Equal Opprtunity Employment Commission v. United Health Programs of America, Inc.
Docket: 14-CV-3673 (KAM)(JO)
Court: District Court, E.D. New York; September 30, 2016; Federal District Court
The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) initiated legal action on behalf of former employees of United Health Programs of America Inc. (UHP) and Cost Containment Group Inc. (CCG), alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The claimants sought partial summary judgment regarding whether the practices known as “Onionhead” and “Harnessing Happiness” imposed by supervisors constituted a religion. Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court granted the claimants’ motion and partially granted and denied the defendants’ motion.
The factual background includes details on the defendants, a small wholesale company operating since 2006 with fewer than 50 employees in Long Island, New York, and the claimants who worked for them over various periods. The claimants include Sandra Benedict, Danielle Diaz, Jennifer Honohan, and others, with employment dates spanning from 1992 to 2012.
The Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness programs began around 2007 when CCG executives sought to improve their corporate culture during financial difficulties. They enlisted Denali Jordan, who had previously developed the Onionhead program, to assist them. The nature and purpose of the Onionhead program are contested, though it is agreed that the defendants utilized it in their workplace and provided unrelated administrative and financial support for it.
Onionhead was implemented in the defendants' workplace, but the parties have irreconcilable views regarding its purpose and nature, necessitating a trial to resolve these issues. Defendants view Onionhead as a multi-purpose conflict resolution tool aimed initially at children, later expanding to address a wide range of issues including addiction, domestic violence, and communication skills for all ages. They describe various materials associated with Onionhead, such as cards and workshops that identify 150 different emotions and include a Declaration of Virtues for Empowerment. In contrast, plaintiffs characterize Onionhead and its associated program, Harnessing Happiness, as a system of religious beliefs and practices, supported by emails discussing spiritual themes and materials featuring religious imagery. They cite documents that incorporate spiritual language and suggest a divine purpose, such as transforming negative thoughts into positive ones. Jordan, who began working with the defendants in 2007, was initially labeled a spiritual advisor and aimed to foster harmony among employees, citing her observations of disharmony and health issues within the workforce.
Jordan's initial engagement with CCG began in October 2007, followed by subsequent visits approximately every month or two, culminating in an annual compensation of around $380,000. Claimants' experiences with Onionhead and Jordan varied, yet many reported similar coercive practices, including mandatory participation in workshops and one-on-one meetings, which defendants claim were voluntary. Claimants were often required to share personal information and received unsolicited personal advice from Jordan, including suggestions to leave their spouses. Defendants did not provide evidence to counter these claims, arguing instead that the information was hearsay and not material.
Claimants collectively described additional workplace practices, such as burning candles and incense for cleansing, avoiding overhead lighting to prevent "demons," and mandatory chanting and prayer. Each claimant asserted that they were terminated for rejecting Onionhead beliefs or for non-Onionhead religious beliefs, while uncontroverted evidence showed that employees adhering to Onionhead were treated more leniently. Defendants acknowledged some terminations but claimed others resigned voluntarily and argued that all terminations were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.
Procedurally, Ontaneda and Pennisi filed discrimination and retaliation charges with the EEOC on June 7, 2011, followed by Pabon on July 27, 2012. On March 13, 2014, the EEOC determined discrimination based on religion had occurred and attempted conciliation, which failed. The EEOC initiated enforcement action under Title VII on June 11, 2014. Aggrieved individuals, including Ontaneda, Pennisi, and Pabon, were granted the right to intervene, and the EEOC filed an amended complaint identifying additional claimants in early 2015.
Summary judgment is permissible when there are no genuine issues of material fact, allowing for judgment in favor of the moving party as a matter of law. A genuine issue exists if reasonable evidence could lead a jury to favor the nonmoving party. Courts must resolve ambiguities and infer facts in favor of the non-movant, maintaining this standard even with cross-motions, where each is considered independently.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on religion, making it unlawful for employers to discriminate in hiring, firing, or employment conditions due to an individual's religious beliefs. It protects against both compulsory religious conformity and retaliation for engaging in protected activities. The claimants assert various Title VII violations, including disparate treatment, hostile work environment, failure to accommodate, and retaliation.
The claims are categorized into two groups:
1. **Reverse Religious Discrimination**: Claimants such as Benedict, Diaz, and others contend they were discriminated against for opposing Onionhead practices, experiencing a hostile work environment due to coerced adherence to these beliefs.
2. **Traditional Religious Discrimination and Retaliation**: Claimants argue they faced discrimination based on their own beliefs, a hostile work environment, inadequate accommodation for their beliefs, and retaliation after protected activities.
