Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; February 28, 2017; Federal District Court
Plaintiff "John Doe," a first-year student at Amherst College, was accused in October 2018 of sexual misconduct by another student, Sandra Jones, regarding an incident from February 2012. Jones claimed that while they engaged in consensual sexual activities, Doe continued after she withdrew consent. Doe contended that he was so intoxicated that he "blacked out" and could not recall much of the night. The College conducted an expedited disciplinary proceeding, resulting in the Hearing Board finding Doe "responsible" for violating the Sexual Misconduct Policy and imposing sanctions, including expulsion. Doe appealed, citing new evidence suggesting Jones had a political agenda that influenced her credibility and alleging procedural errors and gender bias in the proceedings. The College denied his appeal, stating that any political motives were irrelevant to the decision. After receiving text messages from Jones that raised doubts about her credibility, Doe requested a reopening of his case, which the College declined. Subsequently, in May 2015, he filed a complaint against the College and individuals, asserting a biased disciplinary process that violated his contractual and legal rights. The defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in October 2015, and Doe later sought permission to amend his complaint. The court allowed this amendment, and Doe filed his Amended Complaint in June 2016; the defendants then sought clarification on addressing new claims from the amended complaint.
Defendants opted to rely on their existing briefing in response to Doe's Amended Complaint, which includes claims against the College and several individual defendants, including College President Carolyn Martin and others involved in Doe's disciplinary hearing. Doe's claims against the College encompass breach of contract (Count I), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II), Title IX violations (Count III), violations of 42 U.S.C. 1981 (Count IV), Massachusetts Civil Rights Act violations (Count V), defamation (Count VI), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VII). Claims against the individual defendants include tortious interference with contract (Count VIII), violations of 42 U.S.C. 1981 (Count IX), MCRA violations (Count X), defamation (Count XI), negligence (Count XII), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count XIII). Doe also seeks injunctive relief in Count XIV. The court will grant Defendants' motion regarding counts VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII, while denying it for counts I, II, IV, and XIV.
Jurisdiction is established for Counts IV and V based on federal law under 28 U.S.C. 1331, while the remaining claims arise under state law. Federal courts can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims related to federal claims (28 U.S.C. 1367) or when there is complete diversity of citizenship along with an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000 (28 U.S.C. 1332). Plaintiff, a New York resident, claims damages exceeding this threshold, and the court finds it has jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Defendants are pursuing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), which is evaluated similarly to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court assesses the pleadings favorably towards the nonmovant, requiring sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible claim for relief, as outlined in key Supreme Court precedents.
The court can consider documents central to a plaintiff's claims in a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motion when their authenticity is not disputed and they are adequately referenced in the complaint. Unlike Rule 12(b)(6), a Rule 12(c) motion involves evaluating the entire pleadings.
The excerpt details the College's response to sexual misconduct, highlighting a "Dear Colleague" letter from the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) issued on April 4, 2011. This letter emphasizes that Title IX requirements on sexual harassment extend to sexual violence and mandates educational institutions to take immediate action against harassment and conduct prompt investigations. It advises schools to balance anonymity requests from claimants against their obligation to ensure a safe environment and to use a "preponderance of the evidence" standard for investigations related to sexual misconduct.
Following the letter, the College's Title IX Committee recommended procedural changes, adopted in September 2012. The narrative notes the impact of an essay by former student Angie Epifano, which criticized the College's handling of sexual assault cases, leading to increased media scrutiny. In response, the College's administration, represented by Martin, committed to investigating these allegations. Subsequently, on October 31, 2012, the College established a Special Oversight Committee on Sexual Misconduct to assess institutional policies and climate, which later reported concerns regarding racial bias in disciplinary actions.
