Beyer v. Anchor Insulation Co.

Citations: 238 F. Supp. 3d 270; 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23434; 2017 WL 1250984Docket: Civil No. 3:13-cv-1576 (JBA)

Court: District Court, D. Connecticut; February 16, 2017; Federal District Court

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Defendant Anchor Insulation Co. filed a motion for summary judgment in a product liability case concerning its installation of spray polyurethane foam (SPF) insulation in the Beyers' home. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a product defect or causation without expert testimony, which the Defendant seeks to exclude through three Daubert motions regarding the qualifications of Mr. Gary Cude, Dr. Yuh-Chin Huang, and Dr. David Nicewicz. After oral arguments on January 17, 2017, the Court ruled to preclude Dr. Huang's testimony and limited the testimonies of Cude and Nicewicz to their respective areas of expertise. Consequently, the Court denied the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 

The SPF in question is created by combining two components, an isocyanate (A Side) and a polyol resin (B Side), at the nozzle of a spray gun. The materials, manufactured by Johns Manville and Icynene, must be mixed in equal parts according to manufacturer guidelines; improper mixing risks significant defects such as shrinkage and brittleness. Communications from Anchor indicate concerns about the effects of mixing different foam products, highlighting potential chemical interactions. Anchor's inquiry about the safety of mixing these products was addressed by Icynene, which stated no harmful hybrid chemical would result from such contamination.

The foam used in the installation was noted to have a distinct odor and feel, but it was not classified as poisonous or toxic. Johns Manville (JM) provides Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) for its A Side, B Side, and SPF foam. The MSDS for A Side warns that inhaling vapors may cause upper respiratory irritation, fatigue, and allergic reactions to isocyanates. The B Side MSDS indicates that inhalation above safety limits could lead to serious respiratory damage with delayed symptoms. The finished spray foam is relatively inert but can be hazardous if ground into dust, causing respiratory irritation from excessive exposure to dust or chips. 

Icynene's memorandum to dealers outlines safety measures, highlighting that exposure to MDI can result in skin, eye, and respiratory irritation or sensitization. Plaintiffs Richard and Monica Beyer, residing in a century-old home in Niantic, Connecticut, contracted Anchor Insulation for SPF installation in Fall 2010, during which they remained in the home. Mr. Beyer observed the installation, but neither he nor the installers wore protective gear. Post-installation, the Beyers noticed a sweet odor that became more intense in the attic, causing eye and throat irritation. They allege improper installation by Anchor, citing contamination issues, excessive thickness, insufficient curing time, and incorrect product use. Evidence from a JM employee's email indicates Anchor's practice of switching between different foam products without proper cleaning, leading to contamination.

Wayne LaPierre, an installer for Anchor, testified that he applied foam insulation in thicker layers than recommended and did not allow adequate cure time between applications. Post-installation inspections revealed that the foam shrank and detached from surfaces. An Icynene representative noted that the foam "shrunk and cracked." Subsequent analysis by Johns Manville (JM) of foam samples indicated low density and color abnormalities, suggesting possible contamination, preventing JM from confirming the product's identity.

Following the installation, the Beyers reported various physical symptoms. Mrs. Beyer experienced headaches lasting up to two days, fatigue, and heart palpitations a year after the foam was removed. Mr. Beyer reported severe headaches, a metallic taste, memory loss, and boils. After eleven months of complaints, Anchor agreed to remove the insulation. Mr. Beyer observed the removal process without protective gear, during which the foam was ground into dust, exacerbating the situation. While most of Mr. Beyer's symptoms improved post-removal, some persisted due to ongoing exposure in his workplace.

Medical evidence includes a report from Mr. Beyer’s physician, Dr. Licata, indicating a follow-up exam linked the symptoms to environmental exposure from the foam insulation, particularly noting asthma and prior exposure concerns.

Dr. Licata evaluated Mr. Beyer, who reported symptoms including persistent headaches, nasal congestion, chest discomfort, exertional dyspnea, and nonrestorative sleep. Mr. Beyer, with a history of environmental exposure to isocyanate from spray foam insulation installed in his home, noted that off-gassing odors were more pronounced in warmer months. Diagnoses included nasal polyps, allergic rhinitis, and a respiratory disorder linked to environmental exposure. The assessment indicated extrinsic asthma with acute exacerbation due to foam insulation exposure and intrinsic asthma.

