizure” is defined as the intentional application of physical force that restrains an individual's freedom of movement. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes that a child can be considered seized when physically restrained by a teacher. The defendants argued for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs' claim was unrecognized in the Circuit; however, this argument was determined to be legally erroneous.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are legal questions without genuine factual disputes. The defendants failed to demonstrate the absence of a material fact issue, while the plaintiffs presented evidence that the teacher, Riediger, physically restrained a child, KG, by dragging him along the floor, thereby restricting his movement. This act qualifies as a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the plaintiffs generated material fact issues regarding the “unreasonableness” of the seizure, as the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry must consider the school's responsibilities.

Expert opinions indicated that dragging a child is an improper disciplinary action, and medical evidence suggested that KG’s injuries were consistent with excessive force beyond acceptable care for a child. Thus, there remain unresolved factual issues regarding the reasonableness of Riediger's actions, which must be determined by a jury.

Riediger's conduct is characterized as a significant deviation from professional standards, as there is no authorization in KG's Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the use of force to move him, such as grabbing his ankles. The Gosches have established genuine material issues regarding Adams' alleged deliberate indifference to the risks associated with inadequate training and supervision of staff in restraint techniques for special education students. Evidence suggests Adams had previously dragged KG and failed to ensure Riediger received necessary training before the incident. Consequently, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied concerning the Fourth Amendment claim.

Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, the Gosches must demonstrate that a government official's actions violated fundamental constitutional rights in a manner that is shocking to the conscience. The standard for proving this claim is stringent, focusing on severe and disproportionate violations of personal rights that reflect malice or sadism. The defendants have initially shown that Riediger's actions—believing he was preventing harm—were not shocking or irrational, as he took immediate action and ceased when KG expressed pain. However, the Gosches countered with expert opinions indicating that Riediger's method of dragging KG was inappropriate and disproportionate, along with evidence suggesting the situation escalated gradually rather than requiring an urgent response. Despite these arguments, it was determined that there is insufficient evidence to establish that Riediger acted with malice.

To establish a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's actions were motivated by malice or sadism, rather than being merely reckless or overly zealous. While Riediger's actions were intentional, as required for a Fourth Amendment claim, there is insufficient evidence to infer malice. The Eighth Circuit has ruled that malice cannot be inferred without evidence of animus towards the victim, and the evidence presented—KG's perception of Riediger as "mean"—does not suffice to establish such animus. Furthermore, although Riediger was not the first to use force against KG, there is no indication of a pattern suggesting negative intent. The severity of KG's injuries does not imply malice; rather, they are consistent with carelessness or excessive zeal. Notably, Riediger attempted various de-escalation techniques before physically moving KG and ceased actions upon observing KG's pain, seeking medical assistance thereafter.

The defendants are thus entitled to summary judgment concerning the Gosches' Fourteenth Amendment claim. Additionally, the defendants assert that they should be granted qualified immunity, arguing that reasonable individuals would not have perceived Riediger's conduct as a violation of constitutional rights, given his attempts to de-escalate and his focus on KG's safety. The Gosches counter that it is a well-established right for students to be free from restraint and mistreatment, arguing that no reasonable special education teacher would consider it lawful to drag a disabled child in a harmful manner. The Eighth Circuit's precedent clarifies that qualified immunity protects state actors unless they violate clearly established rights known to a reasonable person, with the court previously addressing only the violation aspect, not the knowledge of a reasonable person regarding the violation of rights.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity regarding the Fourteenth Amendment claim due to the absence of a violation. Even if there were genuine issues of material fact about a violation, the defendants would still qualify for immunity under the "reasonable person" standard. The court cites Mathers v. Wright, where qualified immunity was denied to a school official for conduct motivated by improper reasons. Although there were disputes about whether Riediger’s actions exceeded acceptable professional choices, the court found no genuine issues of fact regarding improper motivation, allowing for summary judgment for the defendants on the Fourteenth Amendment claim.

