Gordon v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.
Docket: CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-13289-MBB
Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; March 2, 2017; Federal District Court
Defendant Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide, Inc. has filed a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Susan Gordon, who opposes the motion. The case originated on September 2, 2014, when Gordon filed a lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court for injuries sustained at Cove Haven Resort, which she dismissed before June 30, 2015. On that date, she refiled the lawsuit in Massachusetts Superior Court, including two claims: Count I for negligence by an employee and Count II for inadequate training and supervision of employees. Starwood subsequently removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, citing diversity jurisdiction due to the parties' different state residences and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.
The memorandum outlines the standard for summary judgment, emphasizing that it is granted when there is no genuine dispute over material facts, allowing the court to determine if a trial is necessary. Genuine issues of fact are those that could influence the case's outcome, while material facts are significant enough to potentially alter the suit's result. The evidence must be viewed favorably for the non-moving party, but mere speculation or unsupported allegations do not suffice to negate a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff, a phlebotomist residing in Lunenburg, Massachusetts, made a reservation at Cove Haven Resort in Pennsylvania for a weekend vacation in September 2012. On September 1, 2012, she and her husband arrived at the resort, and on September 2, they participated in two boat ride tours operated by the resort. During the second tour, around 2:00 p.m., the boat encountered rough waves, causing the plaintiff to be thrown from the boat, leading to injuries including fractures to her T-12 vertebrae and bruises. She was transported to Scranton Hospital for immediate treatment and subsequently went to Massachusetts General Hospital for ongoing care, including a spine cementation procedure in November, resulting in approximately $70,000 in medical expenses covered by her insurance.
The defendant seeks summary judgment, claiming the plaintiff's personal injury claims are barred by Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations, while the plaintiff contends that Massachusetts' three-year statute applies, making her claims timely. The federal court, sitting in diversity, will apply Massachusetts' choice of law rules, which utilize a functional approach rather than a categorical application of statute of limitations. This approach focuses on the statute of limitations issue as a choice of law question rather than the underlying tort, as established in case law.
Section 142 establishes that a forum will utilize its own statute of limitations for a claim unless two conditions are met: (a) the claim does not significantly serve the forum's interests, and (b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state with a more significant connection to the parties and the incident. In evaluating this, the court considers whether Massachusetts has a substantial interest in the claims and whether Pennsylvania (referred to as Texas in earlier context) has a more significant relationship to the parties and the negligence claim.
The case of Nierman is cited, where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied Texas's statute of limitations to a personal injury case involving a Massachusetts resident injured in Texas. Key parallels are drawn: both plaintiffs were injured out of state, and the defendants operated businesses in the states of injury but were not incorporated there. The court recognized Massachusetts's interest in compensating its residents but concluded that this interest is not as compelling as Texas's interest in its statute of limitations.
Similarly, Pennsylvania's interest in applying its statute of limitations is deemed dominant, as the injury occurred there, despite the plaintiff's Massachusetts residency and reservation being made from Massachusetts. The court finds that the facts in Nierman undermine the argument that Massachusetts has a substantial interest in allowing the claim to proceed, affirming the application of Pennsylvania's statute of limitations.
Nierman establishes that Pennsylvania, like Texas, has a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence in this case, justifying the application of Pennsylvania's statute of limitations. The analysis based on sections 142 and 6 of the Restatement indicates that claims against a statute of limitations are considered under principles stated in section 6, primarily when determining the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and parties, as outlined in section 145(2)(b).
Section 142(2)(a) emphasizes that the forum state, Massachusetts, typically applies its own statute of limitations unless maintaining the claim serves no substantial purpose for the forum. While Massachusetts has an interest in compensating its citizens for personal injuries, mere residency does not equate to a substantial interest regarding the statute of limitations. Massachusetts only borrows another state’s statute of limitations in limited situations.