A report from Dr. John Russomanno, the Defendant's examining physician, highlighted Mr. Beyer's history as a former smoker who quit in 2010, coinciding with the installation of spray foam insulation. He developed asthma in his 30s, with symptoms worsening after witnessing the installation, which produced visible yellow dust. Although he did not report immediate symptoms, he later experienced burning skin irritation, heart palpitations, headaches, and memory issues. His asthma inhaler use increased during this time, and symptoms improved after the insulation was removed in 2011.

Dr. Russomanno concluded that Mr. Beyer likely experienced adverse effects from diisocyanate foam insulation during its installation, leading to worsened asthma symptoms, which improved after removal. He noted a temporary decrease in pulmonary function that subsequently recovered, indicating a connection between the exposure and symptom exacerbation.

The Defendant seeks summary judgment, arguing that the exclusion of certain expert testimonies would prevent the Plaintiffs from proving causation in their product liability claims. The Plaintiffs argue that the existing record is sufficient for establishing causation without expert testimony, particularly concerning property damage and remediation costs. The outcome of the Daubert motions will significantly influence what claims can proceed to trial.

Defendant challenges the admissibility of Plaintiffs’ three experts under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, referencing the standards from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Rule 702 allows expert testimony if it assists the trier of fact, provided the expert is qualified and the testimony is based on sufficient facts, reliable principles, and a proper application of those principles to the case. The reliability of expert testimony is crucial, with the Supreme Court identifying several factors for trial courts to evaluate: testability of the theory, peer review status, error rates, standards for the technique, and general acceptance in the scientific community. The reliability assessment is flexible and context-dependent, and the court must ensure that the expert applies rigorous intellectual standards typical in their field.

Plaintiffs intend to present Dr. Yuh-Chin Tony Huang as an expert to support their claims regarding health issues caused by volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from spray foam insulation. Dr. Huang will provide three key opinions: (1) that the Beyers’ medical conditions and symptoms are linked to their exposure to SPF chemical compounds; (2) that their symptoms are consistent with exposure during and after the installation of the insulation; and (3) that the Beyers likely developed chemical sensitivities due to this exposure.

Causation in toxic tort cases involves two key components: general causation, which assesses whether a substance can cause a specific injury in the general population, and specific causation, which determines if a substance caused an individual's injury. To prove general causation, scientists often use epidemiological data to establish an association between a chemical and a disease, which is then evaluated for a potential cause-effect relationship. Epidemiological evidence is generally the strongest for establishing general causation, but it is crucial to note that an association alone does not equate to causation.

Researchers evaluate several factors when determining if an association indicates causation, such as the temporal relationship, strength of the association, alternative explanations, and consistency with other evidence. Courts typically require more than one epidemiological study showing a positive association to establish general causation, as results must be replicable. In cases where robust epidemiological evidence is lacking, experts may turn to case reports, which document clinical events involving one or a few individuals. While case reports can provide insights, they are less reliable than controlled studies due to their lack of control groups and potential for limited data.

Despite these limitations, case reports may sometimes be all that is available for rare exposures. Causal claims based solely on case studies should be approached with caution. In one instance, a court considered multiple case reports alongside other evidence, like the strength of associations and dose-response relationships, to support a finding of general causation.

Dr. Huang, an expert witness for the Plaintiffs, is a Professor of Medicine specializing in pulmonology at Duke University. His qualifications are undisputed by the Defendants. He relies solely on a 2014 article he co-authored, which outlines health effects from faulty application of spray polyurethane foam (SPF) in homes, as his basis for causation in this case. This article is an expanded case report detailing symptoms in 13 patients, with no control group and lacking experimental verification. Dr. Huang acknowledges that while the article indicates an association between SPF exposure and symptoms, it does not establish causation. He emphasizes the distinction between correlation and causation, stating that while symptoms are temporally associated with exposure, conclusive causation requires further studies. The article's findings, which suggest a "likely association," do not meet the Daubert standard for reliability in establishing general causation, as they lack comparative studies or replication. Thus, the evidence presented does not support a definitive causal link between the Plaintiffs' symptoms and SPF exposure.

Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that Dr. Huang’s testimony, when considered alongside the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) for A Side and B Side, supports an inference of general causation. They claim that the JM MSDS for both products serves as admissions of general causation due to their causal language. Specifically, the A Side MSDS warns that inhaling vapors may cause respiratory irritation and other symptoms, while the B Side MSDS indicates that inhalation above safety limits could lead to serious respiratory damage, with delayed onset of symptoms.

However, the court finds Plaintiffs’ argument unconvincing for three reasons. First, legal principles dictate that manufacturers must warn of potential adverse effects even in the absence of established causation, meaning MSDSs should not be automatically regarded as admissions of scientific causation. Second, there are policy implications that discourage treating warning labels as such admissions, as it could hinder open discussions on adverse effects and regulatory changes. Third, Dr. Huang’s deposition contradicts the A Side MSDS warnings, as he claims isocyanates do not cause the reported symptoms, suggesting that other factors may be involved. Additionally, a technical bulletin on isocyanates is deemed too vague to establish general causation. Ultimately, Dr. Huang’s testimony does not provide sufficient evidentiary support for a jury to conclude that Plaintiffs have established proximate cause regarding their symptoms and the defendant’s product.

Dr. Huang's research indicates a likely association between exposure to symptoms but does not establish causation. The evidence presented by the Plaintiffs, even with consideration of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs), does not meet the threshold for jury presentation. Although a degree of medical certainty can be less than absolute, the medical and epidemiological evidence provided by Dr. Huang is insufficient. His expert report was prepared prior to examining the plaintiffs, relying only on written descriptions of their symptoms, despite acknowledging the importance of in-person examinations for assessing the validity of non-specific symptoms. Additionally, Dr. Huang failed to adequately explore or justify the exclusion of alternative causes. His vague assertion of ruling out other potential causes lacks specific reasoning, contrasting with the patients in his article who had no prior significant health conditions. In light of these deficiencies, Daubert standards warrant the exclusion of Dr. Huang's causation testimony as unreliable.

Mr. Gary Cude's expert report is submitted by the Plaintiffs to support claims of product defectiveness, lack of necessary warnings, and to estimate remediation costs for the affected home. Cude will testify that the spray foam product was defective due to improper mixing, application, and installation, and that the installers neglected to provide necessary warnings and proper ventilation during removal. He asserts that specialized remediation is essential, with costs aligning with estimates from consulting expert Bernard Bloom. Mr. Cude, who holds an M.S. in environmental sciences and specializes in failure analysis and indoor air quality, faces challenges from the Defendant primarily regarding the independence of his findings, as they suggest he merely echoed Mr. Bloom's earlier report without applying his own judgment. Both experts possess overlapping qualifications, with Bloom having previously assessed conditions at the Beyer home.

Mr. Cude's report extensively incorporates findings from Mr. Bloom, often repeating them verbatim. While it is generally unacceptable for an expert to merely echo another's findings, Mr. Cude's qualifications align closely with Mr. Bloom's, and they collaborated on collecting and analyzing air samples, mitigating concerns about Mr. Cude acting solely as a "mouthpiece." The legal precedent supports that a testifying expert can rely on a consulting expert's conclusions if the former possesses relevant expertise and independently verifies the findings. However, independent verification is crucial; in a referred case, a testifying expert confirmed alignment with a consulting expert only after conducting their own analysis.

In the current matter, despite overlapping expertise, Mr. Cude's report features word-for-word passages from Mr. Bloom's work, and his deposition indicates he may have adopted some of Bloom's conclusions without sufficient critical evaluation. Mr. Cude's opinions are categorized into three groups: remediation opinions, opinions on foam installation, and residual opinions derived from Mr. Bloom's report, including the source of elevated VOCs in the Beyer house as of 2012. 

Regarding remediation, Mr. Cude asserts that specialized remediation is necessary based on the Beyers' reports and air-quality testing, agreeing with Mr. Bloom's assessment and incorporating those opinions into his report. He cites his experience in building science and previous SPF remediation cases to support this conclusion. However, the Defendant has raised concerns about potential methodological issues in Mr. Cude's air sample analysis, such as uncertainty about the locations and durations of the sample collection.

