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Chesher v. 3M Co.
Citations: 234 F. Supp. 3d 693; 2017 A.M.C. 305; 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20706; 2017 WL 569948Docket: No. 3:15-cv-02123-DCN
Court: District Court, D. South Carolina; February 12, 2017; Federal District Court
Crane Co.’s motion for summary judgment has been denied by the court. Plaintiffs James Wilson Chesher and Cheryl Ann Chesher allege that Chesher’s mesothelioma resulted from his asbestos exposure during his 1965-1989 service in the U.S. Navy, specifically through maintenance and repair work on equipment such as valves and de-aerating feed tanks containing asbestos components. Chesher often worked with Crane valves, which required the replacement of asbestos-containing gaskets. Crane is also linked to Cochrane Corp., the manufacturer of the de-aerating feed tanks used on two ships where Chesher served, where similar asbestos gaskets were replaced during inspections. The plaintiffs initiated legal action in 2015, asserting multiple claims against various defendants, which was later removed to federal court. After several rounds of briefing and a hearing, the court is now reviewing the summary judgment motion. The standard for granting summary judgment requires no genuine dispute over material facts that affect the suit's outcome, emphasizing the judge's role in identifying genuine issues for trial rather than weighing evidence. Admiralty jurisdiction is firmly established in this case, necessitating the application of maritime law, which draws from both state and federal sources. Maritime law encompasses a blend of traditional common-law rules and adaptations, allowing for the integration of state law provided it aligns with federal maritime policies. State law can supplement federal maritime law unless it conflicts with it; in the absence of specific federal statutes or established admiralty rules, common or state law can serve as the basis for legal decisions. Crane asserts it is not liable for Chesher’s injuries, arguing the 'bare metal defense,' which contends that a manufacturer is not accountable for damages related to products it did not produce. Plaintiffs counter that this defense may not apply in certain situations where an equipment manufacturer fails to warn about risks from third-party asbestos components. Courts have increasingly examined the applicability of this defense, particularly where the defendant’s products did not contain asbestos but contributed to the plaintiff's exposure. The analysis of the bare metal defense under maritime law begins with the case Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, which outlines that a plaintiff must demonstrate exposure to a defendant's product and establish that the product was a substantial factor in causing their injury, regardless of the legal theory applied. In Lindstrom, the court ruled that the plaintiffs could not prove that the defendants manufactured the asbestos-containing materials responsible for their injuries, leading to a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In the federal asbestos multidistrict litigation, the case of Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc. involved plaintiffs claiming manufacturers failed to warn about risks associated with asbestos-containing components in their products. Evidence indicated that the defendants were aware of Navy sailors' exposure to asbestos through their products, which required asbestos insulation and included asbestos components shipped with the products. However, the MDL court, referencing Lindstrom and certain state court rulings, concluded that under maritime law, manufacturers are not liable for hazards from asbestos products they did not manufacture or distribute. Contrastingly, in Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., the court found that while Lindstrom might preclude recovery for claims related to asbestos-containing replacement components, it did not address failure-to-warn claims. The court identified three judicial approaches: one where liability arises from foreseeable asbestos use, another where third-party supplied asbestos absolves defendants, and a middle approach recognizing liability under specific conditions. The middle path was adopted, establishing that manufacturers could be liable if their products necessitated asbestos-containing materials or if such materials were essential for proper product function. Liability was also recognized when a manufacturer incorporated asbestos into its product, with the rationale that it was foreseeable and inevitable that users would face asbestos exposure. Recently, a split has emerged between courts applying the Quirin approach and those following the more restrictive Conner interpretation regarding a manufacturer’s duty to warn, particularly surrounding the implications of the Sixth Circuit’s Lindstrom decision. Some courts have determined that the Lindstrom decision applies to failure-to-warn claims, indicating that maritime law does not obligate a product manufacturer to warn about dangers associated with products they did not manufacture. There is a divergence in court opinions regarding which interpretation aligns with state law majority positions and the overarching policies of product liability and maritime law. 1. **Scope of Lindstrom Decision**: The Conner court interpreted Lindstrom to mean that manufacturers have no duty to warn about asbestos products they did not produce or distribute. Conversely, the Quirin court differentiated Lindstrom, asserting it did not address failure-to-warn claims. Recent MDL court rulings highlight this distinction as a key point of contention. Courts favoring a Quirin-like interpretation have either distinguished Lindstrom or suggested it does not apply to failure-to-warn claims, leading to a broader debate regarding the interpretation of Lindstrom. The court affirms that Lindstrom should not extend to failure-to-warn claims. 