Court: District Court, D. Connecticut; March 20, 2017; Federal District Court
The court granted Defendant Makita U.S.A. Inc.'s motions for summary judgment and to exclude Plaintiff Eustathios Karavitis's expert testimony in a products liability case under Connecticut’s Product Liability Act. Initially, the court had denied these motions without prejudice, allowing re-filing to address recent legal developments. Subsequently, Makita filed supplemental motions, which Karavitis opposed, referencing prior exhibits.
Factual background reveals that Makita is a global manufacturer of power tools, including circular saws. Karavitis, a Connecticut resident with a business degree, has extensive experience in home renovation and has used various power tools. He purchased a Makita Circular Model Saw 5007 NBA around 1998, which came with an instruction manual he reviewed upon purchase. The manual contained critical safety guidelines, including the importance of using clamps for stability, keeping hands away from the cutting area, maintaining a firm grip with both hands, and positioning the body safely to avoid kickback. It explained that kickback occurs when the blade misaligns and emphasized the need for proper handling to prevent serious injury.
Plaintiff was unable to recall whether the Circular Saw had any warnings during his deposition, although a warning label was present stating: "DANGER: Keep hands away from blade." He had used the saw over 50 times, possibly exceeding 100, for home improvement projects without issues prior to March 17, 2013. Aside from replacing a dull blade and reinforcing the electrical cord, he made no alterations to the saw. On March 17, 2013, after 15 years of ownership, he used the saw to cut a piece of trim at his mother’s house. He did not follow the instructions to clamp the wood and instead supported it with his left hand in front of the blade. During the operation, the saw "kicked back," resulting in a cut to his left thumb. After the injury, he stopped the saw, treated his wound, and drove to the hospital, where he received stitches and later underwent additional surgery. He continued follow-up care and physical therapy, reporting ongoing pain and limited mobility in his thumb.
Regarding the expert testimony, Plaintiff submitted a report by expert Lewis Barbe for his products liability claims. The Court is reviewing Defendant’s motion to exclude this expert testimony, noting that such motions serve to determine the relevance and admissibility of evidence before trial, as outlined by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Evidence should only be excluded if it is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.
Expert witness testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 if it meets four criteria: (1) the expert's specialized knowledge aids the trier of fact; (2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) it arises from reliable principles and methods; and (4) the expert has applied these principles reliably to the case facts. Although Rule 702 promotes a liberal admissibility standard for expert opinions, it also mandates evidentiary reliability for scientific and technical matters. Trial judges have broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable measure of reliability, with evidentiary opinions needing to be beneficial to the trier of fact, as outlined in Rules 701 and 702, while Rule 403 allows for the exclusion of evidence that wastes time or is misleading. Experts cannot merely reiterate admissible evidence without personal knowledge and must not be presented solely to create a factual narrative based on existing evidence. The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by potential unfair prejudice, confusion, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Unfair prejudice refers to an undue tendency to suggest decisions based on improper, often emotional, bases. The connection between the scientific evidence and the inquiry is critical for admissibility, as established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In the case at hand, the defendant seeks to exclude the expert testimony of Barbe, arguing that he lacks the necessary qualifications regarding circular saws and that his conclusions are not based on acceptable methodology. The court must evaluate the expert's credentials, ensuring that any scientific evidence presented is not only relevant but also reliable. A witness is deemed qualified if they possess superior knowledge, education, experience, or skills related to the subject of their testimony.
Expert qualifications must directly relate to the opinions presented. The determination of an expert's qualifications requires a comparison of their specialized knowledge, skills, experience, or education with the subject matter of their testimony. In Diallo, an expert was deemed qualified despite never visiting Benin due to relevant advisory experience regarding gold export policies. Conversely, in Duchimaza, an expert's 22 years of experience in retailer compliance was insufficient for qualification in EBT fraud identification.
Barbe claims a Bachelor of Science in Fire Protection and Safety Engineering from IIT, but does not provide sufficient details about his coursework to establish expertise in circular saw safety. His degree suggests expertise in fire safety rather than in mechanical or circular saw design safety. IIT's current offerings include a Graduate Certificate in the same field, focused on fire safety rather than relevant mechanical engineering.
