Kinzer v. Allegiant Air, LLC

Citations: 215 F. Supp. 3d 1018; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72006; 2016 WL 3176570Docket: 2:15-cv-02306-JAD-PAL

Court: District Court, D. Nevada; June 1, 2016; Federal District Court

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Order Granting Motion to Remand and Denying Motion to Dismiss as Moot issued by Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey addresses the case of Jason Kinzer against Allegiant Air, LLC and Allegiant Travel Co. for wrongful discharge, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress following his termination in 2015. Allegiant removed the case from Nevada state court, claiming federal-question and diversity jurisdiction. Kinzer sought remand, arguing that Allegiant, as a Nevada citizen, could not remove the case based on diversity and that federal-question jurisdiction did not exist.

The court agreed with Kinzer, granting his motion to remand and denying Allegiant’s motion to dismiss as moot. The case will be returned to Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court (Case No. A-15-727524-C). Kinzer's claims arose from an incident on June 8, 2015, when he declared an emergency after smoke was reported on a flight, leading to his dismissal by Allegiant. Kinzer's complaint references federal aviation law, alleging Allegiant's failure to comply with federal regulations concerning emergency situations.

The document explains that federal courts have limited jurisdiction and that removal jurisdiction is strongly presumed against. The burden lies with the defendant to prove proper removal, which can occur when a case falls under federal-question jurisdiction. The court noted that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is evident in the plaintiff's complaint, following the "well-pleaded complaint rule." Three exceptions for federal-question jurisdiction were outlined: complete preemption, substantial federal questions, and artful pleading, none of which applied to Kinzer’s claims.

Allegiant asserts that three exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule permit the removal of Kinzer’s state-law claims to federal court. However, it cannot establish removal based on complete preemption, as this rule prohibits removal based on a federal defense, including preemption, even if such a defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint. Complete preemption is a distinct jurisdictional concept that only applies in extraordinary circumstances where Congress clearly indicates an intent to convert state law claims into federal-question claims. The Supreme Court has recognized only three federal statutes as qualifying for complete preemption: ERISA, the Labor Management Relations Act, and the National Bank Act. Allegiant seeks to extend this list to include federal aviation law, relying on the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) of 1958, which established a uniform system of flight rules and vested the Federal Aviation Administration with the authority to create federal aviation regulations. The FAA, amended by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), restricts states from enacting laws affecting air carrier pricing, routes, or services. Allegiant also references the Whistle-blower Protection Program (WPP) as providing federal remedies for airline employee retaliation.

However, the cases Allegiant cites to support its complete preemption argument are either nonbinding or not applicable. The cited Ninth Circuit cases—Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Export Holdings, and Ventress v. Japan Airlines—primarily address defensive field preemption and do not pertain to complete preemption. The Ventress court explicitly noted that the FAA does not preempt all retaliation and constructive termination claims under state law. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has not ruled that all state-law employment claims related to federal air-safety regulations are completely preempted. Allegiant's attempts to equate ERISA with federal aviation law to justify its argument are also unconvincing, as the majority of its analysis relies on an exaggerated interpretation of the aforementioned cases, and the ADA and WPP do not apply to Kinzer’s claims. Ultimately, if Kinzer’s claims were to be completely preempted, it would only be under the FAA and relevant FARs, which differ significantly from ERISA.

The FAA does not create an exclusive federal cause of action for wrongful discharge from an airline, allowing state-law claims to persist under its savings clause. Complete preemption is limited to exceptional circumstances where Congress has clearly intended to transform state claims into federal ones; thus, federal aviation law does not completely preempt Kinzer’s state law claims. Kinzer's claims do not necessarily present a substantial federal question. The Supreme Court's criteria from Grable & Sons for federal-question jurisdiction require that a federal issue must be necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and resolvable in federal court without disrupting federal-state balance. Kinzer's claims fail the first criterion as proving violations of FARs is not essential for his wrongful discharge claim. Compliance with federal law may serve as evidence, but it does not definitively establish the wrongful nature of his firing. Moreover, any federal issue raised is not substantial, as it pertains to a specific factual scenario rather than a broad legal principle. The artful pleading doctrine, which permits courts to interpret state claims as federal ones, does not apply here; Allegiant's argument that Kinzer's claims are actually WPP whistleblower claims is rejected, as Kinzer does not allege retaliation for a protected communication but for following federal regulations. Consequently, the court lacks jurisdiction, necessitating the case's remand to Nevada state court, and all other pending motions are denied without prejudice.

Kinzer's motion to remand the case to Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court is granted, with the case identified as A-15-727524-C. Allegiant's motions to dismiss and to extend time, along with a stipulation to extend discovery, are denied as moot. Allegiant did not substantiate its claim for removal based on diversity jurisdiction. Various legal precedents are cited regarding jurisdiction and preemption, including notable cases such as Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., Gaus v. Miles, and others concerning the scope of federal and state claims. Specific statutes are referenced, including provisions from the LMRA, ERISA, and the National Bank Act, highlighting the complexities of federal preemption in relation to state law claims. The document emphasizes the importance of Congress's intent in determining the exclusivity of federal causes of action for proper removal under complete preemption doctrines.