Swann v. Washtenaw County

Citations: 221 F. Supp. 3d 936; 2016 WL 6873392; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161993Docket: Case No. 15-cv-13645

Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan; November 21, 2016; Federal District Court

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Plaintiff Tammy Swann filed a lawsuit against Washtenaw County’s Community Support and Treatment Services (CSTS) for failure to accommodate her disability under the ADA and Michigan PWDCRA, following her termination. Swann alleged that her employment was terminated instead of accommodating her request to modify a nonessential part of her job. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment after a hearing on October 12, 2016. 

Swann began her role as a vocational specialist in 2004, assisting consumers with disabilities in various skills and daily tasks. The job required significant physical exertion, including lifting consumers, with job descriptions indicating requirements of lifting 50 pounds or more occasionally and engaging in physical assistance during crises. The evidence demonstrated that lifting was an essential function of the role, corroborated by testimonies from management and colleagues.

Between 2010 and 2012, Swann developed neck and back pain from a prior motorcycle accident, which limited her lifting capacity. A coworker, Michelle Allen, helped Swann by performing lifting tasks. In June 2013, CSTS made changes to consumer group assignments, which led to Swann being reassigned as a floater, tasked with potentially working alone or with different groups.

Plaintiff's neck pain worsened, leading her to take a leave of absence from June 20, 2013, to September 20, 2014, during which her condition did not improve. Throughout this time, she communicated with Sattler and Michelle Murray from the County’s human resources, confirming her inability to work due to neck pain and providing medical documentation indicating she could not perform essential job functions. Initially, medical documents stated she could not work at all; however, by August 2014, she indicated she could return under a 20-pound lifting restriction. On August 25, 2014, after reviewing her FMLA Return to Work form, Murray sought input from HR personnel regarding her employment status. Diephuis and Sattler assessed her lifting restriction against the essential duties of a vocational specialist, concluding that her restriction would hinder her ability to perform essential functions and harm consumers. Consequently, Diephuis informed the HR team that the County could not maintain her position. On September 5, 2014, Murray notified the plaintiff that her employment would terminate effective September 20, 2014, due to the indefinite nature of her restrictions and the County's inability to accommodate them. 

The legal standard for summary judgment is articulated under Rule 56(c), which allows a court to grant summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and mere allegations or denials from the non-movant are insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. The opposing party must present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial, supported by evidence that could reasonably lead a jury to find in their favor.

Defendant is seeking summary judgment regarding plaintiff's claims of failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), which are analyzed together due to their similarities. The ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in various employment aspects, including reasonable accommodations unless undue hardship is demonstrated. To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate, the plaintiff must show five elements, particularly focusing on whether she is otherwise qualified for the position of vocational specialist. This determination hinges on whether she can perform essential job functions with or without accommodation.

Lifting is identified as an essential function of the vocational specialist role, as it constitutes a fundamental duty that cannot be removed without altering the job's nature. The inquiry into this classification is fact-specific and involves a case-by-case analysis of various factors, including the employer's judgment, job descriptions, and the impact of not performing the function. In this instance, the employer considers lifting essential, as the role involves providing physical assistance to individuals with disabilities, further supporting the conclusion that lifting is integral to the position.

Lifting is deemed an essential function of the vocational specialist position by multiple experts, including Sattler, Cortes, Murray, Shemwell, Diephuis, and Heidt, as well as by the plaintiff herself, who did not dispute its essentiality during her deposition. The plaintiff's Return to Work Statement suggests she acknowledged lifting as essential, as it prompts healthcare providers to inquire about the employee's ability to perform essential job functions. The job description in effect during her employment explicitly mentions lifting, requiring employees to exert varying amounts of force frequently and occasionally, with examples of tasks that necessitate lifting, such as providing physical support and assisting consumers with mobility. 

There is a dispute regarding the frequency of lifting required by vocational specialists. Shemwell testified that lifting occurs daily, while the plaintiff and another witness claimed it was infrequent, with the plaintiff stating she rarely lifted over 20 pounds and never faced an incident requiring heavy lifting. Despite this, the plaintiff acknowledged the potential necessity to lift in an emergency. Legal precedent indicates that even infrequently required functions can be considered essential due to the potential consequences of not performing them, as illustrated in Brickers v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., where the court recognized the critical nature of lifting in emergency situations, despite its rarity in regular duties.

A lifting requirement is essential for a bus attendant to protect consumers during emergencies, despite the infrequency of such situations. Courts have established that the rarity of a function does not render it nonessential, as the potential consequences of failing to perform essential duties can pose serious risks. Even if vocational specialists rarely need to lift, their inability to do so places consumers' health and safety at risk. Factors such as employer judgment, job descriptions, and the implications of not performing this function confirm that lifting is essential for the role.

Regarding reasonable accommodations under the ADA, modifications must enable qualified individuals to perform essential job functions. The reasonableness of these accommodations is a factual question. Regulations specify that reasonable accommodations can include job restructuring, but only for non-essential duties. Eliminating an essential function is inherently unreasonable, and employers are not obligated to reassign or hire personnel to perform essential duties that a disabled employee cannot fulfill.

In this case, lifting is deemed an essential function of the plaintiff's position, rendering job restructuring inapplicable. Therefore, the plaintiff's proposed accommodation, which removes this essential function, is considered per se unreasonable, leading to a failure to meet the burden of proof for a prima facie case. Consequently, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.