The Court finds no evidence that Barbe’s degree or credentials provide him with superior knowledge in the safety of circular saws, particularly regarding riving knives and warning adequacy. Despite holding multiple certifications and memberships, Barbe’s CV lacks details about the requirements for these credentials and their relevance to circular saw safety. His most relevant experience, a past membership in the Fraternal Order of Foresters, occurred a decade prior and lacks specifics on evaluations of circular saws. Therefore, the Court cannot ascertain the relevance or support for Barbe’s qualifications as an expert in this area.
Barbe does not qualify as a relevant expert due to vague and insufficient descriptions of his experience. His broad claim of being a safety engineer lacks specific details regarding the products, processes, operations, and services he has worked with. Although he has over 25 years as a consulting engineer and has taught courses on saw safety, he provides no information on the timing, location, curriculum, or relevance of these courses to fire safety or circular saw design safety. Additionally, Barbe does not demonstrate experience with riving knives or warning label analysis. His professional affiliations are either irrelevant or inadequately described, making it unclear if they pertain to his qualifications.
The Plaintiff has not proven that Barbe possesses the necessary knowledge, skill, or education to offer credible expert opinions on the safe design of handheld circular saws, riving knives, and warning labels. Barbe's own expert report and deposition indicate critical errors, including reliance on safety standards that do not apply to handheld power tools and standards that were not in effect at the time of the saw's purchase. These missteps could confuse a jury and undermine the reliability of his testimony. Although Barbe may have qualifications in other areas, the Plaintiff failed to establish his expertise relevant to this case.
Barbe’s analyses regarding the Circular Saw’s design defect and warning label also do not meet the standards for admissible expert testimony as outlined in Daubert. The reliability of an expert’s analysis is assessed based on factors such as testability, peer review, adherence to operational standards, error rates, and acceptance within the scientific community.
Expert testimony that lacks scientific certainty must still be evaluated by the court for intellectual rigor, potentially using Daubert factors. Trial judges should exclude expert opinions that are speculative or based on unrealistic assumptions, as established in various case law. An expert's analysis, whether derived from experience or methodology, must not show an excessive analytical gap between the data and opinions presented.
In the case involving the plaintiff's expert, Barbe, he claims to have used accepted safety engineering principles in his analysis of the Circular Saw. His methodology included reviewing design performance for hazard identification, establishing control barriers, and attempting to eliminate hazards while maintaining product function. Barbe's report details his examination process: interviewing the plaintiff, inspecting the saw, conducting a "trap guard" test, attending a defense expert's inspection, and reviewing various related materials.
During his deposition, Barbe described the "trap guard" test and explained his operational tests with the saw, which included turning it off and on and cutting wood similar to what the plaintiff was using at the time of the injury. However, he did not document his tests or take precise measurements. He also observed further tests by the defense expert but did not conduct any studies on how the saw would behave during kickback with or without a riving knife. Barbe has not demonstrated that his tests are widely accepted for assessing the safety of similar portable circular saws or that a riving knife would enhance safety.
Barbe has not demonstrated that additional tests were necessary to assess the safety of the Circular Saw or the effectiveness of a riving knife. His report references various publications indicating that riving knives are intended to reduce kickback and are mandatory for hand saws in other countries, but fails to provide context or analysis. A cited statement from a 1978 publication notes the purpose of a riving knife but does not establish it as an essential safety feature or an industry standard at the time the Circular Saw was produced. Barbe’s mention of foreign manufacturing standards lacks comparative analysis with the saw in question, leaving the relevance of these statements unclear and rendering them unhelpful. His report does not include a thorough examination of accepted safety tests or results pertaining to the Circular Saw, making his conclusions less useful for fact-finding. Furthermore, Barbe's assertion of being a safety engineer does not suffice to validate his opinions under the Daubert standard.
Additionally, Barbe's analysis regarding the sufficiency of warnings on the Circular Saw and in its manual is also inadequate as an expert opinion. He claims the absence of "danger signal words" without defining them or justifying their necessity based on his expertise or established community standards among safety engineers. His report briefly mentions a duty to warn based on safety engineering principles, asserting that Makita failed to comply with the American National Standard Z 535.4 regarding safety signs and labels, which he claims contributed to the incident, but this assertion lacks the necessary substantiation to support his conclusions.
