United States v. Carrion

Citations: 236 F. Supp. 3d 1280; 2017 WL 662484; 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23335Docket: Case No. 2:03-cr-030-JAD-RJJ-1

Court: District Court, D. Nevada; February 16, 2017; Federal District Court

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Daniel Carrion, initially sentenced as a felon in possession of a firearm in 2004, received an enhanced 15-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). However, the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. U.S. invalidated the ACCA's residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, and the subsequent ruling in Welch v. U.S. confirmed that this decision applies retroactively. Carrion, having exhausted his appeals, filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court noted uncertainty about whether Carrion's sentence was enhanced based on the now-invalidated residual clause or another provision of the ACCA. Nonetheless, following the majority view among courts, it concluded that if a defendant can demonstrate that the sentencing judge may have relied on the residual clause, they can use relevant case law to argue that their prior convictions do not meet the criteria for enhancement under the remaining ACCA provisions. Carrion successfully made this argument, leading to the granting of his motion to vacate the sentence. The legal backdrop involves Title 18, § 922(g), which criminalizes firearm possession by certain individuals, and the ACCA's requirements for classifying prior convictions as violent felonies, which have become increasingly complex and subject to scrutiny. Recent Supreme Court rulings have narrowed the definitions of qualifying violent felonies, significantly impacting cases like Carrion's.

Carrion's pre-sentence investigation report indicated that his previous California convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and robbery met the criteria for armed career criminal status, leading the sentencing judge to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The judge did not specify which of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) clauses applied to Carrion’s prior convictions, and there is no record evidence showing reliance on any particular clause. The Ninth Circuit upheld the sentence, agreeing that Carrion's convictions were violent felonies under the ACCA's force or residual clauses.

Carrion seeks to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson, which invalidated the ACCA's residual clause. He argues that without the ACCA enhancement, his sentencing guidelines would have suggested a range of 30-37 months, with a maximum of 10 years. However, it is unclear whether Carrion's sentence was based on the residual clause, as the judge did not clarify the specific clause used for classification. Both parties acknowledge that the judge endorsed the probation report's conclusion without specifying which ACCA subsection applied.

The government contends that Carrion must demonstrate that the judge could not have applied the ACCA enhancement under the remaining valid clauses, arguing that if he cannot do so, Johnson's ruling is irrelevant to his case. Conversely, Carrion asserts that the determination should be made based on case law developed since his sentencing, which suggests he does not qualify for ACCA enhancement. The ambiguity regarding the judge's reliance on the residual clause complicates Carrion's ability to leverage the Johnson decision in his appeal.

Determining the applicable law for Carrion’s § 2255 motion hinges on whether Johnson affects his sentence and whether the sentencing judge relied on the residual clause. Carrion claims his motion is valid under Johnson, which invalidated the residual clause, arguing that recent case law shows his offenses do not qualify under the remaining clauses. The government contends that Carrion's reliance on non-retroactive cases disqualifies him from relief under § 2255.

The courts are divided on this issue. Some courts assert that if a defendant must depend on non-retroactive case law to support a Johnson claim, they fail to satisfy the requirements of § 2255. These courts maintain that the actual sentencing context matters and that the defendant must demonstrate that the sentencing judge could not have used another clause at the time of sentencing. For instance, in Ziglar v. United States, it was emphasized that a defendant's eligibility under the law at the time of sentencing is the key consideration, not current eligibility based on recent rulings. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in In re Hires concluded that the focus should be on the defendant’s prior convictions qualifying under the residual clause at the time of sentencing, regardless of current law.

Conversely, other courts permit defendants to invoke Johnson along with intervening case law to contest their sentences under § 2255. These courts generally require some indication that the sentencing judge may have relied on the residual clause. Thus, the legal landscape remains contentious, with differing views on whether a combination of Johnson and newer case law can substantiate a § 2255 motion for relief.

