Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; February 6, 2017; Federal District Court
Jacquelyn McKay, a former employee of Vitas Healthcare Corporation, has filed a lawsuit against the company alleging discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), as well as age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Vitas has sought summary judgment on all seven claims made by McKay.
The court acknowledges that it will consider the facts in the light most favorable to McKay. McKay worked as a patient care secretary from December 2002 until her termination in June 2014, without initially indicating any disability. In April 2011, she was diagnosed with tinnitus, which impaired her hearing in loud environments. Despite this condition, McKay did not seek any accommodations, medication, or treatment and maintained that she was able to perform her job duties.
McKay reported that her hearing difficulties led to discrimination from co-workers, particularly from Christina Saldana, who made derogatory comments and displayed irritation regarding McKay's inability to hear. McKay communicated her concerns about harassment to her supervisor, Victoria Chrysokos, who addressed the issue with the staff. Despite this, McKay stated that the harassment continued, including an incident in February 2014 where Saldana made a mocking comment about McKay’s hearing. McKay subsequently reported this behavior to human resources on April 17, 2014.
In the context of staffing, Vitas planned a reduction in force in the Lombard office during the spring of 2014 due to a low patient census, which included the elimination of one position from several roles, including patient care secretaries.
Vitas requires termination decisions to prioritize performance over seniority. Moriarty evaluated five patient care secretaries, focusing on corrective actions and performance scores. McKay had the highest number of corrective actions (six) and the lowest performance score (2.2) among her peers, leading Moriarty to recommend her for termination. McKay, the longest-serving secretary, was terminated on June 6, 2014, and she subsequently filed a lawsuit against Vitas alleging seven claims of discrimination. These include claims under the ADA and IHRA regarding disability discrimination (counts 1 and 4), retaliation for harassment complaints (counts 2 and 6), hostile work environment (counts 3 and 5), and age discrimination under the ADEA (count 7).
For the claims of disability discrimination, McKay must establish that she is disabled as defined by the ADA, which includes having a significant impairment affecting major life activities. Vitas contends that McKay's tinnitus does not substantially limit her daily life, arguing that she "hears fine." The legal standards for assessing claims under the IHRA align with those under federal laws, allowing for a combined consideration of related counts for summary judgment. Summary judgment may be granted if no reasonable factfinder could rule in favor of the non-moving party, with facts viewed favorably for that party.
McKay presented testimony indicating that while she can care for herself and perform daily activities, her tinnitus significantly limits her hearing ability, particularly in loud environments. Evidence from her supervisor and co-workers supports this claim, noting that McKay often required others to repeat themselves and struggled to hear conversations nearby. This suggests that a reasonable observer could conclude McKay's hearing is substantially limited compared to the general population and that she was regarded as having such an impairment.
For McKay to establish a failure to accommodate claim, she must demonstrate that she is a qualified individual with a disability, that Vitas was aware of her disability, and that Vitas failed to provide reasonable accommodations. While McKay has sufficient evidence to suggest she has a disability, Vitas contends that she never requested an accommodation and therefore cannot hold them liable. McKay's initial job application did not indicate any disability, and she did not formally request accommodations related to her tinnitus. McKay argues Vitas had an obligation to accommodate her once it became aware of her condition, but the Seventh Circuit generally requires employees to request accommodations, with exceptions only when a disability impairs the ability to communicate such needs. McKay did not provide evidence that her tinnitus affected her ability to recognize or request accommodations, leading the court to maintain that she must have formally requested an accommodation to support her claim.
Vitas lacked knowledge of McKay’s accommodation needs and did not fail to provide one. McKay's claim of disparate treatment hinges on three elements: (1) having a disability, (2) being qualified for the job, and (3) experiencing adverse employment action due to her disability. The Seventh Circuit has unified evidence standards in discrimination cases while maintaining the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Vitas presented substantial evidence of a legitimate reason for terminating McKay due to low patient numbers, resulting in the elimination of four full-time positions. Moriarty, responsible for recommending terminations, evaluated McKay and other secretaries based on their performance appraisals and corrective actions. McKay's performance score was the lowest among her peers, leading to her recommendation for termination. McKay's arguments regarding suspicious timing of her termination and Moriarty's decision-making process were insufficient to demonstrate pretext or discriminatory intent. The seven-week gap between her complaint and termination does not establish a causal link, as the Seventh Circuit has ruled similar gaps inadequate. Moreover, McKay could not refute her lower performance ratings relative to her colleagues, undermining her claims.
McKay, a long-term employee at Vitas, received more warnings than the other secretary, Gerstmayr, and had a lower performance appraisal score (2.2 vs. 3.0). This undermines her claim that her termination was inconsistent with Vitas's policies. McKay alleged that her termination was influenced by discriminatory intent from Moriarty, who addressed her harassment complaint, but she failed to provide evidence of discriminatory remarks or intent. Consequently, the Court granted summary judgment to Vitas on counts 1 and 4, as McKay did not demonstrate that her disability was a factor in her termination or that Vitas failed to accommodate her disability.
In counts 2 and 6, McKay claimed retaliation for reporting harassment in violation of the ADA and IHRA. While Vitas acknowledged her protected activity and the adverse action of her termination, it argued there was no causal connection due to a planned reduction in force. McKay's argument that she met performance expectations and was treated unfairly compared to non-disabled employees was insufficient, especially since her performance was notably lower than her peers. Without evidence of pretext or violations of termination policies, the Court granted summary judgment to Vitas on counts 2 and 6 as well.
Counts 3 and 5 involve McKay's allegations of a hostile work environment under the ADA and IHRA. The Seventh Circuit has acknowledged the potential for such claims under the ADA, requiring proof of harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions. McKay reported only a single incident of a rude comment from a co-worker, which, while inconsiderate, does not meet the necessary severity threshold for a hostile work environment. Additional behaviors from co-workers, such as slamming the table and making fun of her coughing, were deemed unprofessional but not sufficiently severe or pervasive based on precedent cases. A witness's testimony about one comment being potentially harassing is insufficient to establish that the environment was objectively hostile, as the law only addresses severe harassment. Consequently, the Court granted summary judgment to Vitas on these counts.
Count 7 concerns McKay's claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, asserting that she was unfairly terminated as the oldest patient care secretary. To establish age discrimination, McKay must show that her termination was motivated by her age. Vitas provided a legitimate reason for her termination, citing reduced patient census and poor performance ratings. McKay failed to demonstrate that this rationale was pretextual, and her single instance of age-related comment from a co-worker did not undermine Vitas's justification. Thus, summary judgment was granted to Vitas on this count as well.
The Court ultimately granted Vitas's motion for summary judgment and directed the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of the defendant.