The court will first examine the claimants’ motion for partial summary judgment regarding whether Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness qualifies as a religion under Title VII, followed by an analysis of the defendants' motion for summary judgment concerning the six theories of liability presented. The document emphasizes that discrimination against any non-adherent to an employer's religious beliefs constitutes a violation of Title VII, highlighting the principle of reverse religious discrimination.
Claimants assert both conventional religious discrimination claims, alleging discrimination based on their religious beliefs, and reverse discrimination claims, arguing that they faced discrimination due to CCG's preferential treatment of employees adhering to Onionhead practices. The court must first determine if Onionhead qualifies as a religion under Title VII, as the defendant argues it does not. The definition of ‘religion’ for legal purposes is complex and lacks consensus, with no definitive guidance from the Supreme Court or Second Circuit regarding its application in Title VII cases. Title VII's definition includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, encompassing moral or ethical beliefs sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views. Importantly, the existence of no supporting religious group or the denial of such beliefs by the claimant's religious group does not negate their status as religious beliefs. The EEOC's broad definition stems from Supreme Court cases recognizing nontraditional beliefs as valid for conscientious objector status. Courts typically assess whether beliefs are sincerely held and regarded as religious by the believer. Evaluating sincerity, especially in non-traditional contexts, involves a nuanced and fact-intensive inquiry, requiring careful separation of the claimant's motivations from perceptions of their beliefs' religious nature.
The need to distinguish between genuine beliefs and those motivated by deception is emphasized, particularly for unconventional beliefs. Courts must assess whether beliefs are held as a matter of conscience or are fraudulent. An individual's or entity's rejection of a belief as religious does not negate its classification as such. In the case of Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation, the Second Circuit ruled that a mandatory Alcoholics Anonymous program for a convict was religious, countering claims by prison officials that it was merely therapeutic. Courts evaluate whether beliefs are religious by examining if they address ultimate concerns, as determined by both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit, which define religion broadly and include non-traditional beliefs. Defendants reference a narrower definition from the Third Circuit’s Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which utilizes specific criteria to identify religion; however, the Second Circuit favors a more expansive interpretation. The court concluded that Onionhead qualifies as a religion under Title VII, noting a genuine dispute regarding the sincerity of defendants’ beliefs. The court found that factual issues exist about whether the defendants sincerely embraced the teachings of Jordan, whose involvement with CCG included paid workshops and a personal relationship with Hodes, supporting the claim of sincerity in their beliefs regarding Onionhead. The court determined that summary judgment is inappropriate due to the subjective nature of the issues at stake, necessitating a trial.
Hodes was aware of his aunt Jordan's deeply held beliefs, which were evident in communications he received. In a December 1, 2010 email, Jordan criticized Hodes' management and urged supervisors to remove him, claiming that "Onionhead" cannot thrive in an environment of deceit and destruction. She warned that failing to act would jeopardize their "Divine destiny." In a follow-up email on November 28, 2011, Jordan discussed plans to donate Onionhead cards to schools, emphasizing the importance of protecting children's purity for planetary recovery. Additional emails detailed her positive feedback from a conference discussing Onionhead, her vision of it as a transformative school for solutions, and the spiritual implications of its materials.
Hodes' responses indicated his recognition of the significance of these beliefs, drawing parallels to a science fiction narrative about intellectual evolution. A reasonable jury could conclude that Hodes and his management sincerely believed in Onionhead and "Harnessing Happiness," based on their actions, including inviting Jordan to conduct workshops and encouraging employees to engage with her teachings. Although Jordan claimed in an affidavit that she did not view Onionhead as a religion, conflicting evidence suggests otherwise. The court determined that the beliefs could be considered religious under Title VII, as they referenced spiritual concepts, deities, and moral dichotomies in the context of Onionhead, with Jordan also identifying as a "spiritual advisor" despite her reluctance to embrace the title.
Key points indicate that substantial evidence suggests Onionhead functions as a religion, supported by various testimonies and documents. An email from Jordan identifies the speaker as a “spiritual advisor.” The Onionhead Dictionary includes concepts of divinity and spirituality, stating that life is navigated through the soul and emphasizing love as deeply spiritual. The "Declaration of Virtues for Empowerment" lists 12 virtues, with an acrostic spelling "Garden of Eden," aimed at transforming negative thoughts into positive ones to create a harmonious environment. It includes statements about respect, faith, and the connection between human behavior and the divine. Additionally, "The 13 Codes of Caring" document links creativity to being connected to the Creator. Another document, "Onionhead Keys and Codes to Living Good," references the integration of heavenly and human natures and asserts that choices, underpinned by moral codes, shape human destiny. Testimonial evidence from claimants further illustrates the religious context of Onionhead, highlighting frequent references to God and spiritual discussions in the workplace related to the program.
