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Rivera-Muoz v. Shinseki

Citations: 212 F. Supp. 3d 306; 2016 WL 7646363Docket: Civil No. 13-1302 (SEC)

Court: District Court, D. Puerto Rico; March 15, 2016; Federal District Court

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A motion for summary judgment filed by Eric Shinseki, Secretary for Veterans Affairs, has been granted by Senior District Judge Salvador E. Casellas. The case involves Rivera, a former health technician at the VA Caribbean Health System, who suffered a stroke on November 10, 2010, and was unable to return to work. Rivera remained on leave until his termination on July 14, 2012, after spending time hospitalized and resting at home. Although Rivera applied for disability benefits on April 12, 2012, he faced barriers, as the VA required his case to be reviewed by Dr. Oscar Cardona Ramirez, who ultimately confirmed his disability. Rivera’s complaints include that he could have applied for benefits earlier had the VA accepted a medical certificate from his doctor. After receiving a termination letter from the VA on May 15, 2012, Rivera filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, which was unsuccessful, leading to this lawsuit.

The standard for summary judgment requires the movant to demonstrate no genuine dispute exists regarding material facts, and the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present competent evidence to counter the motion. Courts do not weigh evidence at this stage but must interpret the record favorably for the nonmovant, who cannot rely on mere allegations or speculative arguments to avoid summary judgment.

The Complaint presents two claims for relief against the Defendant. First, the Plaintiffs allege a violation of the Federal Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.), asserting that Rivera was "humiliated" due to his disability and wrongfully terminated before his disability benefits request could be processed. Second, they claim the Defendant disclosed Rivera's private medical information, violating HIPAA and certain VA regulations, constituting a "per se tort violation" actionable under Puerto Rico’s Article 1802 of the Civil Code. 

The Defendant seeks summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim, arguing that the Plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC prior to filing their lawsuit and failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. The Court addresses the Plaintiffs' argument that the Rehabilitation Act does not necessitate exhausting Title VII administrative remedies, indicating that the claim likely falls under 29 U.S.C. § 794, which prohibits denying federal benefits due to disability. The First Circuit's precedent suggests that claims under § 794 are subject to Title VI procedural requirements, which differ from Title VII. However, other circuits require federal employees to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit under the Rehabilitation Act, and the First Circuit has indicated it would likely adopt this stance.

The Court clarifies that while Title VII's exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, it operates similarly to a statute of limitations and may be subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling, albeit with a significant burden on the plaintiff to establish entitlement to such tolling. The EEOC mandates that an aggrieved employee must initiate informal consultation within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory action as part of the grievance process.

An employee has 15 days from the conclusion of counseling to file a formal complaint with the EEOC, as stipulated in 29 C.F.R. 1614.106(b). Rivera's case was dismissed by the EEOC for failing to meet this deadline. The EEOC is mandated to dismiss complaints that do not adhere to these time limits, and courts consistently uphold this dismissal unless a valid tolling argument is presented. Failure to comply with the deadlines results in barring plaintiffs from pursuing claims in federal court, as demonstrated in various case law, including Belgrave v. Pena and Leorna v. U.S. Dep’t of State. The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to allow the EEOC to investigate and mediate disputes effectively. Rivera had actual knowledge of the 15-day deadline after being notified by the EEOC that informal counseling had concluded, yet he filed his formal complaint months late. His inability to exhaust administrative remedies led to the dismissal of his claims. Although plaintiffs argue that the deadline does not apply to Rivera since he was not a unionized employee, this argument is flawed as it misinterprets relevant case law. The EEOC regulations explicitly impose the 15-day deadline on all employees, countering the plaintiffs' claims.

Under EEOC regulations, employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement must choose to raise discrimination allegations either through the negotiated grievance procedure or under 29 C.F.R. 1614, but not both. If no applicable collective bargaining agreement exists, the employee must file a complaint within 15 days as specified in 29 U.S.C. 1614. Rivera's failure to file within this timeline is highlighted. Plaintiffs argue that the EEOC's issuance of a right-to-sue letter renders the timeliness defense moot, citing a case where a government was judicially estopped from contradicting its negotiated settlement. However, the court finds that Plaintiffs fail to provide authority supporting their claims that the EEOC cannot assert a defense of untimeliness based on the right-to-sue letter. Established case law indicates that agencies do not waive the defense of untimely exhaustion simply by accepting a complaint. The court concludes that Plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies regarding their Rehabilitation Act claim, which is dismissed. However, their tort claims related to HIPAA and VA regulations remain viable, prompting the court to order further briefing on those claims within 21 days. Additionally, the Plaintiffs' argument regarding the applicability of the 15-day deadline lacks substantiation, leaving the court uncertain about any alternative deadlines, which raises concerns about the efficiency of the EEOC's procedures.