The report highlights a perceived disparity in the College's handling of sexual misconduct complaints, attributed to white perpetrators having greater access to skilled legal representation rather than differential treatment based on race. The Oversight Committee found no basis for the widespread belief in racial disparities, even when anecdotal evidence was presented. Nonetheless, the report emphasized the need for fairness and equity in the College's procedures related to sexual misconduct. In response, two appendices were added to the Student Handbook: Appendix B outlines the College's Sexual Misconduct Policy, while Appendix C details the Procedures for addressing such complaints, both effective May 2013.
The Policy, encompassing behavioral standards and definitions of prohibited conduct, commits to timely and consistent responses to all reports of sexual misconduct. It mandates fair evaluation and resolution of these reports, promising thorough and impartial investigations when warranted. It defines sexual violence and clarifies that intoxication does not excuse sexual misconduct, emphasizing that incapacitation, whether from drugs or alcohol, renders an individual unable to consent. The Policy indicates that incapacitation extends beyond mere drunkenness and includes states like blackouts, where individuals may appear to consent but lack conscious awareness. However, it does not clarify the responsibility of students in blackout states regarding consent during sexual encounters. The Procedures detail the specific processes for adjudicating sexual misconduct complaints within the College.
Procedures outline the process for handling complaints at the College, detailing steps for filing complaints, notifying respondents, conducting investigations, and managing hearings and appeals. Complaints can be filed without time limits, although timely reports are encouraged to facilitate evidence collection. Respondents must meet with the Dean of Student Conduct within three days of notice and provide a written response within three business days. Both complainants and respondents are entitled to an Advisor from a College-maintained list and may consult private attorneys, who must remain outside the hearing room.
Investigations are conducted by a trained investigator selected by the Dean of Student Conduct, who is required to attempt to gather relevant evidence but is not obligated to obtain all evidence. An investigative report summarizing relevant facts is prepared, but the investigator does not determine if a violation occurred.
During hearings, the complainant, respondent, their Advisors, the investigator, witnesses, and College officials may be present. The Dean of Students can allow remote participation for fairness. Students wishing to present new evidence must request permission from the Dean at least three days prior to the hearing. Evidence regarding prior sexual history or bad acts is only admissible with the Dean's approval.
Hearing board members must have experience and receive annual training on sexual misconduct dynamics and evidence evaluation. They deliberate privately, with only the Chair and legal counsel present; the latter may not participate in deliberations or vote. The board uses a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to determine a respondent's responsibility, meaning they must find it more likely than not that the respondent committed the alleged violations.
If a hearing board finds a respondent responsible for sexual misconduct, it will determine appropriate sanctions from the outlined range in the Student Conduct Process. Factors considered in sanctioning include the harm to the Complainant, any ongoing risks posed by the Respondent, the impact on the community, prior conduct violations, and any relevant mitigating or aggravating circumstances, alongside impact statements from the parties involved. The board must communicate its decision in writing within three days of deliberation, and either party can appeal within seven days based on material procedural errors, bias, or new substantive information. The Provost or designee will assess the appeal grounds, but there is no further review of the Provost’s decision.
The complaint against Doe stems from events on February 4, 2012. Doe was heavily intoxicated that night, with no memory of events after preparing for bed. He and his roommate joined a group in a common room, where Doe was described as very drunk. Doe and Sandra Jones began kissing and later went to her room, where Jones initiated oral sex. She later claimed the encounter became non-consensual when Doe held her head down after she asked him to stop. After Doe left her room, Jones locked his belongings outside and texted a friend about the encounter, expressing concern about being seen with Doe and suggesting they might need to fabricate a story due to his level of intoxication. Jones also mentioned another student arriving at her room later.
Doe sought his phone from Jones’s room but was told to leave due to another person being present. Communications between DR and Jones revealed concerns about disclosing the events to Jones's roommate, EK, who was dating Doe. After waking up on February 5, 2012, Doe was unable to remember interactions with Jones, including a kiss before going to her room. He later contacted Jones, expressing confusion about the prior night and apologizing if he had acted inappropriately.
