Court: District Court, M.D. Florida; October 12, 2016; Federal District Court
The Court, presided over by Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell, addressed three motions for summary judgment in a case involving plaintiffs Charles Smith and Dorothy Capezza against defendants The Village Club, Inc. d/b/a Brookhaven Village, Inc. and five board members. The motions included: 1) Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding Capezza’s claims, 2) Defendants’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concerning punitive damages, and 3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court ultimately denied all motions.
The background reveals that the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) after Capezza purchased land in Brookhaven Village, a mobile home community. Prior to her purchase, Capezza discussed her emotional-support dog, Buttons, with Frank Nutter, the board president, who indicated that she needed to provide certain documentation for approval. Capezza complied and was told by Nutter that she was authorized to keep her dog. Testimony from Tammy Walker, a corporate representative of Brookhaven, supported Capezza’s claim of having received permission. Additionally, board member David Milne confirmed that Capezza was approved to live with her dog, despite residing in a “no pet” section, and maintained that necessary medical documents were secured.
However, approximately a year later, Capezza received a letter from Brookhaven’s attorney demanding the removal of her dog, citing restrictions in the community's covenants that prohibited pets outside designated areas. The Court noted that following the death of Charles Smith, his estate was substituted as a plaintiff, but the motion for summary judgment on his behalf was denied.
The letter asserts that the recipient is in violation of the Declarations of Covenants and Restrictions by keeping a pet outside the designated “Pet Section.” The recipient is instructed to remove the dog within thirty days to avoid potential legal actions from the Association. In response, the recipient, Capezza, argues that prior approval for keeping the dog was granted by board President Frank Nutter and other members. Capezza cites a doctor’s letter supporting the necessity of the dog for managing severe anxiety, further stating that the dog's health is deteriorating due to cancer. Capezza expresses distress over the possibility of having to remove the dog during its critical time and indicates intent to involve federal and state agencies if harassment from the Brookhaven Village Board continues. Capezza also claims that assurances were made regarding pet ownership prior to purchasing the property.
Capezza submitted two prescriptions from Dr. Preeti Harchandani, indicating the necessity of her dog for companionship due to anxiety and for emotional support. In response to her request for an exception to Brookhaven Village’s Rules and Regulations, Pilka, representing the Board of Directors, outlined the need to balance Capezza's rights with those of other homeowners. Pilka requested specific documentation to substantiate Capezza's claims, including medical records confirming a diagnosed disability, a demonstration of how the emotional support animal accommodates her disability, proof of any special training or skills of the animal, and evidence distinguishing the animal from a regular pet. Pilka assured that privacy would be maintained and emphasized that these requests are reasonable and necessary for compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act and Fair Housing Acts. Compliance with these requests was urged to avoid violations of the community’s regulations.
On January 6, 2015, Pilka sent a letter to Capezza, titled 'STATUTORY OFFER TO PARTICIPATE IN PRE-SUIT MEDIATION,' outlining a demand for mandatory pre-suit mediation regarding disputes over compliance with property Declarations. Pilka cited Article V, Section 6 of the Declarations and noted that Capezza had previously ignored requests to submit documentation for a dog kept at her property, prompting legal action. The letter referenced Florida Statute 720.311, requiring mediation before any lawsuit could be initiated. Pilka emphasized that Capezza must agree to mediation and share the costs, warning that failure to respond within 20 days could result in a lawsuit without further notice, potentially including claims for attorney fees.
Capezza interpreted the letter as an indication that Brookhaven intended to sue her. Following the death of her emotional support animal, she sought to acquire another one. On February 20, 2015, Capezza’s attorney, Marcy LaHart, responded, arguing that Brookhaven could not prioritize other homeowners' interests over Capezza's, nor could they request her medical records or assess the severity of her disability. LaHart also stated that emotional support animals do not need special training. The letter concluded with a request for prompt confirmation that Capezza would not face further harassment regarding her dogs. During a board meeting on February 23, 2015, defendants voted to enforce the Declarations against Capezza. After the meeting, defendant Jim Rubert warned about the legal implications of falsely claiming a dog as a service animal.