Barbe did not provide details on the safety sign and label requirements under ANSI Z 535.4, nor could he claim these requirements applied to the Circular Saw, as ANSI Z 535.4 was established after the saw's manufacture. He acknowledged that while the standard was not in effect at the time, it did not alter the industry's intent or state of the art regarding warning labels. Barbe failed to cite any applicable warning standards or authority to support his views on industry practices. Although he confirmed that the warning label on the Circular Saw contained required signal words like "Warning," "Danger," and "Caution," he argued that these should be accompanied by explanations of the consequences of neglecting the warnings. However, he did not clarify if such explanations were part of the signal words requirement at the time of the saw's purchase. Furthermore, while the Circular Saw's warning label lacked justifications, the instruction manual provided them, including clear safety instructions. Barbe did not opine on whether justifications in the manual sufficed or needed to be on the product itself. He mentioned that the warnings could be larger or in red but did not support these claims with any data, knowledge, or industry standards. Overall, Barbe's conclusions regarding the sufficiency of Makita's warnings and their relation to the Plaintiff's injury lack reliable methodology and evidence.
The Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Barbe's report is granted due to his lack of qualifications regarding handheld circular saw safety, the need for riving knives, and the adequacy of warning labels. Barbe's report failed to provide a coherent analysis supporting his conclusions that the Circular Saw was unsafe without a riving knife or that its warnings were inadequate. His deposition did not clarify these deficiencies, making an evidentiary hearing unnecessary.
In relation to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the court will grant this motion if it finds no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, entitling the movant to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must prove the absence of factual issues, and the court must interpret evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. To oppose summary judgment, the plaintiff must present admissible evidence; mere allegations or unsupported assertions are insufficient. The court will not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, as these are jury functions. Summary judgment cannot be denied based solely on minimal evidence, and the court must determine whether genuine factual issues exist that require a trial.
A recent shift in legal standards requires judges to assess whether there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find in favor of the party bearing the burden of proof, rather than merely determining if any evidence exists. Summary judgment can be granted if the evidence necessitates a directed verdict for the moving party. Parties disputing a fact must substantiate their claims with specific references to recorded evidence, which may include various forms of documentation. If a party fails to support their assertion appropriately, the court may grant summary judgment based on undisputed facts. In the context of a motion for summary judgment regarding a Circular Saw design defect claim, the plaintiff alleges that the saw lacked a riving knife, creating a risk of kickback. The defendant argues that the plaintiff's alternative design theory requires expert testimony, which the plaintiff's expert lacks. The plaintiff contends that expert testimony is not legally necessary and asserts that an alternative design would have prevented the injury. Upon reviewing the evidence, the court finds no genuine issues of fact that would prevent granting summary judgment.
Products liability claims in Connecticut are governed by five essential elements: (1) the defendant sells the product; (2) the product is in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition; (3) the defect caused the injury for which compensation is sought; (4) the defect existed at the time of sale; and (5) the product reached the consumer without substantial change. The determination of "unreasonably dangerous" employs two tests: the risk-utility test and the consumer expectation test. The risk-utility test is the primary method, where a product is deemed defective if (1) a reasonable alternative design could have reduced the risk of harm, and consideration is given to feasibility and the impact on the product's utility and safety; or (2) the design is so unreasonably dangerous that a reasonable consumer would not purchase it if aware of the risks. The consumer expectation test, used in res ipsa loquitor cases, assesses whether the product is dangerous beyond what an ordinary consumer would expect, based on common knowledge of its characteristics. The fact finder evaluates the balance of risk and benefit for both tests.
A product must meet minimum safety expectations when used as intended, informed by consumer experience, seller representations, and safety laws. In this case, the Circular Saw was used without incident approximately 50 times over 15 years, indicating it does not fail to meet these expectations. The risk-utility test may or may not require expert testimony, but even absent such a requirement, summary judgment is appropriate. The Plaintiff's only claims of design defect are based on a warning in the instruction manual about kickback and the existence of a European model with a riving knife. However, these claims lack authority linking warnings to design defects and contradict expert opinions that the warnings were adequate. The Plaintiff has not provided evidence that a reasonable alternative design existed that would have mitigated risks, nor that the alternative model (Makita 5903R) was available when the Circular Saw was manufactured. The Defendant argues the Plaintiff's exhibits are inadmissible, further weakening the case for a design defect.