Mr. Cude's opinions regarding remediation are primarily derived from Mr. Bloom's expertise, as Mr. Cude has not conducted a home inspection himself nor directly consulted the Beyers. He acknowledges Mr. Bloom's extensive experience in remediation and relies on Bloom's prior inspection to support his report. The lack of direct input from the Beyers and Cude's admission that he has only participated in the preparation of three remediation plans for litigation purposes raises questions about the reliability of his testimony. Under the Daubert standard, expert testimony must reflect the intellectual rigor typical of the field, which Mr. Cude fails to demonstrate by not performing necessary inspections or consultations prior to forming his opinions. Consequently, while he may testify that remediation is necessary based on air samples, he will be barred from discussing specific remediation methods or costs. Additionally, Mr. Cude identifies four potential defects in the installation of the SPF: 1) likely mixing components from different manufacturers, 2) off-ratio spraying, 3) rapid spraying in the basement, and 4) failure to adhere to standard practices for handling toxic chemicals.

Mr. Cude's opinions are based on his expertise in failure analysis of engineered materials, primarily relying on the Bloom report, a specific photo from that report, and additional data including air sample analysis and the Nicewicz report. His first opinion, regarding the mixing of JM and Icynene products, heavily depends on Mr. Bloom’s conclusions, although Mr. Cude asserts some experiential basis for evaluating this claim. His second opinion about the foam being off-ratio also references Mr. Bloom but includes his own insights on the implications of off-ratio spraying. The third opinion, which states that the foam was sprayed too rapidly, is similarly supported by Mr. Bloom’s judgment and Mr. Cude's independent review of the relevant photo.

In contrast, Mr. Cude's fourth opinion on Anchor’s installation procedures being substandard lacks independent verification, as he admits to relying solely on Mr. Bloom's assessment of industry practices. Consequently, his testimony regarding industry standards for SPF installation is deemed inadmissible. This limitation extends to his fifth opinion about the lack of hazard warnings to the Beyers, his sixth opinion regarding inadequate ventilation during and after installation, and his seventh opinion on insufficient precautions during removal, all of which similarly rely on Mr. Bloom’s insights without Mr. Cude having independent knowledge of industry standards.

Mr. Cude's deposition lacks the necessary depth to help the jury understand relevant standards and their application to his opinions. His reference to the Bloom report raises questions about the elevated VOC levels found in air samples from the Beyer home, although his own report does not address these elevated VOCs. While Mr. Cude can testify regarding the mis-installation of foam and the results of his air sampling, he is barred from discussing specific remediation measures, industry safety standards for installation, and whether the SPF caused the Plaintiffs' health issues.

Dr. David Nicewicz, an associate professor specializing in synthetic organic chemistry, distinguishes between topics he will testify on and opinions that exceed his expertise. He asserts that the Beyers were inadequately warned about potential SPF hazards and lacked necessary protective measures during installation. Dr. Nicewicz lists ten specific assertions, including the lack of warnings, improper ventilation, exposure to high isocyanate concentrations, and the presence of elevated VOCs and formaldehyde after SPF application. He concludes that the Beyers were exposed to toxic chemicals likely linked to their health issues.

Dr. Nicewicz is prepared to testify on several topics, including the safe handling of chemicals, the hazardous substances in spray polyurethane foam (SPF), their toxicity, contamination sources in the plaintiffs’ home, polymer chemistry, and appropriate homeowner warnings. He is qualified to discuss the chemistry of the SPF components and how they release volatile organic compounds (VOCs) at various stages. However, the Defendant challenges his qualifications to offer opinions on warnings due to a lack of training in industrial hygiene, seeking to exclude his testimony on the first four opinions and opinions seven and eight. They argue that Dr. Nicewicz’s expertise in lab safety does not compensate for his alleged deficiencies in SPF installation knowledge. 