Maldari testified that Jordan communicated spiritual concepts to CCG employees, including references to "God loves us all," "demons and angels," and stated that employees were "chosen." Safara recounted that Jordan sent emails with spiritual texts she felt compelled to read. Pennisi indicated that the Onionhead belief system influenced her religious perspectives and described it as a significant part of Jordan's life, emphasizing its spiritual and emotional connectivity. Diaz noted that "Harnessing Happiness" content included angelic references, while several claimants reported being instructed to pray at work, including the use of "Universal Truth Cards" for prayers. Employees participated in group prayers led by Jordan, which involved holding hands and chanting to spirits. The Onionhead belief system is characterized as more than intellectual, involving deep spiritual concerns akin to those recognized as religious by the Second Circuit in previous cases. Comparisons were drawn to the twelve-step program of Alcoholics Anonymous, which also emphasizes spirituality and prayer. The Onionhead beliefs were deemed no less religious than other belief systems accepted in prior rulings. The defendants' assertion that Onionhead functioned merely as a conflict resolution tool contradicts the substantial evidence presented. Therefore, the court determined that Onionhead qualifies as a religion under Title VII.
The court has recognized Onionhead as a religion and is now addressing the claims made by certain claimants. Before assessing the merits of these claims, the court must determine whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) met necessary pre-suit administrative requirements for claimants Benedict, Josey, and Safara. Defendants argue that the EEOC did not fulfill these requirements, which include: receiving a formal charge of discrimination, notifying the employer, conducting an investigation, issuing a reasonable cause determination, and attempting to conciliate the charges. Relevant case law, including Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC and EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., establishes that federal courts can review if the EEOC complied with these obligations, particularly regarding conciliation and investigation efforts. It was determined that judicial review is limited to whether an investigation occurred, not its sufficiency.
Defendants assert that the EEOC failed to investigate, determine reasonable cause, and conciliate for Benedict, Josey, and Safara, noting that the EEOC did not contact these individuals during its investigation. Instead, the EEOC reached out to them only after the lawsuit was filed, asking if they wished to participate. The EEOC argues it previously investigated discrimination and retaliation against a broader class of employees, which included the current claimants, claiming compliance with minimal obligations to inform the employer about the allegations.
Employers must be given the opportunity to discuss allegations with the EEOC to achieve voluntary compliance. The EEOC argues that its investigation into class allegations does not necessitate interviewing every class member, as long as they fit within the scope of the allegations. Thus, the EEOC claims it can file suit on behalf of individuals related to the allegations, even those interviewed after the suit's initiation. The court agrees that the EEOC is permitted to identify new claimants whose claims closely mirror existing claims after filing a Section 706 action. Previous court rulings support that the EEOC can add claimants identified during discovery in both Section 706 and Section 707 actions, though deadlines for adding new claimants can be imposed. The EEOC is not required to identify or investigate every alleged victim before filing suit, and defendants have not provided binding authority to dismiss claimants identified post-filing. A cited case, EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited Inc., illustrates that the EEOC must adequately investigate claims before filing; in that instance, the court found the EEOC's delay in investigating additional claimants justified dismissal for those individuals.
The EEOC's attempt to add 67 claimants in CRST is contrasted with the current case, where seven of the ten claimants were already encompassed in the EEOC's prior investigation, and the additional three claimants share the same alleged conduct, location, and timeframe as outlined in the original complaint. The court cites EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., affirming that the EEOC is not required to identify all potential claimants before filing a lawsuit. Consequently, the court rejects the defendants' motion to dismiss claimants Benedict, Josey, and Safara on procedural grounds.
The court then moves to the merits of the defendants' summary judgment motion, starting with reverse religious discrimination claims from claimants Benedict, Diaz, Honohan, Josey, Ontaneda, Pennisi, Pabon, and Pegullo. Disparate treatment claims under Title VII follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, requiring plaintiffs to establish a minimal prima facie case of discrimination. If successful, the burden shifts to the defendants to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions, after which the plaintiffs must prove that this reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.
Claimants must show that discrimination was a motivating factor in adverse employment actions, even if other lawful motives existed. A modified version of the McDonnell Douglas framework applies, where claimants must demonstrate that they were qualified for their positions, experienced adverse employment actions, and present additional evidence suggesting that these actions were motivated by their rejection of the employer's religious beliefs.
The Second Circuit establishes that the prima facie case requirement for proving qualification in employment discrimination cases is a low threshold. Claimants must demonstrate that they were qualified for their positions at the time of termination, which can be satisfied by showing possession of basic job skills. The act of hiring by the employer implies a belief in the employee’s minimal qualifications. It is clarified that satisfactory job performance is not a prerequisite for establishing qualification under Title VII; rather, basic eligibility suffices. Defendants' assertion that claimants needed to be satisfactorily performing their jobs at the time of termination is legally incorrect. The court finds that claimants were qualified based on evidence, including positive assessments and long tenures. Specifically, one claimant had received an exceptional performance review, while issues raised by the defendants regarding other claimants’ performance do not negate their qualifications. Furthermore, any alleged disobedience does not directly pertain to their basic qualifications. Overall, a reasonable jury could conclude that each claimant was qualified for her position. Additionally, claimants must show that they experienced an adverse employment action, defined as a materially adverse change in employment terms and conditions.