2. **Majority Rule Under State Law**: Both sides of the debate reference state law cases where courts ruled that a manufacturer is not liable for third-party asbestos products outside their distribution chain. Although the California Supreme Court supported the bare metal defense, it allowed for exceptions. The court expresses caution in relying on cases like Simonetta, Braaten, and O'Neil to conclude that an equipment manufacturer is never liable for injuries from asbestos-containing components. These cases did not completely eliminate the possibility of a failure-to-warn claim, particularly in situations where the manufacturer incorporated asbestos components in their original products or specified their use. The court notes that the conditions outlined in Quirin must be met for a valid claim, suggesting that the rulings in Simonetta and Braaten do not preclude failure-to-warn claims under Quirin. Washington law has evolved toward the Quirin approach since the decisions in Simonetta and Braaten. The Macias court highlighted a key distinction: unlike the products in Simonetta and Braaten, the manufacturers’ products in those cases did not inherently pose a danger of asbestos exposure, paralleling the Quirin court's focus on 'inevitability.' Consequently, Washington law aligns more closely with the Quirin approach than with the strict bare metal defense articulated in Conner. The California Supreme Court's ruling in O’Neil also supports this view. The court noted that mere compatibility with asbestos-containing components does not automatically impose liability on defendants. Footnote 6 of the O’Neil opinion suggests that a stronger case for liability could arise if a product necessitated the use of a defective part to operate, although the court did not definitively state whether California law would recognize such a claim. Thus, O’Neil neither supports nor opposes the Quirin approach in the context of state law. In contrast, the Southern District of Florida's decision in Faddish endorsed the Conner approach under maritime law while also providing a detailed analysis under Florida law. The Faddish court strictly applied the bare metal defense, ruling that manufacturers could not be held liable for asbestos exposure from replacement parts unless there was direct evidence of their involvement. The court reached this conclusion despite evidence that some defendants’ products originally contained asbestos, indicating a foreseeable need for replacement parts. While Faddish supports the Conner approach under Florida law, it does not establish it as the majority stance, especially given numerous state court rulings that recognize exceptions to the bare metal defense, which may be more permissive than the Quirin approach. Notable cases include In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig. and McKenzie v. A.W. Chesterson Co., both emphasizing a manufacturer’s duty to warn about dangers arising from foreseeable uses of their products in conjunction with third-party components. Review of legal precedents indicates a rejection of the bare metal defense in cases where plaintiffs are likely to encounter asbestos-containing replacement components. A manufacturer has a duty to warn about asbestos hazards if their product contains asbestos, is critical to the function of the product, requires maintenance involving asbestos handling, and the manufacturer is aware of the risks associated with asbestos exposure. Under Pennsylvania law, a manufacturer must warn of asbestos hazards from component parts that it did not produce if it knew the product would be used with such components. Courts have affirmed that liability may exist for harm caused by asbestos-containing replacement parts, particularly if the manufacturer recommends or requires their use. Additionally, Washington recognizes similar liability principles, emphasizing that a manufacturer's product can inherently pose exposure risks. Recent trends show a growing acknowledgment of a manufacturer's duty to warn regarding replacement parts under specific circumstances. Policy considerations significantly influence courts' determinations of legal duty, focusing on risk allocation, economic impact, and public policy implications. Courts differentiate state law from maritime law regarding these duties, maintaining that the determination of a duty is fundamentally a policy question that should align with established legal frameworks rather than personal policy preferences. In cases lacking a clearly established rule, courts emphasize the importance of policy considerations in determining liability, particularly regarding manufacturers and asbestos products. There is a divide among courts on how these considerations should influence their decisions. Some rulings, like Bell, suggest that manufacturers of finished products containing asbestos should be responsible for warnings, aligning with New York's public policy on products liability. Conversely, other cases, such as Conner, argue against holding manufacturers liable for third-party asbestos products, citing the unfairness and economic burden it imposes on manufacturers who did not benefit from those products. The "bare metal