United States v. Douglas

Citations: 225 F. Supp. 3d 762; 2016 WL 7386599; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176492Docket: Case No. 3:12-CR-119 JD

Court: District Court, N.D. Indiana; December 20, 2016; Federal District Court

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Defendant Charles Douglas was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon. During sentencing, the Court determined he had four prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies, leading to his classification under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes harsher penalties for defendants with three or more qualifying convictions. Following a Supreme Court ruling that retroactively invalidated part of the definition of "violent felony" under the ACCA, Mr. Douglas filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for resentencing, arguing he no longer qualifies as an armed career criminal. However, the Court found that he still possessed at least three qualifying convictions, maintaining the legality of his sentence and denying the motion.

In the factual background, Mr. Douglas attracted police attention in October 2012 for drug dealing and prostitution. A search of his home revealed a loaded shotgun, making his possession unlawful due to his extensive criminal history. He was charged with and pled guilty to firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Presentence Report assigned him 23 criminal history points, including five qualifying convictions under the ACCA: a 1993 juvenile adjudication for robbery, a 1996 cocaine dealing conviction, 2006 convictions for criminal confinement and battery, a 2004 conviction for residential entry, and another battery conviction from 2006. Douglas contested the classification of some offenses; the Court upheld the classification of criminal confinement and battery as violent felonies but excluded the juvenile robbery adjudication due to insufficient evidence of firearm use. Consequently, Mr. Douglas had enough qualifying convictions for the ACCA, resulting in an increased sentence, which he did not appeal. His § 2255 motion has been fully briefed and is now addressed according to the legal standards for collateral attacks on a sentence.

The Seventh Circuit establishes that relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is limited to errors of law that are jurisdictional, constitutional, or represent a fundamental defect leading to a miscarriage of justice. It is not a substitute for a direct appeal. Mr. Douglas seeks to vacate his sentence based on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, which determined that using the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for sentencing violates due process. The Court in Welch v. United States confirmed that Johnson applies retroactively, allowing Douglas to seek resentencing if he can prove he lacks three qualifying convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies without the residual clause. The government has waived procedural defenses, allowing the Court to address the merits of his claim.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), unlawful possession of a firearm typically incurs a maximum 10-year sentence, but the ACCA enhances this to a mandatory minimum of 15 years for those with three qualifying prior convictions. The ACCA defines "violent felony" with specific criteria, including the use of physical force or enumerated offenses like burglary and arson. The Johnson ruling invalidated the ACCA's residual clause due to vagueness but did not affect the enumerated offenses or the elements clause. Thus, a valid sentence under the ACCA remains if a defendant has three qualifying convictions. It is agreed that Mr. Douglas has one qualifying conviction for dealing cocaine from 1996, while a 2004 conviction for residential entry no longer qualifies as a violent felony since it relied on the now-invalid residual clause.

Mr. Douglas' convictions, specifically two for Class C felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury, are determined by the court to qualify as violent felonies under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The court does not evaluate whether his other convictions—juvenile adjudication for robbery and criminal confinement while armed—meet this classification, given that the battery convictions alone suffice. Under Indiana law, battery becomes a Class C felony if it results in serious bodily injury, which is defined as bodily injury that poses a substantial risk of death or causes serious conditions such as disfigurement or extreme pain. Importantly, the intent to cause serious injury is not necessary; only the act of rude or angry touching needs to be intentional.

The court clarifies that the Supreme Court's 2015 Johnson decision, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, does not affect the classification of Mr. Douglas' battery convictions under the elements clause. The elements clause remains intact, and thus the court's prior determination that these offenses are violent felonies stands. The classification process must apply a categorical approach, focusing solely on the statutory elements of the offense, not the specifics of the conviction. The court cites that "physical force" under the elements clause refers to violent force capable of causing injury, distinguishing it from minimal force that may not result in harm. The issue at hand is whether the requirement for serious bodily injury means that the offense involves force sufficient to cause pain or injury.

Indiana battery resulting in serious bodily injury meets the elements clause for violent crimes, as supported by multiple court opinions. The Seventh Circuit in *United States v. Davis* determined that this offense qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), paralleling the elements of 924(e). The court dismissed an appeal by the defendant, labeling further argument as pointless. Though the decision is non-precedential, it provides useful guidance. Similarly, the Minnesota district court in *Talbott v. Fisher* reached the same conclusion, emphasizing that the force required to inflict serious bodily injury under Indiana law must be violent, capable of causing significant physical pain or injury.