On February 24, 2015, Pilka and LaHart exchanged emails regarding pre-suit mediation under Florida Statute 720.311. Pilka inquired whether LaHart's clients were willing to participate, to which LaHart responded that his clients should not incur legal fees or mediation costs for accommodations related to an assistance animal. LaHart emphasized that the process should be straightforward and not intrusive, indicating that his clients would provide necessary verification but would not engage in mediation as it did not constitute an interactive process. Capezza, a plaintiff, provided two prescriptions but refrained from submitting additional documentation, stating during her deposition that she found no need to restart the process with a new board and considered her medical records personal. The plaintiffs filed their initial action on March 16, 2015, and an amended complaint on November 12, 2015, alleging failure to accommodate under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) against Brookhaven and individual defendants, as well as claims of intimidation. They sought compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, including a waiver of the no-pet policy, and attorneys' fees. Both parties are now moving for summary judgment on the liability for the eight claims, while defendants seek summary judgment on Capezza's claim for punitive damages. The excerpt outlines the standard for summary judgment, emphasizing that it is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and detailing the responsibilities of both the moving and nonmoving parties in demonstrating the presence or absence of such issues. Material facts are defined as those that could affect the case's outcome under applicable law. The court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when assessing the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
Failure-to-accommodate claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibit housing discrimination based on disability, requiring reasonable accommodations when necessary for equal opportunity in housing (42 U.S.C. 3604(f)). To succeed in such a claim, a plaintiff must prove: 1) disability status under the FHA; 2) a request for a reasonable accommodation; 3) necessity of the accommodation for using and enjoying the dwelling; and 4) refusal of the accommodation by the defendant (Hunt v. Aimco Props. L.P., 814 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 2016)).
The FHA defines disability as: 1) a physical or mental impairment significantly limiting major life activities; 2) a record of such impairment; or 3) being perceived as having such impairment (42 U.S.C. 3602(h)). Major life activities include self-care, manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working (24 C.F.R. 100.201(b)). Courts interpret this definition by referencing earlier cases under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2014)).
Plaintiff Capezza claims she has a qualifying disability due to major depression, anxiety, and hypertension, supported by expert testimony from Dr. Erika Friedmann. Dr. Friedmann reviewed Capezza’s medical history and concluded that her mental impairments affect her cognition and daily activities, detailing her struggles with social interaction, self-care, and motivation following a personal loss.
Defendants challenge the admissibility of Dr. Friedmann’s report, citing untimeliness of disclosure under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which stipulate that failure to disclose evidence may preclude its use unless justified (Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)). Capezza admitted her disclosure failure was inadvertent and provided no substantial justification.
The Court granted an extension of the discovery deadline and the deadline for the Defendants' expert reports at the Defendants’ request. They deposed Dr. Friedmann shortly before responding to Capezza’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court determined that Defendants were not prejudiced by the late disclosure of Dr. Friedmann’s report, as they had the chance to obtain their own expert and conduct the deposition. Defendants argued they lacked access to Dr. Friedmann’s opinion and relevant medical records when Capezza requested accommodation, asserting their entitlement to summary judgment based on their lack of knowledge regarding Capezza's disability. Their expert, Dr. Curtis Cassidy, stated that two prescriptions were insufficient to prove Capezza's disability. The Court noted that Defendants’ awareness of Capezza's medical condition is relevant to failure-to-accommodate claims but found that Capezza was proceeding under an 'actual disability' theory, where Defendants' knowledge was not pertinent to determining her disability status. Consequently, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion regarding Capezza’s disabled status. Capezza’s Motion was also denied as she did not sufficiently substantiate her claims, particularly regarding her cognitive limitations and personal care abilities. Dr. Friedmann’s declaration was deemed conclusory and lacking specific supporting facts, and Capezza failed to provide significant evidence to demonstrate substantial limitations in her ability to care for herself.