defense" is justified by the argument that manufacturers cannot predict or control risks from third-party components, thereby increasing production costs without enhancing safety incentives. However, this rationale is challenged in the context of a Quirin claim, which requires proof that a manufacturer incorporated asbestos components into its product and specified their use or recognized them as essential. In these specific instances, the original equipment manufacturer is deemed capable of managing the risks associated with these components, as they have the opportunity to test and understand the associated hazards. This underscores the manufacturer's responsibility to investigate and warn about risks tied to components they include in their products, thereby retaining control over the risk associated with necessary replacement components. A product that inherently exposes users to asbestos hazards shares a comparable causal relationship with user injuries as a product that directly contains asbestos. The Quirin requirements restrict a manufacturer’s liability to situations where harm arises from risks integrated into their product, even if these risks stem from a replacement component. The necessary substitution of asbestos parts does not equate to a substantial modification of the original product. When Quirin applies, equipment manufacturers have significant control over the risks linked to asbestos-containing replacement parts, potentially more so than the component manufacturers. Courts have indicated that equipment manufacturers may be better positioned to provide warnings about these risks due to the user’s longer interaction with the finished product, which makes them more likely to heed warnings from that manufacturer rather than from aftermarket suppliers. Moreover, equipment manufacturers benefit from selling products that rely on essential components from third parties, suggesting that they should not evade liability for risks associated with these components while profiting from their use. Immunizing manufacturers from liability while they profit from asbestos-containing components creates an unjust and socially inefficient incentive structure. Public policy dictates that the burden of injuries from consumer products should fall on the marketers of those products, allowing them to treat these costs as part of their production expenses. If a plaintiff can establish that an equipment manufacturer's actions made asbestos exposure unavoidable, there is little justification for differentiating that manufacturer's liability from that of the asbestos component manufacturer. Given the complexity and potential dangers of modern products, the responsibility for harm should rest with the manufacturer. However, in maritime law, there is a policy argument for strictly applying the bare metal defense to promote uniformity in legal standards. Maritime law, as established in the Cabasug case, is intended to function uniformly across the entire country, preventing states from individually regulating its rules, which would undermine consistency in commercial interactions. The Conner approach offers a clear rule requiring evidence that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos fibers manufactured by the defendant; lack of such evidence results in claim dismissal. Under this approach, manufacturers are not liable for asbestos products they did not produce. Conversely, the Quirin approach necessitates a more complex analysis, focusing on whether the defendant incorporated asbestos components into their products and if those components were essential for the product's operation. Courts may interpret "specifying" and "requiring" differently, leading to inconsistent outcomes, as seen in contrasting rulings on manufacturers' responsibilities. Some courts have broadened the duty to warn to include scenarios where a product cannot function without another, economically necessary product. This ambiguity in the Quirin framework raises concerns about uniformity in maritime law, prompting a preference for the Conner approach to ensure more consistent legal outcomes, while acknowledging that uniformity is not the only goal of maritime law. Uniformity in legal interpretations does not compel the adoption of erroneous conclusions. Maritime law primarily aims to protect workers from the dangers of working at sea. The Quirin approach aligns with this goal by holding manufacturers accountable for the risks associated with their products, similar to traditional products liability principles that safeguard consumers. Public policy mandates that the costs of accidental injuries from consumer products should fall on manufacturers, who can obtain liability insurance for such risks. The court prioritizes the protection of maritime workers over the interest in uniformity, leading to the conclusion that adopting the Quirin approach is justified. The court confirms that the Quirin approach (1) is not restricted by the Lindstrom case, (2) aligns with the majority of state law, and (3) is supported by pertinent policy considerations. Consequently, plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims are not barred by the bare metal defense. The Quirin standard necessitates evidence that the defendant designed its products to be used with asbestos-containing materials and actually incorporated such materials. Crane posits a three-pronged test requiring proof that (i) asbestos-containing products were included when sold, (ii) these products required asbestos components for operation, and (iii) the manufacturer provided