Approximately two months later, while intoxicated, Jones disclosed to a senior, JM, that Doe had sexually assaulted her, and later confided in two other friends. During a semester abroad in London, she published an essay indicating that her encounter with Doe started consensually but escalated to non-consensual acts. After the essay's publication, Doe learned that Jones was discussing their encounter, yet the College did not investigate at that time.
In April 2013, Doe sought advice from LR, a member of the Oversight Committee, regarding how he could make amends with Jones, which LR interpreted as a confession of sexual assault. She advised him to avoid Jones and seek counseling, subsequently informing Jones of Doe's alleged confession and offering her support if she decided to file a complaint. LR reported the incident to the College's Title IX Team, but Jones chose not to file a formal complaint initially, resulting in no investigation.
Jones eventually submitted her complaint on October 28, 2013, detailing that she repeatedly asked Doe to leave while he pressured her to perform oral sex. She stated that he disregarded her refusal, forced oral sex on her, and left the room feeling nauseated. Notably, her complaint did not indicate that she willingly performed oral sex before withdrawing consent.
On November 1, 2013, Mitton Shannon informed Doe of a complaint against him, granting him less than a week to respond and the option to select a non-attorney advisor for guidance. The College scheduled a disciplinary hearing to occur before Thanksgiving and allowed Doe to submit a list of relevant witnesses. Mitton Shannon stated that Doe needed the investigator's authorization before discussing the allegations. The College hired Allyson Kurker to conduct the investigation with a $5,000 budget, anticipating completion within fifteen hours.
Both parties provided witness lists: Jones identified LR and JM, while Doe listed EH, EK, NK, and RM. Notably, neither party included DR or ML, who had communications with Jones on the night of the incident. Kurker conducted interviews with Jones, Doe, and all witnesses except RM, whom she interviewed later. Following the interviews, Kurker drafted a report summarizing her findings and direct quotes from the interviews.
In her report, Jones recounted her initial resistance to kissing Doe but later agreed. She described the interaction as initially consensual but stated that she later withdrew consent, telling Doe to stop and leave. Despite her withdrawal, she claimed Doe held her head down until he ejaculated. The report included details of their subsequent communications, with Jones indicating she did not document the incident in writing. Doe referenced an affidavit from EK suggesting that Jones had texted about the interaction with him.
In April 2012, Jones informed JM about her interactions with Doe and discussed the situation with two other students who were upset due to Doe dating her roommate, EK. Doe reported to investigator Kurker that he "blacked out" during his encounter with Jones and had no memory of it, asserting he would not have behaved as Jones described. He provided Kurker with electronic communications, including a message from RM indicating that Jones was involved with another individual shortly after Doe left her room, although this was not mentioned in the Report despite being attached. Kurker's summaries of witness interviews varied in length, with LR's summary being notably extensive. LR suggested that Doe believed he had sexually assaulted Jones based on his own memories, contrary to his claim of amnesia regarding the events. Kurker expressed doubts about LR's testimony due to inconsistencies with other accounts, including Doe's inability to recall the evening.
Doe relied on the investigative findings for his hearing preparation, without guidance to conduct his own investigation from college officials, including his advisor, Torin Moore. Doe felt restricted by a supposed confidentiality policy that hindered him from seeking emotional support or legal counsel. While he had an advisor, the advisor lacked experience with the new procedures and could not advocate for Doe. Doe sought to present evidence about Jones's interactions with another student (ML) but was advised by his advisor that it would be inadmissible, leading him to forgo this evidence. The hearing occurred on December 12, 2013, chaired by Dean of Students Larimore, who limited questioning from Doe and the Hearing Board. Attendees included Jones, her advisor, Doe, his advisor, the college's Title IX coordinator Frankl, and various witnesses.
A physical barrier during the hearing prevented Doe and Jones from seeing each other. Jones was allowed to type her responses, which were read aloud by a student. References were made to Jones’s text messages after Doe left, but these messages were not reviewed by the investigator or presented to the Hearing Board. When questioned, Jones acknowledged texting a friend to avoid being alone, and during her testimony, she mentioned having told a friend that she had "done something bad." Jones indicated that her texts suggested a consensual hook-up, as she was not ready to acknowledge that she had been raped. The Hearing Board did not request these texts, and the Procedures did not allow for new evidence to be introduced during the hearing. The Hearing Board questioned Doe’s witnesses about possible motives for Jones to fabricate her claims.
