Court: District Court, D. New Mexico; March 16, 2017; Federal District Court
The United States District Judge Robert C. Brack issued a memorandum opinion and order adopting the Chief Magistrate Judge Karen B. Molzen's proposed findings and recommended disposition regarding Plaintiff Leonard Rivera's Social Security benefits case. The Court conducted a de novo review of Rivera's objections to the findings and ultimately overruled them, denying Rivera's Motion to Remand or Reverse the prior decision.
The standard of review mandates that a district judge must assess any properly objected parts of a magistrate judge's proposal, with the authority to accept, reject, or modify it based on further evidence or additional instructions. The review must consider all relevant evidence, not just the magistrate's recommendation.
In the background, Rivera's applications for benefits were denied at both initial and reconsideration levels. Following a hearing where ALJ Michelle Lindsay found him not disabled, Rivera appealed, leading to a remand and a second hearing before ALJ Deborah Rose. ALJ Rose also found Rivera not disabled, determining he retains the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range of light and sedentary work with specific restrictions.
The Chief Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court find ALJ Rose did not misstate the burden of proof at step five and that her hypothetical question to the Vocational Expert (VE) was consistent with Rivera's RFC. The VE's testimony was deemed clear and aligned with applicable case law and vocational data. Rivera's objections focused on a perceived misapplication of the burden of proof at step five and a failure to analyze issues regarding bilateral handling and fingering. The Court confirmed the correctness of ALJ Rose's application of the burden of proof in this context.
The excerpt addresses the burden of proof in Social Security disability claims, particularly at the fifth step of the evaluation process. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) is not required to provide additional evidence regarding a claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) since the same RFC assessment is used to evaluate the claimant's ability to perform past relevant work at step four, according to 20 C.F.R. 404.1560(c)(2). When the evaluation moves to step five, the same RFC is considered alongside other factors to assess the claimant's ability to perform other work. ALJ Rose noted that while the claimant maintains the burden of proving disability at this stage, a limited burden of producing evidence shifts to the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner holds the entire burden of proof at step five, which contradicts the ALJ's statement, citing a misunderstanding regarding which ALJ's decision the referenced language came from. The language in question is consistent across multiple ALJ decisions, suggesting it may be directed by the SSA. The excerpt clarifies that the Commissioner has a limited burden at step five, specifically to demonstrate the existence of significant job numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, while the ultimate burden of proving disability lies with the claimant. The excerpt references regulatory clarifications and case law to support this interpretation, indicating that other circuits have recognized this limited burden as well. The Tenth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue but supports the notion of a limited burden shift based on recent regulations.
The Court affirms the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the ALJ correctly articulated the burden of proof at step five of the evaluation process. The Plaintiff's argument that using a 'limited burden' improperly shifts the burden of production back to him lacks merit and is unsupported by relevant authority. The Court distinguishes the case cited by the Plaintiff, Haddock, noting that the ALJ appropriately solicited expert testimony regarding job requirements and discrepancies, thereby fulfilling necessary procedural standards.
Regarding the Plaintiff's claim that the identified jobs do not accommodate his limitations in bilateral handling and fingering, the Magistrate Judge found that the vocations listed by the VE do not require such skills, or that any necessary tasks could be performed while seated. The Plaintiff's reliance on SSR 96-9p is noted, but only one of the jobs identified is sedentary, and the ALJ effectively consulted the VE to assess job viability given the Plaintiff's RFC.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the VE's testimony was informed by the Plaintiff's limitations, asserting that the DOT's general occupational requirements do not reflect specific job conditions that may allow for alternative methods of task execution. Consequently, the VE's conclusions provide substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The Court ultimately overrules the Plaintiff's objections, adopts the Chief Magistrate Judge’s recommendations, and denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse or Remand, directing the entry of a final order affirming the Acting Commissioner's decision.
Karen B. Molzen, United States Chief Magistrate Judge, recommends denying the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand or Reverse concerning the denial of disability benefits. This is the Plaintiff's second appeal regarding applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, initially filed on December 4, 2009, with a claimed onset date of May 29, 2009, due to bulging and ruptured discs and depression. After initial and reconsideration denials, ALJ Michelle K. Lindsay issued an unfavorable decision on January 23, 2012. The Appeals Council denied review, making ALJ Lindsay's decision final.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff appealed to the Court, which reversed ALJ Lindsay's decision on February 6, 2014. The Appeals Council then vacated the decision on November 18, 2014, consolidating subsequent claims filed on July 24, 2013. ALJ Deborah L. Rose held a second hearing on August 5, 2015, leading to another unfavorable decision on November 18, 2015, which also became final after the Appeals Council declined to take jurisdiction.
The Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). To qualify for benefits, the Plaintiff must demonstrate an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable impairment lasting at least 12 months. The ALJ employed a five-step evaluation process, concluding at Step One that the Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity, and at Step Two identified a severe impairment of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. At Step Three, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff's impairments did not meet the regulatory listings. Consequently, the ALJ assessed the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), concluding that the Plaintiff could perform less than full light and sedentary work, with specific lifting and carrying limitations.
