Mears v. Flint Hills Resources, LLP

Citations: 238 F. Supp. 3d 1137; 2017 WL 723895; 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26307Docket: Civ. No. 16-111 (RHK/KMM)

Court: District Court, D. Minnesota; February 22, 2017; Federal District Court

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Beverly Mears initiated legal action against her employers, Flint Hills Resources, LLP and Flint Hills Resources Pine Bend, LLC (FHR), claiming that her demotion constituted discrimination and retaliation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. FHR has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Court has decided to grant.

Mears has been employed at FHR’s oil refinery in Rosemount, Minnesota, since 1998, primarily in a union role. After taking disability leave in 2012 due to severe health issues, she returned to work on November 7, 2013. At that time, FHR was hiring for a Process Lead (PL) in its alkylation unit, a role requiring significant responsibility for monitoring and adjusting process parameters to ensure safety and efficiency. Mears, being the most senior union member to bid on the position, was offered the job on October 30, 2013, which she accepted, commencing training on November 11.

Upon starting her new role, Mears disclosed her disabilities to her supervisor, Dave Sheck, and reviewed her job responsibilities, which included maintaining control over multiple screens and potentially responding to emergency situations. The job description indicated that training would involve both theoretical knowledge and practical experience, necessitating physical movement around the equipment. Mears agreed to pursue the training, which was expected to conclude approximately eight months later, on July 11, 2014.

Mears testified that while the alky board was relatively uncomplicated, she did not expect to complete her training in eight months. The training process comprised six parts, with the first four focusing on extensive study materials and competency tests, followed by "Skills Demonstration" and "Board Review." Skills Demonstration required successful completion of tasks to pass, while Board Review involved discussions to assess the candidate's knowledge and skills. The training form emphasized that qualification timelines vary individually, typically taking around a year, and encouraged open communication regarding learning difficulties.

Initially, Mears studied her materials without incident, relying on four qualified personnel (PLs) for guidance. She needed their signatures upon completing training segments, often receiving simulated task instructions before sign-off. Mears noted that one PL, Bergin, expressed reluctance to train her but still signed off on her training multiple times. 

On February 25, 2014, a negative interaction occurred between Mears and Martin, her trainer, who threatened to halt her training over a question regarding an outdoor tour, which Mears could not complete due to her disability. Mears reported the incident to Sheck, and shortly afterward, she was contacted by HR regarding her complaint. Following this, Sheck and HR Director Hinderaker conducted a respectful workplace training session for the PLs. 

Mears later toured the outdoor unit three times, twice prior and once after the incident. In April, Sheck allegedly told Mears she would never qualify as a PL, leading to a confrontation where Mears accused him of wanting her to fail, a claim Sheck denied, asserting he was supportive of her training.

Mears's contemporaneous journal entries do not reference a specific incident but indicate her focus on observing the alky board and working with valves during training sessions from April to July 2014. On August 20, she transitioned to the Skills Demonstration phase of her training, where FHR acknowledged her satisfactory performance up until that point. However, performance issues arose once she began this new phase, prompting concerns from alky unit personnel regarding her multitasking abilities and technical knowledge, particularly related to compressor operations. On September 3, a meeting between Mears and supervisor Sheck highlighted these issues, with Sheck noting Mears's difficulties in multitasking and lack of understanding regarding procedural discussions. To address these concerns, Sheck arranged one-on-one training sessions for Mears with Dan McDonald, a subject matter expert. Following their first session on September 9, McDonald reported that Mears possessed only a basic understanding of unit operations and required significant improvement before she could independently manage compressor start-up and shutdown procedures. Sheck agreed with McDonald's assessment and emphasized the need for Mears to focus on operational understanding rather than procedural details. Mears, however, stated that she and McDonald did not discuss compressor operations and had no comments on his evaluation.

On September 22, Sheck conducted a meeting regarding Mears's training progress, attended by Mears, Ahluwalia, and Hart. Concerns similar to those raised on September 9 were reiterated, and Sheck proposed "action items," including additional remedial training sessions. During the meeting, Mears attempted to explain a compressor shutdown procedure but provided incorrect answers to questions posed by Sheck and Hart. Mears characterized Sheck's feedback as harassment and requested a meeting with HR, claiming Sheck stated she would never pass the qualification test for a PL. She sought a dedicated trainer and schedule adjustments, mentioning a previous refusal of training by one PL, although she acknowledged this had been resolved. Sheck addressed her concerns and informed her on how to file a complaint with HR. Ahluwalia emphasized the goal of getting Mears trained and qualified.

On the same day, Mears reported her grievances about Sheck to HR leader Sara Lewke, asserting she was treated differently due to her gender. Lewke referred the complaints to Hinderaker, who investigated by interviewing various FHR employees. On October 6, Hinderaker met with Mears, finding no evidence of gender-based differential treatment. Her investigation supported Sheck's concerns regarding Mears's performance issues, including technical knowledge and multitasking abilities, and advised Mears to accept feedback and improve her interactions with coworkers, who described her as "argumentative" and "defensive." Mears did not recall specific details from this meeting but expressed confusion regarding the feedback.