While Dr. Nicewicz can testify on chemical safety and properties, his initial opinions may merely echo factual testimony from the Beyers, which he cannot provide without personal knowledge. Consequently, he will only be allowed to frame his comments hypothetically regarding warnings and involvement in the foam application. The Defendant also contests Dr. Nicewicz’s testimony on potential VOC sources, although he plans to state that VOC levels were elevated post-installation, without asserting causation. The reliability of Mr. Cude’s air sampling analysis is questioned by the Defendant, but he will still testify about elevated VOC levels, with Dr. Nicewicz allowed to discuss potential sources based on his expertise. Finally, Dr. Nicewicz’s opinion linking the Beyers’ health issues to toxic chemical exposure goes beyond his qualifications as an organic chemist and is deemed inadmissible.

Dr. Nicewicz is barred from testifying on medical causation due to lack of qualifications, although he may discuss the plaintiffs’ exposure to toxic chemicals. The court has discretion to exclude expert testimony beyond an expert's area of expertise, as established in Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus. Inc. The court then considers the defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' four claims: negligence, breach of warranty, failure to warn, and strict liability for product defect. The plaintiffs assert they sustained personal injuries and significant property damage, including loss in home value and structural integrity.

Summary judgment is warranted when the movant demonstrates no genuine dispute over material facts, with ambiguities resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, as per Holcomb v. Iona College and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA) governs the plaintiffs' claims, allowing for remedies related to personal injury and property damage from product installation. The CPLA does not change the substantive rights or proof requirements for plaintiffs, as noted in LaMontagne v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co. Inc. 

To succeed in their negligence claim, the plaintiffs must prove duty of care, breach, causation, and actual injury, referencing Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc. which outlines these elements in product liability cases.

A plaintiff's failure to prove all necessary elements results in the dismissal of their cause of action, as illustrated in Angiolillo v. Buckmiller. Claims related to negligent installation fall under the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA) since the defendant acted as a product seller. However, claims for negligent removal do not fall under the CPLA because the defendant functioned as a service provider, as seen in Johnson v. Sears Roebuck. An essential component of a negligence claim is establishing the defendant's conduct as the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, which must be demonstrated without conjecture, as highlighted in Wu v. Town of Fairfield and Paige v. Saint Andrew’s Roman Catholic Church Corp.

Under the CPLA, to succeed in a failure to warn claim, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective due to insufficient warnings or instructions, and that adequate warnings would have prevented the harm, as per Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572q(a). This causation requirement is broader than just medical causation, encompassing potential property damage as well.

Regarding breach of implied warranty of workmanlike conduct, this claim does not stand alone under Connecticut law and is treated as part of the negligence claim. Allegations of failing to perform work competently imply negligence principles, and where the damages are identical, the claims may be combined, as established in Bonan v. Goldring Home Inspections and further affirmed in cases like Ranger v. Gianmarco.

For strict liability claims, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant was engaged in selling the product, (2) the product was in a defectively dangerous condition, and (3) the defect caused the injury for which compensation is sought.

The excerpt outlines key legal principles related to product liability claims involving negligence, failure to warn, and strict liability. The Beyers must demonstrate proximate causation for both personal injury and property damage. Their property damage claims involve issues such as foam shrinking leading to structural warping, decreased property value, and remediation challenges. However, the exclusion of Dr. Huang's testimony negates their ability to establish a causal link between the SPF foam and their medical symptoms, hindering their personal injury claims. The Beyers maintain that general causation can be established through Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) and statements from medical professionals, despite the defendant's assertion that expert testimony is necessary due to the complex medical issues involved. The Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled that expert testimony is required for complex products where ordinary users cannot easily ascertain safety expectations. This precedent applies to cases involving drugs, where expert analysis is essential to link product use to specific health outcomes. In summary, the court may require expert testimony to adequately prove causation in both personal injury and product defect claims, particularly when the product's complexity exceeds the understanding of a layperson.

The document emphasizes the necessity of expert testimony to establish the toxic effects of certain chemicals, which are claimed to be harmful when uncombined or miscombined, due to the complex medical causation involved. While plaintiffs argue that expert testimony is not universally required in product liability cases in Connecticut, the court distinguishes this case from Johannsen v. Zimmer, where causation was clear due to a direct link between a defective prosthesis and the plaintiff's injury. In contrast, the current case presents ambiguity, as the plaintiffs' symptoms could arise from other sources, such as household chemicals, which complicates the causal relationship and necessitates expert testimony for both general and specific causation. The court has excluded the testimony of Dr. Yuh-Chin Huang and limited other witnesses regarding medical causation, preventing the plaintiffs from establishing their claims. Even if expert testimony were not mandated, the product manufacturers' warnings do not suffice to demonstrate general causation, as warnings are intended to inform consumers of potential risks without implying a definitive causal link. This approach is supported by legal and policy considerations aimed at encouraging transparent discourse on risks associated with products.