Following the hearing, the Hearing Board found Doe responsible for violating the Sexual Misconduct Policy, stating that Doe’s account of being "blacked out" was credible but emphasized that intoxication does not excuse sexual misconduct. Doe was expelled, with his transcript marked accordingly, and he had seven days to appeal while being required to vacate campus housing immediately.
Doe submitted an appeal on December 20, 2013, claiming new substantive information had emerged post-hearing, including an essay by Jones discussing the case and Doe's discovery that LR, an activist involved in editing the essay, had influenced the complaint against him. This suggested possible motivations for Jones to fabricate claims as part of an activist agenda led by LR. Doe argued that this new evidence was relevant and substantive, and he also appealed based on alleged procedural errors during the hearing.
Jones allegedly withheld information during her complaint filing and investigation, leading Doe to claim that the Hearing Board's failure to address these inconsistencies was a procedural error. Doe also contended that questions regarding his prior sexual history violated established Procedures, although the decision denying his appeal deemed such inquiries permissible for assessing behavior patterns. The appeal decision maintained that Doe had sufficient opportunity to address alleged discrepancies between Jones's complaint and testimony, which were not classified as procedural errors. Additionally, Doe presented new evidence related to personal motives, but the decision found these claims baseless and irrelevant.
After the College publicly announced a student was found responsible for sexual assault, Doe, although not named, was recognized as the subject. Following the appeal’s denial, Doe sought legal counsel and discovered the identity of a student, ML, who had been present with Jones after Doe left. Doe obtained sexually charged text messages exchanged that night between ML and Jones, as well as messages between Jones and another student, DR, which indicated Jones viewed herself as the initiator of the sexual activity and included derogatory remarks about Doe.
In April 2014, Doe submitted affidavits from ML and EK alongside the text messages to request a reopening of the disciplinary proceedings, which the College declined, prompting this lawsuit. Specific actions attributed to defendants included Susie Mitton Shannon advising Jones on the timing of her formal complaint and telling Doe about the confidentiality of the proceedings while discussing the investigative report’s draft. James Larimore, as the non-voting chair of the Hearing Board, was accused by Doe of improperly influencing the hearing process by disallowing certain questions and prematurely closing the hearing, despite awareness of undisclosed text messages that could affect the case's outcome.
Larimore was one of the individuals who sent an email to the College community informing them about a disciplinary hearing wherein a student was found responsible for sexual misconduct and subsequently expelled. Laurie Frankl presided over the hearing and was responsible for ensuring the College's compliance with Title IX, tasked with responding timely and effectively to all reports of sexual misconduct, irrespective of formal complaints. Frankl also participated in sending the campus-wide email. Carolyn Martin became involved in Doe's case in spring 2014 while the College was deliberating on his submission, which included text messages related to the incident. Evidence supporting Martin's involvement included notifications from LinkedIn indicating her access to Doe's profile.
Doe claims a contractual relationship with the College based on the Student Handbook, arguing that the College (1) issued a Hearing Board decision lacking sufficient evidence, (2) provided an unfair investigative process, (3) discriminated against him due to gender, race, and national origin, and (4) declined to reopen proceedings after he presented new evidence. Massachusetts courts have recognized student handbooks as potentially establishing contractual terms. At this litigation stage, the College has not contested this notion, allowing the court to treat the Student Handbook as a binding contract. Under Massachusetts law, the reasonable expectation standard is applied to breach of contract claims involving private schools, meaning the court interprets the contract terms based on what the College should reasonably expect the student to understand. A breach occurs if the College fails to meet those reasonable expectations. The court must accept Doe’s factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in his favor regarding the expectations set forth in the Student Handbook. Courts generally refrain from interfering with academic and disciplinary decisions made by private institutions.