specifications for this use. The court recognizes the "actual incorporation" of asbestos components as a strict requirement. However, it interprets the latter two prongs of Crane's test as descriptive rather than prescriptive. The Dandridge ruling emphasized that a manufacturer’s duty to warn arises if it designed products with and incorporated asbestos materials, affirming this perspective in the Quirin case. A manufacturer can be held liable for failure to warn if it incorporates asbestos-containing components into its products, and either specifies the use of such components or makes them essential for proper product functioning. In the context of the case involving Crane, evidence shows that Crane supplied valves containing asbestos components for Navy ships, which it acknowledges. Testimonies from experts indicate that Navy-approved design drawings for these valves mandated the inclusion of asbestos-containing components. Crane contends that the Navy, not it, required these components, referencing an affidavit to support its position. This situation aligns with the legal rationale established in the Quirin and Andrews decisions, focusing on the inevitability of asbestos exposure due to the manufacturer's conduct. The Navy's specifications for valves and de-aerating feed tanks allowed manufacturers, including Crane, to design their own products and use both asbestos and non-asbestos components, except in cases exposed to superheated steam. Consequently, Crane was deemed responsible for using asbestos-containing gaskets and packing in valves not exposed to such steam. Testimony from Pantaleoni indicates that the Navy dictated specifications for Crane’s products, implying that Crane did not independently decide to use asbestos. However, this does not grant Crane summary judgment, as there is a genuine dispute over whether the design drawings reflect Navy requirements or Crane's specifications, which necessitates resolution by a jury. Crane further argues that even if it is responsible for the asbestos components, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their exposure was a "substantial factor" in causing Chesher’s injury. The court notes that this argument was introduced only in Crane's reply brief, which typically is not considered under federal court rules. Additionally, Crane's reliance on a Ninth Circuit case regarding insufficient evidence of substantial factor causation is criticized for not addressing the plaintiffs' expert testimony, which could counter Crane's claims. Defendants’ products are implicated in Chesher's mesothelioma, with expert testimonies anticipated regarding the role of asbestos exposure. The court has not yet evaluated the admissibility of these expert opinions in assessing whether the defendants’ products were a substantial factor in Chesher's condition. A Daubert hearing is scheduled to address Crane’s challenge to the expert Bedrossian's testimony, after which Crane may renew its motion for summary judgment based on the substantial factor argument. The court prefers a comprehensive briefing on these issues post-hearing rather than addressing new arguments in reply briefs. Crane acknowledges supplying valves to various naval vessels but is uncertain about their use on the USS Henderson and USS Kraus, despite documentation suggesting approval for those ships. Plaintiffs’ expert claims Crane's documentation indicates valve supply for these vessels, which the court finds creates a factual dispute regarding the use of Crane valves during Chesher's service. The court discusses the legal landscape regarding liability for asbestos-containing products, referencing Quirin and Conner as primary frameworks for assessing manufacturer liability. It notes differing interpretations of these cases among various courts, particularly regarding the distinction between manufacturers of final products and component parts. The court aligns more closely with Quirin's approach, rejecting the notion that a manufacturer has no liability for products it did not create or control, especially in cases involving aftermarket asbestos components. The court recognizes the potential for liability if the manufacturer's failure to warn about the original product contributes to the plaintiff's injury. Decisions that have acknowledged Quirin without formally adopting its analysis are also noted. The court recognizes the Quirin approach as an exception to the general rule that a defendant cannot be held liable for asbestos in a product not manufactured by them, acknowledging that products which expose users to asbestos hazards share similar causal relationships with user injuries. However, the court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff lacked sufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment, even under Quirin. In Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc., the defendant was granted summary judgment regardless of whether maritime or New York law applied, as there was no evidence that the defendant contributed to the asbestos components in question. The Holzworth court noted the congruence between maritime and New York law, indicating that the New York standard was at least as permissive as the Quirin or Conner standards. The Stallings decision, while not directly addressing failure-to-warn claims, aligns with the Conner approach as suggested by the Lindstrom case. In Faddish, Florida law was applied only when compatible with maritime law, viewed as parallel. The discussion assumes the harmful product is the asbestos component rather than the equipment itself; if