Materially adverse changes in employment include actions such as termination, demotion resulting in wage decreases, loss of benefits, reduced responsibilities, or other significant alterations specific to an employee's situation. Minor inconveniences or changes in job duties do not qualify as adverse actions. The defendants acknowledge that certain employees (Diaz, Honohan, Josey, Pegullo, and Pennisi) were terminated, which constitutes an adverse employment action. However, they argue that Benedict, Ontaneda, and Pabon did not experience adverse actions.
Benedict's case involves a dispute over whether she was terminated or voluntarily quit. She worked for the defendants from September 2011 until March 2012, initially allowed to work from home. After being transferred to work on a different project, she was told to relocate her family to Long Island, which she refused. Following her refusal, she was informed of her termination, creating a factual dispute regarding whether her departure constitutes an adverse employment action.
Ontaneda reports being moved from a private office to a less prestigious area, where she was required to perform tasks for which she had no training. This transfer could be viewed as an adverse employment action. Additionally, there is uncertainty about whether Ontaneda was terminated or resigned.
For Pabon, CCG indicated in their response to an unemployment claim that he was terminated, suggesting an adverse employment action. Overall, significant factual disputes exist regarding the employment statuses of Benedict and Ontaneda, raising questions about whether their experiences qualify as adverse employment actions.
Defendants indicated "misconduct discharge" as the reason for Pabon's separation on an unemployment form, leaving the "voluntarily quit" option blank. This raises the possibility that a reasonable jury may disagree with the defendants' assertion that Pabon resigned or abandoned her job. Each plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of having suffered an adverse employment action, which can infer discrimination based on various circumstances. These include derogatory comments about performance based on religious beliefs, preferential treatment towards employees who share the employer's beliefs, and the sequence of events leading to the adverse actions.
Benedict alleges her termination was due to her refusal to follow Jordan's religious directive to relocate and accept Jordan and Hodes as her family. Diaz, who initially participated in Onionhead, began to withdraw after uncomfortable spiritual practices and expressed her concerns about Jordan's teachings, which she labeled as cult-like. Following her disparaging remarks about Onionhead, she was terminated. Honohan resisted Jordan's teachings throughout her employment and was also terminated shortly after receiving a peculiar email from Jordan about astrological alignments. Josey, who initially engaged with Onionhead, felt pressured by Jordan's influence on employment decisions and described mandatory group meetings discussing personal issues, along with a highly personal meeting where Jordan advised her to leave her husband. These testimonies collectively suggest that the plaintiffs' adverse employment actions may have been motivated, at least partially, by religious discrimination.
Josey ceased participating in workplace spiritual activities and claims her termination followed this withdrawal. In July 2010, Ontaneda and Pennisi expressed their Catholic faith, stating they did not wish to engage with Onionhead, to Jordan and Levine, with no opposing evidence presented by the defendants, who dismissed the depositions as speculative. During their relocation to a shared workspace, Jordan allegedly made hostile remarks about "demons," again without defendant rebuttal. Ontaneda and Pennisi were terminated the month after voicing their objections at a meeting with Jordan and Levine. Pabon was terminated shortly after Jordan criticized her "insubordination" during a spiritually-themed company retreat, where Pabon opted out of certain activities. The defendants did not provide counter-evidence. Pegullo, initially part of the Onionhead group and recognized as "Employee of the Month," was also terminated after she shared an email from Jordan expressing a desire to remove Hodes, whom she accused of having demons. Pegullo had previously informed Hodes about her discomfort with Jordan's behavior. The plaintiffs' evidence suggests potential reverse religious discrimination, prompting the defendants to provide legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the terminations, including claims that Benedict did not fulfill her job requirement and Diaz allegedly lied about employment elsewhere.
Honohan’s employment ended due to the obsolescence of her data entry tasks following CCG’s transition to an electronic system and her refusal to upgrade her accounting skills or take on additional human resources responsibilities. Josey was terminated after Levine found she was not performing her job duties. Ontaneda and Pennisi's termination resulted from a joint decision to not report on the same day without adequate explanation. Pabon left her position after refusing constructive criticism regarding her behavior and indicating she would not address the concerns raised. Pegullo was terminated for sharing a personal email with multiple colleagues, which caused disruption in the office.