The court does not enforce strict adherence to due process standards or evidentiary rules for private colleges and universities but instead applies a reasonable expectation standard to evaluate breaches of contract claims made by students. In the case of Doe, he argues that the College breached its contract by failing to support the Hearing Board's decision with a preponderance of the evidence regarding his alleged sexual misconduct. Doe contends that the evidence indicated he was "blacked out," and thus, under the Student Handbook, the Hearing Board needed to find he either knew the complainant did not consent or was aware of his own conduct's implications. He claims the evidence did not support these conclusions and that the Hearing Board misrepresented its findings by asserting he was "blacked out."
The College disputes this interpretation, stating that the Hearing Board's sole finding was Doe's violation of the sexual assault policy, not his state of blackout. The court finds Doe's claim plausible, noting that the Hearing Board's conclusions included credibility assessments of both parties' accounts, particularly Doe's assertion of blackout. The College further maintains that the policy does not require knowledge of consent and that intoxication or impairment does not excuse responsibility for obtaining consent. The policy differentiates between general intoxication and incapacitation, with the latter indicating a state where an individual cannot give consent, even if they appear to do so.
Doe contends that he was incapable of consenting to sexual activity with Jones due to being "blacked out," and argues that the College's Policy does not require incapacitated individuals to obtain consent from non-incapacitated persons. The Policy fails to address the scenario where an incapacitated individual does not seek consent from a non-incapacitated party or the situation involving two incapacitated individuals. This gap reflects broader issues regarding victim identification, particularly in light of historical victim-blaming concerns. The court concludes that a reasonable interpretation of the Policy would suggest that a student in Doe's position could view themselves as a victim of sexual misconduct without violating the Policy, leading to the denial of the Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding this aspect.
Doe's second claim relates to the fairness and reliability of the College's investigative and fact-finding process. He asserts that the investigation led by Kurker did not meet the standards of thoroughness, impartiality, and fairness outlined in the Policy and Procedures. Doe highlights the failure to investigate evidence regarding Jones's actions after their interaction, which he believes could have been exculpatory, particularly text messages exchanged with others. While the College argues that it adhered to the Procedures, Doe maintains that the College had a broader obligation to ensure a fair investigation, which it did not fulfill by neglecting to uncover significant exculpatory information and failing to provide him an opportunity to address this deficiency. Consequently, the court finds Doe's interpretation of the Policy and Procedures to be reasonable, noting that a student would expect a balanced presentation of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence during the investigation.
The court examines whether the reading of the Policy and Procedures was objectively reasonable, relying on evidence outside the Policy. Doe claims the investigator failed to adequately seek Jones’s contemporaneous written communications, which he argues were relevant and potentially exculpatory. Consequently, the court concludes that Doe has presented enough factual allegations to infer that the investigation was inadequate, resulting in a denial of the Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings concerning this breach of contract claim.
For the discrimination aspect of Doe’s breach of contract claim, he contends that the College conducted its disciplinary process in a gender-discriminatory manner. He highlights discrepancies in how the College addressed Jones’s complaint about Doe and Doe’s own claims against Jones. Specifically, after Jones reported sexual misconduct by Doe, the College encouraged her to file a formal complaint and initiated an investigation against him. In contrast, when the College learned that Doe might have been subjected to misconduct by Jones while incapacitated, it did not prompt him to file a complaint nor investigate Jones’s actions. These allegations suggest that the College's differing responses based on gender could indicate gender-based discrimination.
However, Doe's claims of racial discrimination lack the same evidentiary support. He references a 2013 Oversight Committee report which found no substantiation for perceptions of harsher treatment of male students of color compared to others. The Committee did advise the College to avoid discriminatory practices moving forward, but the mere issuance of a warning does not imply that the College ignored it. Thus, the court finds insufficient grounds to infer racial discrimination in the College’s application of its policies.