In contrast, the Seventh Circuit's ruling in *Flores* clarified that misdemeanor battery resulting in "bodily injury" does not satisfy the elements clause, as it encompasses any physical impairment, even minor injuries like a bruise caused by a paper airplane. The *Flores* court specified that the force involved must be violent and intended to cause injury, whereas the injury in question need not be intended. Consequently, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in "bodily injury" lacks the requisite force element.

Mr. Douglas’ Class C felony battery resulting in "serious bodily injury" is distinct from the misdemeanor in *Flores* due to its requirement for more severe injuries, such as unconsciousness or extreme pain, differentiating it from offenses in Illinois and Wisconsin that necessitate intentional injury, which have been ruled to require the use of force.

To constitute battery resulting in "serious bodily injury," the injury must lead to serious permanent disfigurement or a protracted loss or impairment of the affected arm, rather than just a minor bruise. While injuries do not need to be intentional, battery itself requires intentional touching, which must involve sufficient force to cause injury or pain. The distinction between "bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" is significant; the former may not be classified as a "violent" felony, but the latter typically is. Mr. Douglas argues that serious bodily injury could occur without violent force, yet he fails to cite cases where such injuries were inflicted without at least some degree of force. His hypothetical scenario of a minor poke causing a serious injury is dismissed, as courts focus on ordinary cases rather than fringe possibilities. The categorical approach requires a realistic assessment of how offenses are typically applied, not just theoretical scenarios. The court has previously upheld that offenses involving force or threats of force satisfy the elements clause, even if unusual situations could theoretically exist. Thus, Mr. Douglas must demonstrate a realistic application of his argument rather than rely on hypothetical situations.

A finding that a state statute defines a crime outside the generic definition in a federal statute requires a realistic probability that the state would apply the statute to conduct not meeting the generic definition. No evidence has been presented that battery resulting in serious bodily injury in Indiana has ever been convicted without intentional force being used. Therefore, such battery includes the intentional use of force necessary for it to qualify as a violent felony. Mr. Douglas has at least three qualifying convictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act, making his sentence lawful post-Johnson. His motion under 2255 is denied.

Regarding the certificate of appealability, the Court must issue or deny it when entering a final adverse order. A certificate may be granted only if there is a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. In this case, reasonable jurists could debate whether Mr. Douglas's issues warrant further consideration, particularly as the Seventh Circuit has not definitively ruled on the characterization of an Indiana conviction for battery resulting in serious bodily injury as a violent felony. Thus, a certificate of appealability is granted on the legality of Mr. Douglas's sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The Court notes that Mr. Douglas has 60 days under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to file a notice of appeal following this order. The motion to vacate the sentence is denied, but the certificate of appealability is granted for the specified question. The Court references the applicable statutes effective at the time of Mr. Douglas’s offenses and clarifies that it does not need to determine whether serious bodily injury and the use of a deadly weapon are alternate means or elements, as prior rulings establish that battery with a deadly weapon involves at least a threatened use of force.

The offense in question remains classified as a violent felony if it involves battery resulting in serious bodily injury, as the use of force is an element under the elements clause. Various Indiana case law examples illustrate this, including instances where defendants inflicted severe injuries through physical assaults, such as repeated strikes with a belt or hands, resulting in serious pain and lasting injuries. Notable cases include Sutton, where a victim suffered a contusion and vision problems from an open-hand strike; Hollowell, involving a stabbing that caused internal bleeding and required emergency surgery; and Dausch, where prolonged physical abuse led to multiple serious injuries requiring extensive medical treatment. 

Mr. Douglas' convictions for battery resulting in serious bodily injury are similarly categorized. He argues that such battery cannot be classified as a violent crime simply due to the addition of "simple bodily injury." However, the Class C felony battery conviction necessitates serious bodily injury, not merely simple injury. Douglas also critiques the government's characterization of the offense as battery "causing" serious bodily injury rather than "resulting" in it. While he accurately cites the statute, the court maintains that the serious bodily injury must indeed result from the act of rude, insolent, or angry touching, thus justifying the use of "causes" in this context.