Regarding the disability discrimination claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, defendants claim entitlement to summary judgment, arguing that KG was denied a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) but continues to receive one through another district. The Gosches counter that this perspective overlooks the distinct obligations under IDEA and the non-discrimination mandates of Section 504 and the ADA. They assert that KG faced a hostile educational environment due to his disability, which persists despite his enrollment elsewhere. The Eighth Circuit has affirmed that remedies under both ADA and Section 504 are equivalent and that plaintiffs must demonstrate bad faith or gross misjudgment by school officials in cases involving educational services for disabled children. The court ultimately rejects the defendants' argument for summary judgment based solely on KG's current educational services in another district, stating that the core of the Gosches’ claims is not about the denial of a FAPE.

Allegations under the ADA and Section 504 focus on creating a hostile environment for a disabled student rather than on educational services, meaning a showing of bad faith is unnecessary. The defendants cannot obtain summary judgment on the Gosches' disability discrimination claims. The Gosches also assert Iowa common-law claims, including general negligence against Riediger, Adams, and the District; battery against Riediger; and intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants. 

In the negligence claim, the Gosches argue the defendants breached their duty of care through negligent supervision, investigation of wrongdoing, and failing to ensure KG's safety. The defendants counter that the Gosches lack evidence that the District or Adams failed to supervise Riediger or that any failure caused KG's injuries. They assert that Riediger's actions were not foreseeable. The Gosches argue that Riediger's conduct was foreseeable as Adams had previously engaged in similar behavior, suggesting that injuries from such actions were predictable. The court finds that the Gosches have raised sufficient evidence to create a jury question regarding the reasonableness of Riediger's actions and foreseeability of injury, but the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the negligent investigation claim.

On the battery claim, the defendants seek summary judgment as well.

Riediger is claimed to be immune from criminal liability under Iowa Code § 280.21(2) for taking reasonable actions to protect students, as she believed KG posed a risk of harming herself or others. The Gosches contest this immunity, arguing that Riediger’s actions were unreasonable. A reasonable juror could conclude that Riediger's conduct did not meet the standards of reasonableness required to invoke immunity under Iowa law, thus denying the defendants’ request for summary judgment on the battery claim.

Regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the defendants argue that moving KG away from danger was not outrageous conduct, while the Gosches assert that Riediger abused her authority over KG, rendering her actions outrageous. The court, referencing Iowa Supreme Court precedent, determined that Riediger's conduct did not shock the conscience or appear malicious, thereby granting summary judgment to the defendants on this claim.

In conclusion, while some of the Gosches' claims will proceed to trial, the court recognizes the complexity of the case and the challenging circumstances teachers face. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is partially granted and partially denied: it is denied concerning the failure to exhaust claims under the IDEA, as the Gosches are not required to exhaust non-IDEA claims according to the Fry test.

The defendants' motion has been partially granted and partially denied regarding the claims made by the Gosches. The motion is denied for the Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 and for the disability discrimination claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The motion is granted for the Fourteenth Amendment claim under Section 1983, for the portion of the general negligence claim based on negligent investigation, and for the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Additionally, the motion is denied regarding the battery claim. 

The court notes a dispute between the parties about attempts to contact KG’s parents and the events that occurred at the school when Kevin Gosch arrived, including statements made by Riediger and Adams. However, these issues were not addressed in the parties' statements of material facts. It is acknowledged that Kevin Gosch did pick up KG from school after KG visited the school nurse. 

The court provides a comparison of the IDEA, which specifically protects children and adolescents in educational settings, with Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibit disability-based discrimination for individuals of all ages in public and federally funded programs. The defendants' argument regarding qualified immunity is only relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, and even if presented for the Fourth Amendment claim, it is likely to have been denied. The Iowa Code 280.21(2) grants immunity to school employees from civil or criminal liability for reasonable physical contact with students that is necessary for protection.