Plaintiff's claim of a substantial limitation in sleeping is deemed vague and unsupported by evidence that distinguishes her condition from that experienced by many adults. Although she may present evidence of her disability at trial, she has not established her entitlement to summary judgment on her failure-to-accommodate claims. For such claims, Capezza must prove she requested a reasonable accommodation necessary for her use of the dwelling and that Defendants refused the request. While Capezza asserts that Defendants' actions constitute a constructive denial, Defendants argue they lacked sufficient information to assess her request meaningfully. A housing provider cannot be liable for refusing an accommodation without knowledge of its necessity. However, if a provider doubts a disability or the need for accommodation, they are required to engage in the "interactive process," which may involve requesting relevant documentation about the disability and accommodation needs, without demanding excessive information. HUD and DOJ guidelines specify that inquiries about reasonable accommodations must be limited to verifying disability status, describing the accommodation needed, and demonstrating the link between the disability and the accommodation sought, with confidentiality maintained.
HUD has issued guidance on requests for service and assistance animals, clarifying that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) does not mandate individual training or certification for assistance animals. Housing providers are not obligated to immediately approve all accommodation requests; however, failing to make a timely determination constitutes a constructive denial, akin to outright denial. Courts assess constructive denials by examining whether delays stem from unreasonable or bad faith actions by the housing provider rather than benign bureaucratic issues. The interactive process must not be circumvented by either party. In this case, defendants argue that the plaintiff, Capezza, failed to provide necessary information. However, Capezza contends that defendants impeded the process by issuing an overly broad request for medical records rather than merely seeking verification of her disability. Moreover, the defendants incorrectly claimed that Capezza ignored multiple requests for information, while the record indicates only one such request, leaving her insufficient time to respond due to the holiday season. These factors collectively support the argument that defendants both short-circuited and delayed the interactive process, leading to a constructive denial of Capezza’s accommodation request.
Defendants characterize the January 6, 2015, letter as a non-threatening, statutory request for mediation; however, the letter explicitly demanded pre-suit mediation and threatened legal action if Capezza did not comply, including seeking attorneys' fees and costs. The letter's purpose was to fulfill a statutory requirement for mediation before filing a lawsuit. By indicating an intent to sue, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendants effectively denied Capezza’s request for accommodation.
Defendants rely on the Hawn v. Shoreline Towers case, where the Eleventh Circuit upheld a summary judgment against a plaintiff whose request to change a no-pets policy was deemed vague and unsupported by sufficient documentation of disability. In contrast, Capezza provided evidence that Brookhaven had previously approved her request to live with her dog due to her disability, which was not acknowledged in the letters from December 31, 2014, and January 6, 2015. While Defendants dispute Capezza’s claim of prior approval, they fail to present any evidence to counter her assertions or to show that Brookhaven investigated her claim. Brookhaven’s representative admitted to not verifying Capezza’s prior approval. For summary judgment purposes, the Court accepts Capezza’s account that she had received prior approval to reside with her emotional-support animal.
Prior approval that was lacking in the Hawn case undermines Brookhaven’s claim of ignorance regarding Capezza’s disability and the need for a support animal. The court in Hodgetts emphasized material fact disputes concerning obvious disabilities, exacerbated by Brookhaven's revocation of previously granted accommodations. A sudden change in policy by Brookhaven over a year suggests potential bad faith, as noted in Alley, where policy changes indicated constructive denial of accommodation requests. The board's obligation to engage in dialogue before denying requests is highlighted in Peklun, where previous accommodations were acknowledged.
Capezza actively communicated with the Defendants, detailing her severe anxiety and providing a current prescription in her December 2014 letter. Her counsel later invited the Defendants to engage in the interactive process for verification based on HUD guidelines. However, the Defendants proceeded to enforce their Declarations against Capezza without further meaningful communication, indicating a lack of interest in dialogue. This breakdown in communication appears to be the Defendants' responsibility rather than Capezza's.
The record suggests that the Defendants' push for pre-suit mediation and legal action was driven by unreasonableness or bad faith, rather than mere incompetence. Consequently, there is sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude that Capezza's request for accommodation was constructively denied. As the Defendants did not contest Capezza's ability to prove her failure-to-accommodate claims, their Motion for Summary Judgment on these claims is denied.