The excerpt outlines a legal framework for evaluating a defendant's eligibility for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on potential reliance on the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) during sentencing. Once the initial threshold is met, intervening case law can be used to assess whether a defendant's prior convictions qualify as violent felonies under ACCA's remaining clauses. The Ninth Circuit has established that the mere possibility of reliance on the residual clause is sufficient for relief under § 2255, as demonstrated in the case of United States v. Christian. In that case, the district court initially refused to consider favorable post-sentencing decisions to evaluate whether Christian's convictions qualified under other ACCA clauses. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, affirming that the uncertainty regarding the sentencing judge's reliance on the residual clause warranted the application of intervening case law, ultimately determining that Christian’s prior convictions did not trigger the ACCA.

Furthermore, the excerpt references the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in In re Adams, which supports the retroactive application of post-sentencing ACCA case law for evaluating Johnson claims in successive § 2255 motions. The author aligns with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, advocating that defendants should be permitted to use intervening cases to demonstrate that the residual clause influenced their sentencing when the record is ambiguous. There is acknowledgment of the complexities involved in reconstructing the legal landscape at the time of sentencing but emphasizes the importance of due process and liberty rights. Ultimately, the author adopts the Ninth Circuit's approach, concluding that a defendant only needs to show potential reliance on the residual clause to utilize intervening case law in challenging their prior convictions' classification under the ACCA.

Carrion has established a basis for challenging his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as the record does not clarify whether the sentencing judge used the now-invalidated residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to classify Carrion’s prior convictions as violent felonies. The government acknowledges that it is plausible the judge relied on this clause. Consequently, Carrion can argue that his convictions do not meet the ACCA’s violent felony criteria based on recent case law. 

His previous convictions, which justified a 15-year sentence under the ACCA, included two second-degree robbery convictions and one conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Dixon (2015) determined that a conviction for second-degree robbery cannot serve as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA. Removing these robbery convictions leaves Carrion without the necessary predicates for an ACCA enhancement.

As a result, Carrion’s sentence is vacated, and he is resentenced to the statutory maximum of ten years. He has already served more than this duration, making him eligible for immediate release. The court orders that Carrion’s motion to vacate his sentence is granted and sets a timeline for the United States to show cause why he should not be released immediately. Additionally, any party has seven days to justify the need for a sentencing hearing; otherwise, Carrion will be released without further notice. The motion to expedite scheduling is denied as moot.

In United States v. Dixon, the Ninth Circuit ruled that robbery convictions under California Penal Code § 211 do not qualify as violent felonies under certain clauses of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Carrion's sentencing judge initially found his prior convictions to fall under one of the violent-felony clauses. However, Carrion's 2007 motion to vacate his sentence, citing ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking resentencing under the Booker decision, was denied. The Ninth Circuit permitted Carrion to file a second motion under § 2255 to challenge his sentencing based on the Johnson decision. Although Carrion did not submit the pre-sentence investigation report, the case was reassigned due to the original judge's retirement, and Carrion has been in federal custody since May 2003. Many courts have enhanced sentences under the ACCA without specifying which clause was applicable to the prior convictions. The determination of whether a petitioner was sentenced under the residual clause is based on the time of sentencing. Regardless of potential changes in law, the critical issue is the nature of the sentencing that occurred. If the sentencing was based on the enumerated offenses clause, the invalidation of the residual clause by Johnson would not affect the sentence. Current legal standards, including precedents set by Descamps and Mathis, should be applied to assess the validity of a Johnson claim for relief.

A 2255 motion references Sixth Circuit case law from 2011 to evaluate whether a conviction qualifies under the force clause, despite the defendant's sentencing occurring in 2006. Courts have permitted the use of subsequent case law to seek relief under Johnson, even if the sentencing judge did not apply the residual clause. Some jurisdictions argue that employing recent decisions to clarify the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is pragmatic due to the complexities of the law at the time of sentencing. The document cites various cases, including Ladwig and Adams, to support this viewpoint. Additionally, it notes that the interpretation of statutes should reflect their enduring meaning since enactment. The court indicates that it does not need to decide on the qualification of Carrion's other convictions as violent felonies.