MSDSs referenced by Plaintiffs are not definitive in establishing causation. Icynene's warnings indicate potential adverse health effects from MDI exposure, but terms like “irritation” and “sensitization” are too ambiguous to support a jury's conclusion that the product could cause symptoms similar to those claimed by Plaintiffs. Johns Manville’s MSDSs specify that inhalation of vapors may cause irritation and other symptoms, yet the MSDS for the final product lacks warnings about inhalation dangers. Citing In re Mirena IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., the court emphasizes that for causation to be established via admission, it must be clear and unambiguous, which is not the case here. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that their symptoms resulted from VOCs emitted from the SPF without medical causation testimony, although Mr. Cude and Dr. Nicewicz's testimony could support claims regarding property damage. The Court grants the motion to preclude Dr. Huang's testimony and limits Mr. Cude and Dr. Nicewicz's testimonies but denies the motion for summary judgment on negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn claims, allowing them to proceed only regarding property damage. The Court considers the breach of implied warranty as part of the negligence claim, with Anchor Insulation Co. as the sole remaining defendant, sued under the Connecticut Product Liability Act for negligence, breach of warranty, product defect, and failure to warn.

Defendant has submitted a one-paragraph statement asserting that the case is ready for summary judgment, claiming that the absence of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses leaves no basis for the plaintiffs' case. In response, plaintiffs contest this assertion, stating there are genuine disputes regarding material facts, partially referencing their own statement of facts. Mr. Beyer’s deposition is ambiguous concerning his presence during the relevant foam spraying events, leading to disputes over whether he wore a respirator or Tyvek suit. Beyer described the odor from the foam as sweet and not alarming, but this contradicts reports from other subjects who described unpleasant odors during and after spraying. A study cited by plaintiffs indicates that most subjects experienced neuropsychiatric symptoms, with some reporting headaches and skin rashes, but no subjects reported tongue swelling. The study found consistent descriptions of fishy or chemical odors. Moreover, the court previously dismissed a count against Anchor for violating the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. Dr. Huang, a key expert in the plaintiffs' case, admitted that his opinions on chemical off-gassing are solely based on one study and refuted defense claims regarding the feasibility of further testing.

Mr. Beyer informed the Rule 35 examining physician that Anchor stores chemicals in proximity to his workplace and that the storage location was moved closer in 2010. He expressed that the removal of spray foam from his residence did not alleviate his symptoms, as he continued working near the chemical storage. Dr. Huang's evaluation focused solely on granite dust and did not consider the chemical storage issue. Mr. Cude's 2015 report lacked a specific remediation cost and relied on Mr. Bloom's estimate, with an untimely supplemental report submitted in December 2016 that largely reiterated Mr. Bloom's findings regarding remediation, also referencing a remediation plan he had prepared for another home. Instances of Mr. Cude copying factual descriptions from the Beyers' home were noted, although more concerning was his adoption of Mr. Bloom's conclusions. 

Mr. Cude's opinions rested on two assumptions: first, that elevated VOC levels in a 2012 air quality analysis were caused by the spray foam in the Beyer home, and second, that the spray foam removal was the cause of the Beyers' health issues. Cude admitted he did not conduct a home inspection for remediation purposes, although he did collect air samples during a prior inspection. He argued for special remediation to prevent further contamination and health risks, yet neither he nor Mr. Bloom had the qualifications to testify on medical causation, making any claims about the spray foam's health impacts inappropriate for jury consideration. Mr. Cude's report was prepared before other witness depositions, and it is unclear if he had access to a letter indicating the samples from Mr. Beyer were contaminated rather than pure product. Cude’s reliance on Mr. Bloom’s visual inspection and a single photo from Bloom's report was highlighted. The court noted that unless the plaintiffs could present clear and concrete evidence to establish general causation, which would not require jury speculation on complex medical issues, such information would not replace the need for admissible expert testimony on general causation.