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits discrimination based on disability and includes an anti-retaliation provision under 42 U.S.C. 3617. This provision makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with individuals exercising rights protected by the FHA. To establish a claim under this section, a plaintiff must demonstrate intentional discrimination. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies when proving discrimination through circumstantial evidence.
To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show: 1) engagement in a protected activity, 2) suffering an adverse action, and 3) a causal connection between the two. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff can argue that this reason is a pretext for discrimination.
In the case of Capezza’s claims against Brookhaven and Rubert, both parties contested whether she experienced an adverse action and whether she engaged in a protected activity, without addressing the burden-shifting steps. The court found sufficient evidence to support Capezza's prima facie case, noting that her request for a reasonable accommodation constituted protected activity. This request, communicated in a letter dated December 17, 2014, was acknowledged by the defendants in their response. The court also indicated that Capezza had a good-faith belief that her accommodation request was reasonable, supported by precedent that alterations to a no-pet policy may qualify as reasonable accommodations.
Brookhaven previously accommodated Capezza, but the case centers on whether Capezza experienced an "adverse action" due to Brookhaven's or Rubert's conduct, which may involve coercion, intimidation, or interference. Legal precedents indicate that plaintiffs must demonstrate coercive or intimidating behavior by defendants regarding rights protected under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The court found sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude that Brookhaven and Rubert's actions constituted threats or intimidation toward Capezza. Specifically, Capezza contends that a January 6, 2015 letter from Brookhaven was threatening, while Brookhaven disputes this characterization. The letter warned Capezza of potential legal action if she did not comply with mediation demands or pay associated costs, effectively presenting her with a choice between paying for mediation or facing a lawsuit. A reasonable factfinder might interpret this letter as intimidation, particularly given its timing and context. The court distinguished this case from Kromenhoek v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association, where the plaintiff's situation did not involve actual adverse actions like fines, as those were held in abeyance. Additionally, Brookhaven's actions indicated a clear stance on enforcing their rules against Capezza, further supporting the claim of intimidation. Capezza has also filed a separate intimidation claim against board member Jim Rubert.
Plaintiff Smith's companion, Judy Shimunek, recounts attending a board meeting on February 23, 2015, where individual defendants, including Rubert, voted to enforce Declarations against Capezza and Smith. After the meeting, Rubert allegedly remarked about the legal consequences of falsely claiming a dog as a service animal, which defendants argue is an isolated statement insufficient to constitute intimidation under 42 U.S.C. § 3617, referencing case law that limits FHA claims to more than mere isolated acts of discrimination. Capezza argues that Rubert's position as a board member and the timing of his remark, which followed the board's vote against her, creates a potential link to intimidation. However, it remains unclear if Rubert's statement was directed at Capezza or if she was aware of it at the time. Consequently, summary judgment in favor of Capezza on her intimidation claims is denied. Additionally, defendants have filed a motion challenging Capezza's claim for punitive damages, asserting that she has not demonstrated sufficient evidence of liability or intimidation, which are prerequisites for such damages under the FHA.
Defendants claim their actions lacked the necessary intent or recklessness but provide no supporting evidence. The court finds their arguments on liability unconvincing, citing an inference of bad faith in Brookhaven's communications with Capezza. Consequently, the Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied. The court orders the following: 1) Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied; 2) Defendants' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied; and 3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The court assessed facts based on various submissions, including depositions and declarations. Following a substitution of parties, the court reopened discovery and extended the dispositive motion deadline for Plaintiff Patricia Bone.
The excerpt also addresses legal standards related to discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), noting that while the FHA refers to discrimination based on "handicap," the term "disability" is preferred by scholars. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 aimed to lower the threshold for obtaining coverage under the ADA. The court references various cases to clarify that, for retaliation claims under the FHA, evidence of retaliatory intent is sufficient, contrasting this with the requirement of discriminatory intent in other contexts. The court emphasizes the necessity of examining whether the challenged conduct constitutes coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference, and concludes that, even under a "materially adverse" standard, Capezza has presented adequate evidence at this stage.