the latter were considered harmful, Lindstrom would not hinder liability for Crane valves and de-aerating feed-tanks. The Bell decision emphasizes the manufacturer's duty to warn about its original product rather than replacement components, rejecting the interpretation that a manufacturer is liable for failing to warn about asbestos in products where such components are essential. This court does not interpret Quirin as broadly as others have. Quirin establishes specific criteria for imposing liability related to asbestos-containing components. A defendant can only be held liable if (1) they incorporated asbestos-containing components into their original product, and (2) they specified the use of asbestos-containing replacement parts, or those parts were essential for the product's functionality. The court suggests that Quirin's ruling creates a duty to warn similar to that established by Bell regarding original asbestos components, although it considers the issue "unsettled" under maritime law, noting a trend away from the strict bare metal defense articulated in Conner. In total, courts in six jurisdictions have indicated that equipment manufacturers may be liable under a failure-to-warn theory regarding asbestos-containing replacements, while six others appear to support the opposite view. After Quirin, the count of courts favoring Quirin's approach stands at five to four, including the MDL court's reaffirmation of Conner, while the more recent Osterhout decision aligns with Quirin. The court concludes that the Quirin approach is gaining slight favor but requires further examination, especially given its stringent “actual incorporation” requirement. The court acknowledges a distinction in the Faddish decision regarding "foreseeability" versus "inevitability," but finds that the overall implications of Faddish are consistent with Conner, complicating the application of Quirin. The court acknowledges multiple decisions applying the bare metal defense under state law without outright rejecting a Quirin-like claim. In Morgan v. Bill Vann Co., the Alabama court ruled that the manufacturer had no duty to warn about hazards from asbestos-containing components not manufactured or distributed by it. However, the court did not assess the plaintiff's claim regarding the specification of certain gaskets and packing, opting instead to dismiss it based on factual grounds. Similarly, in In re Asbestos Litigation, a Utah court found no liability for failure to warn about asbestos products added post-sale, noting a lack of evidence that the defendant specified such products. In Thurmon v. Georgia Pacific, LLC, the court indicated that a plaintiff must demonstrate injury from the defendant’s product, but acknowledged that a valve requiring asbestos gaskets might be deemed defective. While these cases may support the Conner approach, the court concludes that they are insufficient to outweigh the Quirin precedent, which appears to have more recent judicial backing. The O'Neil court did not definitively address the applicability of the bare metal defense in Quirin-like scenarios but acknowledged that the underlying policy considerations still hold. Although Section 402A is often referenced to limit a manufacturer’s liability to its own products, the court believes that in the specific context of Quirin, 402A's rationale argues against the bare metal defense. This is because courts applying the bare metal defense typically see the asbestos-containing components as the product, while those favoring the Quirin approach view the original equipment as the product. The court asserts that the pumps sold to the Navy included both the original equipment and any replacement gaskets or packing, indicating that replacing them with similar materials does not constitute a substantial change to the product. The product in question consists of valves that contain asbestos gaskets and packing. The court clarifies that if the original equipment is considered the "product," then the application of strict liability under Section 402A is applicable. While the court prefers to categorize asbestos-containing replacement components as separate products to avoid confusion, it maintains that the risks associated with these components are inherently linked to the original equipment. The court aligns with the logic of past decisions (May and Garvin) that installing such replacement components does not significantly alter the original equipment. The Bell decision is referenced, noting that it utilized a different framework, indicating that manufacturers may bear liability for negligently recommending the use of asbestos with their products, rather than through a failure-to-warn theory. The court does not delve into the negligent misrepresentation theory proposed in Bell but emphasizes that the evidence supports a failure-to-warn claim under Quirin, as Crane incorporated asbestos components into the equipment supplied to the Navy. The court also takes into account the Moore affidavit, which supports claims regarding de-aerating feed tanks, and assumes that the drawings discussed in depositions are consistent with the evidence provided. The court suggests that if asbestos components were specified, it implies the valves might require these components for functionality, although it acknowledges the existence of suitable non-asbestos alternatives. Ultimately, the court finds sufficient evidence that Crane specified the use of asbestos-containing components but refrains from determining if these components were essential for the valves' proper functioning.