The claimant is limited to standing or walking for two hours daily and sitting for six hours, requiring the use of a cane for mobility. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, but is never able to climb ladders or similar structures. He faces restrictions on exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and hazards like dangerous machinery or heights. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the claimant could alternate between sitting and standing every ten to thirty minutes and concluded that he was unable to perform past relevant work. However, the ALJ identified other jobs available in significant numbers that the claimant could perform, including mail sorter, office helper, and order clerk. As a result, the ALJ ruled that the claimant was not disabled from the alleged onset date to the decision date, denying benefits.
The court's review focuses on whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and if the correct legal standards were applied. The claimant argues that the ALJ misstated the burden of proof at Step Five, contending that the entire burden should shift to the Commissioner. Although judges in the district have critiqued similar language, past decisions did not reverse ALJ findings solely for this reason, indicating that substantial errors in the decision-making process were the basis for reversals.
No Tenth Circuit case has been found that reverses an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) solely on the grounds discussed. The Commissioner references 68 Fed. Reg. 51153-01, which clarifies the sequential evaluation process, noting a limited burden shift to the Commissioner at step five only after the claimant demonstrates an inability to perform past relevant work. At step five, the Commissioner must show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform based on their Residual Functional Capacity (RFC), age, education, and work experience. However, the claimant retains the burden of proving their RFC.
The regulations underline that while the Commissioner must provide evidence of available work, they are not required to furnish additional evidence about the claimant's RFC, as the same RFC assessment applies to both past relevant work and step five evaluations. The Tenth Circuit has clarified that the agency's burden at step five does not include providing medical evidence for the RFC unless the ALJ is obligated to further develop the record. Consequently, the ALJ did not improperly shift the burden to the claimant at step five, affirming that the claimant is still responsible for proving their disability. The Court will not reverse the ALJ on this basis. Lastly, the claimant's argument regarding discrepancies between the hypothetical provided to the vocational expert (VE) and the established RFC is noted but does not alter the overall conclusions.
The Court emphasizes that when a claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) is impacted by both exertional and nonexertional impairments, expert vocational testimony is required to demonstrate job availability in the national economy. This testimony must be based on hypothetical questions that accurately reflect all impairments supported by the evidentiary record. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the Plaintiff has the RFC to perform less than the full range of light and sedentary work, with specific lifting, standing, walking, and sitting capabilities, as well as restrictions related to climbing, balancing, and exposure to hazards. During the hearing, the ALJ presented a comprehensive hypothetical question to the vocational expert (VE) that incorporated these limitations, including the need for a cane and the ability to alternate between sitting and standing. The VE responded that the hypothetical individual could perform three specific jobs in the economy, albeit with a 30% reduction in available positions due to the restrictions. The Plaintiff contended that the ALJ and VE overlooked the impact of the Plaintiff's need to use one hand while using a cane. However, the transcript indicates that the ALJ included this limitation in the hypothetical and referenced it when discussing the sit-stand option. The ALJ's hypothetical accurately reflected the Plaintiff's limitations, and the VE's testimony was deemed consistent and substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's disability decision, with no reversible error identified. The Plaintiff's claim of vague or confusing testimony from the VE was found to be unsubstantiated.
Plaintiff contends that the vocational expert (VE) only included the position of order clerk after multiple opportunities, questioning the reliability of the three jobs identified by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The Court acknowledges that the ALJ's questioning could have been clearer, but it rejects the argument that confusion in the VE's testimony undermines its status as substantial evidence. The ALJ's first hypothetical involved an individual limited to two hours of walking/standing, six hours of sitting, and the use of a cane. The VE indicated that this individual could not perform the plaintiff's past work but could take on other roles, specifically identifying mail sorter, office helper, order clerk, final assembler, and charge account clerk. In a follow-up hypothetical, the ALJ asked about the ability to alternate between sitting and standing, to which the VE stated that only the office helper and mail sorter could accommodate this need, while the other identified jobs would not. The VE noted that the need for flexibility would reduce job availability in these categories by thirty percent. The testimony, despite its complexity, supports the following conclusions: 1) Plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant work; 2) a variety of jobs exists for the hypothetical individual; 3) only three jobs accommodate the plaintiff’s need for flexibility; and 4) job availability would decrease by thirty percent due to the sit/stand requirement. The Court finds that the VE's testimony provides substantial evidence for the ALJ’s decision, rejecting the plaintiff's claims of inconsistency with legal precedents, particularly Haddock v. Apfel, which requires an explanation for any conflicts between vocational expert testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
The Administration addressed Haddock by issuing SSR 00-4P, which clarifies the role of vocational expert (VE) and vocational specialist (VS) evidence in disability determinations. The plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) improperly relied on the VE's testimony regarding a thirty-percent reduction in job availability due to the sit/stand requirement in the plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). The plaintiff argues that the VE's description of jobs was insufficiently detailed and ambiguous concerning the applicability of the sit/stand allowance, creating uncertainty about the jobs referenced in relation to the 30% reduction.