The court identified disputed material facts concerning the reasons behind the claimants' terminations, warranting further examination of potential pretext in the defendants' explanations. To avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs must provide evidence suggesting that religious discrimination influenced the adverse employment actions against them. Evidence presented by the claimants indicates sufficient grounds for a reasonable jury to infer that discrimination played a role in the terminations.
For instance, Benedict was allegedly terminated for refusing to comply with a requirement to work in the office, despite her successful telecommuting and the presence of other telecommuting employees. She claimed that upon resisting a directive to relocate, her work environment became hostile, culminating in a threat from Jordan regarding her unemployment application. Similarly, Diaz was reportedly terminated for lying about job training, while she contended her dismissal followed her expression of discomfort with Jordan's practices.
Jordan issued a $333 check to Diaz with “For Resurrection” noted in the memo line after Diaz's termination. Defendants argue that Honohan's role became obsolete and she declined new duties, while plaintiffs counter that her responsibilities were reassigned to another individual without increased complexity. Defendants assert Josey was terminated for incomplete work, but they lack evidence of any such work or related accounting errors. Although defendants claim Ontaneda and Pennisi were terminated for absenteeism, plaintiffs present evidence that another employee engaged in similar behavior was not terminated. Notably, Ontaneda and Pennisi were terminated shortly after opposing Onionhead. Defendants assert Pabon quit after rejecting criticism but previously informed the Department of Labor that she was terminated. They also confirm that Grace Durso was not terminated despite instances of insubordination. The defendants characterize Jordan’s emails as personal and claim Pegullo's sharing caused disruption, but it's unclear if Pegullo shared the email beyond Hodes and her supervisor. The court must evaluate the entire record rather than isolate individual pieces of evidence, as established in Friedman v. Swiss Re Am. Holding Corp., which emphasized the need to consider the overall context to determine potential discriminatory intent. A reasonable jury could view the defendants' explanations as pretextual. Furthermore, while defendants argue that Jordan's indirect role in terminations limits liability, precedents like Sattar v. Motorola, Inc. suggest that indirect involvement can still support claims of discrimination.
The court found that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a connection between her harasser and her termination, as there was no evidence that the individuals involved in her discharge had any animosity towards her or were influenced by the harasser. The plaintiff's claims sought to establish a level of involvement by Jordan in employment decisions similar to what was considered in the Sattar case, which could link a harasser's actions to a termination.
Jordan's involvement was highlighted through a memo expressing concerns about the plaintiff's behavior after a spa weekend, suggesting termination while also considering the perception of others involved. Testimony indicated that Jordan was a superior to Benedict and participated in discussions regarding terminations, further suggesting her influence over employment decisions. The court noted that a reasonable jury could conclude that Jordan had enough control over these decisions to attribute her motivations to the defendants, referencing the "cat's paw" theory, where a supervisor, manipulated by a subordinate with discriminatory motives, results in adverse employment actions.
The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the reverse religious discrimination claim. It also addressed the issue of timeliness for hostile work environment claims raised by several plaintiffs, where defendants argued these claims were time-barred. Plaintiffs countered that these claims were timely due to the continuing violation doctrine, which allows for exceptions if there is a pattern of ongoing discrimination. Generally, claims must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice unless continuous discrimination is demonstrated.
Under the continuing violation exception to Title VII's limitations period, timely filing of an EEOC charge regarding any discriminatory acts associated with an ongoing discriminatory policy allows all related claims to be considered timely, even if some would be untimely on their own (Chin v. Port Auth. of New York, 685 F.3d 135, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2012)). The doctrine is particularly significant in multi-plaintiff cases, as established by the Supreme Court in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, which affirmed that if any incident related to a continuing pattern of discrimination occurs within the limitations period, claims from multiple plaintiffs can be timely if they relate to the same conduct (455 U.S. 363, 381, 102 S.Ct. 1114 (1982)).
In this case, the earliest charges were filed by Ontaneda and Pennisi on June 7, 2011, within 300 days of their termination, alleging a "cult-like" workplace environment and retaliation for refusing to participate in religious activities. Their charges indicated a pattern of discriminatory practices, alerting defendants to potential Title VII claims from others. Defendants contend that since certain practices associated with "Onionhead" were not present during the tenures of other plaintiffs, a continuing violation cannot be established. However, Ontaneda and Pennisi's complaints explicitly referenced these practices.
Maldari, despite not hearing the terms "Onionhead" or "Harnessing Happiness" during her employment, described a similar work environment characterized by religious undertones, including prayer sessions, personal discussions, and directives from supervisors that mirrored the allegations made by Ontaneda and Pennisi. Her testimony detailed a workplace atmosphere replete with religious themes and personal intrusions, indicating a continuity of the alleged discriminatory environment.