The plaintiff's arguments, including the fact that she traveled in a Massachusetts-insured vehicle and had medical insurance through Harvard Pilgrim Insurance Company, do not substantially impact the limitations issue. Previous cases cited by the plaintiff, such as O’Sullivan and Elliston, are distinguishable because in those cases, the absence of significant connections to the state where the injury occurred warranted the application of Massachusetts' statute of limitations. In contrast, the case at hand involves a significant relationship to Pennsylvania, where the alleged negligence and injury occurred, making Pennsylvania's statute of limitations applicable.
The court in O’Sullivan distinguished the case from Nierman, noting that the application of Texas’ statute of limitations in Nierman did not conflict with the forum’s statute of limitations in O’Sullivan, as Hyatt's operation of a hotel in Texas was central to the injury's occurrence. In Elliston, which involved product liability, Massachusetts’ statute of limitations was applied because Massachusetts had a greater interest than Oklahoma, even though the injury stemmed from a product defect in Oklahoma. The Elliston court emphasized that product liability claims involve multiple factors beyond the accident's location, resulting in Oklahoma having minimal interest in the claim. Additionally, the court in Mukarker rejected similar arguments presented by the plaintiff, highlighting that prior decisions, though unpublished, suggest the law has not evolved favorably for the plaintiff since Nierman. Mukarker noted the economic interest of Massachusetts in recouping benefits, yet acknowledged that two recent unpublished Massachusetts Appeals Court decisions found that financial implications did not sufficiently establish a substantial interest to override a more significant relationship to the claim from another state. The Mukarker court supported applying Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations, citing strong policy judgments underlying that statute, which outweighed Massachusetts’ financial interests in recovering health benefits.
Pennsylvania's statute of limitations aims to expedite litigation and discourage delays, which courts interpret stringently. In this case, the plaintiff's medical treatment received in Massachusetts post-accident is deemed irrelevant to the statute of limitations issue, as established in Nierman, where the locality of treatment did not influence the court's decision. The analysis indicates that a forum should avoid entertaining claims that do not further any local interest and could conflict with a state that has a closer connection to the case. Here, the court finds that Pennsylvania has a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence, as the injury transpired in Pennsylvania, and the defendant operates a resort there, unlike the Massachusetts-based plaintiff who only made the reservation from Massachusetts. Consequently, Pennsylvania's statute of limitations is applicable, reinforcing that local interests and connections must be prioritized in determining the appropriate jurisdiction for claims.
The court determines that Pennsylvania's statute of limitations applies based on principles from the Restatement. It emphasizes that applying Pennsylvania law aligns with the justified expectations of both parties, as the defendant conformed its conduct to Pennsylvania law, where the resort is located and where injuries are reasonably expected to occur. Although the plaintiff asserts an expectation to sue in Massachusetts due to residency and medical treatment there, the court finds that the defendant’s reliance on Pennsylvania law is justified.
Further, the court notes that the need for harmonious interstate relations does not influence the choice of law in this case. The ease of application principle is acknowledged but is deemed less significant than achieving desirable legal outcomes. As such, all factors considered confirm the application of Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.
Regarding the plaintiff's request for discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), the court denies it due to the lack of supporting affidavit or declaration, despite oral argument elaborating on the request. The court references a strong presumption against allowing additional discovery in this circuit and emphasizes that a party must show due diligence to be entitled to such discovery.
A nonmovant seeking relief under Rule 56(d) must demonstrate three key elements: (i) good cause for their inability to discover necessary facts earlier; (ii) a plausible basis for believing that additional facts exist and can be obtained in a reasonable timeframe; and (iii) an explanation of how these facts would effectively counter the pending summary judgment motion. The request must be substantiated by an affidavit or declaration, as required by Rule 56(d), though a formal affidavit is not mandatory. An unsworn memorandum opposing a motion does not meet this requirement.
In this case, the plaintiff's unsworn memorandum lacked a penalty of perjury statement and thus did not qualify as an affidavit or declaration. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to adequately justify why the requested information was not obtained before the close of fact discovery and did not provide sufficient evidence to meet the third prong's burden of showing how the facts would defeat the application of Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations. Consequently, the court determined that the delay for discovery was unjustified, applied Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations, and ruled that the action was time-barred since the injury occurred on September 2, 2012, and the suit was filed on June 30, 2015. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment was granted.