Subsequently, Sheck and McDonald conducted additional training sessions on October 9 and 15, noting some positive aspects but also highlighting Mears's ongoing struggles with technical concepts. Despite being 11 months into training, Mears lacked necessary understanding in critical areas. On October 20, Mears was informed in a meeting that she had failed to qualify for the PL role due to insufficient progress, specifically citing her lack of concept knowledge and multitasking skills. On October 22, Sheck documented her demotion from the PL trainee position, stating that Mears had not made sufficient progress and did not demonstrate the required capabilities for the role.

FHR replaced Mears with a male trainee, and it is uncertain if seniority influenced this decision. Mears subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Dakota County District Court, claiming FHR violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) by discriminating against her based on sex and disability and by retaliating against her. FHR removed the case to federal court and filed for summary judgment on December 9, 2016. The court heard arguments on February 3, 2017, and the motion is ready for decision.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the burden on the moving party to prove the facts are undisputed. The court must view evidence favorably for the nonmoving party, who must present admissible evidence to create a genuine issue for trial.

Mears claims that her demotion was due to her gender, which is contrary to the MHRA's prohibition against sex-based discrimination in employment practices. Her claim follows the McDonnell Douglas framework, requiring her to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If successful, the burden then shifts to FHR to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Mears must then show that FHR's reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

The court assumes, for argument's sake, that Mears has established a prima facie case. FHR has offered legitimate reasons for her demotion, citing her inability to multitask and insufficient technical knowledge. The court concludes that Mears has not provided enough evidence to demonstrate that FHR's reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination.

Mears can show pretext by demonstrating that FHR’s reasons for her demotion lack factual basis or that a prohibited reason was likely the true motivation. To meet this burden, Mears must prove that FHR either (1) did not follow its own policies, (2) treated her differently than similarly-situated employees, or (3) changed its explanations regarding the employment decision. Mears claims FHR prevented her from observing the alky board during training, alleging that male coworkers were allowed to do so. However, she fails to identify specific male comparators or adequately demonstrate how she is similarly situated to them, which is essential at this stage. Although she references a male predecessor who trained differently, this mention alone does not substantiate her claim. Furthermore, Mears' assertion that she was only allowed limited observation time is contradicted by her own journal, which indicates earlier opportunities. She argues that concerns about her multitasking abilities are unfounded, but acknowledges that the PL position requires multitasking, which is consistent with FHR's job expectations. Overall, Mears does not provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of discrimination regarding her treatment in training.

Mears claims FHR violated its training policy by indicating her "Planned Training End Date" was eight months instead of the default twelve months. However, this assertion is countered by evidence that FHR does not mandate qualification by a specific date and that Mears was trained for over eight months. Testimony clarified that while the alky board was simpler, Sheck did not expect her training to conclude in eight months. The court found no deviation from FHR policy and ruled that no reasonable jury could infer discrimination based on the planned end date.

Mears also argues that shifting explanations for her demotion may indicate pretext for discrimination. However, the court noted that FHR's explanations remained consistent throughout the timeline of her demotion, undermining Mears’s claim. FHR provided specific performance-related concerns, which Mears downplayed, but her subjective interpretation does not suffice to prove discrimination. To overcome FHR’s summary judgment motion, Mears needed to show evidence that FHR's concerns were unfounded, which she failed to do.

Regarding her reprisal claim, Mears argued that her demotion was linked to a complaint about gender discrimination. While temporal proximity between her complaint and demotion can imply a causal connection, the court found that FHR’s documented concerns about her performance before and after the complaint diminished the significance of this proximity. Without additional evidence of causation, the court ruled that FHR had legitimate reasons for the demotion.

Ultimately, the court granted FHR’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Mears’s Complaint with prejudice, as she did not establish a genuine issue for trial regarding discrimination or retaliation.

The excerpt addresses Mears' claims regarding her training and alleged discrimination at work. Mears maintained a journal during her training, documenting incidents she found troubling, although its admissibility raises hearsay issues that neither party contested. In her opposition brief, Mears claimed she was required to finish her written training before observing the work at the alky unit, yet she provided no evidence supporting this assertion and her journal contradicts it, showing she observed the board before August. Mears also made several factual assertions without proper citations, failing to adhere to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which requires parties to provide specific record citations for their claims. To establish a prima facie case for discrimination based on disparate treatment, Mears needed to demonstrate her membership in a protected group, job qualifications, an adverse employment action, and circumstances suggesting discrimination. Although she claimed to have been instructed by Sheck to remain at her desk initially and only later allowed to observe, her journal evidence disputes this. Furthermore, Mears claimed disability discrimination referencing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) but did not include this in her formal complaint. Her counsel indicated that the basis for the disability claim mirrored her sex discrimination claim. Consequently, since Mears could not establish a genuine issue of pretext regarding her claims, FHR is entitled to summary judgment on both her sex and disability discrimination claims.