Plaintiffs failed to establish that the Makita 5903R was available in 1990, nor did they demonstrate that its design would reduce the risk of harm compared to the Makita 5007NBA. The assertion that a riving knife would prevent kickback and protect the user’s fingers is unsupported, as the only reference cited is Barbe’s report, which has been excluded from evidence. Plaintiff admitted to not following safety instructions, including failing to clamp down wood and not maintaining a proper grip on the saw, undermining any claim that proper use would have prevented injury. The court, adhering to precedent, only considers admissible evidence in summary judgment. Exhibits B and C were not properly authenticated as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 901, making them inadmissible. Plaintiff's arguments regarding the saw's design defect rely solely on Barbe's excluded report and deposition, without evidence showing the risk of harm from the lack of a riving knife exceeds the product’s utility. The saw had been used safely by Plaintiff for 15 years prior to the incident, indicating substantial utility. Consequently, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the design defect claim is granted. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege a failure to warn regarding the saw's dangers, claiming that warnings provided were inadequate.
Defendant argues for summary judgment on Plaintiff's failure to warn claim, asserting that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate how a different warning would have changed his behavior to prevent injury. Plaintiff contends that Makita's warnings were inadequate, suggesting that an appropriate warning could have influenced his use of the saw. To support the failure to warn claim, Plaintiff relies on Barbe's report and deposition. The legal framework for failure to warn claims mirrors that of design defect claims, requiring proof of five elements: 1) the defendant sold the product, 2) it was defective and unreasonably dangerous, 3) the defect caused the injury, 4) the defect existed at sale, and 5) the product reached the consumer without substantial alteration.
At the second step of the failure to warn analysis, factors to assess the adequacy of warnings include: 1) the likelihood of harm from the product, 2) the seller's ability to foresee user awareness of risks, and 3) the feasibility and cost of providing warnings. The claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that adequate warnings would have prevented the harm. Connecticut law does not require expert testimony to establish a warning’s inadequacy, though it may be necessary when the issues exceed common knowledge. Cited case law supports that expert testimony is not universally required for all failure to warn claims, but the court has not conclusively ruled on its necessity for this particular case.
The key issue is whether a jury could evaluate the risks of a product without expert testimony, particularly regarding the adequacy of its warnings. The Court has excluded the Plaintiff's expert, who indicated that the average consumer is unlikely to know about a "riving knife," and there is no other evidence to suggest that the risks of kickback from circular saws without such a feature are recognizable to a jury. Consequently, expert testimony is deemed necessary to determine if Makita's warnings and instructions were defective.
Expert testimony is also mandated to establish causation regarding the injury, although it is not universally required for all defective warning claims. The Court recognizes that causation questions are typically for the jury, but can become a legal issue when only one conclusion is reasonable. In this case, the Plaintiff’s admission of not reading the safety instructions or following them at the time of injury is pivotal, undermining his claim that additional warnings would have made a difference.
The Plaintiff relies solely on his expert's report, which the Court finds insufficient, as the expert could not confirm if different warnings would have prevented the injury. Additionally, the Plaintiff had not reviewed the instruction manual in 15 years and could not recall the warnings on the saw. This lack of engagement with the warnings leads to the conclusion that no reasonable person could assert that alternative warnings would alter the Plaintiff's behavior and prevent the injury. Expert testimony is particularly critical here due to multiple factors contributing to the injury, including the Plaintiff's improper handling of the saw, as he admitted to not using two hands and failing to secure the wood, contrary to the instructions.
Plaintiff's failure to provide a credible expert precludes establishing that Makita's warnings were defective or that such defects caused his injury, leading to the granting of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the failure to warn claim. Additionally, while the Complaint does not specify claims, it implies design defect and failure to warn, which similarly merit summary judgment. To prove a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the product is unfit for its ordinary purposes. The Plaintiff failed to present evidence questioning the Circular Saw’s suitability, having used it safely over 50 times before the accident. Similarly, to prove breach of express warranty, Plaintiff must show an affirmation of fact or promise was made, but no evidence was provided that the Circular Saw was unsafe or ineffective. Furthermore, any claims for breach of warranty are time-barred since the Circular Saw was purchased 15 years before the accident and 16 years before litigation commenced. As no factual questions exist regarding the implied warranty of merchantability or express warranties of safety and effectiveness, summary judgment is granted for any additional claims in the Complaint. Consequently, Defendant's motions to exclude expert testimony and for summary judgment are granted, and the Clerk is instructed to close the case. The Court’s understanding of Plaintiff's injury is based on deposition testimony, as medical records were not filed during the Summary Judgment briefing.