Maldari testified that during a group meeting, she was emotionally affected by Jordan's probing questions about her personal life, including her children and ex-husband. Similarly, Safara recounted that Jordan sent spiritual texts via email, pressured her to pray at work, and discussed spirits, suggesting employees dim lights to appease them. The court found a significant connection between the practices described by both claimants and the hostile work environment outlined in the EEOC charge, determining that all claims were timely. The court referenced the precedent that allows for the consideration of the broader context of a hostile work environment, even if some behavior occurred outside the statutory time frame, as long as at least one act contributing to the hostile environment occurred within the period.
To establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that the workplace was pervaded by discriminatory intimidation that was severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions and that there is a basis for holding the employer liable. The plaintiff must demonstrate both an objective hostile environment and a subjective perception of hostility. The court emphasized that religious hostility must be directed at an individual due to their religion and clarified that reverse religious discrimination claims can be based on harassment not necessarily motivated by the harasser's or employee's religious beliefs. The evaluation of whether a workplace is hostile considers the totality of circumstances, including the frequency and severity of conduct, whether it is threatening or humiliating, and its impact on job performance and psychological well-being. While isolated incidents typically do not constitute a hostile work environment, a sufficiently severe single incident can.
A plaintiff must establish a specific basis for attributing the conduct that created a hostile work environment to their employer, particularly if the harassment was perpetrated by someone with supervisory authority. Employers are generally liable for harassment under Title VII unless an affirmative defense applies, which is unavailable if the harassment leads to tangible employment actions like discharge or demotion. The determination of whether a hostile work environment exists is a mixed question of law and fact, typically suited for jury evaluation, and summary judgment is appropriate only when no reasonable minds could differ.
In the current case, evidence suggests the environment may have been sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the employees' working conditions. Testimonies indicate that supervisors coerced employees into participating in Onionhead belief workshops, with some employees attending numerous mandatory sessions. Additionally, frequent religious practices, including mandatory prayer and rituals involving cleansing the workplace with sage and incense, were reported. Employees were expected to engage in physical displays of affection and chant in group settings, highlighting a pervasive atmosphere dictated by these practices.
Claimants reported discomfort and deemed certain workplace practices inappropriate and religious in nature, highlighting the regular use of pins and candles and an emphasis on personal feelings. Several employees testified to negative impacts on their psychological well-being, noting instances of emotional distress after meetings, such as crying. Observations included Ontaneda witnessing individuals leaving meetings in tears, and Maldari recounting a personal experience of distress during a meeting with probing questions. Pegullo expressed feelings of depression linked to the influence of Denali, while Josey mentioned crying during workshops.
The court must assess the totality of the circumstances to determine if a reasonable jury could find the work environment hostile. Evidence of harassment does not need to be directed at a specific plaintiff to be relevant, as highlighted by case law. There is sufficient evidence suggesting that the workplace was rife with discriminatory intimidation, warranting a jury's consideration.
Regarding liability, the court notes that employers are typically liable for harassment by supervisors, though an affirmative defense might apply in certain cases. A supervisor is defined as someone who can significantly alter an employee’s status. It is acknowledged that Bourandas, Levine, and Hodes were supervisors, while the status of Jordan as a supervisor is contested, although he displayed some supervisory characteristics.
A corporate hierarchy chart indicates a four-tier structure with Hodes at the top, Bourandas and Jordan in the second tier, and nine supervisors, including Levine, in the third tier. Levine stated she sought guidance from Bourandas, Jordan, or other managers for difficult decisions, although she did not view Jordan as a manager. Honohan testified that Jordan directed employees to bring complaints to him instead of Hodes. Employees, including Benedict, reported receiving direction from Jordan, who warned her of termination if she did not relocate to Long Island. Jordan also had the authority to reassign Benedict’s duties. There is a factual dispute about whether Jordan meets the Title VII definition of a supervisor, as established in relevant case law. The employer can avoid liability for harassment by a supervisor if it can demonstrate reasonable care in preventing and addressing harassment and that the employee did not take advantage of corrective measures provided. Defendants failed to produce evidence of a written anti-harassment policy before August 2011, which undermines their Faragher/Ellerth defense. Additionally, it is undisputed that the defendants did not provide training for supervisors or human resources on discrimination issues.
The court is unable to determine whether the defendants exercised reasonable care to prevent harassment by a supervisor, which is essential for the Faragher/Burlington affirmative defense. Consequently, genuine disputes of material fact exist, preventing summary judgment on hostile work environment claims related to reverse religious discrimination.
The court then examines conventional religious discrimination and retaliation claims asserted by the claimants, who argue they faced discrimination based on their own sincerely held religious beliefs, distinct from adherence to Onionhead beliefs. The claimants present four types of claims: 1) Claims of religious discrimination based on their beliefs; 2) Claims of a hostile work environment due to their beliefs; 3) Claims of failure to accommodate their religious beliefs; 4) Retaliation claims following protected activities.