Only male students of color have faced disciplinary actions such as forced leave, suspension, or expulsion since the implementation of new policies in May 2013. However, the court found insufficient basis to infer that these actions were motivated by racial discrimination, as there were no allegations that comparable male students received different punishments for similar conduct. The situation is likened to a previous case involving gender discrimination, where the plaintiff also failed to identify any students treated differently. For discrimination claims to be valid, it must be shown that members of a disfavored group experienced different treatment compared to others in similar situations.
Regarding Doe’s claim that the College breached its contract by not reopening his disciplinary proceeding after he presented new evidence, the court noted that he did not cite any specific policy or procedure allowing for the reopening of such cases post-appeal. Without a relevant contractual provision, no breach could be established. Additionally, the court addressed Doe's claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, stating that every contract in Massachusetts implies such a covenant, which prevents either party from undermining the other's contractual benefits.
Doe alleges that the College failed to provide a thorough and impartial investigation as promised in the Student Handbook, which resulted in a denial of fair adjudication regarding the complaint against him. Consequently, the College's motion for judgment on the pleadings for Count II is denied.
Regarding Count III, which involves tortious interference with contract by individual defendants, Massachusetts law requires Doe to prove four elements: 1) the existence of a contract with a third party; 2) that the defendants knowingly induced the third party to breach that contract; 3) that the interference was intentional and improper in motive or means; and 4) that Doe suffered harm due to the defendants' actions. When corporate officials are involved, a heightened standard necessitates proving that the defendants acted with actual malice, meaning their interference was motivated by a spiteful or malignant purpose unrelated to any legitimate corporate interest.
The defendants argue that Doe's complaint lacks sufficient allegations of knowing interference, that their actions fell within their employment scope, and that there are no allegations of actual malice. Doe admitted in his initial response that his original complaint did not adequately allege affirmative conduct by the individual defendants but retained the claim in his Amended Complaint. He asserts that the individual defendants were aware of his contractual relationship with the College, acted to prevent a fair investigation, acted intentionally and maliciously, and caused his expulsion. Although Doe did not contest the applicability of the heightened standard for corporate officials, he claims their actions were malicious. The court accepts, without making a determination, that the heightened standard applies to all individual defendants in this case.
Doe's claim of malicious intent by individual defendants fails to meet the actual malice standard, which requires evidence that their actions were motivated by malice rather than a legitimate interest in serving the College. The plaintiff has not provided facts to suggest such motives. Consequently, the motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Count III is granted.
Count IV addresses a Title IX violation by the College, which prohibits gender-based discrimination in educational programs. Title IX aims to protect individuals from discriminatory practices, allowing for claims of differential treatment based on sex or deliberate indifference to sexual harassment allegations. Courts are increasingly hearing Title IX claims from male students disciplined under sexual misconduct policies.
In the absence of First Circuit guidance, district courts in this jurisdiction have utilized a framework from the Second Circuit’s Yusuf v. Vassar College, which outlines two categories of Title IX claims: erroneous outcome claims, where bias in the disciplinary process leads to an adverse decision, and selective enforcement claims, where the severity of penalties is influenced by the student's gender. To succeed on an erroneous outcome claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate a flawed proceeding resulting in an adverse outcome linked to gender bias. Conversely, a selective enforcement claim can be established without challenging the factual basis of the disciplinary findings.
Doe asserts both types of claims in his Amended Complaint, alongside a deliberate indifference claim based on his incapacitation during the alleged sexual activity, which Jones characterized as consensual. The court will examine each of these claims in detail.
Doe claims that gender bias from the College and individual defendants tainted the investigation and adjudication process, leading to an erroneous outcome in the Hearing Board's decision. In his Amended Complaint, he identifies several procedural flaws, such as the investigator's failure to obtain contemporaneous text messages from Jones, the College's withholding of Jones's initial statement, improper involvement of defendants in directing the hearing and influencing deliberations, and the denial of his appeal based on new evidence.