The Court, however, found the VE's testimony clear, noting that she identified three jobs potentially accommodating the sit/stand requirement, which warranted the thirty-percent reduction. This explanation aligns with the standards set forth in Haddock and SSR 00-4P, emphasizing that a VE can provide reasonable justifications when job requirements conflict with a claimant’s RFC. The Court clarified that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) outlines maximum job requirements generally, not specific variations that occur in different settings, which is why testimony from VEs and VSs can enhance understanding of occupational data.
Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the VE’s thirty-percent estimate seemed speculative, as it was uniformly applied across three distinct occupations without accounting for individual job variations. The Court reiterated that the DOT does not specify the number of available jobs or how a claimant's limitations impact job performance, underscoring the necessity of vocational expertise in evaluating such nuanced issues. Thus, the Court upheld the ALJ's reliance on the VE's assessment and did not find grounds for reversal.
Information regarding job requirements or occupations not specified in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) can be obtained from various reliable sources, including direct employer insights and the experience of vocational experts (VEs) or vocational specialists (VSs) in job placement. The purpose of vocational testimony is to supplement established facts with experience-based evidence, serving as an alternative proof avenue. The plaintiff challenges the VE's reduction of job availability, citing several Seventh Circuit cases that critique VE testimony, such as Herrmann v. Colvin, which questioned the VE's methodology and the reliability of job number estimates. The court acknowledges these cases but finds them unhelpful, noting they are not binding and the Tenth Circuit does not exhibit similar skepticism towards VE testimony. In contrast to Seventh Circuit criticisms, the Tenth Circuit has consistently accepted VE testimony regarding job statistics. The Seventh Circuit's concerns often center on the validity of job number estimates provided by VEs, with suggestions that such estimates may lack credible statistical support. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit's acceptance of VE testimony contrasts sharply with the skepticism reflected in the Seventh Circuit opinions, particularly regarding job categorization and the reliability of statistical data presented by VEs.
The Tenth Circuit has demonstrated a tendency to credit Vocational Expert (VE) testimony regarding a claimant's ability to work, even when impairments exist, as seen in Trim-iar where the claimant’s limited right-hand function did not preclude job performance. In recent cases, such as Rogers and Holcom, the court upheld findings based on VE testimony that relied on the expert's extensive professional experience. The Tenth Circuit shows significant deference to VE testimony, provided the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) adheres to established protocols, specifically those outlined in Haddock and SSR 00-4p.
Plaintiff's contention that the VE's testimony about a thirty-percent reduction in work capability lacks substantial evidence is dismissed. The argument that the VE's job identification does not align with the requirement for "frequent" handling and fingering is also rejected. The plaintiff claims a discrepancy based on the Selected Characteristics of Occupations (SCO), which he fails to substantiate, as he does not provide citations to the SCO. The DOT confirms that the identified jobs require "frequent" handling and fingering, defined as occurring 1/3 to 2/3 of the time, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion of two-thirds. Furthermore, the jobs do not explicitly necessitate bilateral handling and fingering, and the plaintiff does not adequately explain why using a cane prevents him from performing the tasks, noting that many job requirements can be executed one-handed or while seated.
The vocational expert (VE) was aware of the plaintiff's limitations and testified that he could perform certain jobs despite these limitations. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) outlines maximum job requirements generally, which may not reflect specific job conditions. The VE's testimony, which aligns with DOT specifications, provides substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. In referenced cases, such as Segovia and Tollett, the VEs clarified how broad DOT categorizations apply to specific cases, confirming that certain jobs could be performed within the plaintiffs’ limitations. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) appropriately relied on the VE's assessment regarding the plaintiff's ability to perform jobs despite restrictions on standing or walking. The plaintiff's challenge to the VE and ALJ's reliance on the DOT is countered by the fact that the DOT is still recognized as a valid source of occupational information in the Tenth Circuit, despite arguments advocating for the use of the more current O*NET system. The regulations explicitly recognize the DOT as a valid reference for job data.
The excerpt references legal standards and procedural guidelines relevant to a disability claim evaluation under Social Security regulations. It cites the case of *People v. Dockery* and related rulings, emphasizing that once the Vocational Expert (VE) indicates reliance on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) is not obligated to further investigate. The conclusion states that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated reversible error by the ALJ, recommending denial of the motion to remand.
The excerpt outlines a five-step process for evaluating disability claims as per 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a)(4). The steps involve: (1) determining if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) confirming the presence of a severe medically determinable impairment; (3) assessing if the impairment meets or equals listed criteria; (4) establishing if the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) shifting the burden to the Commissioner to show the claimant can adjust to other work.
It also corrects the case caption from *Haddock v. Astrue* to *Haddock v. Apfel* and clarifies the terminology used by the Plaintiff. Additionally, it describes the job functions of various clerical positions as outlined in the DOT, including Mail Sorter, Office Helper, and Order Clerk, detailing their responsibilities and classifications. The Administrative Record is referenced, indicating the internal pagination is used for citation.