The court concludes that, except for one claimant (Pennisi), no reasonable jury could find discrimination based on the claimants' personal religious beliefs. It emphasizes the necessity of assessing the totality of the circumstances rather than isolating individual pieces of evidence. For all claims, the claimants must demonstrate a causal link between their beliefs and the alleged discrimination or retaliation. Under Title VII, employers cannot discriminate against individuals based on their religion, and for retaliation claims, the claimants must establish that their protected activities were the but-for cause of their terminations. The claimants' arguments for their conventional claims largely rely on the same evidence presented for their reverse religious discrimination claims.
Claimants, with the exception of Pennisi, have not established a sufficient evidentiary connection between their personal religious beliefs or their absence and the alleged discrimination and retaliation to survive summary judgment. The deposition testimonies reveal that most claimants did not claim discrimination or retaliation based on their beliefs.
1. Diaz identified as Catholic but stated she was not directly discouraged from her faith, though she perceived pressure to adopt others' beliefs.
2. Benedict expressed no adherence to any religion and did not request workplace accommodations related to religious beliefs.
3. Honohan reported no issues with colleagues regarding her Catholicism.
4. Josey did not discuss her Christianity with coworkers and was unaware of any requests for religious accommodations.
5. Maldari, also Catholic, stated she was never criticized for her beliefs.
6. Ontaneda confirmed no issues regarding his Catholic practices and felt accommodated.
7. Pabon indicated she was raised without religion and currently practices none, yet no evidence was provided to suggest discrimination or retaliation related to her beliefs.
Overall, the claimants' testimonies do not support their claims of discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, which protects against religious conformity requirements.
Pegullo Pegullo testified that she does not practice religion and does not identify as spiritual, though she holds personal beliefs. However, there is no evidence indicating that she faced termination or retaliation based on these beliefs. Safara also stated she did not believe she was discriminated against due to her Lutheran background, suggesting that the claims about religious treatment at UHP were not substantiated. With the exception of Pennisi, no other claimants provided evidence of differential treatment or retaliation related to their beliefs.
Pennisi, in contrast, claims discrimination and retaliation based on her strong Catholic beliefs, presenting four allegations: failure to accommodate, retaliation, disparate treatment, and hostile work environment. Her failure to accommodate claim is unsubstantiated as she admitted to not requesting any accommodations for her religious beliefs. Any claims regarding an accommodation request made during a July 2010 manager's meeting are time-barred, given that they were made over 300 days before she filed her charges with the EEOC in June 2011.
Regarding retaliation, to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate engagement in protected activity, employer awareness of that activity, suffering of adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the two. Pennisi’s claims and the procedural requirements for establishing her allegations under Title VII are addressed in detail, highlighting deficiencies in her arguments.
Pennisi engaged in protected activity by expressing her religious concerns about Onionhead beliefs conflicting with her Catholicism during a July 2010 meeting, which the defendants were aware of. Her termination, claimed to have occurred in August 2010, approximately one month after her complaint, may constitute retaliation. The case references precedents establishing that a one-month interval between protected activity and adverse action can support a prima facie retaliation claim. A reasonable jury could find the defendants’ justification for her termination to be pretextual, suggesting retaliation based on her religious beliefs.
Additionally, to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must show they held a conflicting religious belief, informed their employer, and faced disciplinary action. Pennisi asserted that Onionhead activities were perceived as mandatory and that she informed her employer about the conflict with her Catholicism, yet was terminated shortly after. While defendants claimed her termination was due to absenteeism, a jury could view this rationale as pretextual.
Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the necessary elements include showing that the conduct was objectively severe or pervasive, subjectively perceived as hostile, and that it was due to a protected characteristic. Pennisi's claim is insufficient as she fails to demonstrate that her work environment was hostile due to her religion, despite informing the defendants of her Catholic identity prior to her termination.
Jordan was largely absent between the July 2010 meeting and the alleged August 2010 termination of Pennisi. Consequently, most allegations supporting Pennisi’s hostile work environment claim occurred prior to the defendants’ knowledge of her religion. Pennisi failed to demonstrate that she experienced a hostile work environment due to her religion during the brief period following the defendants' awareness. However, her reverse hostile work environment claim can proceed, as it does not rely on the defendants' knowledge of her Catholic beliefs.
The court granted the claimants’ motion for partial summary judgment and ruled on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment as follows:
1. Denied for reverse religious discrimination claims by Benedict, Diaz, Hono-han, Josey, Ontaneda, Pennisi, Pa-bon, and Pegullo.
2. Denied for hostile work environment claims based on reverse religious discrimination for all claimants.
3. Denied regarding Pennisi's disparate treatment and retaliation claims linked to her Catholicism but granted concerning her hostile work environment and failure to accommodate claims related to her Catholicism.