Doe presents two theories for the erroneous outcome. First, he argues his factual innocence, asserting that the allegations were fabricated by Jones, and procedural flaws prevented the Hearing Board from considering evidence countering her claims and her potential motives. Second, he contends that the Hearing Board was misinformed about the Policy and Procedures, leading to the incorrect result.
Despite alleging an erroneous outcome, Doe does not challenge the Hearing Board's discretion in evaluating the credibility of the evidence it had. To succeed on a Title IX erroneous outcome claim, a plaintiff must show a flawed process, an adverse result, and that gender bias motivated the erroneous finding. Doe's accusations include that Jones filed her complaint in retaliation for his decision to pursue criminal charges against another student and that historical bias against men exists, which may suggest gender bias influenced the outcome.
Additionally, Doe argues a selective enforcement claim, asserting that his gender motivated the College’s decision to pursue disciplinary action and the severity of the punishment. He alleges that the College encouraged Jones to file a formal complaint when it learned of potential nonconsensual activity, yet did not take similar action when it learned that Jones may have initiated sexual activity with him while he was incapacitated. These assertions provide a basis for both his erroneous outcome and selective enforcement claims.
The College is accused of failing to investigate allegations made by Doe, who claims he was incapable of consenting due to intoxication. He alleges that the severity of his punishment was influenced by his gender, aimed at satisfying campus activists seeking the expulsion of a male student. These claims are sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Title IX, which addresses deliberate indifference to sexual harassment. Title IX requires schools to act when they are aware or should be aware of potential harassment, regardless of formal complaints. Doe argues the College was aware of sexual activity involving him during a blackout but took no action to assess his victim status under its policies, allowing him to proceed with a Title IX claim.
Additionally, Doe alleges racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, asserting that he was punished more harshly due to his race. To succeed, he must demonstrate intentional discrimination linked to his race. While he points to disproportionate punishment affecting male students of color, he fails to provide evidence of others receiving lesser penalties for similar violations. Consequently, the court finds insufficient grounds to infer that Doe’s punishment was disproportionate or influenced by factors beyond the findings of the Hearing Board.
The court determined that the Oversight Committee's concerns about racial disparities in disciplinary actions were insufficient to support claims of discrimination, as they lacked documented evidence of such disparities. Consequently, the court granted the Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Count V. In Count VI, concerning the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), a plaintiff must demonstrate that their constitutional or statutory rights were interfered with through threats, intimidation, or coercion. The MCRA was established to address violations of secured rights through such means and does not create a broad constitutional tort. Direct violations of rights under the MCRA require evidence of intimidation or coercion aimed at a specific individual, which interferes with their legal rights. Doe claimed his right to a discrimination-free education under Title IX was compromised by biased disciplinary actions leading to his expulsion. However, the court noted that Doe failed to show that the College or individual defendants employed threats or coercion. Although Doe alleged a breach of contract by the College, for it to be considered coercive under the MCRA, there must be an intention to interfere with Doe’s exercise of his secured rights. The court found that the facts alleged did not indicate any attempt by the College or defendants to pressure Doe to abandon his rights.
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Doe’s MCRA claim against the College and individual defendants is granted. The court elaborates on the elements of defamation under Massachusetts law, which requires the plaintiff to establish: 1) a published written statement; 2) concerning the plaintiff; 3) that is defamatory; 4) false; and 5) either causes economic loss or is actionable without it. Notably, Massachusetts law allows recovery for true statements made with actual malice. The U.S. Supreme Court has imposed constitutional limitations on defamation claims, emphasizing that statements must be provable as true or false, and for public concern issues, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove falsity.
Doe claims defamation based on a campus-wide email and the notation "Disciplinary Expulsion" on his transcript. However, the court finds no factual allegations linking individual defendants Martin or Mitton Shannon to these publications, thus granting judgment in their favor. Similarly, there are no connections between Larimore or Frankl and the transcript notation. The court assesses the campus-wide email, determining it pertains to campus safety, a matter of public concern, which requires Doe to prove the statements' falsity. Doe identifies two specific statements in the email for consideration.