4. Granted against all other claimants regarding allegations of discrimination based on religious beliefs or lack thereof.
The parties are instructed to submit a joint letter to the court to indicate their trial readiness within seven days. The document also notes the involvement of certain plaintiffs-intervenors and references various filings made by both parties in relation to the case.
Defendants’ reply supports their motion for summary judgment and opposes plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. CCG is a holding company that includes UHP and other entities, with all claimants employed by CCG or its subsidiaries. The court collectively refers to these entities as "defendants" or "CCG" for simplicity, as the distinctions are largely irrelevant to the case. Jordan founded Onionhead in 1990, which became a non-profit in 2011, and also co-founded Harnessing Happiness as a non-profit. There is a dispute over the current activity status of Harnessing Happiness. Defendants provided administrative and financial support to both organizations. The events central to the case occurred between 2007 and 2012, involving both Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness, referred to collectively unless differentiation is necessary.
Defendants argue that Jordan was a consultant, while plaintiffs claim she was an employee and supervisor. Defendants dispute the occurrence of several practices mentioned in the claims but must have facts viewed in favor of the claimants during the summary judgment resolution. They also raise boilerplate objections to claimants' testimonies, including hearsay claims regarding statements about "demons" in the workplace, arguing these are not offered for their truth.
Plaintiff-intervenors Ontaneda, Pennisi, and Pabon assert claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). Since the analysis standard for NYSHRL claims aligns with that of Title VII claims, the court does not analyze them separately. The court cites precedent indicating that deeply held moral or ethical beliefs can qualify as religious beliefs for exemption from military service. EEOC guidelines are noted to receive judicial deference as they provide informed judgment relevant to the case.
The First Amendment includes the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government favoritism towards any religion, and the Free Exercise Clause, which protects religious beliefs and practices from government suppression. Senator Jennings Randolph clarified during debates on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that "religion" encompasses both beliefs and conduct. Courts often reference the Free Exercise Clause to define "religion" in Title VII cases. A key issue arises regarding whether an employer's beliefs must be "sincerely held" for a reverse religious discrimination claim under Title VII. Traditionally, requiring a plaintiff to prove the sincerity of their beliefs is reasonable to prevent misuse of religious claims. However, imposing the same burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate the sincerity of an employer’s beliefs may create an undue obstacle, especially when the employer's beliefs are nontraditional and contested. Unlike in First Amendment Establishment Clause cases, where proof of sincerity is not required from government actors, a broader interpretation of "religion" is more suitable in Title VII claims. This broader definition aligns with Title VII's remedial goals and does not raise the same concerns as it would in government contexts.
The excerpt highlights several legal principles surrounding workplace discrimination, particularly in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It cites **Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC**, emphasizing the EEOC's duty to eliminate unlawful workplace discrimination and referencing **EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers Inc.**, which underscores the purpose of Title VII in eradicating discrimination. It notes that only two cases in the circuit have relied on a narrow Third Circuit definition of religion, with one affirmed on different grounds and another reversed in part.
The term "grail" is defined with religious significance, as described by Webster's dictionary. Testimonies from claimants indicate that "Keys and Codes" workshops were held at the workplace. The excerpt discusses the Second Circuit's treatment of **CRST** in relation to **Sterling Jewelers**, where the court found the EEOC's investigation adequate despite interviewing only one of 19 claimants, as it uncovered critical company-wide policies and documents.
Although defendants argue that **Sterling Jewelers** is distinguishable because it involved nationwide claims under Section 707, the excerpt clarifies that the case involved both Sections 706 and 707. It further explains that in reverse religious discrimination cases, plaintiffs do not need to prove membership in a "protected class," as the discrimination arises from the employer's religious beliefs opposing those of the plaintiff. Finally, it mentions the employment policies in effect at the time of a termination that included insubordination and disrespect as grounds for dismissal, alongside an anecdote about an employer requesting pictures of employees' children to display.
Plaintiffs contend that Maldari and Safara cannot rely on Ontaneda's and Pennisi’s charges due to their employment with UHP/CCG ending in 2008, which is over 300 days prior to filing. However, the continuing violation doctrine allows for claims to be timely if they relate to a persistent discriminatory policy, even if specific acts would otherwise be untimely. Defendants incorrectly assert that participation in OH and HH workshops was "indisputably" voluntary, which misrepresents the evidence. Additionally, while defendants claim Jordan did not influence termination decisions, her recommendation for counseling indicates her involvement in that process. The court notes that no claims for failure to accommodate or retaliation under reverse religious discrimination have been raised. Although Pennisi requested Good Friday off, which was granted, the court does not need to evaluate the second requirement from Baker following the ruling in EEOC v. Abercrombie, as Pennisi testified she communicated her Catholicism to Jordan.