In December, a hearing board concluded that an Amherst College student violated the Sexual Misconduct Policy by committing sexual assault, leading to the student's expulsion. Amherst College now has a practice of notifying the community about expulsions for sexual violence. The expelled student, Doe, argues that communications from College officials, Larimore and Frankl, implied he received a fair and impartial hearing, despite evidence that he was incapacitated during the alleged assault. Doe contends that a jury should determine if these statements misled recipients about the fairness of the proceedings. The defendants assert that the statements were true, as a hearing occurred, the board found Doe responsible, and he was expelled for sexual violence. The court sided with the defendants, stating the email accurately represented the events without implying other defamatory facts. A strained interpretation would be required to suggest a defamatory meaning. Regarding a notation about Doe's expulsion on his transcript, the court noted that it was accurate when placed. Even if the notation were considered potentially defamatory under Massachusetts law, Doe did not provide sufficient evidence of malice. Consequently, the court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendants against Doe's defamation claims.
In terms of negligence, Doe must demonstrate that the individual defendants owed him a duty of reasonable care, breached that duty, and caused damage as a result. He claims the defendants had a responsibility to ensure a fair disciplinary process and consider exculpatory evidence. However, the defendants argue that Massachusetts law does not impose such a duty on college administrators.
The court in Emerson ruled on the liability of a college to protect a student from criminal acts at a party on another college's campus, determining that under Massachusetts law, a legal duty arises only when there is a special relationship and foreseeability of harm. The court concluded that the college did not owe a duty to the student once she left its premises. Additionally, it stated that Massachusetts law does not impose a duty on college administrators to enforce university policies, referencing a previous case where the court declined to establish a duty to prevent drug use among students due to privacy rights. Despite factual differences between this case and the precedents, the court found no legal duty applicable in the current situation.
The court emphasized that tort obligations are imposed by law, independent of contractual duties, and noted that the evolving expectations of colleges do not align with imposing a direct legal duty on administrators regarding student disciplinary actions, as these are governed by contractual relationships. Consequently, the court allowed the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings concerning the negligence claim against individual defendants.
For the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court outlined the necessary elements a plaintiff must prove and found that the individual defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiff per the student handbook or in tort. Thus, the court also dismissed this claim against the defendants.
Doe's request for injunctive relief was treated separately but did not provide a new basis for liability; it remained viable alongside other surviving claims. Ultimately, the court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings for counts III, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, while denying it for counts I, II, IV, and X. The plaintiff was allowed to proceed under a pseudonym, with the student who filed the complaint identified as "Sandra Jones."
Students at the College are identified by their initials, and the facts in the case primarily derive from the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 102). The College's Policy and Procedures explicitly promise that investigations into alleged sexual misconduct will be “thorough, impartial, and fair.” Doe's claim relies on this specific language rather than on vague general representations of fairness, which cannot constitute an enforceable contract. The notice-pleading standard allows Doe to assert that only male students of color have been separated from the College since May 2013 without identifying the source of this assertion, as these allegations are appropriate under the standards set forth in Iqbal and Twombly.
Under Rule 11, parties must certify that their factual claims have evidentiary support or are likely to after further investigation. The court views the phrase “on information and belief” in the complaint as unnecessary and not contributory to the claim. Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex, and the First Circuit interprets this as including gender identity. The court expresses skepticism about the applicability of the Massachusetts statute in a way that would not violate the First Amendment but avoids a ruling on its constitutionality for this case.
Regarding Doe’s defamation claim, the court questions whether the allegation that the transcript was "published to College employees and others" sufficiently establishes "publication," as academic transcripts are typically disseminated as part of educational functions. Massachusetts law recognizes a conditional privilege for publishing defamatory material when necessary for legitimate business interests. Additionally, courts have rejected the concept of "self-publication" as a means to establish publication in defamation cases.
